Special Issue

CULTURAL STUDIES IN AOTEAROA

SPECIAL ISSUE: CULTURAL STUDIES IN AOTEAROA

BOOK REVIEWS

CONFERENCE REVIEW

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Scum !

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Editorial

It has been some years since cultural studies could be conceived of as 'cutting edge' – Grossberg, Nelson, and Treichler (1992) announced an unprecedented international cultural studies boom ten years ago. However, in this country, cultural studies never really attained the status it did in Britain, America, or Australia, and perhaps even the limited progress it did make is now looking threatened. Indeed, the idea of the present issue was sparked by rumours of the imminent demise of the journal *SITES*. For us, *SITES* seemed an important instance of left cultural critique, which combined some of the best contemporary intellectual resources available with reflections upon Aotearoa/New Zealand's unique social formation. We were disappointed about the approaching loss of such a significant and long-standing project of situated cultural analysis and critique. As we were putting this issue together, it became clear that many others were concerned at the prospect of a disestablished *SITES*, a concern that has since led to a change of institutional base for the journal. Nevertheless, the initial uncertainty had made us interested in what had become of cultural studies in this country since those early years when the *SITES* project had been first conceived.

In this way, we decided to put together a special issue of *New Zealand Sociology* that would investigate cultural studies in Aotearoa/New Zealand, past and present. To this end, articles and commentary pieces were solicited from people doing important work in cultural studies in this country. Our intention, it should be noted, was never to cover the full range of perspectives and approaches represented in this country – an impossible task given the limited time and hard copy space at our disposal. Nor, for similar reasons, did we attempt to develop an authoritative story of the significant developmental features and intellectual figures doing such work here.

Cultural studies is, in any case, pretty difficult to 'properly' represent. Storey (1996) points to the diversity of replies to questions about its objects of study, its basic assumptions and underlying methods, and its historical formation. Similarly, Hall (1992)

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underscores the unevenness of development of, and significant breaks within, cultural studies, which "always was a set of unstable formations" (p. 278). And, as Grossberg *et al.* (1992) note, cultural studies will remain open to change and development: "No one can hope to control these developments" (p. 3). A mix of Marxism, culturalism, structuralism, post-structuralism, psychoanalysis, post-modernism, and feminism, with important interventions from a number of marginalised groups, there can be no reasonable hope for a programmatic cultural studies approach. And as the first editorial of the *European Journal of Cultural Studies* contends, this openness and contestation is, perhaps, cultural studies' "greatest quality." This openness is signalled by the various attempts to define cultural studies. For instance –

> Cultural studies is a plural field of contesting perspectives which through the production of theory has sought to intervene in cultural politics. Cultural studies explores culture as signifying practices in the context of social power ... Cultural studies is an interdisciplinary or post-disciplinary field of inquiry which explores the production and inculcation of maps of meaning ... Cultural studies is an exciting and fluid project which tells us stories about our changing world in the hope that we can improve it (Barker, 2000, p. 34).

> [Cultural studies is a] ... new academic discipline dealing with a broad range of different types of texts for what they can tell us about the ways in which meanings, identities, and values are produced and reproduced in the world. Cultural studies is particularly interested in the political meaning of culture, dealing with issues such as gender, sexuality, ethnicity, class, technology, nationality, and so on. In contrast to the 'older' humanities, such as English studies, it is these theoretical and political issues that matter to cultural studies, rather than the value of the particular texts studied (Fuery and Mansfield, 2000, pp. 205-6).

Despite their expansiveness, these definitions point to a couple of central issues in cultural studies. Both quotations accent the political and ideological dimensions of the cultural studies endeavour. Cultural studies has long been in dialogue with the political concerns of Marxism, feminism, post-colonialism, and post-modernism. The

role of the intellectual is vital here, as cultural studies has been, and still is, practiced by and associated with those university-based thinkers committed to progressive social change. The definitions also draw attention to the question of the relationship between cultural studies and other disciplines, and to the issue of whether cultural studies should be considered disciplinary, inter-disciplinary, or post-disciplinary. Relatedly, there have been serious questions raised about whether cultural studies should be institutionalised within the modernist University. The above themes come to the fore in the present collection, where significant concerns include approaches to cultural critique, the place and politics of progressive intellectuals, the specificity and universality of the conceptual tools to be used, and problems associated with the institutionalisation of cultural studies.

The first two articles illustrate contrasting political and theoretical orientations within the study of culture. Peter Beilharz contends that we are at risk of making culture 'prosthetic' in the substitutional rather than practical sense, privileging culture's artefacts, and fetishising theory and its tribal languages. For Mitchell Dean, on the other hand, progressive politics found a necessary theoretical tool box in Foucauldian genealogy, for the analysis of the singularities of the present. The seditious mood of genealogy, Dean contends, destabilizes foundations and takes a modest, cautious approach to intellectual intervention and ambitions.

In an earlier issue of *New Zealand Sociology*, which focussed on the state of sociology in New Zealand, an 'exchange' between Michael Pickering and Gregor McLennan was concerned with the question of the specificity of the frameworks and tools of cultural studies. It is unsurprising to see this question so central in this issue, given the politics at stake in the cultural studies endeavour. Michael Peters has long been involved in deploying Lyotardian post-structuralist concepts in and around issues of university futures, intellectual work, and education within the context of Aotearoa/ New Zealand. In the present piece, Peters notes the absence in this country of an institutionalised cultural studies in the Birmingham mould, and he traces the movement from structuralist to post-structuralist approaches to cultural studies, accenting, in particular,

the arrival at *différance*. For Peters, the way ahead is a post-Nietzschean cultural studies, one that is critical of liberal humanism, Enlightenment values, binary oppositions, the scientific pretensions of sociological practice, and the notion of a self-contained and transparent subject. In their responses to Peters, Avril Bell and Katie Pickles both question the fit in the Aotearoa/New Zealand context of the categories Peters utilises. Bell notes the specificities of settler and indigenous cultures, against the categories of Northern hemisphere conceptualisations, and she emphasises the importance of retaining a sense of the dynamism in identities and relations between Pakeha and Maori. Similarly, Pickles questions the relevance of theories from 'there' for 'here' and points to some contemporary examples of significant indigenous cultural studies work.

Alex Calder's contribution develops this questioning of what makes for a good local cultural studies. He notes that the lack of a cultural studies boom here, as experienced elsewhere, has been accompanied by an absence of rigorous interrogation of imported theory and a scarcity of projects that provide "a sustained critical engagement with regimes of representation", an engagement which is necessary for understanding the exercise of contemporary power relations. Suggesting that cultural studies and debates in this country have been largely idiosyncratic, Calder examines his own involvement in the cultural studies scene in this country, reflecting, notably, upon his recent contribution to the project of settlement studies, an important attempt at developing a theoretically informed and locally situated cultural studies of Aotearoa/New Zealand. Steven Turner extends Calder's, Bell's, and Pickles' comments on the need to build local critical cultural studies, warning against 'Cargo-Cultural Studies' – the worship and deployment of the theoretical object that has fallen from the skies. Turner importantly calls for work that reflects "a genuine intellectual and critical impulse", work that develops through reference to the local and generates self-reflexive ways of thinking that are appropriate to the culture being studied. He warns that such work is becoming difficult to conceive of due to the increasingly neo-corporatised structural conditions of academic life (the development of World-Excellent

Universities modelled upon the go-getting private enterprise), which are working against criticism and self-reflection.

Roy Shuker's reflection on the history of *SITES*, based upon his close involvement with the project, provides another valuable examination of the changing terrain of cultural studies. And, again, the same tensions between local and international emerge. In fact, Shuker cites as his central theme, "what happens to cultural theory and practice as it migrates between nations and is recreated in new institutional and national contexts". Cultural studies at Massey focused closely on Birmingham, for a number of reasons, not least of which was identification with the political project of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies. Shuker reflects upon this focus but also traces the more general movement towards a cultural studies of Aotearoa/New Zealand. Rosemary Du Plessis' piece compares some of the issues raised by Shuker's reflections on *SITES* with the recent institutionalisation of cultural studies at Canterbury University, a process that she has been closely involved with. Her article discusses the main reasoning, dynamics, and form of this institutionalisation, and highlights some of the opportunities and problems this may have for the effective teaching of cultural studies.

A key participant in the Massey cultural studies scene, Brennon Wood brings Weberian sociology face to face with cultural studies. Both are sociologies of action; both look at the way in which domination is aligned with meaning; and both, Wood contends, can be tentative before the necessary task of cultural evaluation and judgement. Against these failings, Wood argues the need for analyses of rule, and he underscores the importance of human cooperation. In response, Nick Perry argues that Wood places cultural studies as the junior partner to a seemingly more mature and pressing political-economy critique of the transnational ruling class. For Perry, it is important to attend to "some altogether more modest questions" about the cultural meanings that lie within and between the apparently grander projects of sociological analysis. Similarly, Lloyd argues that Wood's call for an analysis that speaks directly to issues of social inequality and human solidarity may mean that we miss important insights within what are considered the more mundane practices of everyday life.

As already noted, we do not intend that this issue provide an authoritative account of cultural studies in Aotearoa/New Zealand. We do, however, believe that the contributions assembled here offer a set of frequently insightful and provocative reflections on cultural studies in this country. Our hope is that they will promote critical reflection and positive dialogue on the shape and future of progressive cultural studies in this country. On this note, we wish you a stimulating read.

Chamsy el-Ojeili and Lincoln Dahlberg

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The prosthetic fetish – Worlds we are losing

Peter Beilharz

In America, they call it Theory, a fetish category if ever there was one. In the United Kingdom and the antipodes, more often it is Cultural Studies, or even Cultural Theory. Aligned with Sociology, there is Sociological Theory, especially in America, though Cultural Sociology also drifts closer to Social Theory. And then there is anthropology, where it arguably began. However the distinctions are worked, though, however the bookshop shelves are organised, cultural analysis into the new century remains dominated by two signs or images, the voice and the eye. The linguistic turn, if you like, dominated the modern moment; the visual regime of modernity is more readily associated with what we have come to know as the postmodern, virtual reality, the image writ large. Words and images dominate western intellectual life and permeate our cultures. Is that all there is?

At the end of the twentieth century, the result seems reasonably clear: we are good at doing representations. Americanism looms large in global culture: even if Fordism is broke, Hollywood and the rock music machine persist. We are good at video hits, and at interpreting them. From semiology or semiotics through structuralism and after, give us a message or an icon and we can decipher it, no trouble. If in doubt, call in a semiologist.

Perhaps it is difficult to do other than this. As Freud put it, culture is prosthetic, it bridges and controls our worlds. Problem is that we really become captives of culture, not only its creators, and I do not mean this in the dominant ideology sense. My worry, rather, is that culture becomes a substitute for those worlds, that we know about representations of poverty but do not know about the worlds of poverty that actually existing, suffering humans inhabit and experience, in Rio, in Melbourne or in South Auckland. The culture game is in this sense circular, self-enclosing or absorbing; the prosthetic becomes the world, the theory freshly published and duly authorised becomes privileged over its object; we can explain the dominant categories of the appropriate vocabularies as though we

are dealing with things far more fundamental, like putting food on the table, or loving or grieving, often in silence, no words, no reliance on the televisual or filmic image necessary.

Yet ways of seeing rule, and they often seem mechanical, constraining, a substitution for something else. This is what happens when, say, in Australia, somebody makes the claim of a landscape – an interpretation – that it looks like a painting by Fred Williams. To which the comeback is apparent: no, Fred Williams looks like a landscape; but notice as well, what he leaves out, for example, in the famous Pilbara paintings where there are no proletarians, no prostitutes, no dirt, no sluice, no shit. Surely it is appropriate for humans to connect, say painting to landscape to geography. But what do we know, here, of geography, or of the human activity which makes it?

And as some ways of seeing rule, so too do the authorized vocabularies of speaking, or naming. Not enough to observe the fact or principle of difference, no! "you mean differance!", and so the homeless become nomads, heterologies rule, politics is reinvented as governmentality though it seems to mean the same thing, etcetera. Again, it is easier here to deal with culture as prosthetic, though intellectual fashion or habit then makes a fetish of that prosthetic realm, so that the right to speak is identified with the capacity to work the vocabulary, to speak the tongue, and the idea of engagement of any kind, with any thing, becomes incidental.

ow could we begin to explain this to the proverbial visiting martian? I don't know, but I'm sure it would look ridiculous from the outside, this incredible industry of simulacra, this vain if powerful attempt to keep these worlds out via prosthetic fetish, where world becomes discourse, and discourse becomes that which is authorised by academic authority and influence, where Anaheim and Orlando become more politically significant than what happens under the border, where Zizek becomes more significant than Hitchcock, let alone Hollywood as a place, a mode of production, a site of life as well as a mode of consumption.

If we turn to look at this in a more practical, or methodological perspective, the problem might be rendered thus. When it comes to making sense of culture, the activity more than the artifacts, we have

since the postwar period been struggling with the Nosferatu of Theory. It took a long time for folks dealing with culture to realise that theory mattered. Only theory, too, is an activity, not a thing. It is as though we have registered the centrality of theory, only to stop there, in worship of another fetish. Theory becomes identified with authorised Theorist and subsequently with a set lexicon of authorised language which in turn confers the right to speak. Theory-work is tribal, or else, if you prefer, narrowly professional. I think we need to do this differently, to learn theory in order practically to 'forget' it, not to wear it as an iron cloak. Theory, as Marx says of labour, disappears into the product of intellectual activity. It ought to enable, to work as a prosthetic in the practical rather than substitutional sense.

The world is not a text. Seeing is not identical with interpretation. Ours ought, I think, be the work of interpreting all kind of worlds, including those behind or alongside the images, not least because the singular, acontextual interpretation of representations always runs the risk of accepting the self-images of society. Humans make symbols, but they also make lives, share together the necessary cycles of material life and suffer differentially in the process. Perhaps we need to push the dominant western intellectual conception of culture away to some distance in order to take stock of this, to put the big books and their authors back, into our work – read them, and back on the shelf – to revisit both common sense and that good sense which has no particular academic credentials.

Ken Wark recently confessed in the *Australian's Review of Books* that he had made a new discovery. French theory did not explain America. To which we could only respond with the innocent, we should have expected this? Walk the streets, leave de Certeau at home, work the senses, trust intuition and the accumulated theoretical wisdom in our cultures. Get out of Manhattan, leave Seinfeld's apartment, step outside the magic circle, look for cultural difference as well as anthropological similarity. Even the most painful worlds, third as first, can expand rather than close the horizons of possibility.

Genealogy as cultural studies: An interview with Mitchell Dean

Mitchell Dean is Professor of Sociology at Macquarie University, Australia. His publications include the books, *The Constitution of Poverty* (1991), *Critical and Effective Histories* (1994), *Governing Australia* (1998, edited with Barry Hindess), *Governmentality* (1999) and *Governing Societies* (forthcoming). The following interview was conducted by Lincoln Dahlberg and Chamsy el-Ojeili between January and May 2001 by e-mail.

Question
Professor Dean, could you begin by saying a word or two about the way in which the development of cultural studies over the last couple of decades has influenced, or intersected with, your work.

Mitchell Dean
This is, of course, a huge question. 'Cultural studies' itself is an immense black box, as 'actor network theory' would put it, into which all sorts of discursive constructions, intellectual practices, and pedagogic devices can be placed. I would want to distinguish between cultural studies as a discipline as it is now taught quite widely in universities (at least in Australia) and cultural studies as a certain type of ethos that raised certain theoretical problems during and after the beginning of the end of a certain kind of Marxist hegemony over leftish intellectuals from the late 1970s. Cultural studies of the first type has had little influence upon me. As a discipline, it remains, it would seem, in the permanently arrested phase of an eclectic borrowing of a set of theoretical resources from elsewhere. The kinds of books this discipline seems to produce are often simply introductions to various thinkers and schools. Of course the type of things they cover have more or less influenced me like anyone else, but I would not identify them with a single discipline.

Cultural studies of the second type intersect with my work quite strongly. In a sense, both cultural studies and the style of work I have tended to do – let us call it 'genealogy' – started (or restarted) in the late 1970s from the question of 'relative autonomy', a term of

Althusser's that sought to address the question of the relation of law, politics, culture and ideology to the material foundation of society. Thinkers such as Stuart Hall, and the Birmingham School, tended to answer this question in ways which would allow the existence of a field of study of culture, ideologies, subcultures, and so on, with a large measure of freedom but somehow managed to hold onto the Marxist narrative. Others, I am thinking of Paul Hirst and Barry Hindess and their colleagues, drew the conclusion of the incoherence of the Marxist account of social structure and announced, to my generation, that critical analysis of the Left was something of an open field. Genealogy, of the kind practiced by Foucault and his colleagues, was important because it provides a kind of analysis that retained political concerns – captured in the phrase, the "history of the present" – but also the critical toolbox to call into question and to displace much of the Marxist political economic and other dominant narratives of modernisation. So, in about 1979-1980, I became convinced that we must find ways of displacing dominant social-structural narratives, of showing how questions of knowledge and rationality, and power and government, were imbricated within societal dynamics at least as much as capital, class, technologies, modes of production, and so on. Indeed, as I sought of show in *The Constitution of Poverty*, the book that came out of the research which followed this, liberal modalities of government of poverty could be understood to have created the conditions for the emergence of things such as capitalist labour-markets, contemporary ideas of worker and dependant, and notions of individual responsibility. While traditional sociology had been caught in a kind of binary between political economic understandings of capitalism and modernity, on the one hand, or cultural or ideological ones derived however fairly from Max Weber, on the other (the Protestant Ethic thesis), I sought to show that relatively minor practices, often codified and guided quite explicitly by certain knowledges (political economy, administrative discourses) were crucial to the formation of the forms of life which we now take for granted. One did not have to look for deeply secretive processes (the primitive accumulation of capital) or somewhat mysterious ones (religious ethics, etc). One could instead follow the connection

between theoretical knowledge, political program, administrative practices and reform, and technologies of government to show how the poor and the marginal were governed was as crucial as anything else. In short, the Foucauldian moment announced the end of the distinction between political and cultural superstructure and economic base.

I am sorry for so long a detour. But I think this illustrates my point quite well and allows me to make a further one. It confirms that cultural studies, and this genealogical project, started – at least in Britain and, I think, Australia – from a common problem of the displacement of the Marxist social structural framework. My second point would be: where cultural studies then moved to a theory of signification, the text, and the subject, this genealogy was concerned with the analytics of truth, of practices, and of the self. Of central importance was the approach to the subject. When you try to discuss how meaning is generated in a text, you ultimately refer back to a theory of the subject, even if it is to displace the sovereign subject with something else. Much of cultural studies seems to be still working through this problem. The genealogical move allowed us to avoid this kind of philosophical conundrum altogether. It was to 'bracket off' the question of "who are we" and to be more concerned with how we have come to understand ourselves and others in certain ways. The hypothesis being that this was the outcome of the practices by which we are governed, and by which we govern ourselves and others, and the forms of truth that codify these practices and prescribe their reformation.

Question
Many of those who see themselves as working within cultural studies continue to draw upon neo-Marxist traditions while attempting to go beyond some of the problems that are associated with older structuralist approaches. Here we are thinking of those who are extending the critical theory of the Frankfurt School and Gramscian analysis. What are some of the significant 'advances' or simply differences (philosophical, methodological, ethical, political) of the genealogical approach over such neo-Marxist-inspired cultural studies? What key elements, if any, does genealogy share with or retain from these neo-Marxist approaches?

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Mitchell Dean

In the past, in my enthusiasm to argue for this genealogy, I have perhaps overstated the differences between it and the kinds of critical theory you mention. There is a sense that what we are talking about are various contributions to a common European theoretical project with more than a passing set of family resemblances. There are a common set of 'classical' references: Kant, Nietzsche, Weber, as well as, of course, Marx, who is nowadays somewhat more in the background, even or especially among Marxists! There are common themes however differently assembled: the role of science and rationality; the question of power and domination, and resistance and struggle; issues of the self and identity, of individual and collective. I would say that what distinguishes the kind of social, cultural and political theory we are talking about from traditional questions of philosophy – that involve the universal features of Being or of Knowing, or whatever – is that it addresses itself to the question of the present, the singularities within the present, of what characterises the specific difference of the present from other presents, and of the way what is taken as universal manifests itself in the present – think here of all the deliberation on modernity and its variants, of liberalism, capitalism, consumer society, industrialism, the social, etc., and all the diagnostic births and deaths, 'pres' and 'posts', 'neos' and 'protos', those terms have attached to them. I would also want to note that there are plurality of presents (not all of which are present to one another) and ask which one, for whom, etc.

Genealogy actively thematises itself, as we know, as a 'history of the present'. I think there are certainly strong resonances of genealogy with the work of Weber – several interpretations, more or less amenable to genealogy, have been advanced by German Weber scholars – and Adorno, despite the Frankfurt School's propensity to a kind of totalising critique which doesn't leave much room for detailed historical analysis (of the singularity of practices, rationalities and power relations). It is less easy to connect this to the kind of German critical theory that has emerged after the linguistic turn of Habermas and his associates, which is stuck on what I call the problem of 'guarantees' – how can we make safe our

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intellectual activities and our political interventions to ensure against the catastrophes of the twentieth century? How can we build a normative edifice that will protect us and ensure that we are on the right side? And, to further complicate this there are those who don't easily fit the picture for one reason or another: Elias (for his anonymity and English exile), Heidegger and Schmitt (for their dubious relations with National Socialism), and Benjamin (for his mysticism) come to mind. Once you start to look at the complexity of what might be considered twentieth-century critical theory, its various political positions, its different approaches to history, and so on, I think it is a mistake to draw too simple a set of lines between Marxist and non-Marxist, German and French, etc., although I know many intellectual reputations are based precisely on this kind of distinction.

Broadly, the following distinguishes the genealogical approach. Rather than a morality of safeguards, guarantees, and foundations, it exhibits an ethos of permanent danger, an acknowledgment that there can be no guarantees, no necessary connections between theory and practice. Indeed it requires us to acknowledge that those moments when we think, for example, we have found the universal ethic (in the presuppositions of communication, for example), or the techniques or practices for helping others (by empowering them, activating them, increasing their self-esteem) or getting them to help themselves (techniques of mutual self-help), or the nature of modern identity and subjectivity (the cosmopolitan or self-responsible individual), may be the moments of most intense danger. This is particularly the case where new truths apparently fall below the threshold of contestation: the way in which the notion of 'globalisation' is almost universally accepted and contestation only occurs within certain very limited parameters springs to mind as a case in point.

The questions that then arise from a genealogical approach are the following. How did these truths gain their self-evidence? What kind of practices do they codify and attempt to reform? What is the relation between these truths about human beings, society, economy, culture, whatever, and the practices and techniques by which things appear as certain problems that need to be urgently solved? How

was it that certain practices came to assume such a form that they can barely be questioned? What are the conditions which make these practices acceptable, among them these discourses of truth? By what contingent events, conditions, and processes did these practices get assembled? Now all of this is necessarily a historical task, or at least a narrativising one, and genealogy is conducted in the face of narratives which are connected to these practices and the truths that invest them. It tries to disrupt their sense of inevitability and continuity, or alternatively their announcements and claims of rupture. Genealogy is indeed a counter-memory, a weapon of contestation and problematisation, a way of examining the claims to necessity of certain practices and their dominations, of shaking things up to think about them differently, of clearing spaces for actions which it neither claims to guide nor to code. In this regard it is superior – at least for those in search of new intelligibilities, counter-narratives – to neo-Marxism, as I understand it. For even the most 'neo' of neo-Marxists is committed to a certain kind of realist narrative that acts as a line of modification but nonetheless confirms the classical Marxist narrative. It must take the form of 'now' and 'then'. Now, we witness the dissolution of class identity and the decline of class politics, then the class struggle was the motor of history. Now, the axial principles are information, or risk, or consumption, then it was production. And so on. Culture, media, hegemony, consumerism, are thus terms of salience in confirming this narrative and explaining both the 'now' but preserving the 'then'. In sum the critical and analytical acuity of this narrative is dimmed by the fading lights of a certain kind and image of socialism and the historical shadows of the proletariat.

Question
Genealogy's examination of domination and power, resistance and struggle, seems to situate it as a left-political project. You have referred elsewhere, following Foucault, to this problematising of present discourses and practices as the operation of *criticism* as distinct from critique (see, Dean, 1994). Criticism, as we understand it, takes into account the perspectival character of knowledge, escaping the judgement of those critical projects that invoke

universal norms. But to what extent does this criticism also rely upon or have allegiance to a set of norms such as justice, democracy, equality, and so on? Is not the genealogist still working within the left Enlightenment tradition that seeks emancipation, despite the subtly of terminology and escape from teleology and metaphysics? Is not a form of judgement still carried out behind the scene of criticism? If so, what norms is genealogy associated with and what are their status? If not, how does genealogy maintain its power as a project of the left?

Mitchell Dean

I don't think that we ought to worry too much about the difference between words like critique and criticism. I did indeed distinguish between them in order to make the point that there is more than one way to approach the issue of critique. The first way seeks a set of universal safeguards and guarantees, as I mentioned earlier, and in its more sophisticated versions, tries to discover a way of deriving these. This is what Habermas does when he seeks to derive his normative theory from the implicit presuppositions of communication. I have nothing against such a procedure in principle but it seems to be somewhat intellectually sterile and overly cumbersome. To his credit, even Habermas would admit that such a project is ultimately impossible – the norms so derived are always fallible and revisable. So when people talk about universal norms in this sense they are trying to specify a sacred flame at the top of a mountain they know they can never climb. In the meantime, it's possible to write very long books imagining what that light looks like on the basis of what we know when you strike a safety match.

A genealogical point of view does not deny the existence of universal values. On the contrary, it wants to analyse them, look at their particular contexts and the ways in which they operate. Its aim is to make us think more deeply about these values, their conditions and consequences. It helps us shake things up a bit, question commonly accepted notions and ways of thinking. It thus contributes to a situation in which people can begin to think differently about things. It rarely finds itself in a position of leadership. The genealogy of disciplinary practices in the 1970s, for

example, was undertaken in the context of prisoners' rights movements and the widespread questioning of schooling and its forms of discipline and corporal punishment. In this sense, genealogy can be a means of struggle against values that lend legitimacy to certain regimes of practices and forms of domination. It is a way of making things seem not as necessary as they once might have, and of opening spaces for experimentation. In making us clearer about how we come to know and govern ourselves and others, genealogy contributes to our individual and collective capacities. As I have suggested in my last book, following the work of David Owen, it does this in an exemplary way, not a prescriptive way, and is very careful not to enter the game of specifying the content of freedom or autonomy. In the sense that it is a tool which allows certain social and political actors to envisage what liberation or emancipation would look like for them in a given situation, it is an enlightenment approach. But again, it refuses to specify the universal normative content of that enlightenment.

If genealogy has any power for the left, it is derived not from a set of prescriptive principles to which those on the left must adhere, but because it is useful in the way in which I have described for those engaging in various struggles. If it isn't useful, my advice would be not to use it. I don't think genealogy, by the way, is necessarily of left or right, for that matter. There are different styles of genealogy, and different political uses of those styles. Foucault's style, and that of his colleagues, was to problematise legitimising and, in some loose sense, 'hegemonic' discourses such as those of sexual liberation or the humanisation of penality. Others might wish to problematise critical discourses or even self-styled resistance discourse. For example, it would not be hard to imagine a genealogy of contemporary genetics and genomics which shows how they are fundamentally discontinuous with earlier eugenics and how feminist, disability and socialist critiques are misplaced. Such an analysis could be used to make the left more self-critical or to provide a justification of the biotech industry. There are hence no guarantees that genealogy's analytical powers won't be appropriated by competing forces in all sorts of arenas. Genealogy can be as dangerous as any other approach. I don't exempt it from the ethos

that is animated by the view that "everything is dangerous". This kind of ethic of intellectual life seems to me appropriate given the full extent of the tragedies of the twentieth century and the religious, moral and intellectual fundamentalism and paternalism we have now inherited from it. It is even more apposite today, given the various quantum leaps in technoscience, corporate rapacity and political and intellectual moralisation, since Foucault proposed it as the basis of his critical ethical orientation.

Question
To what extent can genealogy be said to have a systemic or structuralist focus, approaching the objects of analysis "from above"? Does genealogy need to be combined with more 'culturalist' or 'bottom-up' approaches in order to provide a comprehensive account of identities and resistances, approaches that, for instance, may be needed to fully understand Maori and Aboriginal cultural resurgence?

Mitchell Dean
This is an excellent question. It rests on an opposition, common in many analyses of public policies and power relations, between 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' approaches. In so far as many genealogical and other analyses focus on the forms of discourse associated with the exercise of power and domination by authoritative agencies, then their focus is properly on that which lies above. This is not true for all genealogical types of study. I think of Pat O'Malley's paper in our *Governing Australia* collection as representing an attempt to incorporate the study of indigenous forms of identity and government into the governing of petrol-sniffing in Western Australian Aboriginal communities.

But I would like to confront the top-down/bottom-up opposition with another one, between 'studying-up' and 'studying-down'. Genealogy tends to study-up, if you like, for obvious reasons in that it is concerned to shake up existing and perhaps dominant ways of thinking about and doing things. It is conducted in the presence of social and political struggles and seeks to free-up spaces for thought, invention, experiment outside ways that are considered dominant,

accepted, unsurpassable, and even taken-for-granted. Its enunciative position, its mode of address, is to problematise existing forms of truth not to produce new and more comprehensive ones.

Now, say you want a comprehensive account of Maori and Aboriginal identities and resistance to power regimes. I would ask: why? If it is to produce true knowledge about these formerly abjected populations, then you are engaged in an academic game that has obvious dangers. What is to stop a knowledge of resistance becoming a knowledge useful to those who wish to overcome resistance, e.g., mining companies, pastoralists, bureaucrats? To push this further. Why do we want to understand indigenous 'cultural resurgence', as you put it? Why not study-up those kinds of issues that this resurgence brings into question, e.g., the whole panoply of assumptions about sovereignty and its indivisibility that it raises, the still continuing practices of appropriation and subordination, the renewed discourses of racial supremacy, and so forth? In my view, cultural resistance and resurgence is not a matter of academic understanding or theoretical argument. It is there. That's it. It needs no further justification nor comprehension. And if we want to create greater spaces for it, then let's use whatever tools we have, including genealogy, to help bring further into disarray those forces that murdered, appropriated, subordinated and marginalised indigenous peoples in the past, the techniques of abjection they used, and the rationalities of necessary superiority they promulgated.

In general, I must say, I stumble on a kind of ethical problem every time I am tempted by the will to truth about resistance, a desire to claim to be able to give voice to this group or the other. My own *askesis*, ascetic exercise, is in part constituted by a checking of that impulse we all feel to speak for, give voice to, the abjected selves, such as the poor, the unemployed, the indigenes, etc. One must try to make one's own practice about opening spaces for the 'work of freedom' rather than specifying the nature of that freedom, the truth on which it rests, and the power relations necessary to it. It is this refusal, I think, which still accounts for the scandal of genealogy. The task of the intellectual today is not to lead as a member of the vanguard but to support, assist, clarify, make connections from behind social and political movements as it were.

Question

Our next question concerns the historical limits of genealogy. How historically specific in conception and scope is the genealogical approach? What are its prospects outside of the current period of neo-liberalism? Are there, at present, approaches or theoretical insights that offer important challenges to, or prospects of articulation with, the goals and methods of genealogy?

Mitchell Dean

An excellent question. I have always maintained that genealogy did not make sense as a method in itself. It is more a mood, or a series of different moods, found at distinctive intellectual and political conjunctures. In the genealogy inspired by Foucault and his colleagues there is certainly the problematisation of the historical materialist narrative at its core and an engagement with a renewed and recharged kind of liberalism. Today, I think that some aspects of that political conjuncture remain operative and some have been modified. First, while a certain style of neoliberalism is problematised as 'Thatcherism' and being too individualist, neglecting community, and so on, this new problematisation is fertile for the renewal of various liberalisms: the focus on community, volunteering, on our obligations as much as our freedoms, on the conditions under which choice needs to be limited. Third way social democrats, communitarians, new paternalists, weak and strong globalisation advocates and so on, all find ways of reposing the liberal problematic of limited government working through a domain exterior to itself – whether the local community, various networks, or the global economy. We need to be prepared to analyse these new political discourses and the techniques and practices to which they are linked. It is a more open field than perhaps twenty years ago, but one that suggests that there is a mutation of the social rather than its death. Second, given the recession of a certain institutionalised Marxism and its historical narrative in contemporary intellectual debate, genealogy might now turn to the liberal-democratic narrative itself, the one which says that what is fundamental about liberalism is the way in which it puts constitutional and legal controls on popular sovereignty and on the

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workings of government and that government must respect individual liberty or operate through freedom. This narrative presents liberalism as a break with earlier despotism (absolutist monarchy and police state) and as the first line of resistance against the tyrannies of the twentieth-century (state socialism and national socialism). I have thus been working on the question of authoritarianism within liberal rule. I would argue that within the fabric of liberal attempts to govern through freedom there are 'folds' of authoritarianism, not simply in the divisions between populations (those capable of exercising mature subjectivity and individuality and those who are not) but in the very understanding of liberal government as working through what lies outside it (the values, processes and agencies of what has been called 'civil society'). The governmental perception of globalisation and its contestation thus interest me as giving rise to paradoxical discourses of sovereignty which say simultaneously "there is very little or less we can do today" and "we must institute comprehensive reform of our institutions and conduct". Some of the latter, of course, require the institution of regimes that are more obligatory (workfare, welfare reform) and sometimes coercive (the use of police to enforce new industrial relations de-regulations, etc.).

My own orientation would be to say that we need to expand our conceptual palette a little and that there are many key concepts which need examination and elaboration. Foucault himself spoke of biopolitics and sovereignty at some length. G. Agamben's *Homo Sacer* (1998) offers a critical development of the relationship of these concepts and, my many reservations aside, really forces us to consider sovereign powers and their relation to matters of life and death. It strikes me that the problems of genetic and prenatal testing, of the wider possibilities of genetic engineering and biotechnology, as well as debates on euthanasia, require us to pose again the question of the use and distribution of sovereign powers over life and death. On the one hand, 'life' itself, including the reproduction of organic life, becomes a 'planning project', as Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim has said, something to which 'advanced liberal' performance indicators can be applied. On the other, there are new spreads of the distribution of the right to disallow life among doctors,

health workers, bioethical committees, parents and patients. At the same time, new techniques of policing, the treatment of asylum seekers, and even the introduction of workfare approaches to social beneficiaries underscored by sanctions and coercion, give rise to new figurations of force within the social and political body. The combination of a 'genetic' perspective on the management of risk and new coercive social approaches suggests what comes after the welfarist model of the social needs to be diagnosed. This new ensemble cannot be reduced – despite its resemblances – to either the eugenic biopolitics with its sinister potentials at the beginning of the twentieth century or the eighteenth-century odes to a system of natural liberty found in the market and their disciplinary underbelly.

You have mentioned a time beyond neo-liberalism and its TINA principle ('there is no alternative'). I think the 'political constitution of the present' has fundamentally changed in the last couple of years and that we might be entering that time. I would date that rupture as stemming from the Battle for Seattle in late 1999 and the public demonstrations against world economic organisations, and the emergence of multiple movements and their web-sites, that have followed ever since. These movements have returned us to the question of global distributions of wealth, and inequality, which has been sidelined for some time. This will have fundamental implications for genealogy and the ethic of following from the rear I spoke of before. I haven't thought all of this through yet but it may be that we need to link the problematising capacity and analytical depth of genealogy to a more systemic focus to understand both the emergence of the new 'global' bio-eco-politico-diplomatico-military orders and the kinds of cultural and political protests this has engendered, all of which can only be approached by means of local singularities and spatialities. This may not exclude connections with non-institutional kinds of Marxist analyses such as are occurring today in Italy to help the development of a biopolitical economics. Sovereignty and the capacities of nation-states are obviously big issues here and it may be that new intellectual formations will help us think through political positions on the future of those states in which we live – particularly New Zealand and Australia, countries without obvious regional groupings. To this end, I have been

referring to Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's *Empire* which I think is exemplary in supporting political movements from the rear although I think I ultimately disagree with their understanding of global economies.

I have also been trying to think through some key questions on violence, coercion, and sovereignty as governmental registers with the help of certain more classical thinkers. Norbert Elias' work on the civilising and rationalising of violence presents an immense starting point on the current character of both military and civil use of violence which seem to have become more central in our present from the Persian Gulf to Kosovo, from the ubiquitous Darth Vader riot police to our treatment of refugees. The questions of world order and sovereignty can only be enriched by a reading of Carl Schmitt's postwar work on *nomos* – meaning governance, law, order, or all three. This work speaks very directly to the political character of the present and the limits of governmentality as a way of addressing questions of the 'international' and of sovereignty. One work which combines many of the themes I have been considering, but in the context of the history of political thought, and which I think sets a new benchmark for scholarship in our part of the world is Ian Hunter's new book on the various German enlightenments.

Question
Finally, Professor Dean, can you talk a little about the recent investigations within cultural studies that you most admire. What do you see as the most exciting and fruitful directions for cultural studies research in Australia and New Zealand?

Mitchell Dean
I know at my own university there is very important work being done on the problems of genetic testing, on transformations of notions of life, on science and technology, and on various aspects of authoritarian liberal politics. It is tending to come from those who are doing or have recently just done their doctorates. At any rate, I don't want to single anyone out in particular – their work will stand for itself and does not need my recommendation. It could even suffer from the association! However, if I were to map out a plan for cultural studies, I would recommend that we should cease to try to

create a new 'interdisciplinary field' and begin delineating crucial theoretical problems in depth. We have a lot of books defining or introducing cultural studies, but where is the survey of twentieth century theories of sovereignty, or of tracing the concept of life across various scientific, philosophic and aesthetic disciplines, or of an attempt to theorise the present world order against the narratives of global governance by international relations thinkers? If I could find time, I would hope to write all of these.

It is also now necessary to forget the now timeworn and tedious problem of the theory of the subject, and remake our concerns in much more polymorphous ways. I still endorse as fruitful the Foucauldian view of our object as the regimes of practices, the spaces and zones in which they operate, the naturalisations they entail, and the kinds of identities and normalisations they presuppose and foster. The theory of the subject leads, I think, to an almost inevitable normativity, which reproduces the kind of linkage between theory and various political programs – the Third Way being paradigmatic of this. The genealogical analysis of practices of caring and curing, of educing and punishing, of loving and confessing, leads us to question the certainty with which we define subjects and begins to break up or at least make explicit the normalisations of which we are not even aware. I am sceptical of narratives of who we have become or are, of who we might ideally be or become, and thus wish to undertake analyses of how we have come to think about, experience, imagine, and act upon our identities and subjectivities, and those of others, in certain ways.

In the cultural studies – and indeed humanities and social science university – of my imagination, there is intense debate and scrutiny of the heritage of our cultural, political and social thought, and a complete disrespect for not only disciplinary boundaries but for schools and traditions. One can connect the history of science with contemporary political philosophy, for example, or the genealogy of biopolitics with contemporary political economy, and no one should worry about what field you are working within or whether your references are politically correct or theoretically consistent with each other. There is an expunging of the normative and legislative function of intellectuals for the plethora of interpretative problematics: of hermeneutics, semiotics, psychoanalysis,

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deconstruction, as much as genealogy and analytics. What is at stake is the interrogation of the actuality of 'our' present, of the regimes of practices that concern us, of the discourses that make those practices acceptable, that turn them to certain purposes – an interrogation which yields an intelligibility which is capable of inducing effects, some of which might be described as political, others ethical.

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Cultural studies and the future of 'culture'

Michael Peters

> If mankind is not to destroy itself ... it must first of all attain to a hitherto altogether unprecedented knowledge of the preconditions of culture as a scientific standard for ecumenical goals. Herein lies the tremendous task for the great spirits of the coming century (Nietzsche, 1996, p. 25).

Colonialism, race and culture

In the Preface to an edited collection *After the disciplines: The emergence of cultural studies* (Peters, 1999) I expressed a view that in Aotearoa/New Zealand there was no such thing as cultural studies. By this I meant not only that 'cultural studies' was not an institutionally recognised field or discipline taught in universities under a programme or within a departmental structure, but also that there was no accepted broad philosophical approach which practitioners agreed upon and nothing that resembled a 'school.' In New Zealand there is nothing that matches, for instance, the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies and there does not seem to be a native tradition as we might suppose exists in the UK, US, Canada or Australia. Perhaps, the closest that we get to such a tradition is the Massey-based journal *SITES* which described its orientation in its editorial statement as "a multi-disciplinary journal established in 1981 to promote the study of cultural questions within the broad tradition of left scholarship" with a focus on Aotearoa/New Zealand and the South Pacific. This is a curious absence for a country that prides itself on being aware of cultural difference, and especially since the New Zealand State has been officially committed to *biculturalism* as a policy for many years. There is some basis for the claim that New Zealand has made some progress in coming to terms with its past (mostly as a result of Maori initiatives) especially in comparison with the still entrenched institutional racism and injustice that persists against the indigenous peoples of Australia. One might have thought that a distinctive version and disciplinary formation of cultural studies, hewed out of the local intellectual

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landscape, would have flourished in one of the first white-settler societies to begin in earnest the process of working through its violent colonial past: conquest by war, illegal acquisition of vast tracts of land, and the cultural injustices it perpetrated in the name of empire and 'civilisation.'

Yet as many critics have observed, *biculturalism* has often worked as a form of State ideology rather than as a set of genuine practices. This 'lip-service' recently has been thrown into high relief by the ways in which neoliberalism in New Zealand, as the reigning political ideology since 1984, marginalised and structurally disadvantaged the majority of Maori, while at the same time, paradoxically, also significantly advancing the process of addressing Maori claims under the Waitangi Tribunal. *Ka Awatea* effectively demonstrated under neoliberalism that Maori were still structurally disadvantaged, measured on any major statistical variable or index, be it in terms of rates indicating poor health, low educational achievement, prison incarceration, or comparative household income. The present Labour administration's *Closing the Gaps* policy seems to be predicated on the recognition of immediate past failures and the widening of the gap under neoliberal governments.

Ranginui Walker (1999) explains that the nation-state of New Zealand was comprised from the outset by two separate and antithetical cultural traditions:

> The founding cultures of the nation-state of New Zealand are derived from two disparate traditions of Maori and Pakeha. Maori belong to the tradition-oriented world of tribalism, with its emphasis on kinship, respect for ancestors, spirituality and millennial connectedness with the natural world. Pakeha, on the other hand, were the bearers of modernity, the Westminster system of government, scientific positivism, the capitalist mode of production and the monotheism of Christianity. The philosophic difference between the two cultures is encapsulated in the prophetic aphorism:
>
> E kore te uku e piri ki te rino, ka whitikia e te ra ka ngahoro
> Clay will not unite with iron, when it is dried by the sun it
> crumbles away (pp. 187-8).

For much of the nineteenth- and twentieth-centuries the relation between these two cultures – a traditional one and a culture of modernity – came to be officially perceived as largely a problem of *modernisation*, of making the latter more like the former. This modernisation was not just a form of 'assimilation' or 'integration': the logic of modernisation was taken to supersede all forms of traditionalism. Tribalism, in particular, was perceived to be inimical to the interests of the liberal State because it promoted historic 'we-they' attitudes and thereby militated against the liberal conception of one language, one culture, one state. Only recently in the Western development and political theory has it even seemed a remote possibility that the enhancement of traditional ways of life might actually contribute to, rather than hinder, the 'development' or 'progress' of a people. The question of postmodernity or of *postmodernisation* considered in relation to traditionalism has not yet been properly raised.[1]

There is probably no more pressing set of philosophical problems in cultural theory than those that fall under the broad issue of cultural difference. The question of cultural difference in the era of modernity is normally considered in abstract terms, in terms of the logic of alterity, of Otherness, but it cannot be thought in Aotearoa/New Zealand without examining the historical context of colonisation, its consequences for imperial, white-settler and indigenous cultures, and the historic struggles against the exercise of imperial power: the myriad forms of decolonisation, cultural re-assertion and self-determination. We have a reasonably clear though contested historical picture of the consequences of the clash between traditional cultures and cultures of modernity, and also, of the kind of historical relations that have existed between Maori and Pakeha cultures, although use of the term 'culture' in relation to Pakeha is problematic for it gains purchase only from being *not*-Maori. It is a familiar story of cultural disintegration: language death, dislocation of rural

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1. See, in particular, Crook *et al.* (1992), although the emphasis is on transformations within advanced liberal societies. For a poststructuralist approach which deconstructs development and critiques the professionalization of development knowledge and the institutionalization of development practices see Escobar (1995).

extended family structures, the decline of traditional values, urbanisation (with all that that entails), and the official relocation of male labour to work in factories. A radical experiment in indigenous cultural studies would be to conceive of *Pakeha* 'culture' from the viewpoint of Maori. What does alterity and the tradition of European thought devoted to studying the Other look like from the Other's viewpoint?

Cultural studies *as biculturalism* (if I can use this shorthand), for instance, might have focused, not solely on the emergence of working class identity or the development of class culture, mass culture or popular culture, as it did in Britain, but also on the power relations existing between a metropolitan 'colonising' culture and indigenous cultures – from first contact, exploration and early settlement through various stages of colonisation, to the development of 'dominion status,' nationhood, and participation in global economy. Such an orientation would have the distinction of being different from either Maori Studies or English Studies. Why such a notion of cultural study did not develop in the New Zealand academy is a complicated and interesting question. One aspect of the story, I would guess, would involve the history of the relations between anthropology and Maori Studies, the genealogy of the ruling conceptions of 'culture,' and the influence of American structural functionalism, among other things.

The notion of culture becomes central in these discussions and in the space of the nation, the adoption of an anthropological concept of culture as a set of *lived practices* and even, 'a structure of feeling,' certain conceptual gains were made, including the recognition of class cultures which permitted political analyses of 'national' culture and popular formations. Certainly, the move from the notion of culture, considered in the singular and as a synonym for 'civilisation.' to cultural studies provided the grounds for recognising 'culture' as a more *differentiated* concept that no longer gained its respectability from the discipline of cultural anthropology alone.

The famous definition Edward Tylor (1903) gives in *Primitive culture* provides a definition of human culture from the viewpoint of an evolutionist interested in stages of human development. It was Franz Boas (1948, p. 159) who referred to cultures in the plural

and successfully displaced the notion of 'race' as the major signifier of cultural difference:

> Culture may be defined as the totality of the mental and physical reactions and activities that characterise the behavior of the individuals composing a social group collectively and individually, in relation to their natural environment, to other groups, to members of the group itself and of each individual to himself (cited in Sökefield, 1999, p. 14).

While cultural difference under Boas' definition came to be seen less as a matter of descent and evolutionary development and rather more as a matter of acquisition, Boas' new concept still retained a certain determinism and exhibited homogenising tendencies, treating individuals and groups as merely cultural exemplars. Yet as many scholars have pointed out the concept of culture is itself *an implicit instrument of Othering*, epistemologically constructing the anthropologist as 'subject of knowledge' and the others as its scientific objects. This epistemological problem of reflexivity has led to the observation that anthropological knowledge creates or constructs difference: it is actually produced by anthropological texts as well as being an aspect of empirical reality (Clifford and Marcus, 1986). Yet at the very moment in which the concept in anthropology is dissolving itself into a series of epistemological and ethical puzzles, the political concept of culture has been advanced as a *political concept* (see Sökefield, 1999).

Williams (1988, p. 88) argues that it was Herder who enabled us to first talk of cultures in the plural by equating a people and nation, thus producing the notion of 'national culture.' It was Williams and his compatriots Richard Hoggart and E. P. Thompson that reinterpreted the political concept of culture by reference to class, enabling the analysis of various nationalist formations and the idea of 'Englishness' in a way that established British cultural studies.

Tom Steele (1997) reminds us that British cultural studies began principally as a political educational or pedagogical project in the field of adult education. He argues that:

> Adult education has, since the nineteenth century, been a critical place of dialogue and negotiation between the forces that attempt

to modernise the British sate and the emergent social movements, especially that of labour or 'working-class' movement.

Steele suggests that "interdisciplinary study in adult education was an important precursor of academic British cultural studies" (p. 2), rather than an offshoot of English and he documents the involvement of Hoggart in extramural studies at Hull (founding the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in 1962), Thompson as a tutor for WEA and later in extramural studies at Leeds, and Williams as a member of the Department of Extramural Studies at Oxford.

I would argue that education also played a crucial role for the conscientisation of Maori. Since the late 1960s in Aotearoa/New Zealand, *Pakeha* (the Maori term for non-Maori) have been forced to become more and more aware of Maori political demands concerning their own self-determination, sovereignty and their rights under the Treaty of Waitangi (1840). From the early beginnings of the latest phase of Maori protest in the early 1970s, beginning, perhaps, with the activist group *Nga Tamatoa*, through to the Land Marches of the 1970s, the *Hikoi* of the '90s, and the establishment of new pan-Maori organisations (including the Maori Congress), *te kohanga reo* (language nest) and *kura kaupapa Maori* (Maori schooling), education has played a huge role in Maori political and cultural conscientisation. It provided one of the few avenues within a white-settler society governed, in part, by forms of individual discrimination and institutional racism, for Maori to begin the process of decolonisation, as well as to educate *Pakeha* in Maori language and culture, and, thereby, to advance Maori political and cultural causes.

Ranginui Walker (1990), himself an actor in these struggles, provides an historical narrative of the Maori struggle. He has also traced the development of Maori Studies in tertiary education in Aotearoa/New Zealand (Walker, 1999), commenting upon the question of 'cultural subversion' and the European project of assimilation. (Walker was employed early on in the department of continuing education at the University of Auckland and later shifted to Maori studies.) He quotes from Hirini Mead, the first Maori professor of Maori studies in New Zealand, to indicate how Maori

educational philosophy grew out the necessity for an emancipatory pedagogy:

> There is no real option but for knowledge managers of our universities and departments of Maori Studies to become involved in the struggle of the Maori people to survive culturally .... Liberation is the opposite of cultural death. (Mead, 1983, p. 340; cited in Walker, 1999, p. 197)

It is not surprising that Maori educational politics based upon the question of cultural survival and an emancipatory pedagogy should draw so heavily upon the work of the great Brazilian educational philosopher, Paulo Freire (1972). Freire's educational philosophy provides an easy fit with *biculturalism*, understood as an ideology. It is dependent upon a logic of alterity, of Otherness, that gains its force from the Hegelian dialectic.

The Hegelian dialectic is the machinery that underlies the development of the Marxist understanding of imperialism and much of the early work of 'post-colonial' thinkers such as Frantz Fanon. Yet it suffers from a number of theoretical difficulties, although I do not deny its effectivity as a political concept and strategy. First, by dividing up Aotearoa/New Zealand into two separate, discrete, cultures it implies a false homogeneity of both cultures, reifying them and thus tending to downplay the interconnections, the links, the fluid boundaries and exchanges. This homogeneity can also (dangerously, in my view) portray a 'pureness,' as though the culture is an organic whole protected from 'pollution' or 'contamination' in coming into contact with other cultures and social formations. Second, a Hegelian definition of culture as a notion that defines itself only through the power of negation can also be *reactive*, asserting that both cultures are in a life-and-death struggle and only one of them can 'win' in the end. The oppositional logic tends to obscure relational processes between the two cultures (such as migration, borrowings, hybridisations, and other social processes). Here the example of language is a good guide: look at New Zealand English as a distinctive local version of metropolitan English, or at modern Maori. Third, the discrete notion of culture easily leads to a 'museumifcation,' a kind of static and unchanging nature that

preserves a cultural unity. Fourth, this view tends to underestimate both the importance of sub-cultures and social movements that have the power to redefine cultures, and it also fails to conceptualise the relationship between cultures and individuals in order to take account of dissent and disagreement within cultures (see Sökefield, 1999).

Hegel, modernity and the logic of alterity

In *Phenomenology of spirit*, Hegel (1977, orig. 1807) defines 'consciousness' in terms of 'self-consciousness' and what he calls the 'truth of self-certainty' and he develops a model of consciousness, of self and identity, which inaugurates a new way of thinking that helps to define these concepts for Leftist thinkers of modernity: not only Marx but also Kojève, Sartre, Lacan and Fanon. Broadly speaking, we can characterise Hegel's modernity in terms of the dialectic of self and other, governed by the logic of negation. This model informs versions of Marxism (particularly notions of 'alienation' and imperialism), phenomenology (Kojève's interpretation of 'unhappy consciousness'), existentialism, and psychoanalysis, and philosophies of decolonisation and cultural liberation, as they have been articulated by Fanon (the 'coloniser' and the 'colonised') and Freire (the 'oppressor' and the 'oppressed'). Hegel defines what he calls 'self-consciousness' in terms of the dependence/independence of 'lordship' and 'bondage.' He argues in terms of fundamental duality that "Self-consciousness is faced by another self-consciousness" which has a double significance:

> ... first, it has lost itself, for it finds itself as an *other* being; secondly, in doing so it has superseded the other, for it does not see the other as an essential being, but in the other sees its own self.... It must supersede this otherness of itself. This is the supercession of the first ambiguity, and is therefore itself a second ambiguity. First, it must proceed to supersede the *other* independent being in order thereby to become certain of *itself* as the essential being; secondly, in order so doing it proceeds to supersede it *own* self, for this other is itself. (p. 111)

And Hegel amplifies this analysis by focusing on the relations of the two self-conscious individuals who must "prove themselves and each other through a life-and-death struggle" (p. 114). Only by staking one's life is freedom won for "The individual who has not risked his life may well be recognised as a *person*, but he has not attained the truth of this recognition as an independent self-consciousness" and "just as each stakes his own life, so each must seek each other's death" (p. 114).

Hegel's dialectic of 'lordship' and 'bondage' – of self and other – defined through the process of negation, and his analysis of 'consciousness' has exerted a powerful sway on modern thought. In particular, his account of consciousness in terms of the 'struggle of recognition' and his picture of 'Spirit' as a progression towards freedom, exercised considerable influence over many of the precursors of the poststructuralist philosophy. A certain Hegelianism also became important for the founders of the Frankfurt School – Horkheimer and Adorno – and later, for Habermas (see O'Neil, 1996).

Certainly, it is Hegel's dialectic of self and other that provides the fundamental duality informing the work of Friere. One can understand how Maori found in Freire a logic of self-recognition that helped to define the colonial experience. It was one that also distinguished, albeit implicitly, the notion of biculturalism: two cultures that defined through the power of negation. Hegel's account provided the most comprehensive account of the dualistic or oppositional logic characterising modernity – not only labour/ capital, capitalism/socialism, coloniser/colonised, man/woman – yet it is also a product of its age.

There are philosophical resources and an understanding of 'difference' that tend to characterise the present historical phase – what we might provocatively call 'postmodernity' or 'postcoloniality' – better than Hegel's dualistic logic of alterity. This is one of the main lessons that so-called postcolonial theorists (e.g., Said, Spivak, Bhabha) have learned from the French poststructuralists. Why would we expect a text written almost two hundred years ago to have the power still to be able to define the present era? In postmodernity – in the postcolonial age, an age where

many peoples have won their political independence or recognition – 'difference' provides a better ground for understanding identity claims and struggles.

The development of cultural studies in Britain seems to reflect a theoretical move away from the exhaustive binary logic of the dialectic. This is reflected in Hall's (1997) observation that there was never one regulative notion of culture that operated in British cultural studies, although he does recognise the regulative force of William's anthropological notion of culture as 'a whole way of life.' He provides an interesting genealogy of the concept of culture, not just its regulative force in the early stages but also the critique of its organicist character and the way it assumed "a humanist notion of social and symbolic practices." As he goes on to say, and I think it worth quoting yet again:

> The really big shift was the coming of semiotics and structuralism: not because the definition of culture stopped there, but that remains the defining paradigm shift, nonetheless – signifying practices, rather than a whole way of life. There had to be some relative autonomy introduced into the study of signifying practices. If you want to study their relation to a whole way of life, that must be thought of as an articulation, rather than the position which Williams had, which was that "everything is expressive of everything else": the practices and the signification, they're all one; the family and ideas about the family are all the same thing. For Williams, everything is dissolved into practice. Of course, the new model was very linguistic, very Saussurean, but nevertheless, that was the definitive break. Everything after that goes back to that moment. Post-structuralism goes back to the structuralist break. Psychoanalytic models are very influenced by the Levi-Straussian moment, or the Althusserian moment. If I were writing for students, those are still the two definitions I'd pick out, and I wouldn't say there is a third one. I suppose you might say that there was a postmodern one, a Deleuzian one, which says that signification is not meaning, it's a question of affect, but I don't see a break in the regulative idea of culture there as fundamental as the earlier one.

The structuralist notion of culture as a system of positive differences represented a marked shift from the organicist, humanist version

embraced by Williams.[2] I think that the shift from the structuralist notion to what Hall calls a Deleuzian one, is more important than he gives credit. Let me deal with these points in turn.

The structuralist notion of culture

In the structuralist notion of culture based upon the model of semiotics, identity is relationally defined and is purely a function of *differences* within the system. The relationship of signified to signifier is entirely arbitrary. One of the distinguishing features of Saussure's linguistics and an advance over the comparative grammar of the time, is his emphasis on the autonomous form of the system as a whole which comprises and organises phonic and semantic elements not directly accessible in sensory experience. Jonathon Culler (1976) explains the *structuralist* Saussurian view of language that came to define 'culture.'

> [It is] not simply that a language is a system of elements which are wholly defined by their relations to one another within the system, though it is that, but that the linguistic system consists of different levels of structure; at each level one can identify elements which contrast with one another and combine with other elements to form higher-level units, and the principles of structure at each level are fundamentally the same. (p. 49)

Yet it was Jakobson who first coined the term 'structuralism' in 1929 to designate a structural-functional approach to the scientific investigation of phenomena, the basic task of which was to reveal the inner laws of the system. Jakobson (1973), following the success of the First Prague International Slavistic Congress, came to frame his programmatic statement in these terms:

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2. Hall's (1980; 1988) response to the "crisis" in cultural studies represented by the contradictions between Williams' "culturalist" paradigm and the structuralist paradigm was to turn to Gramsci and, in particular, his notion of "hegemony" which analyses political domination as a contested struggle. For a detailed discussion of these moves and a strong critique of "postmodern cultural studies" see Katzl (1995/6).

> Were we to comprise the leading idea of present-day science in its most various manifestations, we could hardly find a more appropriate designation than *structuralism*. Any set of phenomena examined by contemporary science is treated not as a mechanical agglomeration but as a structural whole, and the basic task is to reveal the inner, whether static or developmental, laws of this system. What appears to be the focus of scientific preoccupations is no longer the outer stimulus, but the internal premises of the development: now the mechanical conception of processes yields to the question of their functions.

The 'linguisticality' of culture came to provide a method for structural anthropology. Jakobson introduced Claude Lévi-Strauss to structural linguistics at the New School for Social Science Research in New York in the early 1940s. Lévi-Strauss published an article relating structural linguistics and ethnology for the first time in Jakobson's newly established journal *Word* in 1945. It becomes an early chapter of *Anthropologie structurale* published in 1958, comprising a collection of papers written between the years 1944 and 1957. Lévi-Strauss (1968) acknowledges his debt to Saussure and Jakobson and proceeds to describe method in anthropology focusing upon the notion of the *unconscious structure*:

> If, as we believe to be the case, the unconscious activity of the mind consists in imposing forms upon content, and if these forms are fundamentally the same for all minds – ancient and modern, primitive and civilised ... – it is necessary and sufficient to grasp the unconscious structure underlying each institution and custom, in order to obtain a principle of interpretation valid for other institutions and other customs ... (p. 21).

Lévi-Strauss (1968) suggests that we apprehend the unconscious structure through the employment of the *structural method* developed by structural linguistics, declaring "Structural linguistics will certainly play the same renovating role with respect to the social sciences that nuclear physics, for example, has played for the physical sciences" (p. 33). And he goes on to define the structural method in terms of the programmatic statement made by Nikolai Troubetzkoy (1969) (a member of the Prague Linguistic School) in his seminal *Principles of phonology* :

First, structural linguistics shifts from the study of *conscious* linguistic phenomena to the study of their *unconscious* infrastructure; second, it does not treat *terms* as independent entities, taking instead as its basis of analysis the *relations* between terms; third, it introduces the concept of *system*...; finally, structural linguistics aims at discovering *general laws*, either by induction [or deduction] (p. 33).

Employing this method, Lévi-Strauss (1968) suggests that social science is able to formulate necessary relationships, "new perspectives ... open up" where the anthropologist can study kinship systems in the way the linguist studies phonemes: "like phonemes, kinship terms are elements of meaning; like phonemes, they acquire meaning only if they are integrated into systems" and kinship systems like phonemic systems "are built by the mind on the level of unconscious thought" (p. 34). Three years later in 1961 in his inaugural lectures at the Collège de France Lévi-Strauss publicly recognises his debt to Saussure and defines anthropology as a branch of semiology.

Jean Piaget's *Structuralism* (1971) is useful in defining structuralism:

As a first approximation, we may say that a structure is a system of transformations. Inasmuch as it is a system and not a mere collection of elements and their properties, these transformations involve laws: the structure is preserved or enriched by the interplay of its transformation laws, which never yield results external to the system nor employ elements that are external to it. In short, the notion of structure is compromised of three key ideas: the idea of wholeness, the idea of transformation, and the idea of self-regulation (p. 5).

The notion of wholeness emerges from the distinction between *structures* and *aggregates*. Only the former are wholes, whereas the latter are formed of elements which are independent of the complexes into which they enter "the elements of a structure are subordinated to laws, and it is in terms of these laws that the structure *qua* whole or system is defined" (p. 7). The nature of structured wholes depends upon their laws of composition which in turn govern the transformations of the system, whether they be mathematical (e.g., 1+1 'makes' 2) or temporal. The notion of self-

regulation entails both self-maintenance and closure and Piaget mentions three basic mechanisms of self-regulation: rhythm (as in biology), regulation (in the cybernetic sense) and operation (in the sense of logic).

Post-Nietzschean cultural studies?

The movement we can call 'poststructuralism' can be interpreted, at least in part, as a philosophical attack on the *scientific* pretensions of structuralism by means of Nietzsche, whose work in the French context is used to provide a re-evaluation of Hegel's dialectic (see Peters, 1996). Foucault (1983), in a rare interview in which he directly engages the question of structuralism/poststructuralism, makes it clear that structuralism was *not* a French invention and that the French moment of structuralism during the 1960s should be properly viewed against the background of European formalism. Foucault suggests that apart from those who applied structural methods in linguistics and comparative mythology none of the protagonists in the structuralist movement knew very clearly what they were doing. While Foucault (1983) declared that he was never a structuralist, he acknowledges that the problem addressed by structuralism was a problem very close to his interests as he has defined them on a number of occasions: "that of the subject and the recasting of the subject" (p. 205).

The *problem* of structuralism is one that Foucault discusses in terms of a single point of convergence for otherwise completely different kinds of investigations: the focus on a philosophical opposition to 'the theoretical affirmation of the primacy of the subject,' which had dominated in France since the time of Descartes. It had served as the fundamental postulate for a range of philosophies and approaches during the thirties, forties and fifties, including, phenomenological existentialism, "a kind of Marxism that agonises over the concept of alienation" (Foucault, 1991, p. 86), and tendencies in psychology which denied the unconscious.

The real turning point came with the French reading of Nietzsche. Alan Schrift (1995) suggests that poststructuralists, drawing upon Nietzsche's critique of 'truth' and on his analysis of the differential

relations of power and knowledge, have challenged the assumptions "that give rise to binary, oppositional thinking, often opting to affirm that which occupies a position of subordination within a differential network" and questioned "the figure of the humanistic human subject, challenging the assumptions of autonomy and transparent self-consciousness while situating the subject as a complex intersection of discursive, libidinal, and social forces and practices." At the same time, these poststructuralist thinkers have resisted "the impulse toward claims of universality and unity, preferring instead to acknowledge difference and fragmentation" (Schrift, 1995, pp.6-7).

Crucial in this regard was Gilles Deleuze's (1983, orig. 1962) *Nietzsche and philosophy*, which interpreted Nietzsche's philosophy as an attack upon the Hegelian dialectic, and helped to create the conditions in post-war France for an accent upon pure difference – a 'philosophy of difference' – that emphasised difference not only as a constant in linguistic and symbolic systems but also as a necessary element in the process of creating social and cultural identity. Deleuze (1983) writes:

> Three ideas define the dialectic: the idea of a power of the negative as a theoretical principle manifested in opposition and contradiction; the idea that suffering and sadness have value, the valorisation of the 'sad passions,' as a practical principle manifested in splitting and tearing apart; the idea of positivity as a theoretical principle and a practical product of negation itself. It is no exaggeration to say that the whole of Nietzsche's philosophy, in its polemical sense, is the attack on these three ideas (pp. 195-96).

Deleuze's radical questioning of the dialectic, its negative power and its purely reactive disposition – the positive is achieved only through the double negation – is contrasted with the purely positive power of affirmation inherent in 'difference' as the basis for a radical thought that is not Hegelian.

The full story of Nietzsche's reception in post-war France is not part of my narrative here: it is too complex and involved to go into here (see Peters, 1997; Peters *et al.* 2000). Suffice it to say that by the early 1970s Nietzsche had served as a basis for an attack on the

Hegelian dialectic and for alternative formulations of difference as a positive theoretical principle. Derrida (1981, pp. 8-9) had come to a definitive concept of *différance* over the ten years beginning in 1959. *Différance*, Derrida's neologised concept, refers to 'the movement that consists in deferring by means of delay, delegation, reprieve, referral, detour, postponement, reserving'; the movement of *différance* is the 'common root of all the positional concepts that mark our language' and the production of those differences that is the condition for any signification. Finally, it is "the unfolding of difference," of the ontico-ontological difference, which Heidegger named as the difference between Being and beings.

Lyotard also arrives at a concept of difference with his formulation of the *differend* which had its origins in his intellectual break with radical Marxism. For Lyotard dialectical logic as "the machinery for overcoming alterity by negating and conserving it" had broken down. As he says:

> Inasmuch as there was in Marxism a discourse which claimed to be able to express without residue all opposing positions, which forgot that differends are embodied in incommensurable figures between which there is no logical solution it became necessary to stop speaking this idiom at all … (Lyotard, 1988, p. 61).

He develops a notion of the *differend* which he defines as "a case of conflict, between (at least) two parties, that cannot be equitably resolved for lack of a rule of judgement applicable to both arguments" (Lyotard, 1988, p. xi). He states "a universal rule of judgement between heterogenous genres is lacking in general," or that "there is no genre whose hegemony over others would be just" (p. xi), and argues that the aim of philosophy in this situation is to detect *differends* (a cognitive task) and to bear witness to them (an ethical obligation).

I would like to suggest programmatically that there is a version of cultural studies we might describe as 'Deleuzian,' or 'poststructuralist,' or, perhaps, more happily as 'post-Nietzschean.' It is one, I would like to think, that takes pedagogy seriously, both pedagogical practices and institutions, and focuses critical attention on cultural studies as a set of pedagogical interventions into the

reproduction of subjectivities (see Katzl, 1995/6). It is a version – not theoretically to be prescribed against all others but to be understood as a progressive research programme – that is inspired by Nietzsche and especially his idea that "[There is no being] behind the doing, acting, becoming … the doing is everything" (Nietzsche, 1992, p. 179). Nietzsche is, perhaps, the foremost philosopher of culture.

During the period 1872 to 1875 Nietzsche started working upon a major project that was to provide a sequel or companion to *The birth of tragedy*. He variously titled this proposed work *The last philosophy*, *Philosophy in the Tragic age of the Greeks*, and *The philosopher as cultural physician*. The notion of culture runs through these notes, as it does through the corpus of Nietzsche's works: not only was he concerned to understand what it is and to develop knowledge of the conditions for its renewal in the age of science, he wished to define the cultural significance of the philosopher, and above all, to signal the importance of the philosopher as a *physician* of culture, as one who could *prepare* the ground of culture, and in the figure of the future philosopher-artist, *create* new values. But in order to do so the philosopher must first turn his life into a work of art, for the philosopher's product is his life, before his works (#48, p. 108). These are themes now well traversed by the work of the late Foucault.

In the age of social democracy, against Nietzsche, I would argue that cultural studies can trace and analyse the relations of power and culture in the formation of subjectivities by reference to aesthetic conditions of existence, to the way we are both made and recreate ourselves, through the processes of self and style – a certain self-stylisation – already common to ordinary talk in the dubious notion of 'lifestyle.' More generally, if somewhat too programmatically, I would suggest that a post-Nietzschean cultural studies would share with other approaches a critique of liberal humanism, of the rational, autonomous, self-transparent subject of humanist thought and of the liberal privileging of human consciousness as autonomous, directly accessible, and as the sole basis of historical interpretation, understanding and action.

At the same time, we would expect the reintroduction of a form of critical history. Against the effacing of history through synchronic analyses of structures, post-Nietzschean cultural studies might

emphasise the mutation, transformation, and discontinuity of structures, and also a serialisation, repetition, 'archaeology' and, perhaps most importantly, what Foucault, following Nietzsche, calls genealogy. In this context genealogical narratives are seen to replace ontology, or, to express the same thought in a different way: questions of ontology become historicised.

Nietzsche's work, then, provides a new way to theorise and conceive of the discursive operation of power and desire in the constitution and self-overcoming of human subjects. Heidegger in his two-volumed *Nietzsche* first published in 1961, focuses upon *The will to power* - a work assembled from notes and first published posthumously by his sister – interprets Nietzsche as the last metaphysician. A critical philosophy of technology can be written as a series of innovative theoretical developments of or about Heidegger's notion of technology. Heidegger's philosophy of technology is related to his critique of the history of Western metaphysics and the disclosure of being. The essence of technology is a *poeisis* or 'bringing forth' which is grounded in disclosure (*aletheia*). He suggests that the essence of modern technology shows itself in what he calls *enframing* and reveals itself as 'standing reserve,' a concept that refers to resources that are stored in the anticipation of consumption. As such modern technology, names the final stage in the history of metaphysics (nihilism) and the way in which being is disclosed in this particular epoch: a stockpiling in principle completely knowable and devoted entirely for human use. He suggests that the essence of technology is nothing technological; it is rather a system (*Gestell*), an all-embracing view of technology, described as a mode of human existence that focuses upon the way machinic technology can alter our mode of being, distorting our actions and aspirations. Heidegger is careful not to pose as an optimist or pessimist. He sees his own work as preparation for a new beginning that will enable one to rescue oneself from nihilism and allow the resolute individual to achieve an authenticity. Thus, tapping the rich veins in this tradition a post-Nietzschean cultural studies can begin to approach technology in innovative ways, always focusing upon the question of the intersection between culture and power, and yet oriented to examining 'technologies of self.'

With a post-Nietzschean conception of cultural studies we might also talk of a deepening of democracy and a political critique of Enlightenment values, based upon criticism of the ways that modern liberal democracies constructs political identity. Liberal theory often constructs identity in terms of a series of binary oppositions (e.g., we/them, citizen/non-citizen, responsible/irresponsible, legitimate/illegitimate) that has the effect of excluding or 'othering' some groups of people. Western countries grant rights to citizens – rights that are dependent upon citizenship – and regard non-citizens, that is, immigrants, those seeking asylum, and refugees, as 'aliens.' We must examine how these boundaries are socially constructed, and how they are maintained and policed. In particular, the deconstruction of political hierarchies of value comprising binary oppositions and philosophies of difference, are highly significant for currents debates on multiculturalism and feminism.

If there is one element that distinguishes post-Nietzschean cultural studies it is the notion of difference which various thinkers use, develop and apply in different ways. The notion of difference comes from Nietzsche, from Saussure, and from Heidegger. For Derrida *différance* is seen as plotting the linguistic limits of the subject. These notions of difference, pointing to an anti-essentialism, have been subsequently developed in relation to gender and ethnicity (e.g., Young, 1991; West, 1993).

Even the notion of power is revised, just as 'culture' itself has been subject to on-going criticism and revision. The diagnosis of 'power/knowledge' and the exposure of technologies of domination based upon Foucault's analytics of power is decidely Nietzschean. For Foucault, power is productive; it is dispersed throughout the social system, and; it is intimately related to knowledge. It is productive because it is not only repressive but also creates new knowledge (which may also liberate). It is dispersed rather than located in any one center, like the state; and, it is part of the constellation 'power/knowledge' which means that knowledge, in the sense of discursive practices, is generated through the exercise of power in the control of the body. Foucault develops this thesis through his genealogical study of the development of modern institutions like the prison and the school, and the corresponding

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emergence of the social sciences that helped devised new methods of social control.

Foucault's studies thus provide post-Nietzschean cultural studies with a basis for examining the reproduction of liberal subjects as individuals, indeed, their ethical self-constitution as subjects. As such this Foucault-inspired approach might help us unravel the inherent individualism of liberalism which even with the proposed reform of core assumptions is not readily able to entertain collective entities and thus, theoretically, is impoverished when it comes to questions of culture and difference.

Post-Nietzschean cultural studies provides us with an alternative to structuralist notions particularly insofar as it moves away from scientific pretensions and from the static conceptions of historical time toward more philosophically nuanced work that respects the dynamic quality of cultures and the capacity of their members, individually and severally, to reconstitute, relanguage, and revitalise themselves.

Acknowledgement

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Response to Michael Peters

Avril Bell

Michael Peters calls for a 'post-Nietzschean' Cultural Studies in New Zealand. The central project he envisages for such a Cultural Studies is the exploration of the dynamics of Maori and Pakeha cultures and identities, with the more general aim of contributing to the broader theorisation of cultural difference. I agree with his call for intensive and extensive research and debate of Maori and Pakeha identities, relations and histories, although I am unconvinced that a post-Nietzschean approach is the only or most useful form such study might take. In fact, having read Peters' paper a number of times, I remain unsure as to what exactly distinguishes a post-Nietzschean approach from other versions of poststructuralism. Peters mentions "taking pedagogy seriously", an emphasis on doing and style over being, a genealogical approach to history, a Foucauldian concept of power and a Derridean concept of *différance*. It may be the utilisation of all these in combination to which Peters refers, but none is the preserve purely of 'post-Nietzscheans', as Peters himself recognises. Hence in this response I intend to leave the issue of Nietzsche and his followers aside and attend to the 'local' aims Peters envisages for a New Zealand Cultural Studies – an examination of relations across difference that centres on the consideration of the history of colonisation, resists binarism and conceives of culture in dynamic terms. I agree with Peters that such local studies can productively inflect the insights of poststructural and postcolonial theorisations in general. Further, the study of settler and indigenous identities has a particular contribution to make to the international debates about, and conceptualisations of, cultural difference. However, while overseas theory has much to offer us, it needs some working over to fit our conditions.

There is of course a substantive body of work within a range of disciplines which focuses on Maori and Pakeha identities and relations and utilises poststructuralist and postcolonial concepts and arguments. Simon During (for example, 1985; 1989; 2000), to name one of the most prominent in the field, has long engaged in

poststructuralist/postcolonial explorations of colonial relations in New Zealand.[1] However, Peters wonders why we don't have a 'school' sharing a broad philosophical approach to the local study of cultural difference. He cites the Birmingham School as a model, suggesting we could possibly do for the study of cultural difference what the School did for the study of social class. I don't think it's that straightforward. The motivation behind the Birmingham School, as Peters rightly notes, was the emancipation of the subordinate working class (and later the gendered and raced) subject. It is certainly the case that emancipatory projects are crucial here. However, the divisions and subjects constituted by colonisation in settler societies such as ours, and the resulting politics of representation, are significantly different from those addressed within the Birmingham School. In settler societies, projects of emancipation are in many significant respects distinct from those in imperial centres, such as England. Settler and indigenous peoples are not found in such contexts and exist in particular relations to each other that inflect the pursuit of emancipatory projects.

Maori have long pointed out the ongoing colonisation involved in any desire on the part of Pakeha to 'emancipate' them and are engaged in their own emancipatory projects.[2] Further, any discussion of Maori identities and cultures by Pakeha has, at times, also been considered inherently colonising. One result of this has been a tendency for Pakeha to withdraw more generally from engaging in work related to Maori at all, Michael King being the most well known example. The result is an intellectual segregation fuelled by anxieties not to be seen to be continuing colonisation by 'speaking for' Maori. And the idea of Pakeha emancipation? The idea that a dominant group needs 'emancipating' is not immediately obvious, but is nonetheless worth developing. Pakeha, as a people, are as bound by the essentialist economy of self/other relations constituted in

1. Others include the following: Berg (1994), Berg & Kearns (1996), Brown (1989), Calder (1996), Dibley (1997); Dyson (1995), Lawn (1994), Matahaere (1995), Maxwell (1994; 1995), Mohanram (1999), Tilbury (2001), Turner (1999a; 1999b).

2. See, for example, Linda Tuhiwai Smith (1999).

colonialism as are Maori,[3] in fact possibly even more so, since Maori have been engaged in anti-colonial resistance far longer. While Maori and Pakeha emancipatory projects are, and must remain, distinctive, we need also to avoid an artificial intellectual segregation between them. Our histories and identities are 'entangled' and the project of moving beyond colonialism requires the identification of its traces in both our representations of ourselves and of each other. To talk about Pakeha, for instance, without talking also about (but not 'for') Maori would be to ignore the impact of the history of colonisation on the constitution of Pakeha identity and to continue colonial relations by relegating the experiences of Maori "to the margins of history" (Maxwell, 1994, p. 326).

In place of essentialism, as Peters argues, we need to conceptualise cultures and identities in dynamic terms. Such an orientation encourages consideration of the processes of identity construction and of cultural change and the significance of intersubjective relations in those processes. There are of course a variety of ways in which this dynamism might be theorised, many of them utilising metaphors of movement to illuminate the abstract concept of 'identity'. For Deleuze and Guattari (1987) this means replacing our 'sedentarist' histories with 'nomadologies'. For Homi Bhabha (1994, p. 9) it means an emphasis on the 'unhomely', destabilising moments that disrupt any sense of certainty in identity. Both these approaches seek to 'uproot' cultural identities from any idea of a fixed relation to place. Certainly the problems that arise from the ways in which peoples consider particular geographies 'theirs' and seek to exclude 'others' don't need to be rehearsed. Here again though, the specificities of settler and indigenous identities and cultures tend to escape these primarily northern hemisphere

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3. See, for example, Stephen Turner's (1999a) argument regarding Pakeha that "it is possible to open up the cultural body, to recover the feeling of encounter and exchange with a new place and other peoples. Not to do this may be to participate in colonialism, but the illiberal settler is little moved by past excesses: a stronger motive for such recovery is that forgetting settlement is also not to know oneself, not to be fully alive to the experience of place" (p. 22).

conceptualisations. The universalisation of 'homelessness' may have more emancipatory purchase elsewhere than it does here.

One fruitful line of inquiry for a local cultural studies, I believe, is to explore the possibility of other alternatives to the binary opposites of claims to territorial exclusivity, on the one hand, and 'uprootedness' and 'homelessness' on the other. Can we conceive of the dynamism of identities with emplaced histories?[4] Can we conceptualise belonging in non-exclusivist terms? Such an alternative would more closely relate to the experiences and desires of both Maori and Pakeha. The relationship to place is central to the identity construction of each, albeit in profoundly different ways and in culturally distinct registers. Consequently any local cultural studies must be able to theorise and account for those relationships and the conflicts and connections between them. In this regard, for the analysis of Pakeha, I consider the concept of 'unsettlement' has huge potential, evoking both a sense of dynamism in a way distinctive to our situation and also the problems of the Pakeha relationship to place.

Peters points also to the need to move beyond binary, oppositional thinking. I agree absolutely that this is a crucial direction for scholarly work on Maori, Pakeha and their 'entangled histories', but must take issue with the binarism Peters himself slips into in his opening discussion of the local situation. Ranginui Walker is quoted accounting for the difference between Maori and Pakeha in terms of the traditionalism of the former and the modernity of the latter, an argument Peters then seems to accept. The binary opposition of 'tradition' and 'modernity' slides easily into the primitive/civilised opposition.[5] These binary pairings have been widely critiqued for continuing, rather than disrupting, the colonising project. As the

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4 This question is addressed variously by Allon (2000) and Grossberg (1996).

5 See Appadurai (1988) and Wolfe (1994) for extensive discussion of the effects of the traditional/modern dichotomy on so-called 'traditional' peoples. See Dibley (1997) and Turner (1999b) for two very different, but both critical, accounts of the representation of Maori in terms of the primitive/modern dichotomy.

bearers of tradition and culture in this pairing, Maori are subject to what Andrew Lattas (1990) describes in relation to Aboriginal Australians as:

> ... a patronising gesture that constructs the Other as full of a significance which we lack. This ideology positions itself as non-racist because it values the primitive whilst denouncing the spiritual poverty of Western society. However, the effect of this ideology is simply to imprison Aborigines within a binary opposition where they become the system of meaning which White society has lost (p. 61).

Peters gives the impression of pursuing this mode of reasoning when he quickly follows the quote from Walker with the following: "use of the term 'culture' in relation to Pakeha is problematic for it gains purchase only from being *not*-Maori." Without any further explication of this point these words seem to imply that Peters is arguing that Pakeha are 'culture-less' and that the term 'Pakeha' refers only to some 'empty' Other to Maori – Pakeha 'lack' is constituted by Maori plenitude. This statement reeks of the cultural essentialism and binarism which Peters elsewhere derides and seems completely at odds with his call for "questions of ontology to become historicized." Such a statement seems to posit 'culture' in terms of the purity and stasis Peters sees as problematic in Hegelian thought and denies Pakeha any validity as a people on the grounds of their very dynamism – migration and cultural translation.

It *is* possible however that Peters simply refers here to the impossibility of understanding Pakeha in isolation from Maori. Stephen Turner (1999b) has expressed this more clearly and in the terms Peters suggests a local cultural studies should pursue when he says that being Pakeha is:

> ... bound up with the encounter with Maori in the same way that the construction of civilization, conceived as European high culture, is bound up with the conception of the primitive in the state of nature. The history of cultural contact suggests a genealogy, or history of identity, the idea that having a culture is the result of a reciprocal exchange with others which grounds a sense of "who you are." (p. 412)

In a sense Peters' seeming repetition of a problematic essentialism and binarism perfectly illustrates the need for the studies for which he calls. Extensive exploration of the impact of colonialism on the constitution of Maori and Pakeha identities and relations is crucial if we are to escape colonial modes of thought and modes of interaction. In addition, investigation of the specificities of indigenous and settler identities and relations has much to offer in extending the theorisation of cultural difference and of modes of belonging to place. While international theory is crucial to these projects, we should certainly remain cautious about 'direct imports' of northern hemisphere theorising and develop distinctive conceptualisations which address the particularities of a settler society.

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Commentary on Michael Peters' *'Cultural studies and the future of "culture"'*

Katie Pickles,

Michael Peters' article raises the important issue for cultural studies in Aotearoa/New Zealand of whose knowledges are relevant for 'our place.' It makes me reflect upon the on-going irony and tension involved in drawing upon the ideas of 'great' thinkers in cultural studies who did not intentionally think or write for here. Can the way forward for situated knowledges ever be to mimic the ideas of elsewhere? I find Michael Peters's article refreshing and clear in some places, while in others, trailing off into the complexities of languages and ideas constructed in other times, for other spaces.

On one hand (and in the first half of the essay), Peters is engaged and political, and is refreshingly clear in providing a situated overview of the development of cultural studies in Aotearoa/New Zealand. On the other hand (in the second half of the essay), Peters relays the ideas of a series of key philosophers. Hegel, Levi-Strauss, Foucault, Nietzsche, Lyotard and Derrida are amongst those mentioned. Peters comes up with a "post-Nietzschean conception of cultural studies" in which "we might talk of a deepening of democracy and a political critique of Enlightenment values based upon criticism of the ways that modern liberal democracies construct political identity." The connection to Aotearoa/New Zealand of post-Nietzschean cultural studies is not broached. I am left wondering about the implications of Peters' placeless vision which would, I believe, see Aotearoa/New Zealand grasping at what has been done elsewhere, rather than charting its own unique trajectory.

Peters sets out in useful fashion by situating Aotearoa/New Zealand in a 'settler society' context. He refers to the 'curious absence' of cultural studies as an institution. Such an absence is indeed both disappointing, and perhaps surprising. (It is worth mentioning here that the University of Canterbury now has an undergraduate cultural studies programme.) Peters suggests that biculturalism's failure to extend far beyond 'lipservice' and the strength of essentialist narratives of modernity are reasons why

Aotearoa/New Zealand has not developed a strength in cultural studies. In addition, I would suggest that a further component in an explanation is that the recent past here has been *too* political and *too* raw. Aotearoa/New Zealand hasn't needed a cultural studies school to express anguish, because to live in Aotearoa/New Zealand is to live cultural studies. Rather than coalesce around institutionalisation, the focus here has been on education, and upon land. Just as rural imaginings are never far away, nor is our cultural past, present and future.

Another important consideration in understanding why cultural studies has not developed in Aotearoa/New Zealand as it has elsewhere is that while so much Marxist-grounded cultural studies has centred upon deconstructing hegemonies, here in Aotearoa/New Zealand the position and function of the hegemonic is unique. First, the Crown is a mediator between Maori and settler interests. Second, due to the relative lack of capital investment in New Zealand's past, the scale of our history is smaller. We do not have institutions to the same extent as elsewhere. We are a place of thinking small-scale. Our schools and hospitals exist as colonial monuments to pragmatism and limited resources. Here, the pedestals are shorter, although not easily toppled due to complex, contradictory and tense relationships – witnessed in the tryptic of Maori/Crown/settler society.

Another factor in explaining the lack of cultural studies in Aotearoa/New Zealand is that the cultural studies of elsewhere often implies multiculturalism, multiple identities and differences: a break from modernity and a challenge to essentialism. This is worth emphasising, as such ideas do not rest easy with bi-culturalism. Such uneasiness needs to be addressed. Aotearoa/New Zealand's past is one of two-way transaction, contact, conflict, interaction, and nuance. The 'Empire striking back' in Britain, and the Birmingham School's emphasis on immigrant cultures are a different politics to Aotearoa/New Zealand's redress to Maori for the settler past. It is no co-incidence that Linda Tuhiwai Smith's brave book *Decolonizing methodologies: Research and indigenous peoples* is receiving considerable international attention, especially amongst those grappling with the tensions and interconnections between cultural studies and

indigenous peoples. Perhaps Aotearoa/New Zealand is a site for the germination of new forms of cultural studies?

Further to the issues of biculturalism and essentialism, mid-way through a paragraph on cultural difference, Peters slips in a contentious point about Pakeha and identity. In suggesting that 'Pakeha' is "problematic for it gains purchase only from being not-Maori", Peters is signalling the recognition of the construction of Pakeha identities. This seems an irrefutable point, as the construction of culture and the differences in being Irish, Scottish, working class etc. are of great salience. But such lines of argument risk reinforcing essential identities and not recognising the importance of interaction between different groups in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Such discussion contrasts with Peters' emphasis on the pitfalls of essentialism, and the development of auterity in the second part of his essay. Peters causes me to pause and think about how strongly the limits of auterity are reached in theory and practice in New Zealand. With its blendings, relentless clashes, and mixings, I believe that New Zealand tests the limits of European theories.

What are the implications of the structuralist notion of culture for New Zealand? Strategic essentialism, situated knowledges, or, as Peters suggests, post-Nietzschean cultural studies? Peters signals the problems of essentialism. Yet for Aotearoa/New Zealand's bi-cultural pursuit, strategic essentialism can be useful. And if there is any enlightenment notion deserving of retention, it is that of hegemony, whose importance in colonisation (cultural, economic, political) is 'essential' when unpacking the construction of such culture. Retaining a sense of hegemony is vital in avoiding celebrating the Pakeha coloniser.

Two recent works signal that we are at an exciting moment in Aotearoa/New Zealand cultural studies. Indeed, in line with the cultural cringe that saw Crowded House recognised in the United States before New Zealand, we have Aotearoa/New Zealand-situated work that has made it big in the international intellectual arena. In *Black body*, Radhika Mohanram (1999) writes of "continual recategorization – from 'unmarked' to 'brown' to 'black'" taking the classification of race into the terrain of "the social, economic and cultural history, as well as the markers of the places of domicile,

of the subject" (pp. xii). Her discussion of "raced hierarchies, embodied nations, bodily identity and mobility" are grounded in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Linda Tuhiwai Smith's *Decolonizing methodologies: Research and indigenous peoples* has resonated with other indigenous cultures, hungry for a critique of Western post-colonial knowledges. She writes that "under colonialism indigenous peoples have struggled against a Western view of history and yet have been complicit with that view. We have often allowed our 'histories' to be told and have then become outsiders as we heard them being retold." These two texts dare to be different, and exist as evidence that the theoretical areas that Peters overviews in the second part of this essay are being vibrantly engaged with in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Rather than mimic the cultural studies of elsewhere, Mohanran and Tuhiwai Smith are situated, sophisticated and relevant. Peters has cause to rejoice.

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SPLAT! KABOOM! : Cultural studies in New Zealand

Alex Calder

"In a small way," wrote Meaghan Morris in a stocktaking essay of 1988, "cultural studies in Australia has been for some time in a state that the Japanese call a boom." Might the same be said of New Zealand? I could answer positively and, in a small way, give an account of some of the cultural studies-ish things that have gone boom over the years in my neighbourhood, but I would be just as inclined to say no, cultural studies never really took off here, and I could, at least in some moods, go further and say a good thing too – we may need a cultural studies 'boom' like we need a hole in the head. Splat or Kaboom? I'm reminded of an anecdote Meaghan Morris goes on to tell about the predicament of Australian bands trying to make it big in Japan. Unknown Aussie band arrives, up comes a cartoon of the inscrutable Japanese businessman: *very sorry, no boom;* famous Aussie band arrives a year later, up pops the business man again: *very sorry, boom over.* With that quandary in mind, I guess you could say New Zealand cultural studies is between booms.

That there has been a sustained international boom in cultural studies is of course in no doubt. Were I to place it between bookends, one end of the shelf might be 1987, when 3 new journals, *Cultural Studies, New Formations*, and *Textual Practice,* all appeared under the Methuen imprint. For the sake of argument, let's say this moment represents the widespread institutional recognition of cultural studies as a highly visible, highly exciting, highly trendy academic inter-discipline. The other bookend might well be *Cultural Studies for Beginners,* published 10 years later in 1997: the blurb says, "Cultural Studies, indisputably the hottest subject on planet earth! But what exactly is it? Where does it come from? What is it for?" – and the book itself gives some answers in a handy pellet form. Those three 1987 magazines were carefully positioned to cater for an explosion of academic writing in applied literary theory and cultural studies, work that more traditional disciplinary journals were often indifferent or hostile to, and that could not possibly be met by older

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'flagship' theory journals like *Critical Inquiry*. It was the start of a period when editors and readers for journals began to blanch at the prospect of yet another feisty article on race or gender in television, written by yet another aspirant on the frosty outskirts of an academic career. The *Cultural Studies for Beginners* book is written for the undergraduate students of those who made it. It meets an old demand: for short cuts, for capsule summaries, for explanatory headlines. A book like this is not necessarily a sign that cultural studies is now de-energised and routine, but it does underscore the extent to which, in the international context, cultural studies has not only arrived, it has long since arrived.

I would have to tell a very different story about cultural studies in New Zealand. Its institutional history is remarkably thin, but looking back I can nonetheless track an informal history of networks, of local interventions, of 'necessary corrections,' and of family resemblances between disparate projects. For me personally, it goes back to the *And* project and a sort of conspiracy between myself, Leigh Davis, Roger Horrocks, Simon During, and Wystan Curnow among others, to inject 'theory' into local cultural discourse in the dark closing years of the Muldoon era. My editorial for the second issue finished up like this:

> A culture is a special community of sign users. We speak of Maori culture, Punk culture, rugby culture, cultural communities within the arts as well as culture broadly defined as "The Arts." All these variously sized populations are cultures for two reasons: 1) their members recognise a complex formation of codes as a group style; 2) that group style bears a coded relation to patterns of cultural dominance ... As a language centered text, *And* takes it as axiomatic that textuality is never confined between two covers. *And* can read everywhere, and culture is its favourite, 'unputdownable' text.

Stirring words. Yet if anything looks dated in that issue now, it is not the amateurish pieces on popular culture we mostly solicited from others, but my own editorial with its post-Althusserian critique of New Zealand poetry in relation to patterns of cultural hegemony – an early example of theory dazzle. Later pieces got it right, and cultural studies in Auckland in the eighties went on to develop a

house style that was more filtered through deconstruction and psychoanalytic criticism than was generally the case elsewhere. Jonathan Lamb's *The uncanny in Auckland*, an essay on the Mervyn Thompson affair and the play it repeated, is a good example of how seeing a problem through the lens of literary poststructuralism could promote a sharp and pertinent intervention in local cultural debates. Other essays in a similar vein also appeared in Auckland magazines like *Antic* and *Interstices* but, at least in my case (from which I shall continue to generalise), there was very little difference in methodology between the essays I was writing on Frame, Mansfield, Allen Curnow and the like, and more cultural studies pieces like an essay on *The Sandbaggers*, an espionage TV series I was hooked on, in which I took the line that cultural studies was best practised as a mode of auto-ethnography rather than observations on the viewing habits of others.

That piece came from a winter lecture series organised by Roger Horrocks on television in New Zealand. I recall a sense of common purpose between our small group of literary theorists and 'cross-over' sociologists like Nick Perry, but mutual suspicion and antipathy towards a very much larger 'non-theory' group consisting of the sort of industry guy who wittered on about national identity, the sort of sociologist who believed in surveys and polls, and the sort of feminist who objected to media on the grounds of 'content.' I'm not sure this gap has ever really closed, and its appearance marks a "very sorry, no boom" point at which the kind of story I've been telling starts to diverge markedly from international trends.

Elsewhere, cultural studies tended to take one of two paths. Where there were new universities, you tended to find specific programmes in cultural studies being developed; and where erstwhile polytechnics took on the status of universities, you tended to find cultural studies approaches influencing more vocationally oriented 'communication studies' programmes. In older universities, organised on traditional disciplinary lines, cultural studies tended to be a post-disciplinary phenomenon, often hooked up with new centres for research or special graduate programmes. On the whole, that hasn't happened here. At Auckland, there are no graduate programmes in cultural studies, though many of the theses done in

departments such as English, Film Television and Media Studies, Sociology, Women's Studies, Anthropology, and Art History might well come in under that umbrella. An undergraduate student, looking for the kind of cultural studies major readily found across the Tasman, will find his or her way to many courses in individual departments but no formal programme of study knitting them together.

Is this muted reception simply a peculiarity of our local educational infrastructure or is something else at stake? I believe it's the latter, but before explaining why, I need to signal that what I mean by cultural studies ought now to be understood rather more precisely and narrowly than may have been the case so far. I'll take my definition from one of those 1987 journals I mentioned earlier. "The impulse behind *New Formations*," its editors write, "is the need for sustained critical engagement with the regimes of representation that have become a characteristic and peculiarly pervasive feature of the way power is exercised in contemporary societies." The contemporary or, as we used to say, the postmodern, is one defining element of cultural studies, an interest in modalities of power is another, but you don't in my view have cultural studies without adding to that, a "sustained critical engagement with regimes of representation."

If I were to roll along to a faculty meeting and say, "hands up everyone who does cultural studies!" I believe my definition would thin the forest of arms considerably. Out goes most of English, concerned very much with representations and the circulation of power, but our 'new historicism' is a cultural studies of the past. Out goes much of the social sciences, too, unconcerned or naïve as they are about questions of representation. Not that they need be so concerned, but an interest in popular culture doesn't always go hand in hand with an interest in reading its representations closely or well, so that what one is often left with is a kind of shallow moralising in and around race and gender as themes. I would still have colleagues like Lee Wallace and Nabeel Zuberi left standing who do profess cultural studies according to my narrow definition, but I would not count myself among them.

The reason is not hard to find. Since the late eighties, my own research has mostly been concerned with representations of the past.

I've been particularly interested in literary and ethnographic representations of tapu (or taboo) in early writing about the Pacific, and in relating those early attempts at thinking through the explanatory lens of what we now call 'culture' to our contemporary experience of the difference cultural difference makes. I've been fascinated by beachcombers and missionaries and pakeha Maori, by writers like Maning, Melville, Stevenson, and I'm very much influenced in what I do by the wonderful example of Greg Dening. You won't find excerpts from *Mr Bligh's bad langague* or *Performances* in any international cultural studies readers, but I find it hard to imagine tracking cultural exchange in New Zealand without them. Then again, as part of my ongoing defence against the tedium of New Zealand literature, I've become more and more interested in non-fiction, have put together an historical anthology of the stuff, and have explored various strategies for reading and unravelling these works in a manner that is indifferent to distinctions between literary versus non-literary or to high versus popular cultural forms. In this respect, I'm influenced by new historicists like Stephen Greenblatt and, more particularly, by literary critics like Philip Fisher and the late Tony Tanner, whose books on American cultural history suggest many parallels in terms of our own. Again, it's this kind of work, and not British cultural studies or standard French theory, that seems most pertinent to my current thinking about cultural formations in New Zealand.

The other thing I've been up to, along with my colleagues Wystan Curnow and Stephen Turner, is developing various projects under the general heading of what we call Settlement Studies. We aim to develop new ways of thinking about the cultural histories of settler societies, particularly, but not exclusively, of Aotearoa/New Zealand. Our paradigm differs from older nationalist accounts of settlement culture which stress the formation of a distinct cultural identity, and from metropolitan post-colonial approaches which are inclined to view the historical processes of colonialism too starkly in terms of active agents and passive victims. The idea of the settler who arrives and starts over, and the idea of the settler who arrives and takes over, are simplifying cartoons for what we take to be more complex, entangled, and unfinished histories. We don't celebrate the processes

of settlement. We take it that the settlement of another's country is necessarily painful, partially blind to its own activity, contradictory and contested. We are especially interested in the way these various problems of settlement are not only enacted but repeated in literature, art, and other cultural forms. Some specific examples: I've introduced and edited the first critical edition of F. E. Maning's *Old New Zealand and other writings* (see Calder, 2001), a central text for this field, and am writing a long essay, *The settler's plot*, about what happens when land changes hands in literature and film. Wystan Curnow, who has been putting together a McCahon exhibition for the Stedelijk Museum in Amsterdam, has been writing about mapping and the politics of landscape, and has been involved with Leigh Davis and others in editing and producing *Te Tangi a te Matuhi*, a book which stages a cross-cultural exploration of the legacy of Te Kooti through oral and pictorial maps as well as a number of writings. Alongside other important essays, Stephen Turner has recently finished writing *Stories of unsettlement: An autobiography of place*, an as yet unpublished book examining the insecurity of settlers who can neither forget history nor adequately remember it. The work we do is often theoretical, and reflects on how the project of settlement produces impasses that cannot be resolved within the discursive universe of settlement.

This leaves me with a problem of pigeon-holing. It's clear that very little of what I now do is recognisable as international cultural studies. Nor is there a boom for it elsewhere. And while I'm by no means an enemy of developments in the general cultural studies field, I am a little wary and weary of what Stephen Turner terms cargo-cultural studies: the "sorry boom-over" mistake of imagining you will be transported to the cutting edge of intellectual practice (and boost EFTS besides) simply by running courses on, say, sexuality and subversion in *Shortland Street*. We regard settlement studies as offering one highly developed alternative model of how the big fluffy metropolitan world of theory-come-postcolonial-come-cultural studies can be made local. The result is a *New Zealand* cultural studies and not just cultural studies imported to New Zealand. If that distinction has any pertinence, then the future of New Zealand cultural studies will continue to involve cross-cultural traffic with

the past, not exclusively or uniquely, but in profoundly local ways that may also be of comparative interest some place else.

I've told what may seem rather too personal a story, but a roll call of the major cultural studies debates and occasions over the last decade (thin on the ground as they are) would suggest it is not an idiosyncratic one. In 1990, Ian Wedde and Greg Burke put out *Now See Hear!*, an eclectic collection mapping "translations between art, language, advertising, television, graphic design, comics, video, film, history, art-history, signs and symbols, landscape and architecture within the context of the current conditions of the market place." It wasn't entirely historical or solely concerned with cross-cultural issues, but it had, nonetheless, a skewed and critical relation to the various official markers of New Zealand's 150th year. It was what we could now call a cultural studies book, though I'm not sure if it would have obviously seemed so then. By 1993 – the year Simon During's *Cultural studies reader* came out – the term was well known and available, but it should not be forgotten that, over there in Melbourne, Simon was not only promoting international cultural studies and recasting their English Department along those lines, he was also writing a series of key essays (*What was the West?*, *Postcolonialism or postmodernism today*, etc.) that crucially informed what I'm calling the historical turn of New Zealand cultural studies.

The transformative capacity of a local cultural studies has been most evident in and around the art world. Others know this history much better than me, but it is important to signal the exhibitions and catalogue essays accompanying such shows as *Sex and sign*, *Exhibits*, *Putting the land on the map*, all from the late eighties, and the biggie, Robert Leonard's *Headlands: Thinking thorough New Zealand art* which rethought the recent history of New Zealand Art from the perspective of cultural studies, and went on to trigger a sometimes shallow and rancorous debate on the propriety of Pakeha appropriations of Maori art forms. In 1994, there was the Under Capricorn/Is Art a Western Idea? conference. It took up a variety of questions arising from the aftermath of *Headlands* and the international success of the Te Maori exhibition, and sought to trouble distinctions between the modern and the non-modern, the global and the local, high art and popular culture, in ways that were often

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energised by the kind of work James Clifford had been doing in a series of brilliant essays collected in *The predicament of culture*. I doubt there is a museum or art gallery in the country whose exhibition practices and strategies have not been made over by a local, art-oriented cultural studies whose most resplendent and vulgar temple is, of course, Te Papa.

The most recent cultural studies bash I've attended was there. Culture Shock/The Future of Culture was, I seem to recall, Te Papa's inaugural, showcasing international conference. It was great. It was the conference where Meaghan Morris lost her glasses, forgot her paper, and so ended up with no alternative but to deliver, with stunning eloquence, an impromptu piece on the implications of the recent Wik decision, on Pauline Hanson, and on the poisonous attitude of urban liberals to their 'country cousins.' Ian Wedde, a virtuoso of local cultural studies, told a number of artful and resonant stories, Dave Dobbin sang, and I heard for the first time the amazing work of Geoff Park – a mix of ecohistory, geography and cultural studies. Tipene O'Regan talked about history, fisheries allocations, the role of the jig-saw in Maori carving, and the ethnography of 'flash huis.' A talk about the teenage Polynesian rap scene in Australia featured a performer called 'Fatty Boomstick' – a name unheard for eons, but redolent of playgrounds and *temps perdu*. Andrew Ross gave a slide show talk on Celebration, Florida, the 'new town' built by Disney where he'd been living the past year, and that minx, Cushla Parakowhai, did a sort of comedy routine that ended with her audience singing the national anthem in Maori with the enthusiasm of a well-drilled kindergarten class. For much of the time, the conference managed to be smart without being academic, bicultural without being churchy, local without being insular.

Where do we look to for other such occasions? And where might work along these lines be published? The history I've outlined suggests that even though universities as institutions have found it hard to play much of a role, semi-academic institutions, like galleries and museums, have more effectively positioned themselves as post-disciplinary intellectual sites. No doubt various dumbings-down and compromises are current there too, but the energy and vitality

of the cultural studies influenced art world is such that it even has its own visiting anthropologist in Nicholas Thomas, whose many books and articles are also part of our cultural studies canon.

I began by quoting from a well known article by Meaghan Morris that addressed the problem of banality in cultural studies (i.e. she rejects the patronising 'high culture' idea that everyday culture is banal, yet she also finds the repetitive mantras of a lot of what passes for cultural studies exceedingly banal). As I'm a literary type (almost an aesthete!) writing in a journal for sociologists, I suppose I mustn't be allowed off of this hook. Rather than use her term, banal, I prefer terms like ordinary or everyday. Now I have experiences every day and I also have everyday experiences, but do I ever have an experience of the everyday, of what we might call the culture of everyday life? I'm with those (Wittgenstein, Philip Fisher) who say the ordinary or the everyday is not a category one experiences. It's on the far horizon of my attention. What I notice has stopped being everyday in my noticing of it. But this hoving into view of the ordinary can be a source of surprise, curiosity and wonder to me. Cultural studies might be considered, albeit ideally, as a set of interpretive techniques for making ordinary everyday life heave into view. It doesn't 'demystify' – the ordinary is not hidden – it doesn't 'make strange' – the ordinary is not a habit one needs to be saved from – but it is a mode of attention that makes the peripheral visible in ways that should give you pause. If cultural studies loses that capacity for wonder, I don't think it's worth doing.

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Cargo-cultural studies

Stephen Turner

> *Stand in the place where you live*
> *Now face North*
> *Think about direction*
> *Wonder why you haven't before*
> *Now stand in the place where you work*
> *Now face West*
> *Think about the place where you live*
> *Wonder why you haven't before* (R.E.M. Stand).

The belated concern in Aotearoa New Zealand with something called cultural studies, as much as 30 years old elsewhere, explains my title: cargo cults set up for worship the locally strange objects that have come off the boat, or fallen out of the sky. The idea is not just that we import a wide range of goods, but that we can import thinking, too, rather than having to do our own. Hence what passes for a cultural studies course here will most likely consist of the works of established critics in the 'field,' providing students with the currency, or credit, of a certain knowledge they can no doubt use as academic vouchers elsewhere (although elsewhere you will get something less than an A+ for unquestioning though perhaps rigorous reproduction). The point is that cultural studies does not work like this in its various sites of origin, where it is the fruit of a more genuine intellectual or critical impulse.[1] How to teach students criticism and good habits of self-reflection in this place, and not just how others have usefully done so in other places – without question providing useful models for thinking – is not just a problem of institutionalising cultural studies, but of institutionalising the production of 'critical' knowledge more generally.

Cultural studies concerns nothing less than the self-conception of the new humanities (arts and social sciences) just as philosophy

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1. For some idea of the intellectual or critical impulse of cultural studies at one point of origin see Stuart Hall's (1992) remembering of the Birmingham School.

may be said to concern that of the whole university.[2] My interest in the parallel is that there is a difference between teaching and doing philosophy, between what others have usefully thought and what you usefully think; indeed, what you do might even put what you teach – the 'field' as it stands – entirely in question. This point of tension is vital in all fields of knowledge, no less the would-be field of cultural studies.

Yet what the real object of cultural studies is, or should be, is the topic of much short-sighted and self-serving conversation among specialists (the conversation keeps them in business if nothing else). Because cultural studies partly involves generating ways of thinking that are appropriate to the culture of study, or the culture in which you are studying (let's not worry for the moment what 'culture' means), you just have to think about it for yourself, in your own place, for your own purposes – reflecting a genuine intellectual or critical impulse – not excluding the question as to why we suddenly want 'cultural studies' here. If we find it difficult to conceive of cultural studies in terms of local making that is because the belated desire to have cult. studs or crit. theory is caught up in changing conditions of academic work (the forced autonomising of universities and so on). Cultural studies is part and parcel of what I will call the World-Excellent University – the site of Cargo-Cultural Studies – an idea of economising the production of knowledge that is utterly specious.

The mission statement of the World-Excellent University will be greatly concerned with internationalisation or international standing (Go Global is the motto). If, however, cultural studies is symptomatic of changing conditions of academic work, including the need to find new sources of revenue, it also presents the new university with something of a problem. For cultural studies is to some degree peculiar to the place of its study, or doing, and may not be recognised as meeting standards of excellence – which amounts to recognised modes of good practice – that have already been established elsewhere, may not even be recognised (yet) as properly part of the

2. Consideration of this claim usually takes as its starting point the classical or enlightenment model of the university as laid out by Immanuel Kant in *The contest of faculties*.

'field.' The self-contradiction of cultural studies as such throws into sharp relief the new economy of an international or internationalising academy.

If the World-Excellent University conceives of knowledge-production on the model of go-getting private entreprise, what is productive can only be measured as such within a larger economy, and its significant indices (measures that signify endorsement by international peers). But the knowledge gained from criticism and self-reflection may not be 'productive' in this sense – studying Maori kawa may not contribute to a field as such[3] - nor its benefits strictly calculable. The increased emphasis on research – the capital of the World-Excellent University – makes good or better whatever is fundable according to the above indices. Yet because the knowledge of criticism and self-reflection is not quite predictable, cannot be fully anticipated, the emphasis on calculable research suggests a kind of risk aversion – a tendency to fail-safe investment – that we more commonly associate with large banks or housing societies. Risk aversion in the university leads to the fellow-fashioning of academic specialisation rather than real innovation and transformation, leading to the intellectual inflation of new fields such as cultural studies, or the closely associated postcolonial studies (while adding 'post' to 'colonial' makes no sense in the context of a Maori place you might reasonably think 'cultural studies' without the 'colonial' in it actually inconceivable here).[4]

3. I do not attempt to address here what does and does not constitute 'criticism.' Suffice to say that Maori modes of self-reflection cannot be excluded from any conception of what cultural studies might be, or be about, in this place. A point of very great importance somewhat lost in the internationalising of cultural studies is that modes and not just objects of criticism and self-reflection differ. The economics of institutionalising cultural studies has partly worked to ensure this reduction.
4. Consider this salutary point by E. San Juan, Jr (1998, 275): "With the appropriation of the equally nascent field of 'cultural studies' by Australians, Canadians, and other Commonwealth settlers resentful of British and American hegemony, postcolonial studies seem destined to become a terrain of contestation by warring disciplinarians from settler regions. In that case, the horrors of Western imperialism will be replayed — this time on the backs of postcolonized victims everywhere."

I may well work in the future Coca Cola University, but the university will remain, hopefully, within the domain of criticism and self-reflection. My wishful charter is that criticism and self-reflection be sponsored without exemption. My only question is this: can there be in the university more than one idea of the university? When the university ceases to tolerate different ideas of it then it ceases to tolerate the criticism and self-reflection of intellectuals, as opposed to the required or prescribed labour of academics, in the place of its setting.

Of course, there are new pressures on the university. Business and political leaders demand that we meet the challenge of the 'knowledge economy.'[5] But this has nothing to do with the knowledge produced by criticism and self-reflection. It is certainly good to produce experts in information technology (similarly doctors, teachers and so on), but less clearly good that the university itself should be reduced to a mere function of a larger economy. Cultural studies, if it's worth its salt, is one area where new conditions of labour – not just for academics – can be considered without criticism and self-reflection being made directly subject to capital gain, and recuperated by an internationalising economy of which it is inevitably part. Changing conditions of labour presage the disintegration of disciplines – the replacement of self-standing and static areas of knowledge (the cognitive product of 'disinterested' and detached observation) with performative and experimental knowledge (understood as a product of the frame or technology of observation). The need for post-disciplinary structures of knowledge-production is patent (rather than greater specialisation or new disciplines on the old model). Knowledge as an object of performance and experiment – production understood in the sense of 'staging' rather than simple output or economic benefit – at least makes self-conscious territorialising desire, which is the basic objection to the imperialism of modernity, and to the disciplinarity of the modern university.[6] Similarly, the more advanced

5. Witness the media-trumpeted 'Knowledge Wave Conference' recently held in Auckland (August 1-3, 2001).

6. The exclusive maintenance of the areas of knowledge of traditional disciplines ('fields'), or the development of new disciplines on the same

territorialising of postmodernity – pressures exerted by corporatised capital and global marketing – ought to be a question for the new university and not just an opportunity for profit, that is, through internationalising becoming world-excellent.

Meanwhile the empty criteria of excellence (who disputes excellence?), or the received standard of 'world-class,' makes changing conditions of life and labour (if you have work) all the more difficult to articulate in terms of local experience, understanding and conception. In a cultural studies with some imagination made native – not necessarily called 'cultural studies'[7] – there is an intellectual or critical impulse which the Thinking University nurtures where the World-Excellent University disavows.

The irony of cultural studies in the new university is that the unthinking reception and replication of prevailing ideas in the field is precisely not the hallmark of excellence and innovation; it defines the Also-Ran University. So the belated interest in cultural studies is nicely self-colonising. This is something more than economic opportunism. Or better said, *no more than economic opportunism* (a long-standing reason for the evasion of the local by non-Maori locals). The problem is that Aotearoa New Zealand might be made wholly reducible to the original desire of the majority of its settlers for a better life elsewhere (i.e. here), while this need, or drive, itself remains unself-conscious. Without criticism and self-reflection this history of opportunism dooms them to a permanent sense of displacement and hunger for worldliness – not knowing where they are – and the fabricated identity and nation with which this lack of

Footnote 6 continued.

> model, militates against conceiving of processes of culture and colonialism in an interrelated way – relations, say, between institutional, political and economic developments – and makes difficult any reflection on the role of the disciplines themselves in the territorialising of modernity. On the role of history and anthropology in the formation of settler societies, for example, see Nicholas Thomas (1994).

7. See for example Alex Calder's account in this issue of 'Settlement Studies,' which by no means exhausts the possibilities for local cultural studies, or cultural studies made locally relevant.

self-knowledge is masked.[8] Thinking about the place where you are in a way that is appropriate to it may not be advantageous in any world-excellent sense. If being colonial links a place, its peoples and a 'productive' economy through an ideology of sorts (say, the Greater Good of non-Maori settlement) then criticism and self-reflection is strictly non-productive, neither self-serving nor self-rewarding. Would that the interest in cultural studies here reflected such a genuine intellectual or critical impulse.

The purely intellectual aspect of academic labour is in the first instance non-productive, because you cannot say in advance what its aim is, or should be (often enough necessitating academic 'spin' to secure funding). That is, the intellectual's labour is both self-directed (i.e. independent-minded) and directed-to-the-self (i.e. critical and self-reflective). You cannot justify such effort on the grounds that it will prove productive, and therefore any expense incurred will be recuperated; it may well prove non-productive, wasted effort. What I am calling 'intellectual' is strictly an element of waste – redundancy in the structure – and 'academic' the element of production. While the university, among other public institutions, may actually profit at the expense of self-knowledge – including a greater awareness of the stakes of local power-holding – all that saves it from this shortcoming (as I see it) is the intellectual habit of criticism and self-reflection, which acknowledges the fall-out or fall-off of economic opportunism more generally, that is, the real conditions of life and labour in a world-culture of corporatised capital. When academics lose the capacity to question and transform their own conditions of work the university acts as an Intellectual

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8. My argument suggests the need for a cultural studies responsive to the history of place rather than one exclusively concerned with the present, and the seemingly more pressing phenomena of globalisation. While the disregard of history by cultural studies is a theoretical problem which this would-be discipline has only begun to address – as if globalisation is even new – the local embrace of things global over and against a deeply troubling colonial legacy suggests an evasion with obvious historical motivation.

Insurance Society, averting the risk of thinking, if not research.[9] Of course the intellectual may or may not be an academic, but in the purely intellectual aspect of his or her activity is in any case redundant to the 'productive' economy.

What prompts this perhaps fruitless intellectual effort? Many things – self-loathing, traffic jams, social prejudice – but I'm guessing. For me criticism and self-reflection is like scratching, a kind of pleasurable pain which is in the first instance its own reward. I don't say it's healthy but no doubt it highlights sore spots, points of tension, symptoms if not the source of social problems. Which is to say I can no more escape my sense of an unsettled place than my own skin. The pathology of the intellectual, if at all made objective through his or her self-directed 'labour,' is the condition or state of society.

This tension between intellectual and academic work – a tension within academic work itself – might be preserved if the university had any interest in maintaining a culture of criticism. But the university as an increasingly neo-corporate structure, as opposed to its individual members, may have no such interest. Of course institutions depend on innovative members to provide a dynamic and rich environment, but institutions also have a structural impetus to preserve their current state of being, and to ensure that members accommodate themselves to the structure of its current imagining.[10]

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9. At some cost. The operation of a tenure system according to the architecture of traditional disciplines, for instance, has cost the country a generation of younger academics in the area of cultural studies – and some amount of criticism and self-reflection – critics who will have worked instead on non-New Zealand based material to maintain their careers elsewhere. Nor is the recent local interest in cultural studies the result of self-questioning within the university so much as a response to external competition in the environment of tertiary education, including new teaching opportunities. While acknowledging new demands on universities to make ends meet, the simple reduction of criticism and self-reflection to competition for students deprives academic programmes of the intellectual merit that distinguishes and in fact sustains the best of their kind.

10. The point is made at greater length by Hans Magnus Enzensberger (1982, esp pp. 13-14).

The conflict or contradiction in the nature of institutions is not unique to the university. In the interests of being intellectual, however, which is for me the pleasurable pain of criticism and self-reflection, individual members would resist structural moves, like the Cargo-Cultural Studies of the World-Excellent University, in order to sustain this vital (and vitalising) tension, and to avoid the critical illusion of world-following or fellow-fashioning academic culture. My use of 'might' here is naturally speculative, not prescriptive, as my argument is that the future of the university cannot be anticipated or pre-determined.

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Site-ing New Zealand cultural studies: The evolution of *SITES*

Roy Shuker

SITES is a 'cultural studies' journal, currently published twice a year by the Department of Social Anthropology, Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand. The journal initially began as a newsletter in 1981, became the *New Zealand Cultural Studies Working Group Journal* in 1982, and changed its title to *SITES* in 1984. The journal became the central focus of a range of cultural studies work across several departments at Massey, and within New Zealand. Having built its sales up to 4 to 500 copies per issue by the early 1990s, and with a now considerable critical reputation, *SITES* became one of New Zealand's leading academic journals, extending its ambit to the South Pacific more generally. Most recently, the vagaries of academic publishing and a dilution of editorial energies have led to a reassessment of the institutional location of *SITES*.

The following account of the evolution of *SITES* aims to situate the journal in terms of its developing conception of cultural studies, especially its intention to develop a distinctively 'New Zealand cultural studies' and to establish a particular mode of academic practice. Following the focus of the symposium at which an earlier version of this paper was presented,[1] the underpinning theme of the paper is what happens to cultural theory and practice as it migrates between nations and is recreated in new institutional and national contexts. My emphasis is on the early period of the journal, 1982-1994, during which a cultural studies 'project' and a modus operandi were established.

The account is a personal one, drawing on my experience as a founder member of the enterprise, membership of the editorial board since its inception, and periods as the journal's General Editor and Book Reviews Editor. I have also referred to a complete run of the

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1. This is a revised and extended version of a paper originally presented at the Symposium on Cultural Studies in Asia, the Pacific, and the U.S., East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, September 16-18, 1993.

newsletter/journal, the minutes and other documents of the editorial board, and the records of the activities of the loosely-constituted Massey 'Cultural Studies Group' which existed through the 1980s. In addition, this paper has benefited from informal discussions with members of the editorial board, past and present. That said, this is *one* account of the constant reassessment and reinvention of the journal over some twenty years. Further, it is an account restricted primarily to *SITES* itself, since to fully situate its story against the orgy of cultural studies retrospectives and surveys over the past decade is too daunting a task.

Birmingham and beyond

The genesis of *SITES* lay in a shared interest in the work of the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (BCCCS) amongst a number of staff at Massey University in 1980, located in the Departments of Sociology, Education, English, Social Anthropology, and History. It was this very mix of disciplinary backgrounds which made these early discussions and exchanges so stimulating, illustrating Stuart Hall's (1992) observation that "(cultural studies) has had many trajectories; many people had and have different trajectories through it; it was constructed by a number of different methodolgies and theoretical positions, all of them in contention" (p. 278). The BCCCS/Hutchinson volumes then published, and some of the Centre's stencilled papers, were being discussed in an informal manner, as was the work of figures such as Raymond Williams and E.P. Thompson, and various Massey courses began to show the influence of 'English cultural studies.'

The obvious question here, is 'why Birmingham?' Our shared interest in the BCCCS work reflected a more general historical tendency for New Zealand academics to look to the U.K. for intellectual roots and stimulation, a situation reinforced by the local University system having been largely founded and staffed by academics from 'the Mother country,' and by the continued tendency for New Zealanders to undertake postgraduate study in the U.K. More specifically, however, we were variously attracted to the Birmingham 'model' of cultural studies, which combined an

interdisciplinary approach, an emphasis on the politicization of culture, group work, and an engaged, broadly leftish, scholarship.

This shared interest was consolidated at the 1980 New Zealand Sociological Association's annual conference (at Waikato University), with a workshop on 'cultural studies' organized by members of Massey University's Department of Sociology, including Sheila Cox and Peter Beatson. The workshop concluded with general agreement that a newsletter be produced at Massey to maintain contact between the diverse range of people contributing to cultural studies in New Zealand, and to inform them about developments elsewhere.

In producing the first *New Zealand Cultural Studies Working Group Newsletter*, published early in 1981, the co-editors were aware of the diversity of opinion expressed at the Waikato workshop, but saw an overall focus emerging around a general concern with the relationship between consciousness and society. The first editorial (written by Steve Maharey) defined cultural studies more precisely in relation to the concept of production, seeing cultural products and practices "in terms of their material conditions of existence and their work as representations which produce meanings. In other words, our concern is both with modes of production and with modes of signification."

This definition, while materialist in emphasis, already suggested a concern to find a middle way between structuralism and culturalism. This concern dominated early group and newsletter/journal discussions of the nature of cultural studies (CS), and mirrored the debates within 'English CS.' This was most evident in Maharey's (1982) subsequent article, 'Cultural studies: Mapping the field,' which drew on the experiences of a reading group at Massey to map cultural studies within the Birmingham Centre's paradigms of structuralism and culturalism, and shadowed the BCCCS turn to Gramsci for theoretical salvation (see Hall, 1980).

Maharey observed that two consequences followed from this definition. First, CS was unavoidably an interdisciplinary project, involving people from a variety of organizations and groups concerned with culture. Second, since no one discipline or subject area could 'own' CS, "progress will be made where the exchange of ideas is the greatest." Accordingly, the Massey people established a

New Zealand CS Working Group to provide opportunities for the free exchange of ideas and information, using the newsletter as the primary vehicle for achieving this, particularly for those interested from outside of Massey. However, the logistics of getting a national network established conspired against such an ambition (perhaps if E-mail had then been available?!), while the group's adoption of 'New Zealand' in its title was to some a signal that it was attempting to represent the field of CS, and establish a particular reading of CS as the local hegemony.

Indeed, some of the initial exchanges in the newsletter reflected this latter view, with academics at Victoria and Auckland Universities arguing that the Massey group were "adopting a hegemonic and peremptory position, albeit with some reluctance" (Mast, 1982). An editorial response to such criticisms reasserted the nature of CS as a problematic concerned with the relationship between consciousness and society, and with the processes of signification through which that relationship is expressed, but argued that to recognise this is not to necessarily adopt an exclusive or hegemonic position. Stuart Hall's (1980) explanation of the BCCCS position was approvingly quoted as instructive in this regard: "There has never been a rigidly imposed unitary theoretical position in the Centre, though there has always been a general project – the elaboration of a non-reductionist theory of cultures and social formations – and a defined 'universe of discourse' within whose framework different positions and emphases are exposed to mutual critique."

A more formal editorial board was established from issue 2, a group whose institutional location and interests were to give a strongly sociological orientation to the developing enterprise.[2] In his editorial for the second issue, Brennon Wood defined CS as "an interdisciplinary endeavour concerned with understanding the processes of signification," and raised questions of the relationship

2. The initial board, and their primary academic interests (at that time), were: Steve Maharey, Dept of Sociology; cultural theory , subcultures, rock music; Shelagh Cox, Dept of Sociology; sociology of literature, cultural theory; and Roy Shuker, Dept. of Education; education and cultural reproduction; working class history; media studies.

of this to the New Zealand context: "What are the social practices by which shared meanings are produced in New Zealand? What is the nature of the values, ideas, etc so created ?" For Wood, and other members of the group, answering these questions involved rejecting the notion, common amongst nostalgic elitists, that New Zealand lacks a distinctive culture. It also involved striving to overcome the fragmentation of the local "human sciences." Here Wood raised a difficulty which was to ultimately restrict the development of CS at Massey (and, indeed, elsewhere in New Zealand): the fact that CS was too 'departmentalized,' in the sense of being spread across and within traditional subject-based departments, "to produce a unified problem for research and a coherent notion of what consititutes the peculiarly New Zealand culture."

The newsletter became a journal with number 3 (Autumn 1982), which presented an extended editorial policy. The issue included several articles 'mapping the field' of CS, both in terms of its manifestations at Birmingham and in relation to New Zealand; a bibliography on structuralism and semiotics; the first of a series on 'methodologies' (in this case oral history); and a strong book review section. Such a mix was to characterize the journal for the next few years.

The editorial policy, developed in discussion amongst the editorial board with input from the wider Massey group, was a refinement of the viewpoints expressed in the first two editorials:

> The New Zealand Cultural Studies Working Group exists to promote interest in the field of cultural studies. Cultural Studies is a problematic, centrally concerned with the relationship between consciousness and society, and with the processes of signification through which that relationship is expressed. We welcome contributions from anyone working within this problematic. (Editorial Policy, Issue 3)

This was to remain the editorial policy until it was revised and considerably extended in 1984. It is noteworthy that it included no specific reference to New Zealand, although most members were already attempting to apply to the local context in sights and approaches culled from "the BCCCS writers" (especially Willis and

Hebdige) and cultural theorists such as Pierre Bourdieu and Raymond Williams. In this eclecticism, we were displaying what Turner has identified as a central charactersitic of Australian CS: "the postcolonial's version of bricolage – of continually modifying and adapting what comes to us so that it can be put to use" (Turner, 1992, p. 432).

Towards a New Zealand CS

Issue 9 (Spring 1984) saw a change of title, from the cumbersome and now somewhat imperialistic *NZCSWG Journal*, to *SITES A Journal for Radical Perspectives on Culture*. This title was chosen because of its associations with the Gramscian notion of sites of cultural struggle, and the application of this to specific cultural studies in New Zealand, especially those concerned with ethnic, gender, and class politics – admittedly a somewhat traditional sociological trinity, and one which soon became extended. Issue 9 also included a new editorial policy:

> *SITES* has been established to promote the study of cultural questions in the New Zealand context within the broad tradition of left scholarship. By culture we mean the processes by which sense is made of the world, of consciousness and feeling and the forms in which they are expressed. These processes take place in the context of struggle, conflict and negotiation amongst, in particular, classes, genders and ethnic groups. The outcome of these exchanges is taken to be the reproduction or restructuring of relations of domination and subordination. Culture, then, is understood to be inherently political.

The new journal editorial policy stated that its general project was "to promote broadly radical perspectives on culture," and, within this broad ambit, invited "contributions from a plurality of positions."

This policy emphasised the adoption of overseas cultural theory to the New Zealand context, and the development of indigenous CS work. As such, it represented a significant move away from the early preoccupation with assimilating the work of the BCCCS,

towards a more self-consciously New Zealand cultural studies. In part, this move was influenced by the emergence of a distinctively Australian cultural studies. We were aware of the *Australian Journal of Cultural Studies*, launched in 1983, the annual working papers of the Melbourne University Social Research Group in Cultural and Educational Studies, and the work of people such as John Fiske, Graeme Turner, and Lesley Johnson. The assertive nationalism across the Tasman reinforced our own feeling that "Birmingham" and "English CS" had been useful points of reference, but we now needed to move on.

The growth of a New Zealand CS through the 1980s had more to do with an emergent sense of identity, in both national terms and ethnic terms, than had been the case in England. It was also part of a break from a colonial and rural past, a break associated with an emergent biculturalism and the new prominence of the Treaty of Waitangi (1840) and issues of Maori sovereignty, with questions of gender and sexuality in a no longer masculine-dominated frontier society, and with the demise of the country's traditional egalitarianism and the rise of an entreprenuerial culture.

These issues helped create a CS agenda which successive issues of *SITES* have tried to address, and provided starting points for many of the theme issues of the journal in the late 1980s and into the 90s: feminism and gender politics; the role of the media, and the State's role in restructuring the economy and civil society. In each case, the emphasis was on relating 'theory' to the New Zealand context, and providing a forum for the exchange and debate of various cultural studies perspectives.

One difficulty with the theme issues was that the frequent use of 'guest editors' from outside of the 'core' editorial group made the relationship of some of the resultant contributions to the editorial policy at times tenuous. This was particularly evident where contributors were drawn from a range of (non-academic) institutions, and did not have shared conceptions of 'critical,' 'argument,' and 'evidence.' That said, the intention of the journal has been to engage with various cultural positions, at times by simply juxtaposing them within the one journal issue and creating a debating forum. Since the late 1980s, a 'strategy' of alternating theme issues

and more 'general' issues of *SITES* has operated, and has proved a viable one.

While I can not do justice here to the range of themes covered in *SITES* during that time, it is worth briefly alluding to several of the most important in terms of the construction of a New Zealand CS. The question of national identity and its ethnic dimension has been strongly present throughout the history of *SITES*. This reflects the considerable and on-going public debate over such questions as the validity of Maori land claims, the status of the Treaty of Waitangi, the place of Maori in the school curriculum, the nature and status of 'Pakeha' (broadly, 'white' New Zealander of European descent), and the role of corporate culture in co-opting or creating specific images and ideologies of nationhood. A crucial journal issue was number 13, 'Being Pakeha' (Spring 1985; guest editor: Paul Spoonley), in which various contributors interrogated the utility of the notion of 'Pakeha ethnicity,' while *SITES* 18 was similarly devoted to the state of ethnic politics in New Zealand. Issues 30 (Autumn 1995: National Identities/National Futures) and 35 (Spring 1997: Postcolonial Debates) also grappled with these issues, as the country was increasingly characterised by the prominence of its Pacific Islander and Maori populations, and associated issues such as language maintenance, and appropriate health and education provisions for them.

A central aspect of the debate around nationhood and cultural identity was the role of sport, particularly rugby football, in New Zealand. The (South African) Springbok rugby tour of New Zealand in Winter 1981 divided the community, and served to highlight culture as a political issue. The great majority of the Massey CS group were opposed to the tour, with several heavily involved in the widespread protest movement against it. The conflict was a key political event of the 1980s, raising issues of racism, cultural policy, and sport. As Brennon Wood observed at the time (in the editorial to Newsletter 2), the tour produced new meanings and symbols that did not exist prior to it, while the games of rugby (including the two that were not played because of protest activity) made obvious older practices of signification by bringing these into conflict with new and alternative practices. Newsletter 2 included an influential paper

by Canterbury sociologist Geoff Fougere, "Barbed wire and riot squads: What is being defended?," attempting to analyse the 1981 Springbok tour in terms of New Zealand culture. This paper became a focal point for discussions about the significance of the tour, which had both confirmed and strengthened the Massey group's alignment of culture with politics. This interest in sport as cultural politics was subsequently maintained and broadened, with various articles on the media representation of rugby, and a special issue (*SITES* 14, Autumn 1987) devoted to youth, sport and leisure.

Another major concern evident throughout the group and journal's history was feminism. This was evident in many of the articles in the earlier, more eclectic *SITES*, and was the 'theme' for *SITES* 15 (Spring 1987), which posed the question: 'Feminism/80s: What Agenda?' The editors, Allanah Ryan and Judith Loveridge, hoped that 'if we started from the state of feminist culture and politics in New Zealand today, we could begin to map out where feminism should be going and how it is going to get there. We considered that locating the project within a cultural studies framework, that understands culture as inherently political and contested, would be an appropriate way to begin to explore these challenges." A subsequent *SITES* on 'Sex/Politics' (issue 19, Spring 1989) brought together some of the current work being done in New Zealand around sexuality. The emphasis was on "sex not as pleasure, but rather as disease, repression, contestation, oppression, marginality," on sex as "a complex collection of social relations that are produced through the various regulating discourses and practices that are institutionalised in our culture" (editorial: Allanah Ryan).

Other theme issues of the journal have included Health; Public Culture and Institutions; The Media; and Working Class Culture.

SITES and CS at Massey

The Journal was part of a network of CS activities at Massey through the 1980s, based around the ad hoc CS group. These activities included publishing a series of stencilled CS papers; two monographs co-published with the Sociology Department (Brennon Wood, *Smashing the audience*, 1984, on the political economy of New

Zealand television; and Lynley Cvtanovich, *Breaking the silence*, 1985, on NZ woman authors); an annual seminar series, which served to develop work in progress; and symposia at several Sociological Association conferences. Contract teaching and research undertaken by some members of the CS working group fed back into the journal, both intellectually and financially. There were a number of 'cultural studies' masters theses produced in the Sociology and Education Departments, reflecting the involvement of a particularly capable cohort of post-graduate students in the CS group (the monographs mentioned above were initially theses). During the summer of 1981-2, Allanah Ryan worked for the group on a student employment scheme, putting together bibliographies on New Zealand culture, and semiotics and structuralism (with the latter published in the journal). The group also succeeded in building up library holdings of relevant journals, and contacts were developing with overseas CS groups: in 1983 Steve Maharey went to the BCCCS on study leave, and in 1984 Roy Shuker spent four months with the Sociology Research Group in Cultural and Educational Studies, at Melbourne University.

The years 1985-7 proved a watershed period. Attempts to create a Cultural Studies Centre at Massey floundered in the face of traditional academic structures, the lack of someone of professorial status within the group, and the difficulty of reconciling different agendas; a proposed national conference on CS failed to eventuate, and the range of activities evident earlier now ran out of impetus. The result was a shifting of energies almost entirely to *SITES*, and a focus on it and its expanded editorial group as the 'institutionalisation' of CS at Massey. This has remained the case through the 1990s.

A brief note on the pragmatics of publishing *SITES* is worth including at this point. While early issues of the newsletter/journal were funded on a donation basis, with its consolidation in terms of circulation, greater length, and increased production costs, the journal moved to a subscription basis from issue 6. *SITES* has always striven to maintain financial independence, depending primarily its sales and informal departmental support for its sustenance. However, with increased production costs and a declining subscriber

base during 1998-9, the journal needed a 'handout' from the Dean of Social Sciences to balance the books. Since late 1986, it has been based in the Department of Social Anthropology at Massey University, though the Editorial Board has remained more widely representative.

The circulation of *SITES* has been built up and maintained in the usual fashion of such enterprises: through direct approaches to booksellers and potential subscribers, especially libraries; through exchange ads with kindred publications; and through individual Board members participating in various conferences and symposia. Two particular strategies are worth mentioning, as they illustrate the role of pragmatic considerations in the development of what is an economic product as well as an intellectual entity. Firstly, from early on, considerable attention was given to format; in particular, after studying the market and consulting booksellers, we opted for a 'large' format and individually designed full colour covers, designed by Mike Quill. This was a deliberate marketing strategy aimed at giving us greater physical visibilty, to compliment what we immodestly regarded as our intellectual weight. Secondly, in similar vein, the move to theme issues, while justified primarily in terms of these issues being central to a local CS, was not unaware of the potential of specific interest groups as a potential pool of new journal purchasers/subscribers (e.g., *The Green Politics, 22*, Autumn 1991).

'Doing' cultural studies

A series of Board meetings in 1986-7 explored individual members' engagements with CS and their understandings of the field, in the process clarifying the issues involved while also marking out areas of major disagreement. One result of this dialogue was a special issue of *SITES* devoted to 'Intellectuals at Work' (Issue 17, Summer 1988). Allanah Ryan and Judith Loveridge, the editors of this, invited potential contributors to address the general problem of academic work:

> More specifically we wished to examine intellectuals within academia who were engaged in what could be very loosely called

cultural politics. We chose intellectuals in academia not out of any belief that the University is where 'real' intellectual work goes on, but because that is the site where we find ourselves located. The university is a powerful institution and we believe it can be a place where radical work is done. We sought contributions from people who we thought might reflect on their experience of the institution and their attempts to form a radical praxis there (Editorial, *SITES* 17, Summer 1988).

This view reflected the on-going concern of the group to be interventionist in intellectual life, and locate itself within an historical tradition of democratic cultural politics.

Linked to such a view of academic/intellectual practice, has been the question of the journal's commitment to left activism. In setting itself up as *A Journal for Radical Perspectives on Culture*, the journal subtitle (from issues 9 to 24) suggested an interventionist attitude and a concern to reach a constituency broader than the purely academic. Further, there was by the late 1980s a concern to play a role in the forging of a democratic political culture in New Zealand, in part as reaction against the rightist restructuring of the State and civil society and its domination of much of the discourse surrounding these developments. Such concerns were manifest in the editorial policies exhortation to contributors to "write in an accessible style," and the identification of three main audiences for the journal: "First, we are addressing the academic social science community. Second, we anticipate an important audience among professionals working in such areas as the media, education and policy. Third, we want *SITES* to be directly relevant to activists engaged in specific struggles."

A scan of the articles down the years, and the list of subscribers, suggests that these ambitions have arguably been rather muted. Essentially *SITES* has become an academic journal, written in academic language, for a readership that is primarily, but not exclusively, academic. What arguably makes it distinctive, within New Zealand at least, is its continued broad commitment to a left engaged scholarship, reiterated in the editorial of Issue 36 in Autumn 1998: "As an editorial team, we are committed to operating *SITES* as a collegial and politically relevant project. Sites was founded

almost 18 years ago as a forum for airing radical intellectual debate about cultural politics. We remain committed to this project."

The dropping of the 'radical' subtitle, and its replacement in 1992 by *A Journal for South Pacific Cultural Studies* reflected a shift in emphasis. It also indicated an element of disenchantment, most fully expressed by Michael Pickering in his editorial announcing the change: "Ten years ago, it seemed much easier, and more self-sustaining, to use the adjective 'radical' as descriptive of one's political philosophy or critical mode. It is harder now after the ascendancy of the New Right, to be quite so certain. We may now look back ruefully on our brave talk in years past about 'making interventions' in this or that area of public life" (*SITES* 23, Spring 1991). The editorial board was now expanded, and a group of Associate Editors, drawn from New Zealand, the Pacific rim, and the United Kingdom, were added in an effort to broaden the ambit of the journal.

The back issues of *SITES* now represent a substantial body of work delineating 'New Zealand cultural studies.' That the precise nature of this entity remains unclear is not unexpected, as the journal's editors and contributors continue to engage with the old chestnuts of the nature of CS as a field of study, and what it means to 'do' CS. *SITES* continues to define the field of CS locally, acting as a critical gatekeeper by deciding *which* cultural issues are to be accorded the status of 'theme' issues of the journal, and, through its formal refereeing process, which work is accorded 'value' and wider circulation through publication. In common with CS internationally, recent journal issues show something of a trend towards a preoccupation with textual analysis, but there remains a core engagement with cultural policy and its public debates and agendas.

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Changing times, shifting contexts: Variations on cultural politics and 'the turn to culture'

Rosemary Du Plessis

Roy Shuker's history of *SITES* provides a lively set of insights into the ways in which the project of 'cultural studies' has been taken up in Aotearoa/New Zealand. A core issue for Shuker is how cultural theory and the project of cultural studies is modified over time and across national and institutional contexts. I read Shuker's analysis on the evolution of *SITES* through the lens of my own recent involvement in the development of an undergraduate programme in cultural studies at the University of Canterbury. This programme, for which Committee on University Academic Programmes (CUAP) approval has just been obtained, builds on the initiatives documented by Roy Shuker. It is also shaped by intensifying challenges to disciplinary boundaries in the humanities and social sciences, challenges that were often advocated by the founders of *SITES*. This brief paper uses Shuker's social history of *SITES* as a springboard for looking at the more contemporary development of cultural studies at the University of Canterbury.[1]

Shuker maps the way in which *SITES* developed into a key vehicle for publication of New Zealand focused critical cultural and political analysis. The group that came together at Massey in the early 1980s was drawn primarily from the well-established disciples of Sociology, Education, English, Social Anthropology, and History. Their conversations were sparked by a keen sense that critical work on cultural production demanded cross-disciplinary connections. In contrast, over half of those who joined the University of Canterbury Working Party on Cultural Studies in late 1999 represented departments that were already interdisciplinary in

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1. Roy Shuker indicates that his account of the evolution of *SITES* is a personal one. This discussion is also a set of personal reflections – others might offer different accounts of the same set of processes. I was one of seven members of the Arts Faculty Working Party on Cultural Studies convened by Associate Professor Howard McNaughton (English) in late 1999.

orientation: American Studies, Gender Studies, Theatre and Film Studies, and Mass Communication. Those in the more traditional disciplinary fields of English, Art History, and Sociology were in the minority. Work pressures in the Maori Department meant that it was not represented on the working party, although discussion with members of the department occurred at different stages of the planning process.

In the early 1980s members of the Massey cultural studies group were significantly influenced by the work of the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies and *SITES* was defined as "a journal for radical perspectives on culture." Twenty years later, the Canterbury working party had a less coherent commitment to a particular strand of cultural studies and less overt identification with the designation 'radical.' However, like the Massey group of the 1980s, the working party had a mix of intellectual backgrounds, theoretical engagements and methodological expertise. Aware of the need to celebrate these differences and resist codification, but also under some pressure to 'define' cultural studies, the Canterbury working party, like the Massey group two decades before, crafted a statement about 'culture' as a field for political analysis, and attempted to list the types of intellectual work encompassed by the phrase 'cultural studies.' The final version of this statement locates cultural studies "outside the reigning orthodoxies and the still dominant disciplinary traditions in the humanities and social sciences." Echoing the concerns of the Massey group in the early 1980s, the Canterbury working party also identified cultural studies as "committed to the politicisation of knowledge producing practices" (University of Canterbury Working Party on Cultural Studies).

The eclectic body of intellectual work referred to as 'cultural studies' was identified as including empirical work, but also critical of empiricism and traditional historiography. Feminism and gender studies, queer theory, critical and feminist science studies, and work on the politics of disabilities jostled with social semiotics, Marxist cultural theory, post- and anti-colonialism, the new cultural history, critical ethnography, and cultural geography in the list of potential components of the Canterbury cultural studies programme. Shuker

identifies feminism, feminist politics, and sexualities as a major theme in issues of *SITES* over the last two decades. This is also a strong, but certainly not exclusive, focus in the Canterbury cultural studies programme that includes most of the current courses in Gender Studies as well as courses in History, American Studies, Theatre and Film Studies, Sociology, English, Geography, Anthropology, Russian that incorporate feminist analysis. The cultural studies working party were keenly aware of the way in which contemporary cultural studies draws on developments in gender, ethnic, and sexuality studies over the last twenty years.

Just as 'the Massey group' were sometimes identified as potentially constructing a problematic cultural studies 'orthodoxy,' so too were those in the Canterbury working party. Members of the larger Arts Faculty reference group, who met periodically with the working party, provided critical feedback on the draft statement on cultural studies and the fields of inquiry it encompassed. Members of the working party were identified as too US focused by specialists in European literature and culture, while New Zealand scholars thought there was insufficient attention to the specifics of this context. These critiques of output from the working group suggest a lively engagement with the context specific aspects of cultural studies and the impossibility of any group 'owning' the programme.

The Massey focused cultural studies group that spawned *SITES* was very convinced about the need to attend to the political economy of cultural production. Shuker quotes Steve Maharey's statement in 1981 on the significance of attention to both 'modes of production' and 'modes of signification.' Those developing a cultural studies programme at University of Canterbury have probably been more focused on 'modes of signification' than the Massey cultural studies group in the 1980s. This is partly an outcome of shifts in the politics of cultural studies in the last twenty years, and partly a product of the interests of those who have been involved in the working group.

The working party at Canterbury developed an undergraduate programme against the background of the increasing legitimacy of poststructuralist academic work over the last twenty years. The text chosen for the core third year course is the second edition of Simon During's *The cultural studies reader*. Compiled within an Australian

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academic context, it incorporates core texts from scholars associated with the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, but also draws on a range of European, United States, feminist, and postcolonial scholarship. Simon During commented on the first draft of the Canterbury cultural studies proposal and has been an ongoing source of advice. This reflects the extent to which Australia as much as the United Kingdom or the USA is a source of inspiration for contemporary cultural studies in Aotearoa. During's cross-disciplinary collection is aimed at an international audience and encompasses both textual analysis and attention to the political economy of cultural production – both 'signification' and 'production.' It will be complemented by a set of cultural studies texts produced in Aotearoa/New Zealand, including articles that have appeared over the last twenty years in *SITES*.

The Massey cultural studies group and the set of people who founded and sustained *SITES* were pioneers. The Canterbury working party on cultural studies are consolidators rather than front line workers in the field of cultural studies. From the start, the Canterbury working party did not see itself as instituting a new set of courses with a cultural studies label, but facilitating connections between existing courses spread over a number of different departments and disciplinary fields. The challenge was to look at how components of diverse disciplines or interdisciplinary departments might be combined to produce a major in Cultural Studies that was not a substitute or 'master signifier' for degrees in the humanities and social sciences (Striphas, 1998, p. 464).

An examination of courses offered in fields as diverse as German, Film Studies, Geography, and Sociology, indicated a cluster of offerings that explored the politics of place, space, and technologies, particularly the cultural politics of cities. Similarly, a range of courses examined the politics of gender, sexualities, race, migration, ethnicity, and representations of resistant identities. A cluster of courses that addressed the politics of cultural interaction was apparent as well as an array of courses in the field of film, media, sport, leisure, and popular culture. The latter has been enhanced by the recent development of a Mass Communications programme.

Significantly, the development of a cultural studies undergraduate programme did not require the rapid acquisition of

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new journals and books. Cultural studies journals have found their way into the library as 'old' disciplines and new cross-disciplinary programmes have found them imperative for their teaching and research. A report from the library confirmed that holdings are strong because of the activity of departments such as American Studies, English, Sociology, and Feminist Studies over the last decade. The development of Theatre and Film Studies has also had a major impact on relevant library holdings. The development of the Anthropology programme has also contributed to an improvement in library resources. Holdings in this field will enhance students' access to books and journals on culture as social process and the materiality of cultural production. The development of cultural studies in the last 20 years is also marked by an expansion in the number of websites with a cultural studies focus.[2]

Within the faculty there was some disquiet that a programme in cultural studies could undermine student enrolment in existing programmes at a time of static or declining numbers in the humanities and social sciences, both locally and nationally. The working party argued that the programme would build on existing courses rather than setting up a competing set of courses labelled 'cultural studies.' The final version of the programme introduces just one new course, a third year core course, that is compulsory for all those majoring in this programme. CULT301: Cultural Studies – Theories and Practices includes a research segment on cultural production that will involve students working in teams to investigate particular sites of cultural production. It is envisaged that skateboard facilities, web design businesses, kohanga reo, hairdressing salons, sports bars, working men's clubs, martial arts schools, tattoo shops, video parlours, museums and art galleries will be potential sites for this work. The aim is to ensure that students attend to the economics and social relations of cultural production as well as textual analysis.

2. See for example: CULTSTUD-L http://www.cas.usf.edu/communication/rodman/cultstud/index.html
Cultural Studies and Critical Theory http://eserver.org/theory/
Critical Approaches to Culture, Communications + Hypermedia
http://www.eciad.bc.ca/~rburnett/

Those involved in developing this new programme have been acutely aware that there are deep contradictions involved in setting up an undergraduate degree in cultural studies. A cultural studies programme may resist disciplinarity, but it also potentially mimics the disciplines in order to create legitimacy. An attempt was made to embrace openness within the cultural studies undergraduate programme and minimise rigidity with respect to how students might move through courses in this field. For this reason the programme does not start with a base, or foundational, first year Cultural Studies course, but instead encourages interaction between students coming out of different facets of the programme at the third year level. Some commentators have seen this as a weakness of the programme.

Why has Canterbury, one of the most conservative of New Zealand's universities, mounted the first cultural studies programme in this country? Why has the proposal not met with more resistance? Part of the explanation for this rests in the pursuit of incorporation as a core strategy. The number of existing courses that could be identified as suitable for the programme is indicative of the ways in which cultural studies has had an impact on Geography, Sociology, English, German, and History during the last twenty years. Within almost every department in the Arts Faculty there are individuals who teach, write, and research in ways that are inflected by this set of intellectual and political challenges to the humanities and social sciences. The impact of feminist scholarship, even in an institution as conservative as University of Canterbury, means that there are now a range of courses across departments that engage with feminist political analysis. Postcolonial critiques have also had a significant impact on the way in which Art History, Gender Studies, and New Zealand History are taught. Consequently there is an array of exciting and relevant courses that students will be able to combine in different ways to construct degrees with a focus on cultural studies.

These courses vary in the extent to which they engage with what During (1999) has referred to as 'engaged cultural studies' as opposed to 'the turn to culture' (p. 24). During distinguishes an increasing focus on 'culture' and issues of representation from

analyses "with an openness to the culture's reception and production in everyday life, or more generally its impact on life trajectories" (p. 25). The aim of 'engaged cultural studies' is to produce analyses of culture that 'listen to far-off and marginalised voices.' For During, this project involves constantly challenging the boundaries in which it is located, including disciplinary boundaries and academic/non academic divisions.

Roy Shuker discusses attempts by those producing *SITES* to develop 'a distinctively New Zealand cultural studies' and an appropriate mode of 'academic practice.' This is an issue that has also concerned the Canterbury working party on Cultural Studies. What is distinctive about this programme that locates it in Aotearoa/ New Zealand at this point in time? The core statement about cultural studies developed by the working party suggests that cultural studies offers conceptual tools that can be used to analyse debate about 'biculturalism' and 'multiculturalism' in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Some of the courses included in the programme have a strong focus on the specificity of this context; they include: Te Ao Hurihuri: The Westernisation of Nineteenth Century Maori Society; Te Taura Whakairo: Maori Art – The Continuum; Te Ara Motuhake: Twentieth Century Maori Politics; the Sociology of Ethnicity; Post Colonial Writing; and Pacific Arts – Transition and Change.

What is the place of sociology within the cultural studies programme at Canterbury? The programme has been designed so that students can pursue a range of different pathways within the programme. One of those pathways involves completing the second year course on social theory offered by the Department of Sociology and Anthropology. Other routes into the third year programme are a course on popular culture and the media offered by American Studies, a course on postcolonialism offered in Gender Studies, a cultural studies course on cultural collection and display offered in English, and a mass audiences course offered by the Department of Mass Communication. A number of courses in sociology have been identified as optional courses for students preparing to enter level three courses in cultural studies; they include the sociology of sport and leisure, globalisation, ethnicity, and the sociology of everyday life. Sociologists will contribute to analysis of global economic

mechanisms of cultural production, consumer preferences and advertising, Internet culture, the politics of indigeniety, and the social relations within which ideas, texts and artefacts are produced, displayed, promoted, circulated, and consumed. Colleagues in the anthropology programme will provide cross-cultural analyses of the socio-relational aspects of bodily substances, the aesthetics of gardens and the politics surrounding the production and circulation of cultural artefacts. Student preferences within this programme are as yet unknown. Will their interests be primarily in the textual analysis of novels, Internet sites, magazines, films, and television? Will they be interested in the political economy of cultural production? Will this programme just extend the opportunities of those in the humanities, or will it become a significant option for students who are primarily enrolled in the social sciences?

Students who meet the course requirements will be able to enter the third year cultural studies programme in 2002. They will do the level three core course that runs for a full year and one of a range of third year courses that are double or cross-coded. It is anticipated that most of these students will be enrolled in double majors and combine Cultural Studies with Sociology, Theatre and Film studies, Gender Studies, Anthropology, Art History, German, Russian, American Studies, English, and Mass Communication. Since approval for the programme from CUAP has only recently been obtained, it has been difficult to promote the programme. However, a web site is now being developed and publicity about the programme will be included in material made available to those visiting high schools in the next few months. The working party has been disbanded and a board of studies is currently being established.

The cultural studies programme at Canterbury encourages an interdisciplinary orientation among students. Many of the academic staff who developed the programme and argued it through the Arts Faculty are committed to interdisciplinary research, writing, and teaching. They vary, however, in their commitment to the ongoing importance of disciplines and disciplinary based teaching as a continuing component of academic work. For some, disciplines like History, Geography, Anthropology, Sociology, and English are vestiges of old framings of intellectual endeavour. Others are positive

about the sometimes uncomfortable coexistence of traditional disciplines and critical interdisciplinary work. Some of those developing this programme are primarily interested in academic work that is best described as 'postdisciplinary'; others consider that interdisciplinarity recognises the contributions of those with exposure to varied ways of framing problems and different skills in research and analysis. Cultural studies can embrace disciplinary breadth and depth while also resisting the constraints of disciplinary boundaries (Newton, Kaiser and Ono, 1998, pp. 547-8).

Shuker refers to an early editorial in the *New Zealand Cultural Studies Working Group Journal* in which Brennon Wood argued that cultural studies was too 'departmentalised' to produce "a coherent notion of what constitutes the peculiarly New Zealand culture." The programme at Canterbury continues to exhibit, even celebrate, these 'departmentalised' features. However, one of the stated goals of the programme is to enhance communication between those involved in similar projects in different departments and potentially to grow research, writing, and publishing endeavours. Whether this occurs will depend on the time and energy of those whose courses are included in the programme and on the next stage of this project – the development of a postgraduate cultural studies programme that will enhance students' opportunities to pursue transdisciplinary projects using the expertise of academics in different departments/disciplines.

As Ted Striphas (1998, p. 453) indicates, studying the institutionalisation of cultural studies involves attention to specific institutions and organisational contexts. The Canterbury cultural studies programme is being implemented against the background of proposals to 'restructure' the university – to create 'super-departments,' to consolidate disciplines into 'schools,' to diminish the number of faculties and introduce a system of executive deans (Darryl Le Grew, 2001). Academic initiatives like cultural studies that de-emphasise disciplinarity have been identified with managerialist commitments to restructure universities and 'undo' disciplines in the interests of 'efficiency' and 'relevance' (Readings, 1996, p. 39). Striphas (1998) suggests that those promoting cultural studies need to address the possibility that its commitment to

interdisciplinarity "colludes with the larger strategies of corporatisation/capitalization in the university" (p. 461). Restructuring within a university that has been characterised by a relatively 'flat' departmental structure may not be the ideal context in which to enhance collegiality and consolidate voluntary intellectual ties between those involved in different facets of cultural studies. On the other hand, 'engaged' cultural studies could be a resource as members of this university respond to the challenges of restructuring. This may be the test of whether cultural studies in this environment is just 'a turn to culture' or a basis for active engagement in the politics of culture, including the production and distribution of knowledge within tertiary education.

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Cultural domination and the problem of rule

Brennon Wood

Sociology is another allied discipline, so close that translation between it and Cultural Studies seems at best difficult if not altogether impossible (as Kafka once observed about the analogous kinship of German and Yiddish).
Jameson, 1993, p. 19.

Introduction

My association with cultural studies in this country divides into two reasonably distinct periods. As a sociology post-graduate at Massey University from the late 1970s until 1981, I was involved with attempts to establish a New Zealand Cultural Studies Working Group. Among other things, this included presenting conference papers to what was then the New Zealand Sociological Association and editorial involvement with the CSWG's newsletter and journal. By 1984, when the journal was renamed *SITES*, I had already been overseas for a couple of years. My second period of involvement follows from my return as a Massey sociologist in 1991 and extends to a decade or so of editorial work with *SITES*. That period is now drawing to a close as the journal moves to a new organisational base. In general, then, my experience centres on an initial and largely unsuccessful attempt to form a cultural studies group and on a period of editorship at *SITES* some years after the journal had been established.

Although wary of generalising from such a narrow platform, I do want to take this paper as an opportunity for critical self-reflection. My intention is to draw sociology into the terrain of cultural studies and *vice versa*, presenting each to the other as a matter of internal affairs rather than foreign relations. It seems to me that both sociology and cultural studies are often overly preoccupied with disputes about how meaning is aligned with domination. By highlighting and criticising this preoccupation, I aim to recall the study of culture to the problems of solidarity and rule. I must apologise in advance, then, for the theoretical character of my

discussion. These days, unfortunately, the study of culture has become, of all things, a vehicle for the empirical illustration of conceptual abstractions. Cultural studies and sociology have always been predisposed to theorise and that is one reason I have been drawn to both. However, I am now more wary of academic specialisms that cohere around 'theory' in general rather than around theories about things in particular. So if here I must begin with what Hall (1992) calls "the necessary detour" (p. 283), my aim is nevertheless to return to a more everyday appreciation of both human cooperation and social inequality.

SITES unseen

As an editor of a local journal, I proudly report the abundance of articles we have published over the years. Although the record is impressive, in general the pages of *SITES* have been marked by relatively little in the way of sustained dialogue. This criticism must not be overdrawn. We have published many and occasionally dazzling pieces of the puzzle, but I must also record a sense of frustrated editorial responsibility for the succession of writers who have treated *SITES* as no more than an envelope, as a neutral place in which our written words appear. This is a surprisingly unreflexive posture, given the theoretical registers of cultural studies. As a consequence of this invisibility of 'the site itself,' there has been relatively little extended discourse.

My sense of shortcoming flows from expectations laid down in the late 1970s. Perhaps substantive cohesion is not to be expected in a journal such as *New Zealand Sociology*, but our early hopes for cultural studies were more ambitious. In part, these hopes reflected the importance we attached to Birmingham. Such importance does not hold for everyone today; indeed, as points of access to the field have multiplied our compliance with "the standard narrative" may seem if anything a sign of narrowness and weakness. All I can say is that when we got going in the late 1970s Birmingham was vividly contemporary. From Birmingham we drew hopes for an intellectual style that departed from competitive-possessive individualism (Maharey and Wood, 1981, p. 6). We were certain that cultural studies

needed to be organised as a *group*. That ambition failed. With hindsight, perhaps the expectation seems unreasonable, even undesirable.[1] As the group dimension atrophied over the years, *SITES* settled down to become one of those struggling, small journals familiar in academic life. As a *collective* undertaking, our cultural studies have remained more a matter of hope than achievement.

The experience of *SITES* reinforces a more general trend for, as Peters (1999) says, it often seems that "in New Zealand there is no such thing as cultural studies" (p. xi). Consider, for example, the major staging of our field to date, the 'Culture Shocks' extravaganza at Te Papa in mid-1998. Unlike *SITES*, here the venue was not invisible, quite the reverse, but the results seem much the same. According to Brabazon (1999, pp. 83-5), "the new museum became *the* major subject of the conference," which consequently "started to fragment and dissolve from its first session." As with *SITES*, then, we find a lack of shared purpose. A harsh critic might conclude that if the journal's record indicates a lack of due care for the project as a whole, then the museum symbolises the arrival of such cultural studies in the public sphere, where they are aimlessly torn hither and yon. We should be wary of such sweeping assessments. Cultural studies have their social determinacies; they are not a taxi to be driven just anywhere. We have achieved much, there is good work going on and plenty still to be done. It is certainly true that our situation starkly contrasts with developments overseas, for there we find a more robust and collective elaboration. Perhaps success, however, brings its own problems.

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1. Sadly, our renewed editorial efforts to improve the quality of *SITES* in the late 1990s were if anything aided by an intensification of the competitive-possessive style, with academics tending more zealously than ever to their publication "outputs."

The conventionality of Cultural Studies

We need go no further than across the Tasman to feel a cringe coming on.[2] Within the world at large, cultural studies have assumed an established academic profile. Unsurprisingly, given our radical impulse, this has been accompanied by much agonising about the "moment of profound danger" such institutionalisation entails (Hall, 1992, p. 285). The exponents of cultural studies are having to come to terms with the *conventionality* of their grouped existence. Perhaps such a turn of events is inescapable, but it is a great challenge for many of us and surely the source of numerous disappointments.

If our local attempts have proved too little, then perhaps cultural studies abroad are rather too much. There is, for example, a great deal of talk about whether or not cultural studies have been institutionalised as a discipline. Within the terms of such debate, one familiar response holds that the 'power and attraction' of cultural studies lie precisely in their "undisciplined capacity to plunder an array of theoretical and methodological sources and produce hybrid forms" (Noble *et al.*, 2000, p. 262). This is an answer popularised by Hall 20 odd years ago, but it seems increasingly problematic in the current context. Friends and foes alike often pose cultural studies as an opponent of The Disciplinary Order, but the terms of such debate are surely anachronistic. We do not live in an age when knowledge is organised by old-fashioned academic segregations. These days, knowledge has been steadily re-disciplined into new forms that if anything *privilege* this 'undisciplined capacity to plunder.' After all, it is not just cultural studies but also the neo-liberalising OECD that extols 'knowledge diffusion' through a "continuum of functions which cut across and break down the

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2. In her departing presidential address, Schaffer (2000) proudly lists the Australian achievements: a smoothly running Cultural Studies Association, growing membership, a stream of newsletters, an official journal, a web site, a span of programmes in secondary schools and universities, self-organising postgraduates, an expanding range of research, government funding status, the ability to offer small grants ("in each state and New Zealand"), "and last, but not least, as a result of four successful conferences, ... a healthy bank balance" (p. 265).

categorical distinctions of the past" (Taylor, 1987, p. 101).[3] By the 21st century, cultural studies have clearly become in many respects *status quo*, an established part of the new organisation of academic knowledge.

We in New Zealand may very well look on enviously from the sidelines. However, to my mind these debates about (inter-, mega-, meta-, multi-, neo-, post-, quasi-) disciplinary status are as much a dead letter in cultural studies as they are throughout the human sciences. For more than a generation, all human sciences have experienced the meltdown of older 'categorical distinctions' and have been engaged in radical attempts to reconstruct themselves. The development of cultural studies falls within this more general history. It is thus futile to project cultural studies by debating with co-existing human sciences in disciplinary terms. Consider, for example, the frequent use of resolutely anti-sociological slogans to define the field. Stratton and Ang (1996, p. 364) may disdainfully reduce their 'opponent' to no more than some sort of American functionalism, but my *entire* experience as a sociologist falls precisely post- any such singular discipline (if indeed it ever existed at all). Inevitably, such hubris has been countered by what McLennan (1998) dubs the rhetorics of "sociological revenge" (p. 7), by an attempt to turn the tables and reinstate the disciplinary superiority of sociology over its modish pretender, a move that is of course equally out of tune with my own experience.

Perhaps the zero-sum character of such exchanges is understandable for, as Jameson (1993) astutely remarks, sociology is an "allied discipline, so close that translation between it and Cultural Studies seems at best difficult if not altogether impossible" (p. 19). While understandable, however, such debate (if that is the

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3. On the reorganisation of New Zealand universities, see Peters (1997). Notably, the Foundation for Research, Science and Technology strongly emphasises the interdisciplinary character of state-funded research. For a caustic assessment of attempts to draw pre-existing 'specialist" cultures within the new regime of "generic management," see Easton (1995). However, the consistency of academic reorganisation should not be exaggerated. Neo-liberal audits, for example, also often promote the assumption of familiar disciplinary forms.

right word) only too evidently generates more heat than light. At worst, it licenses wilful ignorance. Upping the disciplinary ante obstructs dialogue by encouraging a casual and often callous lack of consideration, a sense of otherness that fails to respect our kinship. Do Noble *et al* really propose to bring nothing to these pages in *New Zealand Sociology* other than their 'undisciplined capacity to plunder'? Such fixations with externality fail to appreciate the working out of some familiar, indeed classical, sociological concerns within parts of cultural studies, just as they fail to appreciate the way some cultural studies in part pick up and advance these concerns. It seems best, then, to proceed by abandoning any attempts at the translation that Jameson suspects is impossible. Let us take our mutuality on board and, as McLennan (1998) suggests, concentrate more on the substantive theses and ideological commitments that co-locate cultural studies and sociology.

Culture and the Domination Problematic

Many strands of contemporary cultural studies participate in thematic discussions that have a protracted history within sociology. Sociologists are thus often apt to feel themselves drawn into a familiar disciplinary argument. Consider, for example, what is these days called the issue of social constructionism, that is, the general idea that social relations are constructed by meaning, that social reality is an artefact of cultural organisation. This is an idea that runs in various complex ways across the human sciences past and present.[4] It frequently appears in cultural studies today, just as it does in sociology too. Here I want focus on how social constructionism forges links between cultural studies and the classical concerns of Weberian sociology in particular.[5]

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4. See Hacking (1999) for a general review. As he usefully reminds us, "all construction-isms dwell in the dichotomy between appearance and reality set up by Plato, and given definitive form by Kant. Although social constructionists bask in the sun they call post-modernism, they are really very old-fashioned" (p. 49).

5. Such links are worth exploring for Weberian sociology and cultural studies exhibit numerous family resemblances, including, for example, philosophical debts to Kant and Nietzsche, methodological anti-holism,

"The transcendental presupposition of every cultural science," Weber (1949) declares, is to be found "in the fact that we are cultural beings, endowed with the capacity and the will to take a deliberate attitude towards the world and to lend it significance" (p. 81). Following on from this presupposition, sociology becomes "the interpretive understanding of social action" (1978, pp. 4-5). Weber conceives social reality as the outcome of motives intended by acting individuals. In keeping with this constructionist emphasis, he excludes from consideration "merely reactive behaviour to which no subjective meaning is attached," though he concedes that the line between such behaviour and meaningful action "cannot be sharply drawn empirically" and indeed that "a very considerable part of all sociologically relevant behaviour" falls between the two. For example, both "the great bulk of everyday action to which people have become habitually accustomed" and 'purely affectual behaviour' are at best 'borderline' areas for investigation (1978, p. 25). This certainly seems a curious sociology, one that approaches 'the great bulk' by way of concepts derived from those expressly 'marginal' cases in which "meaning is fully conscious and explicit" (1978, p. 22). Weber, however, did not think that such a focus on the marginal debilitates sociology. Quite the reverse; he believed that, given the centrality of domination in social life, this was the only sensible approach.

Like many cultural studies today, Weberian sociology often seems somewhat obsessed with analysing the exercise of power. According to Weber (1978), however, power exhibits such variability in quality and circumstance as to render it "sociologically amorphous" (p. 53). He thus centres attention on the 'more precise' concept of domination, defined as "the probability that a command with a given

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a sense of the transitory relativity of scientific concepts, a pronounced suspicion of utopianism and moral certainty, the devaluation of the general or the universal and a privileging of the individual or unique, a view of history as infinite flux, the notion of an inexhaustible field of possible meanings, of agency as radically undetermined choice and of subjectivity as torn between incommensurable claims. A more concrete passage between the two can be tracked via Hall's (1980) influential "plundering" of Parkin's work, an appropriation that has reinforced the tendency to align meaning with domination (see below).

specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons." For Weber, such dominance is the decisive feature of social life. When posed in terms of a sociology of action, questions about domination are to be answered by referring to the various sorts of cultural justification that secure obedience. I do not propose to dwell on the details of Weber's well-known typology of 'legitimate domination.' What is important here is that each type turns upon a justification that "confirms the position of the persons claiming authority" (p. 214). As has often been said, this is a 'top-down' approach that categorically privileges the subjective meanings advanced by leaders. Indeed, it seems that you have to be dominant to be a subject at all, for the obedient contribute nothing of substance other than their obedience. The subordinated thus effectively disappear from the analysis; it is the leading margins, the few who dominate, that set the character of social life.

Lacking any independent expression of subjective meaning, subordinates appear as no more than the instrumental extension of their leader's intention. It would be difficult to find a sentiment more contrary to the mood of contemporary cultural studies. According to Weber (1978) power is exercised 'despite resistance' and, at a minimum, domination implies "the actual presence of one person successfully issuing orders to others" (p. 53). Cultural studies deploy a great variety of strategies to undermine any confidence in the 'actual presence' of such authority. Concentrating upon the 'everyday life' and 'affectual relations' that Weber downplays, cultural studies accent, 'despite domination,' the unquenchable powers of resistance.[6] The contrast is perhaps most evident in the different conceptions of populism. For Weber, popular rule – leadership by the people – is literally inconceivable; democratic consent has no place in his typology of political authority (Turner, 1982, p. 370). Cultural studies, on the other hand, are persistently drawn towards populist formulations. If Weber emphasises 'a command with a specific given content,' cultural studies highlight

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6. The notion of resistance figures in early Birmingham work (e.g. CCCS, 1976). Ten years later Morris (1988) found the cultural studies' emphasis on resistive acts of consumption "banal," a sentiment echoed by more recent commentators (e.g. Kellner, 1995).

textual openness and thus the inevitably 'undisciplined' character of the 'popular reader' (Fiske, 1989a, p. 196). Against Weber's emphasis on the 'successful issuing' of commands, Fiske (1989b) insists that "the readings we make of a text as we momentarily 'dwell' within it are ours and ours alone" (p. 33).

Although such cultural studies offer an alternative to the Weberian conception, the strength of this alternative resides in its systematic departure from and thus *reinforcement of* that conception. Weber identifies achieved meaning with domination. Cultural studies, particularly in their various 'post-' incarnations, accept that achieved meaning is inevitably dominant, but add the proviso that such meaning does not inevitably arrive. Domination is studied as a resource for resistances that eternally subvert or postpone. As this resistance plays upon and thus establishes the boundaries of meaningful domination, such cultural studies are a hegemonised discourse. This reinforcement of Weberian sociology is also evident in the conception of social life. Weber (1978), for example, defines an 'organisation' as "a social relationship which is either closed or limits the admission of outsiders" and argues that "whether or not an organisation exists is entirely a matter of the presence of a person in authority" (pp. 48-9). By tirelessly subverting the closures that establish such exclusion, cultural studies effectively *accept* this reductionist interpretation of legitimised domination. Resistance can thus be located only by dismantling the organisational unities of social life. As there is never a person present with sufficient authority to achieve closure, the social must be conceived as structurally indeterminate, as, in Weber's terms, 'disorganised.'

Weber builds his sociology on an understanding of successful dominations, successes that render domination all-encompassing. Cultural studies reply that there is "always a point from which hegemony can be resisted" (Fiske, 1987, p. 44). On these terms, then, cultural studies are not so much an anti-sociology as a sociology built upon an understanding of resistance.[7] Cultural studies turn

7. As with Weber, this sociology is liberal in character, though often naively optimistic by comparison. Fiske (1987), for example, contends that "societies as diverse as western capitalist democracies are constructed out of such a variety of social experiences" that "a theory of social

Weber on his head and the systematic character of this inversion accounts for the various divergences and continuities discussed above. Underpinning these agreements and disagreements is a shared privileging of the study of culture in the study of social life. Although more sceptical about the extent of our capacities, cultural studies concur with Weber's 'transcendental presupposition' that the social is at root a matter of the significant. In keeping with this constructionism, both offer sociologies of *action*, both emphasise the attempts of social actors to construct a meaningful world.[8]

In effect, then, these cultural studies complete and confirm the problematic of domination essayed by Weber. Within the terms of this problematic, the social is a construction of meaning and to be meaningful is to be dominant. Thus, in refusing the 'more precise' concept and focusing instead upon resistance, cultural studies must return to the very 'sociologically amorphous' conception of power from which Weber departs. As Hall (1992) puts it, such cultural studies constitute "power as an easy floating signifier" and so must leave "the crude exercise and connections of power and culture altogether emptied of any signification" (p. 286). The systematic opposition to Weber leaves Weber in his place. Cultural studies wage eternal resistance against the Master and that, ultimately, is how they are mastered.

Cooperation and the Problem of Rule

The conversation between Weber and cultural studies speaks domination only by completely silencing the subordinate and speaks resistance only by robbing the dominant of significance. The domination problematic thus seems to comprise an either-or and

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determination not only leaves room for individual and other differences, it emphasizes them" (p. 81). For criticisms of Fiskean sociology see Wood (1998a, pp. 64-68).

8. In keeping with the "building" metaphor, cultural studies tend to conceive social reality as the outcome of contingent and disjunctive "articulations." For criticism of the articulation concept, see Wood (1998b, pp. 406-409). The concept bears more than a passing resemblance to Weber's notion of "elective affinity" (see Howe, 1978).

accordingly to prompt a neither-nor response. Although my presentation has no doubt itself encouraged this cancelling out, such a response would fail to appreciate the more positive aspects of this encounter.[9] To join the discussion in more critical fashion, I suggest that the way dominance and resistance fail to communicate with each other tells us something about the value of culture, a value that should turn our conversation towards a more comprehensive account of social life.

The constructionist tenets that animate the domination problematic effectively reduce the social to the cultural.[10] The social is conceived as a matter of how power is inflected by culture, how domination is aligned with meaning. Such an approach is clearly partial, for if we say that the dominant cannot hear the subordinate and that the subordinate always resist then we have not yet begun to talk about how inequality, the stratification of social actors, is routinely institutionalised and so comprises an abiding feature of human life. The domination problematic falls short of an account of *rule*. While it is tempting to interpret this falling short as a sign of theoretical failure, might it not rather suggest the great value of culture in human affairs? On these terms, the domination problematic shows that culture cannot itself account for rule, that meaning must be debased with some other currency if it is to be pressed into the service of social inequality.

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9. According to Barthes (1972), "neither-norism" is "on the whole a bourgeois figure, for it relates to a modern form of liberalism" (p. 153).

10. Contemporary cultural studies often present this reduction as a tactical rather than metaphysical commitment. Hall (1988) is a noted exponent of the self-consciously partial approach, deliberately "foregrounding" the "political/ideological" by downplaying "other levels of analysis" (p. 156). Weber (1978), it should be noted, similarly claims that sociology in general "is by no means confined to the study of social action" and that his typologies are "in no sense meant to exhaust the possibilities of the field" (pp. 24-26). Such statements are in keeping with constructionist principles. However, as work by the followers of Hall and Weber suggests, ultimately it is unclear how strategic reductionism differs much from reductionism pure and simple.

In expounding his "transcendental presupposition," Weber (1949) expressly rejects the idea that the studies we undertake are somehow to be based upon "our finding a certain culture or any 'culture' in general to be valuable" (p. 81). Contemporary cultural studies often begin in much the same state of transcendence, though to be sure there are important differences. Weber grounded his rejection in the fact-value distinction, a distinction that cultural studies typically undermine, just as they are also more sceptical about our leaders' capacity to lend the world meaning. However, Weber and cultural studies are alike in that both, paradoxically, focus resolutely on the significant and at the same time profess to be agnostic about the value of cultures in general or in particular. Instead, at best they rather non-commitally uphold the merits of heterogeneity in a world tricked out for cultural uniformity. Can I just say, then, that I desire more than this? Weber's difficulties with moral judgement are well known; the charge of moral bankruptcy has been repeatedly levelled at cultural studies (e.g. Tester, 1994, pp. 9-10). In social life (thankfully), pluralism is less the solution than an enduring source of our problems. I thus feel the need for a more substantial valuing of culture than is offered by praise of diversity alone, however liberally imagined. In general, I hope that culture, in falling short of rule, has positive value. And this hope in turn implies that I know I must always begin and end with the finding that certain cultures are more valuable than others.

Desires and hopes do not rely on arguments, but studies of culture certainly do. I contend, then, that appreciating the value of culture calls for an understanding of rule and that in turn demands an extension of our discussion beyond the limits of social constructionism.[11] We need a conception of social action as more than just the eternal play of domination that silences and resistance

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11. This is not to advise rejecting constructionist principles in some general sense. Recent controversies about these principles often have the same zero-sum character as the disciplinary exchanges between cultural studies and sociology that I noted at the outset. As "theory," constructionism has been debated for well over 2000 years and is evidently one of those many philosophical matters "on which clear and honorable thinkers may eternally disagree" (Hacking, 1999, p. 63).

that knows no bounds. Instead of holding to such a narrow definition, we might follow the example of Marx and Engels (1974), who suggest that "by social we understand the cooperation of several individuals, no matter under what conditions, in what manner and to what end" (p. 50). Marx, of course, has been emphatically posted in contemporary cultural studies, just as he has always proved a problem for any attempt to narrowly incorporate 'the discipline' of sociology. I believe that our dialogue must remain open to such broader understandings. These days, generality is often derided for diverting attention away from the actual details of social life. If anything, however, the reverse is the case; grasping human interaction concretely demands a comprehensive approach.

We should not forget the Marx (in Tucker, 1978) who so emphatically insists that "what is to be avoided above all is the re-establishing of 'society' as an abstraction *vis-à-vis* the individual" (p. 86). 'The cooperation' highlighted by Marx and Engels is neither divorced from nor reducible to those 'several individuals' who enact it. Social reality is not individualised intention but 'reciprocal action' (p. 136). The recognition of reciprocity points beyond the problematic of domination and its underpinning sociologies. Archer (1996) is surely on the right track to insist that understanding action requires an appreciation of relational structures. Action and structure must be analytically separated precisely in order to acknowledge their constitutive interdependence and so investigate their complex connections. Only by moving beyond the narrow confines of action sociology, for example, can we distinguish between 'ubiquitous social conflict' that generates no profound change and conflicts that entail radical social transformation (1996, p. 691). Unable to make this distinction, the studies of domination and resistance often exaggerate the significance of many cultural disputes.

To be sure, this initial emphasis on cooperation is no more than a vague description, altogether too imprecise to count as a philosophical definition, but it is a description of group life that helps move us on from the fixation with all-pervasive power that stymies the domination problematic. Paradoxically, a wider concern with human cooperation also allows for an analysis preoccupied with the relations of rule as *exploitation*. As Hall (1992) points out,

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the notion of power "is an easier term to establish in the discourses of culture than exploitation" (p. 279). Focusing on the 'easier term' often transforms cultural studies into a surprisingly familiar sociology of status. Weber (1978) defines status groups in terms of "their consumption of goods as represented by special styles of life" (p. 937) and argues that such groups decline with the advent of modern capitalism and the state. Contemporary cultural studies, on the other hand, typically downplay class and party in order to emphasise consumerist life-styling. Exactly the same sort of move can be found within contemporary sociology. We are all familiar with arguments that in the current age culture has become "the prime determinant" of social reality, and consumption "the very essence of capitalist functioning" (Kumar, 1995, pp. 115-116). This epochal shift is often held to entail "the death of class" and the advent of what has been called a "status-conventional society" (Pakulski and Waters, 1996: 25). Departing from old modernist rigidities, social stratification is now held to be 'culturalist,' a 'shifting mosaic' of life-styles pieced together with 'ephemeral and fragile' resources.

"In the contemporary period of history," declare Pakulski and Waters (1996), "the class paradigm is intellectually and morally bankrupt" (p. 26). It is hard to respond mildly to such implausibly grand claims, and right to castigate them as exercises in chronically "data-free sociology" (Marshall, 1997, p. 16). We simply cannot, for example, ignore the well-documented correlations between occupational position and consumption pattern (Goldthorpe and Marshall, 1992). It is the persistence, not the 'death' of class that needs to be explained. Indeed, by the end of the 20th century this 'old' stratification system was if anything intensifying. The Rowntree Foundation's eighteen-country comparison revealed growing disparities in income and wealth (Barclay and Hills, 1995). Between 1979 and 1990, it was in New Zealand that the gaps widened most dramatically. More recent local studies have confirmed our stature as a world leader in the growth of class inequalities (Podder and Chatterjee, 1998).

It is often useful to distinguish between notions of class and status but, as Crompton (1998, p. 164) argues, the making of this distinction has unfortunately prompted the study of each to develop independently of the other. Classical social theory often divided class

from status in order to highlight the significance of the former in the transition to modernity. Some contemporary sociologies and cultural studies invert this modernist assessment by similarly *accentuating* divisions between the study of 'economic' and 'cultural' inequality. Hence the zero sum game in which status 'replaces' class. Such single-minded emphasis on cultural consumption is clearly misleading; market position and productive capacity remain central pivots of social stratification. Equally, however, there is something to the culturalist sense of changes in the spurs to action, changes suggesting that by the end of the 20th century class position was less likely to be associated with durable and conflict-oriented collective identities (Crompton, 1998, p. 226). These are complex issues that require empirical investigation and theoretical discussion. Rather than accentuate the old divide, then, we need to talk about connections, for it is only by combining the study of economic and cultural inequality that we can address the problem of rule.

Conclusion

Given the difficulties of translating between sociology and cultural studies, I have instead attempted to stage a conversation between certain strands of both, a conversation organised by the terms of what I have dubbed the domination problematic. In a nutshell, I suppose my advice boils down to little more than asking sociology to remember its youth and cultural studies to act their age. If I have highlighted critical weaknesses in both, however, my intention has been to emphasise common ground. Recent theoretical developments in our field have often made rather too much of academic distinction and too little of shared concerns. There has been a discernible hardening of the disciplinary arteries. Reminiscing about his search for an 'academic home,' Wright (1994) recalls that "of all the available social sciences, sociology seemed to me to be the *least disciplinary*; it had the fuzziest boundaries" (p. 9). Moreover, and "even more significantly, sociology has valued its own marginal traditions in a way that other social sciences don't." That's also what drew me to sociology, and that's what drew me to cultural studies too.

According to Turner (1996), sociology's 'intellectual origins' make for a persistent "moral inquiry into the nature of reciprocity under conditions of scarcity" (p. 260). I have much the same feeling for cultural studies. In critiquing the problematic of domination, I have thus sought to emphasise the importance of human cooperation and the problem of rule. In the study of social inequality, it is crucial to understand both that the meanings of domination and resistance are never finally resolved *and* that the practices of rule are indeed routinely concluded. The field of culture in itself cannot secure such conclusions. Quite aside from the secondary issue of scholarly definition, there is class rule. Exploitation by transnational capitalists is an evident feature of life in this country; so too are more than twenty years of immiseration. Any study of culture that cannot speak to these social realities is beside the point. Does that sound too austerely righteous? Perhaps, but then I have also called for studies of culture that speak more directly to the simple pleasures of human solidarity.

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Detours and dialogues: Comment on Wood

Mike Lloyd

Brennon Wood's paper *Cultural domination and the problem of rule* is a considered, and heartfelt, reflection on the positioning of sociology and cultural studies, both to each other, and within the academy. Much could be commented on, including the very first words of the frontquote (see below), but I want to begin with a detour. Whereas Wood approvingly cites Hall's 'necessary detour' to theory, my detour is mainly coincidental.

The day after my second reading of Wood's paper is a Sunday, a day where, if possible, I like to begin with the Sunday paper. For me, in this particular Sunday's edition, one story stands out. Titled "Radical Che Chic" (Rhodes, 2001), it describes a race between Mick Jagger and Robert Redford to tell Che Guevara's story on film. The article is wrapped around the well-known image of Guevara – beret, straggly black hair, upward-distant gaze – that has graced everything from clothes to record covers to watches and skis. It also contains the images of directors Jagger and Redford, and their two Latin stars – Antonio Banderas and Benicio Del Toro. The article tells us that Guevera was shot dead by Bolivian troops in 1967, but since then has become a global icon, including amongst his fans Jagger and Redford. The former knows that if Redford is first to the screen, his own movie will bomb, hence the race. Jagger plans to make his version distinct from Redford's by focusing on Guevera's relationship with Tamara Bunke, an East German intelligence officer who infiltrated the Cuban revolutionary movement, only to fall in love with Guevera, ultimately being killed two months prior to Guevera, with (apparently) his child in her womb.

Great material for a movie. Or, four of five movies, for the article notes that three other movies are also in the works. Just why there is this sudden clamour around Guevera is unclear; perhaps in these times of recycled icons and images this should hardly surprise us. Further, these events are actually run-of-the-mill material for some kind of cultural studies analysis: a story of a postmodern world where the image reigns supreme; a world where Marxism is

remaindered to its most photogenic guerilla, with the movies directed by two distinctly non-Marxists (also photogenic in different ways), presumably for a healthy profit.

The Guevera story is a detour from direct comment on Wood's argument, nevertheless it seems relevant to a certain 'nostalgic' core to Wood's paper. I am referring here to his conclusion that "... there is class rule. Exploitation by transnational capitalists is an evident feature of life in this country; so too are more than twenty years of immiseration." I have no desire to criticise this statement. Rather, it seems to me that in the Guevera example an important question looms: is it possible that all, or even a few, of the movies about Guevera will be more successful in promoting left-wing identifications in contemporary audiences than all the sober treatises and arguments from within academic sociology? There is no need to venture a hypothetical answer, but note here that I did not say "from within academic sociology and cultural studies." For it is my belief that cultural studies is by far the more likely discipline to take the Guevera movies as a serious topic of investigation, that is, not to scorn Redford and Jagger's profit-oriented actions, but to ask interesting questions about what is going on here, or what might be made to follow on from this Guevera phenomenon.

Sociologists should know by now that both what we study, and how we study it, are important. In my view, currently, it is cultural studies that is more accepting of the fact that we exist in a world where style, form, presentation, sensuousness and so on, are key to how we live our lives, hence it becomes 'natural' to opt for investigation of things like the Guevera movies. Sociology too has its versions of formalist inquiry, but as Urry (2000) has recently put it in a challenging book, there is still considerable resistance to moving 'sociology beyond societies.'

Now from detour to dialogue. When I first read the frontquote in Wood's paper I was sceptical: surely linguistics informs us that with two similar languages, translation between them should be easier rather than more difficult. Thus, it would appear that the Jameson frontquote cannot be taken as a literal comment about translation of languages. In my case an understanding of this frontquote was aided by going away and reading the Hall paper

that Wood cites. In it I found a very useful passage where Hall.(1992) talks about his serious reading of psychoanalytic work 'interrupting' his sociological translations, particularly talk of 'socialisation':

> Psychoanalysis completely breaks that sociological notion of socialization; I'll never use it again. That's what I mean by interruption: the term falls out the bottom. ... It just had to go. But I cannot translate the one [psychoanalysis] into the other [socialization]. I have to live with the tension of the two vocabularies, of the two unsettled objects of analysis and try to read the one through the other without falling into psychoanalytic readings of everything. (p. 291)

In Wood's paper the two terms that are battled over in a similar manner are 'domination' and 'resistance,' with Wood clearly wanting cultural studies to make better use of the more mainstream sociological work on domination. If I am not misreading him, Wood's view of this dialogue is that it will be much like Hall's experience above: domination and resistance are simply incommensurate vocabularies. This suggests that family resemblances in concepts can make for severe family quarrels (or, idiomatically, 'familiarity breeds contempt').

I can understand the depth of feeling in Wood's paper. If it is not going from the sublime to the ridiculous, again I would like to cite an everyday example. In Wellington there is a radio station called Channel Z, where the Z is without exception enunciated as zee, not zed. On that same station you can hear talk of the Wellington Super 12 rugby team as the 'Hurri*kanes*,' not 'Hurrikins,' as hitherto standard New Zealand English would have it. Clearly, the growing influence (through use) of American English is an interesting example of cultural imperialism (or globalisation), but what I want to point to here is more pragmatic. Again, it is clear that language use like this can produce disagreement, or more honestly, it can be damn annoying. Personally, it annoys me every time I hear 'Channel Zee' and not 'Channel Zed' – we are not Americans after all.

This illustrates how the very materials of even the most apparently trivial discourses can be intensely emotional, charged, dangerous and annoying things. But, in my view, there is an

important point to stress here: ultimately, the question of preference for zed over zee is not one where rational arguments will win the day. As Wittgenstein might have put it, "Zed or Zee, it is up to the public to decide." Similarly, using concepts from mainstream sociology, over those from cultural studies, is a choice partly based on caprice, personal preference, chance, style, and so on. These preferences will themselves be socially structured (this is the import of Bourdieu on 'habitus' - see Kauppi, 2000), but never in any fully determined manner. When concepts, words, or things are similar in what we might best call 'accent,' rational persuasion on which to use is very difficult. In the last instance, we just *do* 'cultural studies' or 'sociology,' or we mix their concepts, and we would have great difficulty fully explaining our practices. Hence, ultimately I disagree with Wood's statement that "Any study of culture that cannot speak to these social realities [exploitation, dominance, rule] is beside the point." It is not so much 'austerely righteous'; it just presumes too much, and in doing so closes off many interesting phenomena from sociological examination.

Does it matter exactly which terms we use, or whether this kind of inquiry is called Sociology of Culture, Media Studies, Cultural Studies or whatever? Surely, what does matter is that *it is done*. In my view the more attention to *ordinary* social practices the better. To quote an under-appreciated social theorist: "every feature of sense, of fact, of method, for every particular case of inquiry without exception, is the managed accomplishment of organized settings of practical actions" (Garfinkel, 1967: 32). The less we assume about this management of practical actions, and the more we actually study it, the better. It might be that it is in the studying that it becomes clear exactly which are the more appropriate concepts and terms to use.

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W(h)ithering heights

Nick Perry

'Whithering' is a neologism that appears in John Bayley's memoir of marriage to the philosopher and novelist Iris Murdoch. It is their term for the practice of taking part in those 'symposia on 'Whither the Arts?' (or 'Whither the Novel?') which are cosy routine for so many writers and academics' (Bayley 1998, p. 123). The theme of Bayley's book is the progression of their relationship from its beginnings in the 1950s, through to Murdoch's position of authorial pre-eminence, to her subsequent descent into the bleak anxieties of Alzheimer's disease as the 1990s draws to a close (i.e. from 'with her ring', through her whithering, to her withering). Bayley both recognizes the cerebral demands of producing *Against Dryness, The Sovereignty of Good* and *Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals,* and records her twilight delight in watching Teletubbies. His narrative thus follows her along the downward-sloping path from the austere discipline of such Platonic high theory to the ephemeral pleasures of television for pre-schoolers. What he persistently probes for en route are traces of some kind of continuity, some evidence of an Ariadne thread that might lead to, and thereby confirm, the enduring (if residual) presence of that version of his wife's past self as it was once routinely manifested in and through their relationship at its high tide. It is therefore part love story, part lament, part confessional, part an act of therapy, part a drama of loss, and part advice to others. As such, Bayley's repudiation of reticence would seem to be at once necessary and suspect, precisely because the (sometimes childlike) intimacy that his prose so elegantly insinuates – and hence persuasively affirms – is otherwise confounded by the fact of its thoroughly controlled and asymetrical representation.

If Bayley's text is interpreted as a paradigm of a methodological problem and a moral dilemma, then it can be made to reach beyond the sometimes parochial affectations of its informing social milieu. Thus if one reads the second half of Brennon Wood's essay through the template that Bayley's memoir provides, then classical sociology plays the part of high theory, whereas cultural studies – distinguished

by dispersal, amnesia, floating signifiers – threatens to become an other-ing that is tantamount to the withering of a pre-existing same. Cultural studies may have begun from Marxist premis(s)es, but consequent upon its elaboration it is here interpreted as having perforce undergone a fateful narrowing into Weberian conclusions. Hence in Brennon's version of this process, John Fiske's late 1980s writings play the part that Bayley assigns to the Teletubbies. For in each case they are employed to indicate the extent of the descent into a severely limited and evasive representation of material reality. In each case, however, they are *also* revelatory, but only if and when they are understood as gesturing towards the availability of a culturally informed, but otherwise elusive, notion of the social that is conceived in terms of the value of co-operation.

Brennon closes by setting such cooperation and 'the simple pleasures of human solidarity' both alongside and against the obligation to attend to the activities of a transnational ruling class. He thus concludes where Bayley had more-or-less begun, i.e., with courtship and a proposal for a closer union. What is envisaged is a relationship in which cultural studies becomes a junior partner to political economy, with the former now expected to 'act its age' and the latter to 'remember its youth'.

What the first part of his essay indicates is that this is second time around for the desired liaison. The pattern of the initial engagement is couched in a more obviously personal form. This allows him to acknowledge that the promise that he had earlier both sought and attempted to construct through cultural studies has not been realised, since the partner in question proved to be at once more reluctant to be seduced and yet nevertheless more promiscuous than he had expected.

Some pointers to the reasons for this earlier disappointment – and hence some lessons for its future prospects – may be gleaned from the very mode of its representation. Compare, for example his deployment of what Pat Barker (1995) in her World War 1 novel *The Ghost Road* calls the "... group of words that still mean something. Little words that trip through sentences unregarded: us, them, we, they, here, there. These are the words of power, and long after we're gone, they'll lie about in the language, like ... unexploded grenades

... and any one of them'll take your hand off" (p. 257). Barker sets these over and against the words that don't mean anything "Patriotism honour courage vomit vomit vomit," and the proper names that do "Mons, Loos, the Somme, Arras, Verdun, Ypres." Those same little words appear in Brennon's essay, but "patriotism honour courage ..." which are generally identified with the Right side of the political ledger, are displaced by the Left-leaning right mindedness of "cooperation human solidarity ..." What is missing is that category of proper names that Barker sees as standing between a now hollowed-out rhetoric and the immediacy of those still meaningful little words. The relevant members of this missing category are 'Auckland, Canterbury, Massey, Otago, VUW, Waikato.' What rushes in to colonise the resulting empty space is the conflation of 'I' 'we' and 'our,' so that a succession of *Sites* contributors ('our written words') are mildly chastised for either not recognising or not cooperating with the agenda of the editorial group ('our early hopes').

What this exemplifies is a generic local difficulty, viz. the few hierarchies problem. In a country with only a handful of academic institutions there is typically room for only one journal devoted to any given academic specialty or subject area. It is only when the latter is cognitively integrated, however, that there is no necessary conflict between such a journal acting as both the only available national forum and as a vehicle for editorial discrimination. *Landfall* and *Art New Zealand* are thus only the most visible of those local journals that have in their time acquired notoriety and generated frustration and anger for the perceived selectivity of their editorial line.

Brennon records his exasperation – which I share – with the kind of smorgasbord that emerges as a typical alternative to this. But what this dilemma incidentally signifies is what I once referred to as the absent centre of sociology in this country – as distinct, that is, from 'Massey sociology' or 'Auckland sociology' or 'Canterbury sociology' (Perry 1987). This claim derived from an empirical analysis of variations in preferred outlets and modes of publication, attitudes towards conferences, relations with government agencies, construction of networks and access to resources as between the

various local centres of sociological work. These divergent practices were interpreted as the effects of: i) individuals spotting and creating opportunities, making connections and striving to solve problems pertinent to them; ii) in an institutional context distinguished by a locally specific articulation of market and state patronage relations; leading to iii) rudimentary modes of specialisation within the limits set both by this general context and by more proximate material and cognitive constraints.

So, not unlike Brennon, I looked at – indeed looked to – the pattern across the Tasman and argued for the benefits of being part of it. (Moreover, it seems to me that what Australia subsequently illustrated is that the pluralism which he sees as a source of problems rather than a solution is – amongst cultural studies academics at least – actually a precondition for the kind of cooperation and generosity of spirit which we both admire).

My plug for a trans-Tasman connection prompted a spirited, cultural nationalist riposte from Pat Day (I wasn't persuaded then, and am unrepentant now). At the time nationalist euphoria was rising even faster than the stock market and travelling even quicker than KZ7, David Lange was wearing a Nukebusters T shirt and wowing the Oxford Union. It was, in short, a time to tell your children about when you visit them – or join them – in Australia. It was also a time when I was viciously bad-mouthed (not, I hasten to add, by Pat, who never resorted to *ad hominen* argument and with whom my relations were, and are, cordial). The level of malevolence and hostility so shocked Canadian and Australian academic visitors who independently reported comments that were made about me, but never to me, that they indicated their willingness to testify if I should choose to sue.

Reading Brennon's essay brought all of this back to mind, thereby disrupting the pleasures that reading his work routinely provides. My response should therefore be interpreted as riding the ridge between 'a filling in of the gaps' (temporal, conceptual, empirical) in his account and providing some of the raw materials for a different one. If my recollection of such shabby conduct prompts me to press down on this second option, then Brennon's plea to attend to the activities of the transnational ruling class gives way to some

altogether more modest questions. In her "Anxieties of A Petty Bourgeois Intellectual" Meaghan Morris (1988) records her weariness with the all-too-familiar-voice-of-the-Left-from-the-back-of-the-room with its mantra of "What about Chile?" My questions are closer to home and closer to hers - and they are addressed not to Brennon – who wasn't here – but to all the readers of this journal who were. Who was 'us' and who was 'them,' who was 'we' and who was 'they,' where was 'here' and where was 'there'? Was this whithering or was it withering? Was this cooperation, solidarity, proud to be a Kiwi, or vomit vomit vomit?

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BOOK REVIEWS

Lasn, K. (1999). *Culture jam: How to reverse America's suicidal consumer binge - And why we must.* Quill: New York. *Seven TV Uncommercials and the Culture Jammer's Video.* The Media Foundation: Canada. Available from www.adbusters.org

Reviewed by Sheryl Hann and Grant Ellen

Kalle Lasn advocates revolution. *Culture Jam* opens with the claim "we can change the world" (p. xi), and sets out from there to develop a manifesto of cultural politics for the generation written off as 'slackers.' Lasn's book is a call to action for committed activists as well as all those First Worlders who feel that something is going terribly wrong with the world in which they live, but do not quite know what it is, or what to do about it. His book is aimed both at reeducating and motivating citizens to take action, and at providing information to use as ammunition.

Lasn begins by outlining the problem: His focus is on a world dying of consumption. Environmental pollution, the lack of democracy, and unrestrained corporate greed are his central concerns. First Worlders, Lasn claims, have lost their way. They are shopping themselves to death in the America™ superstore. They are mindlessly changing channels and stuffing potato chips unaware of, and unconcerned by, the destruction caused by their excessive lifestyles: They have become "voyeurs of their own demise" (p. 47). Generations of people, he maintains, are now recruited into the 'corporate cult' (p. 53) at a young age: They wear the uniform, speak the jargon, and rehearse the behaviours modeled by corporate advertising. As one of the uncommercials featured in the video proclaims: "Your living room is the factory. The product being manufactured is you."

Following McLuhan, Lasn claims that we are in the midst of a 'guerrilla information war' where corporate hype seeks control over

the collective consciousness and actions of citizens. Lasn sees himself as engaged in a battle for the minds of the masses, fighting corporate enemies on their own turf, the global media culture. Lasn's goal is to attack corporate ideology, reduce the 'mental pollution', and lever a gap wide enough for people to see that another world is possible.

Lasn is another of the cultural critics transplanted in the North American landscape from post-war Europe. (He immigrated to Canada from Estonia by way of Australia and Japan). In 1970, Lasn formed a film commune in Vancouver, and today, is the editor of *Adbusters* magazine, an 'alternative' media publication which aims to "change the way we interact with the mass media, and the way meaning is produced in our society" (p. 251). Lasn is also the founder of the Culture Jammers network, "a global network of artists, activists, writers, students, educators and entrepreneurs who want to launch the new social activist movement of the information age" (p. 251).

Lasn's writing is most compelling when he launches powerful attacks on a few multi-national corporations, including his declared mortal enemy, the tobacco and food giant, Philip Morris Inc. For those finding their way around global economics, and the roles of multi-national corporations, Lasn provides useful 'big picture' discussions about the links between your Big Mac or your Marlboro cigarettes; the companies that produce them, and the organisations that conspire to run the world, like the G8, World Trade Organisation, the World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. Neo-liberals would be quick to label Lasn a 'conspiracy theorist', but many of us have long been aware of the information about corporate cover-ups, hand-outs, buy-ups, and rip-offs. We have wondered when someone is going to do something about it. Lasn however, is clear: The 'someone' is you, and the time is now.

Culture jam can not be read as neo-Marxist pessimism, as Lasn boldly goes where many Left cultural critics do not: He dares to suggest political actions and strategies for ending corporate domination. Termed *culture jamming*, these 'rebranding strategies' (p. xvi) aim to subvert advertising and corporate propaganda so as to expose the ideologies based on profit and greed. They use 'direct action' and 'critical mass' activism to reclaim the (mental and

physical) spaces that have been commodified and exploited, stopping corporates in their tracks.

The term *culture jamming* was first used by San Francisco experimental punk band Negativland in their celebration of the ham radio 'jammers' who clogged radio waves with pop culture 'noise' (p. 217). Culture jammers stand between the corporations and the people, deflecting the propaganda: They aim to corrupt the corporate message, turning it back on itself using the same medium and style. Culture jamming is not a new phenomenon: Punk rockers, hippies, feminists, eco-warriors, anarchists, Situationists, Surrealists, Dadaists, student protesters, and angry advertising executives have all employed these strategies. Lasn explores culture jamming as a millennium-version of what Guy Debord termed *'detournement,'* acts designed to interrupt the flow of mass media 'information', detracting from the profit motive, prompting a rethink in the audience, and reclaiming commodified products and processes for the people. Culture jammers seek to create and exploit moments of spontaneity that allow one to see outside the Matrix.

'Cyberjamming' is another strategy outlined by Lasn, where the World Wide Web becomes the site for jammers to 'uncool' (p. 172) the corporates, and share information that would never make its way past the corporate media gate-keepers. Lasn claims that cyberjamming is not just about a group of privileged middle-class kids reading computer screens in their dorms: Activists download posters, banner designs, and ready-to-copy flyers and take these to the streets. One of the many examples of cyberjamming, is the Indymedia Centre (www.indymedia.org). This was established during the Seattle WTO protests (after this book was written) following a deafening media silence about the protests. Mainstream journalists keep a close eye on the cyber-activist sites and e-groups, recognizing that these provide a vital alternative to carefully crafted 'free-trade' spin. The independent media internet sites are obviously making those in power nervous. At the G8 meeting in Genoa, Italia, in July this year, the Police viciously attacked the Independent Media Centre, smashing computers, breaking video tapes, and bashing in the heads of sleeping journalists and protesters.

As you search for your favourite corporation on the internet, you will also come across cyberjamming sites dedicated to 'uncooling'

and 'demarketing' (p. 166) the Big Ones (Disney, McDonalds, Nike, Coke etc.) Unfortunately, Lasn does not go into much detail about one of the main cyberjamming sites: McSpotlight on McDonalds (www.mcspotlight.org). This site has a huge collection of facts that you will not want to know if you consume the burgers. Many of the activists' claims about McDonald's business practices and products have been tested and upheld in a British Court, and the site is regularly updated with news about activism and research. The world wide Anti-McDonalds Day (October 16th) is coordinated through this site.

Lasn believes that television is the "most powerful social communications medium of our time" (p. 133), so it follows that his personal activism has focused on 'TV jamming.' 'Subvertisements' (p. 131) can create a shift in consciousness that disrupts both the audience's consumer trance and the carefully planned marketing strategies. They are 'mind-bombs' that reveal 'the hollow spectacle within' corporate culture (p. 132). In 1989, Lasn produced an issue ad about the destruction of ancient forests, and found that no television networks would air it, and even in the land of litigation, no lawyers would take up the case about the right to have access to the airwaves. Lasn finds his way onto the airwaves more often by making a story out of the fact that television stations routinely reject most of the 'uncommercials' included in the video. However, several have been aired, most noticeably the 'Buy Nothing Day' subvertisement that publicises a now global campaign against consumerism. This uncommercial shows a pig's head emerging from a map of North America. The voice over says, "The average North American consumes five times more than a Mexican; ten times more than a Chinese person and thirty times more than a person in India. We are the most voracious consumers in the world…a world that could die because of the way we North Americans live."

One of the most concerning problems with Lasn's rally call is his description of other possible worlds. He fleetingly dares to picture a utopia of participatory democracy, with citizens unplugged from corporate media machine, but more often Lasn harks back to the 'good old days' of either post-War of Independence, or post-World War II America, where people were in control of corporations, children knew how to play games without joysticks, and the

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'revolutionary spirit' (p. 71) prevailed. This is clearly very problematic: Many women, working class, Native Americans or African Americans living in those times would not agree that they were the heady days before democracy was 'derailed' (p. 71). A central reason for Lasn's idealisation of the times before late consumer capitalism is that he seems to want to hold back from advocating the inevitable: the death of capitalism. Instead his discussions often take a line similar to the New Zealand Green Party, arguing for 'capitalism with a human face.'

Culture jam is at its best however, when Lasn moves away from the search for 'authenticity,' instead describing culture jammers by what they oppose and who they are not. The anti-capitalist movement has rapidly gained momentum around the world for this very reason. It avoids debates over detailed utopias, and battles over competing identities, thus allowing diverse activists to coalesce around broad ideas of justice, democracy, freedom and sustainability, united in their moral outrage, and shared hatred of global corporate capitalism.

How can a few seconds of a television ad disrupt the corporate power of giants like Phillip Morris or McDonalds? Lasn advocates the 'pincer approach' where you attack the corporation from above and below. 'Anti-ads' work to subvert the companies' advertising, meeting the corporate dream machine on its own turf, in the glossy magazines, on the box, and on the billboards. Simultaneously, citizens organize actions and protests to oppose the corporation, and mobilizing through Critical Mass demonstrations, consumer boycotts, direct action, protests and legal action.

The bigger question however remains largely unanswered in *Culture jam*: How can bringing down one corporation like Nike alter the wider power relations between corporates and consumers? Like Michael Moore's *TV Nation* and *The Awful Truth*, and our own Havoc and Newsboy's show, *Culture jam* is important not because it provides all the answers but because it makes politics accessible and fun. This book puts some substance to the environmentalists' call to 'think global: act local,' thus sowing the seeds for further developing analyses of power as well as encouraging action.

Some academics will find *Culture jam* lacking in rigorous theoretical discussion but this is the very reason we are

recommending this book. It is an accessible and easy read: The book can be read in one sitting, or in bursts between work and protests. Lasn's rhetoric is inspiringly positive. Following the Situationists, Lasn delivers many fabulous one-liners and quotable phrases that could be put to good use on t-shirts, placards and album covers. As well as the global campaigns, *Culture jam* contains creative ideas for small resistances like 'liberating' billboards (altering the message to parody the original) to dealing with unsolicited faxes (jam their fax by sending back a black page with a small box in middle, containing the word "don't fax me at home again"). Lasn clearly articulates the anger that many of us have felt about the state of the world. Instead of allowing you to slip into anomie and inertia however, Lasn eschews postmodern nihilism and offers strategies for getting started as an activist.

Holmes, J. (Ed.). (2000). *Gendered speech in social context: Perspectives from town and gown.* Auckland: Publishing Press.

Reviewed by Chris Brickell,

Gendered Speech in Social Context is an intriguingly multi-faceted collection. I first picked it up while in the process of collecting material for a 200-level lecture I was writing on gender and communication in the workplace. What I thought I would find was a combination of descriptive articles from which I could pull out some material on how men and women engage in talk at work, and perhaps some fairly formal discourse analyses concerned with the patterns of grammar and syntax in particular workplace interactions.

Imagine my delight when I discovered a series of essays which were primarily written by linguists but many of which engaged in debates which are of crucial interest to the sociological enterprise. These debates include the relationships between gender and narrative, self, social constructionism, essentialism, interaction, hegemony and structure vs. agency. The interventions which

linguists make into these debates in this collection are, I think, incredibly productive for sociologists.

This collection arose from the Language and Gender Symposium which was held at Victoria University of Wellington in 1999, and included local speakers as well as a number of prominent overseas linguists. The symposium and the resultant book sought to showcase recent research into the theoretical relationships between language and gender. It also set out to consider the application of research on language and gender in workplaces outside of academia. Contributions include writings on gender and language in Japan, Germany, the UK and Australia as well as New Zealand, and these examine apology, humour, children's speech, movements toward linguistic change and feminist approaches to organisational communication.

Within these substantive discussions, sociological questions are pondered in ways which are theoretically useful while providing ample empirical illustration of the theoretical presuppositions offered.

In her chapter on British men's talk, Jennifer Coates explores the function of narrative and storytelling in the construction of masculinity, at the level of the self and wider hegemonic social structures. Her discourse analysis is an exemplar of a form which is unfortunately all too rare – a harmonious combination of close readings of language with a critique of the ideologies and power effects reproduced through speech. Coates notes the features of men's language that perpetuate hegemonic forms of masculinity, including emotional restraint; the construction of an all-male world; the use of taboo language; and persistent constructions of male heroism. These linguistic 'performances' play a part in the 'ceaseless struggle to define gender.' This struggle involves repeated interaction and performance, linguistic and otherwise. Gender is therefore a potentially shifting terrain which requires constant reinforcement during social interaction. Coates goes on to argue suggestively that

> Conversational narrative is our chief means of constructing the fictions that are our lives and of getting others to collude in them. But storytelling also allows us to order and to re-order our everyday,

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normally taken-for-granted experiences. So while storytelling reinforces hegemonic masculinity, it can also provide a space where what is normally taken-for-granted can be questioned and challenged. (p. 35)

The focus here on ordering and re-ordering the everyday through narrative has an appealing reflexivity which works well in combination with the emphasis on the interaction which takes place on a quotidian basis. Coates' argument suggests feminist sociologist Dorothy Smith's (1990) proposition that power relations and the very character of the social are "achieved in and through what actual individuals are doing in the everyday settings of their lives" (p. 165).

Ann Weatherall continues this theme in her chapter which examines gender and language use among children relating in a creche. Rejecting essentialist assumptions that gender precedes language, Weatherall argues for a social constructionist position in which sex/gender (apparently following recent scholarship she does not distinguish between the two) are realised between people in interaction. Her interest is very much in 'doing gender' *through* language use rather than 'gender difference' *within* language, an interest which she puts to good use in her explorations of children's interactions. For the record, Weatherall's analysis suggests that pre-school boys and girls alike make wide use of both competitive and co-operative linguistic strategies!

Deborah Jones, too, is interested in the role of talk in constituting gender categories, in her discussion of feminism and organisational communication. Jones takes a slightly different tack to Coates and Weatherall, employing the work of Judith Butler to make a similar point about gender as an "effect of a series of practices" (p. 196). One of Jones' key interests lies in the possibilities for denaturalising gender categories offered by Butler's focus on 'making gender trouble.' While Jones' reference point is different from the other chapters canvassed here, viz. Butler rather than more explicitly interactionist perspectives, the concerns and desired ends involved are similar. Challenges to and ultimately dislodging of male dominance are the desired ends, and theoretical focus is placed upon the centrality of routinised, everyday enactions of gender, in which language use plays a key part.

If there is a chapter which requires some clarity in its use of sociological concepts it is that written by Maria Stubbe, Janet Holmes, Bernadette Vine and Meredith Marra on challenges to gender stereotypes in the workplace. The authors make some apt comments on the shortfalls of essentialism, exemplified by the now-infamous 'Mars and Venus approach,' which sees linguistic behaviours as rooted within individuals. However their setting up of social constructionism as an antidote could have used further theoretical exposition. They suggest that within social constructionism, "language is viewed as a set of strategies for negotiating the social landscape" (p. 250). This is rather vague, and does not go far enough in exploring how those involved in the negotiating construct the social and/or are themselves constructed through these processes. Although the other chapters mentioned here are lucid in their explication of social constructionism, that one should prove rather more unclear is not hugely surprising. Social constructionism is widely misunderstood generally. I have lost track of the countless times I've heard it said that constructionism is not useful because its proponents (apparently) believe that this or that is 'only' a social construction – as if a construction cannot be the most incredibly pervasive thing there is.

A similar lack of clarity is evident in these authors' ambivalence towards issues of linguistic domination. On the one hand they criticise Deborah Tannen for not offering an adequate account of the inequalities between men and women reproduced linguistically; but on the other hand they appear to offer their own form of liberal pluralism which insists that men and women make the same use of the same range of persuasive, directive and relational linguistic strategies. Their conclusion that linguistic resources available to men and women "consist of features which cluster to create a continuum of styles which are available to construct a range of social meanings, including those relating to gender" could easily have been written by Tannen herself (e.g. Tannen, 1994). In a sense this all begs the eternal (post-) postmodern question about how both variability and domination are to be afforded theoretical space, but this chapter could have done with an acknowledgement of the importance of these tensions.

Speaking (or writing) of postmodernism, the collection as a whole eschews the notion that discourse is so pervasive that everything and everyone are determined by it, a notion that often appears under the rubric of the 'linguistic turn' in sociology and elsewhere. My prevailing impression is instead that the chapters discussed here have an interest in discourse but an emphasis on social interaction. This leads me to wonder whether at the same time as sociology has been marked by a 'linguistic turn,' linguistics has been investigating the possibilities offered by a 'sociological turn.' There is certainly a rich vein of interactionist and social constructionist sociology available here to mine.

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Developing Research 'Culture' within New Zealand? A Comment on *Connections, resources and capacities: How social science research can better inform social policy advice* (Report from the Improving the Knowledge Base for Social Policy - Social Science Reference Group, August 2001).

Neil Lunt

The report contains recommendations and discussion from the eight member reference group charged with reporting how to secure effective social policy advice from social science research within New Zealand. The group drew on material gleaned from government officials, from a web-based New Zealand Social Science discussion group, and from previous reviews.

The authors identify a window of opportunity existing for evidence, evaluation, and social science activity to better shape

policy responses. They seek to rectify the 'muted' dialogue that exists between the social science community and social policy users. Highlighting the silo-based approach to departmental commissioned policy research, they emphasise the short-term, piecemeal, and somewhat scatter-gun nature of research activities.

The report's thrust is to secure a higher social science/policy equilibrium, thus raising questions on both the supply and demand sides. The report notes the lack of clarity around departmental and cross-departmental research priorities (something acknowledged by the current Minister for Research Science and Technology); the lack of resources within the system; insufficient research capacity; and the particular research (dis)incentives fostered within the current tertiary environment.

Social science research has been 'strategized' many times during the last thirty years (*a la* Gibson Report 1970, activities of the National Research Advisory Committee (Committee D) from mid-1970s, and debates around the role of the Social Science Research Committee towards the end of the 1980s to name only some). Whereas earlier reviews and discussion centred on funding and structural issues, *Connections, Resources and Capacities* focuses on process – aiming to create better dialogue between social science providers and government commissioners. Such dialogue it hopes will help Departments make better use of strategic research, and challenge the perceived elevation of disciplinary and academic debates.

Three types of recommendation are made; *connection* between government departments and the social science community includes the requirement for an annual 'social policy' conference, a dedicated social science journal, and a web-based discussion list to help foster debate. *Resources* recommends increased funding through Vote Research, Science and Technology for social research outputs. While increased *capacity* is to be fostered by a Code of Practice for contracting of government social science, better attention to research funding, and facilitating relationships between postgraduate students and government agencies.

The tertiary system is seen as a 'supplier' on two fronts – of future researchers and of research outputs. It faces major challenges however in responding to central (and local) agency policy demands

for graduates with project management, quantitative, and evaluation skills. Training of such students is likely to be resource intensive and require agency-tertiary collaboration. Effective teaching of research/policy demands integration with research activities, although current conditions mitigate such a vision. Frequently for individuals, at best teaching is research-influenced, or research is teaching-driven; at worst research is a hobby and not a prerequisite. We must hope the tertiary review and 'Centres of Excellence' will offer pathways through this research and teaching quagmire.

The report comments upon the Treasury's academic linkages programme, that offers students ways into the policy 'world.' The model may require revision if it is to be transferable to broader social science. Treasury's constituency within the tertiary sector is clearer (economics and statistics) than the more amorphous social science community, with its more troubled disciplinary identities. Arguably the report must be read (at least in part) as an appeal to consolidate the discipline of social policy. If so, where does this leave sociology and a number of other disciplines with close disciplinary relations in the social science configuration? In particular, where do Maori and Pacific Island interests fit within this discussion of social science?

The report identifies a number of tensions emerging from the tertiary system which inhibit role development. The challenge is to develop career paths for social scientists, and to consider how 'research careers' can be sustained and buttressed within the tertiary sector. Research careers should not just be contract careers – nor should contract research outcomes become prized proxy's of success. The New Zealand tertiary system has always been a multiversity – and far more than an instrumental supplier – the challenge is to maintain that diversity, to retain a notion of University, and avoid turning the tertiary institutions into training providers and servicing agencies. Many social scientists will remain cautious of any proposed governmental rapprochement. Disciplinary and academic debates retain their place and managing the tension between theoretical *Californication* of social science and more empirical-minded activity is an ongoing task that reaps methodological and practical rewards.

In brief, the report offers many useful recommendations developed on the basis of sound diagnosis. But if many of the issues are systemic ones then goodwill will go only some way to resolution. It must be matched by re-alignment of structures and incentives within the tertiary system and government departments.

Hunt, A. (1999). *Governing morals: A social history of moral regulation.* Cambridge Studies in Law and Society, Cambridge University Press.

Reviewed by Ruth McManus

Governing morals is timely and provocative. Hunt's point of departure is the recognition that contrary to popular belief, moral regulation is a pervasive aspect of contemporary political life that does not fit the image of pockets of archaic conservatives working feverishly through moral panics.

The book is organised into six chapters with an introduction that situates Hunt's contribution as a significant intervention in governmentality theory. Through a comparative study of moral regulation movements over a two hundred year period, he puts forward the thesis that moral regulation is a discrete mode of regulation.

Chapter one focuses on an early moral regulation movement active in London from 1690 to 1738. The 'Societies for the Reformation of Manners' were projects of moral regulation that acted upon social and moral anxieties of the age. Emanating from the Ecclesiastical Reformation, Societies for the Reformation of Manners focussed on the hedonism of the Restoration period. The streets, taverns, fairs, markets and brothels of urbanising London, condemned as hotbeds of prostitution, sedition and Sunday trading, were the hunting ground for a patricial and patriarchal hierarchy of informers and constables applying JP's directives that upheld new Royal Proclamations against vice and immorality. This included, for example, 'a *Proclamation for the Encouragement of Piety and Virtue and for the Preventing and Punishing of Vice, Prophaneness and*

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Immorality,' issued on the accession of Queen Anne in 1702 (p. 32). These Societies produced copious guidance tracts and made strenuous efforts to engage with those in need of reform.

Chapter two concerns the United States and British Vice Societies active at the beginning of the 19th Century. Hunt argues that the Industrial and French revolutions and their associated political issues caused social anxiety that spawned 'associational articulations' that intensified projects of moral regulation. There was an 'intimate moral linkage' between vice and idleness already present in societies for the reformation of manners; however, there was an increased inflection of patriotism and social improvement that marked a shift in emphasis from the improvement of manners to the suppression of vice. Vice societies concentrated on securing the passage of new anti-vice Acts and following them through by actively seeking the prosecution of Sabbath breakers and obscene publications. The Vice Society age is marked by coercive strategies of moral reform from above, where targets were compelled to virtue. For Hunt, these manners and vice societies were early attempts at the moral regulation of popular culture through the civil associations of policing and philanthropy that were both coercive and non-coercive.

Highlighting the indivisibility of morality and sex in bio-politics, chapter three documents the rise of a sexual *purity* movement in the United States and Britain at the end of the 19th Century, within which middle class women were key players. This movement was absorbed into a medically-driven social hygiene movement that had emerged alongside the rise in state welfarism. The switch from purity to hygiene signaled a transformation from an eschatological and ecclesiastical to a medicalised and secularised version of moral reform and a transformation in the form of coercive and non-coercive practices of moral regulation.

Chapter four and five develop comparable accounts of this transformation. Chapter four focuses on the United States and the tension between coercive moral regulation, epitomised in the 'Society for the Suppression of Vice,' and non-coercive moral regulation, epitomised in the Female Moral Reform Society. As an adjunct to the Temperance movement, this 'purity' organisation was

a focus for middle class women's patronising philanthrophy of saving poor fallen sisters from prostitution. In chapter five, Hunt discusses the way in which British women's involvement in sexual purity movements coincided with a period of mass franchise movements and an increasing state welfarism that heralded the age of V.D. clinics. The two trajectories exemplify different manifestations of the same tension between coercive and non-coercive tactics of moral regulation.

Chapter six shifts to the second half of the 20th Century. Here, stagnated debates within current feminism, epitomised in the polarity between radical and liberal feminisms, are paralleled with polarities present in late 19th Century maternal feminism. Both are understood in terms of the enduring tension between coercive and non-coercive strategies of moral regulation. Notwithstanding the longevity of this tension, the focal points have shifted from a concern with character to a concern with identity. The pervasive tension between coercive and non-coercive strategies of moral regulation demonstrate that the inculcation of ethical subjectivity involves simultaneous practices of self and other regulation *and* that the forms of moral regulation have been transformed.

Hunt approaches moral regulation from a governmentality perspective. However, the study is not a rehash of accepted positions. Hunt's substantive study of the unpredictable shifts and permutations of moral projects allows him to engage with a problematic in the heart of governmentality theory – subjectivisation. His research undermines the conventional thesis that there has been a transition from other to self government usually explained in terms of a shift from coercive to non-coercive practices of regulation. Hunt's accounts show that coercive and non-coercive practices of regulation have coincided in projects of moral reform; i.e., self-government 'frequently comes together' with other-government. Furthermore, the historical record indicates a shift in focus from considerations of 'good character' to considerations of 'self-identity.' Hunt views the shifts as transitions in *forms* of other/self-government rather than a shift from one form to another. That the reconceptualisation of self/other government as a transformation in forms relies on the analysis of moral regulation

movements signals to Hunt that moral regulation is a discrete mode of regulation that runs alongside the familiar political and economic modes and "involves the deployment of distinctive moral discourses which construct a moralised subject and an object or target which is acted upon by means of moralising practices" (p. 8).

Hunt's *Governing morals* is groundbreaking on a number of counts. Outside the introduction, six chapters build substantive accounts elaborated with fine and colourful detail that is marshaled effectively yet gently enough to allow the people's voices to be heard. This is no mean achievement and is a testament to the author's skill as a social historian. Furthermore, it represents new research on early moral regulation movements that adds to the socio-historical archive. In addition, it traverses the feminist terrain in a refreshing and productive (though possibly unsettling) reading of recent feminist projects and dilemmas.

Most significant for me is that it marks a shift in the governmentality discourse about moral regulation: on one level, it reintroduces the concept of moral regulation into governmentality. At another level, the detailed substantive exposition pulls this debate back out of the abstracted arena of purely theoretical discussion. For me, this is a plus, as the division between theory and substance is a bad habit in social theory.

The most juicy and problematic aspect is the way Hunt affirms the place of moral regulation in governmentality theory. To be brief and overly schematic, Hunt shifts the way moral regulation is considered from a first to a second order ethical problem: from judging the intrinsic moral properties of conducts to accounts of the processes that underlie these judgements. Hunt's processualism breaks the stranglehold of absolutism that tends to dog discussions of moral regulation. It is a familiar strategy in governmentality and is central to their model of regulation through enablement, as it shows how people are subjectivised rather than coerced.

This processualisation of moral regulation turns it into a mode of regulation that, contra Mitchel Dean and Mariana Valverde, allows its inclusion in governmentality lexicon. Theoretically, Hunt uses Corrigan's work as a point of reference, to argue against Dean and Valverde's dismissal of moral regulation. For him, Dean's rejection

of moral regulation as a concept because it tends to overshadow accounts of the inculcation of ethical subjectivity, and Valverde's position of viewing accounts of moral regulation as the inculcation of ethical subjectification, making the concept superfluous, are rather misdirected. This is because the inculcation of ethical subjectivity comes through moral regulation "in complex and varied forms of interaction between governing others and governing the self" (p. 16).

Although processualisation allows Hunt to demand moral regulation's inclusion in governmentality despite its disrepute, it also makes his account susceptible to a long observed problem in governmentality. The complication that processualism brings is that it reproduces the inability of governmentality to give an account of agency: the old threat of external determinacy or sociologism.

In Hunt's case, despite protestations, he repeats a common move of seeing ethical self-formation as an outcome of other governance: "A significant dimension of moral regulation projects is that they are projects directed at governing others while at the same time *they result in* self-governing effects" (p. 16 emphasis added). This frames internal processes as dependant on and defined by external processes which objectifies the subject and in so doing evacuates agency from his account of moral regulation and is exactly what Dean warned against. Yet Dean's subsequent refusal to work with the concept does not generate a non-objective account of agency either. It turns his attention to already formalised practices rather than their uptake (p. 18). The issue of agency within governmentality accounts of subjectification remain unresolved.

All is not lost though. The difficulty with agency suggests that the notion of volition may require more consideration. Hunt unwittingly implies this due to the centrality of civil associations in his account.

Notwithstanding these limitations, I would recommend this book to sociologists, governmentality scholars and social movement historians as a study resource and a reminder of the perplexing presence of moral regulation in our lives.

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Reviewed by Chamsy el-Ojeili

The Phronesis series within the Verso imprint was launched in the dramatic year 1989. As the blurb announces, the editors' initial hopes for Left renewal gave way to the reality of neo-liberal hegemony and a deeper Left crisis. The aims of the Phronesis series are to redefine the Left/Right distinction and to bring together Left politics and the critique of essentialism. This aim was, of course, controversially advanced by the series' editors Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in their 1985 book *Hegemony and socialist strategy.* This work combined the following: an Althusserian accent on relative autonomy and the ubiquity of ideology; a Eurocommunist appreciation of the gains represented by bourgeois democracy and liberal rights; a Gramscian meditation on the importance of alliance, historical specificity, the mediation of culture, and, most importantly, hegemony; and a post-structuralist rejection of Jacobinism and messianic catastrophism – a brake, that is, on the utopian imagination out of control, an imagination that posited future transparency and the reign of virtue. Both of the books presently

under review are explicitly described as continuations of the reflections contained within *Hegemony and socialist strategy*.

Mouffe's book – a collection of essays from the last few years – centres around the meaning of democracy and the attempt to develop a radical democratic alternative (agonistic pluralism), in the face of what she views as the threats to democracy represented by the Third Way, by deliberative democracy, and by the disappearance of real political contestation in the West.

What is most vital for Mouffe is democracy, as in Lefort's words, the "dissolution of the markers of certainty," where power becomes an empty place (p. 1). Most vitally, this entails a radical anti-foundationalism, which makes very clear democracy's dependence on conscious, collective reflection and political engagement, rather than adherence to an ideal justified by the authority of God, Doctrine, or History. Her commitment to democracy makes Mouffe sensitive to the threat posed by the current 'democratic deficit' and attentive to the need for a resurgence of the ideals of popular sovereignty – power to be exercised by the people – and equality. However, Mouffe is painfully aware that some popular decisions might jeopardise freedoms and rights and that these liberal concerns must provide a framework for thinking about a radical democratic future. A vital point of this book, and of Mouffe's work since *Hegemony and socialist strategy*, is to insist that these logics – the democratic and the liberal – cannot ever be perfectly reconciled; they will (and should) continue to exist in tension with one another. Paradoxically, his attention to this tension (the people versus humanity) makes the work of the conservative political philosopher Max Schmitt of great interest to Mouffe.

The post-Marxist contention about the ineradicability of power and antagonism, and the importance of the 'constitutive outside' in the construction of political identities, provide vital lenses through which Mouffe examines democratic competitors such as Giddens, Rawls, and Habermas. For Mouffe, Third Way-ers have a shallow economic strategy (forgetting the critique of capital), and theirs is a politics without an adversary; that is, they believe that all identities can be reconciled. Similarly, deliberative democrats and Habermasians believe in the dangerous utopia of a public sphere cleansed of power and struggle, where a rational and moral

consensus has emerged, removing from the equation the 'specificity of the political'. The recent emptying of democratic contestation – something that Third Way-ers are complicit in – says Mouffe, opens the way for the radical right to present itself as the only alternative to the self-satisfied neo-liberal consensus.

Mouffe and Laclau's relations with Slavoj Zizek date back to the publication of *Hegemony and socialist strategy* and the turn to post-structuralism within the Marxian tradition. This turn and the many questions that it raises are the agenda of discussion between Zizek, Laclau, and Judith Butler in the second book under review here. All participants accept the fruitfulness of the concept of hegemony, the necessity of the critique of essentialism, the importance of the turn to psychoanalysis to look at questions of identity and political strategy, and the gains represented by the post-structuralist focus on language. But, as the exchange shows, there is quite some scope for disagreement.

Unfortunately, much of the discussion reminds one of Martin Amis' description of the world chess championship fought between Gary Kasparov and Nigel Short. The audience are baffled by the moves, the experts (despite vigorous and confident commentary) have no sense at all of what they are witnessing, and, in the end, the participants themselves are fairly uncertain about what has happened after an encounter. As allegations of 'secret Kantian formalism' and 'historicism' are traded, as Hegelian exegesis meets counter-exegesis, as the Lacanian Real is unpacked, and as the prose becomes denser and denser, the reader can only hold on and hope for easier times ahead.

Nevertheless, some very interesting questions come into view, and the broad differences between these three contemporary leftist thinkers become clearer. For instance, Judith Butler very appositely asks Zizek and Laclau whether the notion of incompleteness in Lacanian thought is transcendental and what sort of empirical evidence confirms/disconfirms such a claim. Relatedly, in response to the claims of Zizek and Laclau that Lacan's 'Phallus' is not necessarily phallogocentric, Butler says

> The fact that my friends Salvoj and Ernesto claim that the term
> 'Phallus' can be definitionally separated from phallogocentrism

> constitutes a neologistic accomplishment before which I am in awe.
> I fear that their statement rhetorically refutes its own propositional
> content, but I shall say no more. (p. 153)

Butler also asks, most pertinently, and without receiving proper replies, about the compatibility in Laclau's thought of the Lacanian notion of the constitution of the subject with the notion of hegemony, and about the relation in Zizek between the social example and the psychic principle.

A significant part of the debate concerns the relation between universality and particularism. Laclau and Mouffe were initially accused of over-accenting contingency and particularity over relative fixity and the importance of universals in political strategy. Since this time, they have both been at pains to assert that their analyses include a recognition of the need to avoid absolute pluralism, and to insist on the continuing importance of universalism, all the time acknowledging that universalisms can and have been used to exclude and dominate people. Each thinker acknowledges the importance of universalism and the relationship between particularity and universalism:

> … we sometimes differ on how the emphasis is to be made, [but] we
> each offer accounts of universality which assume that the negative
> condition of all political articulation is 'universal' (Zizek), that the
> contestatory process determines forms of universality which are
> brought into a productive and ultimately irresolvable conflict with
> each other (Laclau), or that there is a process of translation by which
> the repudiated within universality is readmitted into the term in
> the process of remaking it (Butler). (p. 4)

To make this clearer, as Laclau notes, the universal is an empty place that can only be filled by the particular. There is, further, no purity about these concepts: "the only universality that society can achieve is a hegemonic universality – a universality contaminated by particularity" (p. 51); "There is no politics of pure particularity. Even the most particularistic of demands will be made in terms of something transcending it" (p. 305).

In a number of his articles – most notably "Multiculturalism, or, the cultural logic of multinational capitalism" – Zizek has

trenchantly asserted the continuing place of class struggle against neo-liberal hegemony, against a post-modernism that would suspend analysis of class struggle, and against the Third Way compromise. For Zizek, Laclau's politics threaten a retreat to gradualism, and radical democracy can, at times, look a little too much like plain old liberal democracy. In answer to the again important Leninist question – what is to be done? – Zizek retrieves the anarchistic formula of '68: "Soyons realistes, demandons l'impossible." In response, Laclau argues that class struggle is but a species of identity politics and is becoming less important, and he makes the following, scathing assessment of Zizek's politics: "[Zizek's] discourse is schizophrenically split between a highly sophisticated Lacanian analysis and an insufficiently deconstructed Marxism" (p. 205); "…Zizek's thought is not organised around a truly *political* reflection but is, rather, a *psychoanalytic* discourse which draws its examples from the politico-ideological field"(289).

While the Phronesis discourse is likely to be demoralising and/ or irritating for the outsider, the value of this discussion will be obvious to those familiar with, and excited by, the work of Laclau and Mouffe. The richness of their brand of post-Marxist insights will be confirmed by anyone who witnessed the energy, intelligence, and humility of Slavoj Zizek at the Ticklish Subjects conference in Auckland recently.

Pierson, P. (2001). *The new politics of the welfare state.* Oxford, Oxford University Press. $65.00, (Paperback), 514p.

Reviewed by Gerard Cotterell

In the introduction to this book, Pierson notes that while much is known about the expansion of welfare states, relatively little is known about the more recent period of welfare state retrenchment. Pierson argues that the process of rolling back or retrenching welfare states cannot be understood by employing the same theories used to examine their expansion and thus there is a need for a "new

politics of the welfare state." This "new politics of the welfare state," he suggests, needs to take into account the enduring popularity of welfare states and the pressures for austerity that they face, and the presence of a new constituency of supporters created by the expansion of welfare states.

The collection of 13 chapters in this book represents an attempt to outline this "new politics." The book is divided into four sections, with chapters grouped around four themes: "(1) the sources and scope of pressures on national welfare states; (2) the role of economic interests, and of systems for representing those interests, in the politics of reform; (3) the implications of electoral politics and the design of political institutions for welfare state adjustment; and (4) the distinctive policy dynamics of particular areas of social provision" (p. 2). The chapters focus on the experiences of North America and of countries in Western Europe and North America, but Australia and New Zealand receive some coverage.

In the first section, Schwartz, Iversen and Pierson examine the sources of pressure for the retrenchment of welfare states. In a detailed analysis of the impact of globalisation, Schwartz notes that the most significant influence on welfare state retrenchment in the USA has been the pressures for deregulation, which have reduced protection for many forms of employment. Iversen examines the influence of de-industrialisation as a promoter of social change and finds little evidence to support the claim that globalisation represents a threat to welfare states.

Pierson identifies four transitions taking place in advanced economies that place ongoing pressure on welfare states. These transitions are: a slowdown in economic growth; the demographic consequences of an ageing population; changes in the structure of households; and the expansion and growth to limits of government welfare commitments. The consequences of these transitions, he suggests, are an increasing pressure on welfare states to contain expenditure. Pierson also argues that while governments use globalisation as a reason to restructure welfare states, it is primarily the social and economic transformations identified above that generate fiscal strains. He notes that in many cases the threat of globalisation is used to impose reforms.

The three chapters in the second section of the book examine how policy makers are influenced by 'economic actors' and investigate the distinctive patterns of social policy provision within Western countries. Huber and Stephens examine the impact of retrenchment pressures on different types of welfare regimes[1]. They note that retrenchment efforts during the 1990s in New Zealand were among the few cases (along with the UK and the USA) where large-scale ideologically driven cuts took place. Manow examines the manner in which retrenchment pressures impacted differently on different groups in the workforce, and also notes that strong welfare states can have a positive impact on global competitiveness, a point not often mentioned by detractors of the welfare state. In the last chapter of section two, Rhodes looks at the formation of coalitions between employers and unions in negotiating welfare reform and argues that pressures for welfare reform can create unexpected alliances. He also suggests that there is little evidence to support the claim that nation states no longer have the have ability to implement the welfare policies they desire.

Section three examines the circumstances under which significant welfare state retrenchment has been undertaken. The essays in this section are of particular interest to New Zealand readers for they illustrate why successive governments in this country were able to impose welfare state reforms – and they also help to explain the limits on those reforms. Bonoli explains how different electoral systems and legislative arrangements impact on policy-making. He notes that New Zealand has a unicameral parliament and a first past the post electoral system (until the introduction of MMP in 1996), which allow political power to be concentrated in the hands of a few. Bonoli suggests that unicameral parliaments are generally associated with stronger government control over policy-making. He also notes, however, that the reform policies of such governments are more visible and therefore they are more easily held accountable for their actions.

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1. Huber and Stephens use the typology of welfare states devised by Esping-Anderson (1990). Thus they identify the liberal, social democratic and conservative types of welfare states.

Swank, using principal components analysis and multiple regression, highlights the "importance of national political institutions in shaping social policy responses to domestic fiscal stress and internationalisation" (p. 232). He finds that in countries with liberal welfare states (New Zealand is defined as a liberal welfare state) the presence of negative economic factors such as high levels of public debt results in downward pressures on social welfare provision. Kitschelt examines the circumstances under which politicians adopt unpopular policy programmes, given the potentially negative electoral consequences of such actions. He finds that the presence of economic crises and the discrediting of other policy alternatives help to create space for retrenchment policies.

The final section examines the reform process in particular policy arenas: health care, pension provision and the labour market. These studies emphasise the importance of examining the retrenchment process in separate policy areas as the impact of reform measures may be applied unevenly across policy sectors. Giaimo analyses the reforms of the health sector in the USA, UK and Germany, noting that while the reforms were driven by the desire to cut costs, the impacts differed because of the structure of health care provision in each country. Wood examines the politics of labour market reform in the UK, Sweden and Germany, arguing that despite all the pressure for labour market reform in these countries, little change is evident.

Myles and Pierson examine pension reform, which they classify as a classic example of the 'path-dependence' of policy. That is, once policies are well established, proposals for reform will face limited choices because of the difficulty of significantly changing the direction of policies currently in place. Myles and Pierson also note that the problem of legitimating reforms may be overcome if the proposal has the approval of the different groups involved. In New Zealand this practice was reflected in the Accord on superannuation provision organised by the National Government in 1993.

In the final chapter Pierson sets out a framework for examining the process of welfare state retrenchment. He notes the difficulty of assessing the extent of retrenchment given definitional issues, problems with inadequate theorisation and data limitations. Pierson

proposes that a useful way to conceptualise retrenchment is to think about it along three dimensions: recommodification, cost containment, and recalibration. Recommodification entails attempts to restrict the alternatives to participation in the labour market, while cost-containment refers to reducing the level of spending on welfare states. Recalibration involves rationalising and updating current welfare states to ensure that they are in line with current government policy goals.

Pierson uses these three dimensions to examine the dynamics of reform in different types of welfare states. He notes that liberal welfare states (such as New Zealand) focus on recommodification. In contrast recalibration and cost-containment have been more central to the policy agenda in continental welfare states, while cost-containment has been the principal mechanism used in the social democratic welfare states of Scandinavia. While noting the differences in the reform agenda across different welfare regime types, he argues that the desire for cost containment is a high priority for all of them.

Pierson also identifies the political conditions essential for achieving significant welfare policy reforms. First, a series of economic setbacks which discredit the policy status quo and its supporters; and second, a partisan institutional configuration that translates an electoral plurality into a governing majority and allows that majority to operate essentially unhindered. Pierson concludes that an important factor underlying welfare retrenchment is economic performance, arguing that "the future fate of mature welfare states is likely to be dependent upon the economic performance of the particular countries to which they are joined" (p. 456).

For New Zealand readers the material covered in the book illustrates certain aspects of the reform process that took place during the 1980s and 1990s. For example, the early chapters on the importance of institutions illustrate how radical reform was imposed in this country by the National Government after its election in 1990. Additionally, the later chapters point to ways of understanding how the retrenchment process impacted on particular areas of policy.

The book is highly recommended to those interested in the process of welfare reform, particularly its observations on the

difficulty of modifying aspects of welfare policy. The collection of chapters provide a thorough assessment of the pressures facing welfare states in advanced western countries, and the use of complex quantitative methods allows for detailed comparative examinations of the pressures on welfare states. A 43-page bibliography provides an extensive set of references to recent and current research about welfare state retrenchment, further increasing the usefulness of the book.

| CONFERENCE REVIEW |

The International Social Theory Consortium, Second
Annual Conference, July 5-7 (2001).

Reviewed by Stephen Kemp

Although the temperamental British weather did its best to put a
damper on/induce heat-stroke in the proceedings, the second
conference of *The International Social Theory Consortium*, held at the
University of Sussex, was an undoubted success. The Consortium's
conferences allow participants to both discuss issues around the
institutionalisation of social theory, and engage in lively debate about
issues in social theory past and present. This conference certainly
provided evidence of the 'international' scope of the Consortium,
with a large number of participants hailing from universities in the
United States and Canada, as well as impressive contingents from
Belgian, Italian, and Australian universities.

Although strictly institutional issues were largely discussed
outside the programme of papers, Wolfgang Natter's presentation,
which opened the conference, raised some of the relevant points. In
particular, he discussed the potential for social theory to become a
discipline in itself, rather than its practitioners being dispersed
through various disciplines such as sociology, philosophy, and
politics. This possibility of the disciplinisation of social theory has
been raised within the Consortium's literature, and is held to be
advantageous because it could generate a sense of *esprit de corps*
and solidarity, as well as allowing students to focus specifically on
the theoretical issues that concern them rather than, say, having to
take courses on quantitative methodology, as they might do as
participants in a sociology programme. Nevertheless, after Natter's
paper, questions from the audience highlighted some of the potential
problems with disciplinarisation, including the sense that the drive
to disciplinarise social theory seems to go against current trends

within social science in which de-disciplinarisation is the dominant mood.

Another paper highlighted the need for discussions about the place of social theory to be located in the specific institutional contexts in which they are relevant. Louis Kontos, who teaches at Long Island University, USA, put forward the admirable sentiment that theorising should not be taught in a way which divides theoretical perspectives into one of three camps: functionalist, conflict theory, or interactionist. Clearly this was an important point to make in relation to his own institution, and the institutions of some others in the audience for whom this observation resonated. However, such points do not apply to the teaching of sociological and social theory within the United Kingdom, which raises a different range of problems and potentials.

Moving from institutional issues to matters theoretical, although the papers presented covered a wide range of topics, a number of themes emerged. Firstly, as one might expect, the characteristics of modernity were the subject of lively debate. Speakers such as Peter Wagner continued to explore issues arising from the analysis of modernity put forward by the Critical Theorists. Other speakers considered the validity of the concept of 'multiple modernities,' with some, such as Jong-Hwa Shin, raising doubts about its analytical potential, and others, such as Gerard Delanty, attempting to show its validity by considering a concrete case study of one possible modernity, that experienced by Japan.

Other papers offered us a chance to reflect on the achievements of prominent social theorists. The session devoted to Zygmunt Bauman's work was particularly notable here, with a sense that speakers, and members of the audience, were working towards a full appreciation of the characteristics of Bauman's thought and the influences upon it, rather than engaging in polemics about its validity or otherwise. The paper on Hannah Arendt presented by Dennis Smith and Christina Ujma was similar in tone, attempting to extend our knowledge of Arendt's work, the better to assess it. Arendt's name was certainly on the lips of many speakers and questioners during the conference, although not all were convinced of the value of her work. Andreas Hess's paper on Judith Shklar

caused a stir by suggesting that Shklar was a superior thinker to Arendt, a claim which gave rise to debate over the relative political merits of their work.

A further noteworthy aspect of the conference was the appraisal of social theory by feminists attempting to identify the gendered aspects of the work of thinkers such as Simmel and Weber. These papers were of particular interest within the British context, given the recent article in *Sociology* by Jo Eadie which pointed to the continuing marginalisation of issues of gender from theory debates, as apparent in a range of recent texts on social theory.

In terms of broad analytical orientation, one would have to say that the dominant mode was interpretive analysis, with many of the papers discussing issues arising from hermeneutic and constructivist approaches such as the status of critique, resistance, and agency. To the defenders of such approaches, it appeared that the notion of social inquiry being conducted naturalistically was not even a possibility to be considered. However, papers by Peter Caws and Patrick Baert at least raised this possibility, even if they ultimately found reason to dismiss it. More positively, the panel discussion on Realism demonstrated that lively and interesting debate can be had around this question, even if realist modes of analysis are not the only option for naturalistically inclined investigators.

Of course, a conference cannot be summed up by listing the papers involved, as it is a social event as much as an academic one. The spirit of friendship and lively conversation was best represented by the atmosphere at the Conference Dinner, which was a highly enjoyable event. Those inclined to investigate the social may not be renowned for the 'tacit skills' they demonstrate in interaction, but the laughter and merriment of that evening was a joy to behold. It remains only to thank the organisers of the conference at the University of Sussex for their sterling efforts and look forward to next years Consortium gathering.

CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

Peter Beilharz is Professor of Sociology at Latrobe, and an editor of *Thesis Eleven*. His most recent books are *Imagining the Antipodes* (1997); and *Zygmunt Bauman - Dialectic of Modernity* and *The Bauman Reader* (2000).

Avril Bell teaches Sociology and Women's Studies at Massey University in Palmerston North. Her major research interests are in the areas of cultural identity theory and colonialism, particularly as they apply to Maori and Pakeha identities and relations. She is currently completing her doctorate on this topic. A second major research interest is media sociology, particularly the areas of media representations and media policy.

Chris Brickell followed his PhD in Sociology at VUW with a Postdoctoral Fellowship in History at the University of Canterbury, where he started examining politics, culture and gender in 1940s New Zealand. He is now a lecturer in the Gender and Women's Studies Programme at Otago.

Alex Calder is a senior lecturer in English at the University of Auckland. He has recently published the first scholarly edition of F. E. Maning's *Old New Zealand and Other Writings*.

Gerry Cotterell recently completed a Masters of Philosophy in Social Policy at Massey University, Albany. The subject of the thesis was "Welfare state retrenchment under National: 1990-1998 - A Marxist perspective."

Lincoln Dahlberg is a post-doctoral research fellow in the sociology programme at Massey University. He is investigating the practices and meanings surrounding Internet use, with particular focus on processes of democratization.

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Rosemary Du Plessis teaches sociology at the University of Canterbury. She is co-editor of *Feminist Voices: Women's Studies Texts for Aotearoa/New Zealand* (1992), *Feminist Thought in Aotearoa/New Zealand: Connections and Differences* (1998) and *He Pounamu Korero: Politics, Policy and Practice* (1998). Her academic interests are as eclectic as the field of cultural studies. She has written about gender, work and social policy as well as *The Piano, Iron John,* and *Rachel Hunter: Cover Girl*. She is the social science representative on the Council of the Royal Society of New Zealand and coordinated the social science component of the RSNZ submission to the Royal Commission on Genetic Modification. This has involved constant attention to the cultural politics of science and technology.

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Katie Pickles is a lecturer in History at the University of Canterbury. She has published in The New Zealand Journal of History, The

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Roy Shuker In the late 1970s, when I investigated issues in the historical sociology of education, I fell under the influence of the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies and helped found SITES. In the 1980s, my teaching and research interests moved increasingly toward the study of popular media, drawing strongly on political economy and policy studies. In the last decade, intrigued by my own children's engagement with the media, I have researched young people's media consumption, media literacy, and issues of censorship and regulation. As an aging baby boomer, I have also exercised a Peter Pan complex to indulge in extensive popular music studies.

Stephen Turner teaches in the departments of English and Film, Television and Media Studies at Auckland University. Having published a number of articles on issues of local cultural studies in journals ('Meanjin') and anthologies ('Quicksands'), he is currently preparing for publication a book on the psychology of settlement in the New Zealand context.

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INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTRIBUTORS

Submissions of Manuscripts. All manuscripts submitted will be considered for publication, on the understanding that they are original material and are not being considered for publication elsewhere. Please submit only finished manuscripts.

Length. Manuscripts should not exceed 6 000 words.
Number of copies. Three (3), preferably laser-printed, copies of manuscripts should be provided for consideration. These should be sent to:

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Specifications for manuscripts. Text will be double-line spaced on one side of A4 paper. Authors should consult articles in current issues of *New Zealand Sociology* on general matters of editorial style, e.g. titles and headings, indentation of paragraphs, form of referencing, etc. Do **not** underline any words in the text. Manuscripts must begin with an **abstract** of about 100 words. Please ensure that your text conforms to UK spelling rather than American.

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Footnotes and references. Footnotes are to be reserved for substantive commentary. Number them from 1 upwards. The location of each footnote in the text must be indicated by the appropriate superscript numeral. Footnotes will appear at the foot of the page where they are located.

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References. A reference list consisting only of those references cited in the text should be arranged alphabetically using the following American Psychological Association style:

Book: Keane, J. (1996). *Reflections on violence*. London: Verso.

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Article in Journal: Lichtenstein, B. (1996). Aids discourse in parliamentary debates about homosexual law reform and the 1993 Human Rights Amendment. *New Zealand Sociology*, 11 (2), 275-316.

Unpublished paper: Ryan, W. (2001, June). *Globalisation and governance*. Paper presented at the Association of Asia-Pacific Social Science Research Council's (APSSREC) Seminar on New Zealand and the World: The impacts of globalisation - social, economic and cultural dimensions, Wellington.

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