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Editorial

Just over a year ago – Volume 16, Number 1 – *New Zealand Sociology* underwent some significant changes. A new editorial team was enrolled with a more proactive editorial policy. This resulted in the more frequent appearance of special feature issues (e.g. on Sociolinguistics, Cultural Studies) and changes in format and look of the journal. Attention was paid to getting the trains running on time, and indeed the two issues did appear in their proper place in the yearly timetable. There was a price increase, but this was modest enough to still keep the journal value for money.

These changes were quickly followed by a perhaps more momentous event. After more than fifteen years running the journal, the Massey Sociology Programme announced that it was stepping aside. Subsequently, the Sociological Association of Aotearoa New Zealand took up ownership of the journal, and the SAANZ executive set about collecting bids for editorial control and production responsibility. In mid 2002 it was announced that Mike Lloyd, Lincoln Dahlberg, and Chamsy el-Ojeili had gained the editorship.

Hence, we are now pleased to bring you the current issue of the journal. Helping us with the ongoing task of producing the journal are our new book review editors, Avril Bell and Lesley Patterson, plus a new group of associate editors (see above). In addition, we gratefully acknowledge the support provided by the School of Social and Cultural Studies, Victoria University of Wellington. This support includes the administrative assistance of Kaye Perkin and the secretarial and typesetting work of Alice Fisher (the fruit of her labour is abundantly clear in this issue). Finally, we thank Roger Joyce for his production work, in particular for the new design of both cover and text.

New Zealand Sociology is so well-established that it is relatively easy to take it for granted. However, as all sociologists know, making things real requires a great deal of constructive work and practical accomplishment (not to mention administrivia). In this regard, there is plenty of scope for an article that traces the labour that has gone into the journal, how it was establised and the personnel and intellectual shifts across its life. This would

be a useful contribution to our collective knowledge of the sociological tradition here, and we would like to flag this task for future work. In the meantime, the New Zealand sociological community should extend an enormous thanks to all those at Massey involved in establishing and running the journal for so long (1987-2002). We hope that the journal will continue to receive the support it has enjoyed to date and that subsequent issues remain as full and vibrant as this one.

In the age of the infomercial and the quest for excellence almost everything is "exciting"; nevertheless, we feel justly excited about this issue. It includes Peter Beilharz's engaging and wide-ranging keynote address from the 2001 SAANZ conference. We are also pleased to publish articles from the winners of the 2001 Postgraduate Prize for Scholarship in Sociology – Johanna Schmidt and Lesley Hunt. Gregor McLennan, former Professor of Sociology at Massey University, is interviewed on sociology's future, post-colonialism, Marxism, and the border wars between sociology and cultural studies. The general articles cover a wide range of topics and there are reviews of several important new books.

We hope that you enjoy the issue and can help us make the journal an active and successful dialogue through contributing articles, reviews, comment pieces, and so forth. Email has its disadvantages, but we would like to encourage this dialogue by conducting the bulk of journal correspondence through email (see the "instructions for contributors" for contact details). We welcome any communication about the journal that readers may care to make.

It only remains to be said, read on ...

Mike Lloyd, Lincoln Dahlberg, Chamsy el-Ojeili

The Antipodes: Another Civilization, Between Manhattan and the Rhine?

Peter Beilharz

Keynote Speech, SAANZ Annual Conference, 2001, Massey University

Who are we? Where have we come from? Where are we going?

Paul Gauguin asked these three famous questions, in the extraordinary painting which now hangs in the Boston Museum of Fine Arts. Australia and Aotearoa ran parallel paths through the twentieth century, beginning with enormous promise, ending in anxiety and ambivalence. We came from some similar places, travelled different paths, ending up in related binds. Yet this was, is, for me, an integral experience, in all its difference. The incapacity of Australians and New Zealanders intellectually to connect these stories is extraordinary: after the social laboratory, after Pember Reeves, there is no single work known to me which takes the antipodes as an integral experience across the twentieth century, in broad terms of culture and political economy or the patterns of antipodean modernism. Perhaps the closest we get is in Frank Castles' essay "The working class and welfare". This is especially striking given that these parallel paths in the antipodes are long, and yet both marked by a high degree of change since around 1980. There are some good, or solid reasons, for our mutual indifference, which has also to do with being peripheral, or antipodean, and not only to do with the real difficulties in bridging knowledge across two sets of stories that are also quite radically distinct. By virtue of being antipodean, Australians and New Zealanders both look north, rather than sideways. In the setting of this conference it would be likely much easier to start a conversation on the work of Michel Foucault than on the antipodes, or the actual moment we find ourselves in now. This is a real shame, I think, for while we have a great deal to learn about antipodean relations to the centres, we also have much to ponder laterally, connecting with settler colonialism, South Africa, Latin American modernities, and so on – connecting with each other.

Today I begin with the four constituent terms of my paper, and follow with three steps, which only slowly approach the heart of the matter of parallel paths, partly because of my ignorance of New Zealand, which I am here hopefully to begin to remedy, for I should dearly like to write this missing book. So I shall talk briefly about the four keywords here: Antipodes, Civilization, Manhattan, and the Rhine; and then, in more detail, I shall talk especially about America and modernization, rather less about the Rhine as a possible alternative model, and offer some hints about the antipodes as a third alternative.

First term: antipodes. I follow the work of the Australian cultural historian Bernard Smith in thinking it useful to imagine the antipodes, our places, not only as places, but also as relationships. Culture comes of cultural traffic, rather than of place in itself. Antipodean cultures, like Australia and New Zealand, result from the unequal flow of cultural traffic from north to south, and back as well as sideways. Relations of cultural traffic are necessarily asymmetrical, but they are mutual, as, perhaps, in the dialectics of master and slave. I have sketched out some of these themes in a book called *Imagining the antipodes*. Let me note in passing that I was surprised not to get stick, in reviews, along the lines of *which* antipodes? Neither a West Australian, nor a Tasmanian, nor a New Zealander took up this question in review. I think it's an interesting issue; the term, antipodes, obviously, is plural, a beginning for many different conversations. I certainly don't think that Australians own the idea.

Second term: civilization. I reject the fashionable period refusal of the idea of civilization. I think it remains a necessary and useful term. I use the word in the sense Walter Benjamin did, to register the way in which civilization rests on violence, as culture rests on power. But I am equally interested in the idea of modernity, which I take to include tradition and the postmodern. I think the idea of modernity is central, provided again that we pluralize it, in the manner of arguments concerning multiple, or alternative modernities. And this is to anticipate part of my argument here: that the antipodes is, or was, an alternative modernity, given that modernity in dominant discourse often works as a password for America.

There's a categorical problem built into the use of terms like civilization or modernity that you find from Toynbee on. These are big categories, that

indicate a few major global clusters; they become broken down quickly, only we then have as many civilizations, or modernities, as we have, say, nation-states. I don't claim to have a solution to this analytical problem, but I do think that it is still useful to seek to cluster types of experiences, and this is my methodological immediate justification for connecting Australia and New Zealand in this way.

Third term: Manhattan. Manhattan is a clumsy synecdoche I have chosen for Americanism, Wall Street. Plainly its significations have changed vastly since 9/11, though some have also been revived – Gotham, Gomorrah. I'll explain further in a moment the centrality of Americanism to this whole argument, to thinking about modernity, modernism, and the idea of the antipodes as an alternative modernity or civilization. For the present, the image of Manhattan contrasts with my fourth term, the Rhine. The contrast between America and the Rhine is associated with the 1993 work of Michel Albert, *Capitalism versus capitalism*, where the postcommunist alternative is posed: after the fall, you can have Yankee or civilized capitalism, Manhattan or the Rhine, that's the global choice. In Albert's frame, the major choice indicates preferred investment strategies, short term or long. Americanism wants it all, now. The Rhine model counterbalances these claims with those of social solidarity and the long, or mid-term, durée. As I indicated already, with reference to the pluralization of modernities or civilizations, there may well also be more than two alternatives here: not only Manhattan and the Rhine, but also Tokyo and Stockholm. David Coates, for example, in *Models of capitalism* suggests three models or clusters, politically rather than geographically defined: first, market-led – American and Anglo-Saxon; second, State-led – Japan, South Korea; third, negotiated, or consensual (or what in the 80's we called corporatist) – Germany and Scandinavia. To anticipate, while within Coates' frame of reference, my curiosity here is whether there might be in his terms a fourth, antipodean model, State-centred and marked out by particular institutions which are labour-oriented if not labour-led, such as Arbitration. The simpler frame I choose to work within here is Michel Albert's – that if there are two major alternatives, American and Continental European, is it then possible that the antipodes might be or have been a third way, an alternative civilization between Manhattan and the Rhine?

So much for definitions and preliminaries; let me enter the first analytical problem, the relationship between America, Americanism and modernity, before I turn to the German model and the antipodes in turn.

Why should America be so central here? As Peter Wagner argues in a recent paper in *Thesis Eleven*, America comes to function in western culture as the image of pure modernity, modernity *ex nihilo*. It also impure, and imperial, invasive; but it is the new world experience which becomes the central frame of global culture. John Locke's innocent foundational claim, in the beginning, all was America, becomes for us the last world – in the end, all is America. Of course, America also remains framed by its own experience: it remains unable to escape from slavery, or liberalism, and its puritan culture is increasingly coloured by the revival of the Hispanic culture which it sought to displace. America, these days, is no longer full of Americans; except that it never was. American modernity remains an endlessly fascinating puzzle, not least because we love it, for all its flaws. The famous graffiti encountered throughout Meso America captures something of the ambivalence, where one hand has written "Yankee go home", and another added beneath this, "and take me with you". As Salman Rushdie has his central character put it in his novel *Fury*, America insults the rest of the planet with its abundance; high modernity in the centres is we might say a potlatch culture, a culture where waste is either a value or else at least a habit. The rest of us envy this world, even as we despise it; and this, I suggest, is nothing more than a cultural-historical manifestation of our deep ambivalence toward modernity itself.

Let me remain here a moment longer, for my sense is that in Australia, at least, there has been a revival of leftwing inauthenticity regarding this condition since 9/11. It seems absolutely hypocritical to me to cast the USA as the Evil Empire, the image of negation as some seem keen to do. Whatever positions we might choose to take up on American foreign affairs, imperialism, or global questions of inequality, it seems to me that there is no way around the fact that American culture is the present world-historic frame of world culture in the best, as well as the worst sense. That Americanism is an imperial, universal culture is manifest in the dominance of its four major cultural forms: Fordism, Hollywood, rock and roll (R and B, blues, and jazz), and television. American culture is the global frame

within which others – such as we, in the antipodes – lead, in innovation – in film, in music, even in ideas. To make a claim like this, incidentally, raises the question mentioned earlier, from the other end. The earlier question was, which antipodes? Australia? or its extremities, west, south, north, Fremantle, Hobart, Cairns? Aotearoa? Argentina, Brazil, Chile vis-a-vis Italy, France, Spain or Portugal? and now, viewed from the centres the question becomes, which centre? Our antipodes, in Australia, are plainly now in America in cultural terms, even though the demographics and institutions remain British in their predominant bias. And then there is the attendant question, which America predominates? The Hispanic, Pacific, Asian version in the Los Angeles model? The major growth model until 9/11, in Las Vegas? The Puritan model in New England, the melting pot in Manhattan, the middling model of the middle west, the slower, so to say antipodean stream down south – New Orleans, Arkansas, Texas – the Mexican model under the border, or the stroppier Canadian version above?

Recognising the rich diversity of American experience shouldn't be difficult, but it is: because the idea of America remains associated with the image of modernity, and that model is unmixed modernity. For the problem remains, conceptually speaking, that which William Morris identified more than a century ago in Edward Bellamy's *Looking backward* as unmixed modernism. The political arguments for America as modernity remain unaffected by all those cultural and regional variations of the kind I have just listed. The mainstream argument about, or for America mainstreams America as modern. And here, I think, the problem in much interpretation or advocacy is less immediately to do with the politics of glossy globalization than to do with the spectre of modernization theory revived. Modernization theory has done a big comeback. This trend is apparent in the extraordinarily influential work of Robert Putnam, first on how the good, northern Italians outperform the bad, southern Italians, more recently on how the smart northern denizens of the USA similarly outperform its southerners. I caricature, I confess; though one also has to wonder about the Tocquevillian legacy and its transmutation in American self-analysis or self-congratulation. For what Putnam in *Bowling alone* calls social capital we, in the antipodes would until recently have called commonwealth, or civil, social goods in the general value-sense rather than the creeping, imperial

economic sense. Social capital, here, seems really to suggest something more like solidarity. To put the obvious twist on Putnam's conclusion, perhaps it is the case that rather than working out a charter for social capitalists, we should be approaching these matters as capital socialists. Social provision is something we have, after all until recently, been good at.

Perhaps a more clear exemplar of the problems in this kind of modernisation thinking is the best selling collection edited by Harrison and Huntington, *Culture matters*. Harrison and Huntington are right: culture does matter; though this axiom seems rather here to indicate that Protestantism rules, with none of the ambivalence left to us by Max Weber. In this volume, the editorial implication is that culture rules, only culturalism here is modernism, Americanism. Harrison, in particular, claims that there are ten values which distinguish progressive cultures (North America) from static cultures (Latin America). In summary, they read as follows:

1. future time orientation
2. centrality of work
3. frugality
4. education
5. merit
6. community
7. ethical code (cf. corruption)
8. justice
9. dispersion of authority
10. secularism

The hilarious thing about lists like this, needless to say, is that viewed as party-games, North America can easily be read here as backward. To read the list backward:

10. secular, yet fundamentalist
9. power concentrated in NYC, DC, LA, Miami
8. justice racially distributed
7. corruption at City Hall, mafia
6. community – individualism
5. merit = class
4. education, cf. entrepreneurialism; class, again
3. frugality – hedonism
2. work ethic cf. play ethic
1. future orientation vs. traditionalism/foundationalism

For the point, to repeat, is that modernity is always mixed – modernism is a project rather than a condition. Yet the imperative of the politics here, presented via culture, persists: modernity in this condition looks increasingly like a module, a capsule, a pill. "Did you take your modernity today?" And while the problem of explaining and achieving levels of prosperity remains, this kind of check list seems nevertheless to conceal as much as it might reveal. The ten claimed attributes of progressive cultures seem really to reduce to one, work, or three, work work work. To invert the logic at this point, we might also want to ask, from our position in the antipodes: where, here in this list of desirable, dynamic attributes, is leisure, contemplation, re-creation? where is democracy, or political cooperation in this model of modernity? where is respect for the past, for nature, for the senses of limits that we might associate with both respect for history and nature in different ways? or in the American case, where, here, is the other America? where are the other peoples? All this, to me, seems tediously reminiscent of that Parsonian prejudice, that the best solution for the problems of modernity was more modernization; whereas perhaps the more appropriate response would be more tradition, or at least a reconsideration of tradition in order to clarify our own values for the present and future. As Gauguin understood, where we have come from is central to where we are headed.

Second step. What, then, of the German, or Continental alternative? European arguments to solidarism, to Christian and Social Democracy, were one earlier candidate for the idea of Third Way, the path between raw capitalism and Soviet communism. Certainly Europeans and Americans have traditionally followed different ways of organising capitalism, one plain source of distinction indicating the discrepancy between liberal and collectivist, capitalist and traditionalistic cultures, where it is exactly the mix of modernity and feudal tradition that separates the two models. The problem, to step perhaps too quickly ahead, is whether these distinctions still apply, in any substantive, tendential manner. Germany, in other words, is already heading towards America. This is certainly one strong sentiment you meet among Germans, who, if my own experience is worth anything, have hitherto known both how to work, and how not to. Earlier this year I gave a paper to sociologists at the University of Trier, Marx's hometown,

on the idea of Australia as an alternative modernity. Discussion was sharp; some of my interlocutors knew more about Australia than I did. As one of them put his question, by way of a comment, "Australia was an alternative modernity, but that story is over". My friends in Trier were speaking, also, it seems, of themselves – once there was a local modernity, perhaps they themselves still lived in it, but their children would not – so we drank together in midsummer nights, as Marx did, only American fighter jets flew low and loud overhead, and their complaints about the fate of their university sounded remarkably antipodean, or perhaps they are universal.

The problem with the German model is less whether it existed, than whether it survives. Either the German model – the second way, the alternative in Michel Albert's scheme to the dominant Americanist hegemony – becomes a version of this first way, or else, viewed from different perspective, it feeds into the ideological project of a Third Way which itself is a pale imitation of Germanic corporatism. The immediate promise of social democracy, the inheritor of classical Marxism in Germany seems kaputt. Arguably this has less to do with the exigencies of political economy than with the politics of globalisation as a necessitarian rhetoric where nation-states deny that the social question is their problem. Suffice to say, then, with David Coates that to "stay on the terrain of the national is to stay in the terrain of labour and the state", or to insist, together with Alain Touraine, that there is no such thing as the tsunami globalisation. Plainly there are accelerating global trends, in IT, less so in the globalisation of finance and production, more so, in some ways, in the globalisation or glocalization of culture. It is equally plain, however, that all these processes are also delivered through nation states, where the political imperative of globalisation nevertheless proclaims the uncoupling of economic and political sovereignty. The challenge to what remains of social democracy here involves both globalizing, as per the logic say of the ILO, and renationalising politics.

Evidently social democracy becomes managerial or corporate after World War Two, and capitalised into the eighties, finally to be processed, homogenised into the Third Way. The problem with the Third Way is not only that it is vacuous, a slogan looking or pretending to look for some values like the drunk under the lamp post somewhere off Broadway. The

intellectual limit of Third Way talk is that it plugs back into notions of exclusion that are themselves vacuous, for the solution to exclusion is the culturalist hit we met before in Harrison's ten-point program: work, and more work – a necessary, but an insufficient precondition of citizenship, and in many places around the globe not even yet a guarantee of survival. The problem with the logic of inclusion is that it is open to a purely mathematical, aggregative solution – individuals get to join in the race, not to join in society. If the nineties was the decade of citizenship talk, and of the attendant politics of inclusion, the new decade will be the decade of globalisation talk, which calls out a new sociology of inequality. This may be one of the clearest practical effects of what we call globalisation itself, that the further globalisation of capitalist relations of exploitation also brings with it the global gaze and sense of outrage and responsibility for the other, together with the globalized means of communication which expose all this. To moot a point to which I shall return, later, in closing, notwithstanding widespread senses of disciplinary weariness and despair, ours is exactly the moment which calls for a new sociology. The case for sociology has not been as compelling in a hundred years.

Let me begin the third step, towards the antipodes. Even to begin to do this is difficult, for the consequence of glossy globalisation talk over the last twenty years in Australia is, I suggest, to devalue the past, and to devalue the achievement of the experiments that come out of the trans-Tasman social laboratory through the twentieth century. This has been part of the legacy of the long Labour Decade in Australia, 1983-1996, which was an attempt at modernising Australia with a Third Way twist. The Keating experience preempts New Labour's Third Way in no uncertain terms, not least in the combination of neoliberal economic policy coupled to a putative politics of inclusion in matters of social policy, integrative slogans like multiculturalism and reconciliation.

The globalisation push in Australia has been perhaps best expressed, and advocated by the work of Paul Kelly, editor of the *Australian*, in his widely influential 1993 book *The end of certainty*. *The end of certainty*, the title itself a rhetorical trick in the repertoire of glossy globalisation talk, rests on the formula of what Kelly, following Hancock's anticipation in his 1930 classic *Australia*, calls the Australian Settlement. The Australia Settlement

rests, in this advocacy, on five policy claims: White Australia, Arbitration, Protection, Imperial Benevolence, and State Paternalism. The last two are cultural ambits – Imperial Benevolence refers to the defence or foreign affairs aspects of the antipodean relation of dependence on, and exploitation by, first Britain and then America, while State Paternalism refers pejoratively to what sociologists might call a state-led or state-centric tradition. The other three claims are, in Kelly's interpretation, as anachronistic as these old ambits, traditions or ties. The only one of these which is relatively uncontroversial properly speaking is the obsolescence of White Australia. The hegemony of White Australia was already unsettled by mass postwar immigration from Southern Europe; these were the kind of lazy southerners who appear symbolically as the problem in those American texts from Banfield to Harrison. In Australia they worked harder than those already incumbent in the postwar strategy of construction, reconstruction and industrialisation, just like the lazy Mexicans who legally or illegally hold up the US economy today. The two remaining institutions, or cultures, those involving Arbitration and Protection, remain less obviously evil than this new orthodoxy is prepared to make out. Of Protection I shall say nothing here, except to remind you of the maxim that Free Trade works to the advantage only of those already powerful, and even then in selective application; the idea that free trade is good for us all reminds me of R.H. Tawney's observation, that what the rich (sometimes) see as the problem of poverty, the poor for their part see as the problem of riches. Arbitration is more interesting to tease out, not least because it has hitherto been the object of so much mutual contempt – from socialists or marxists, from feminists, conservatives, liberals, all. Paul Kelly evidently views Arbitration as one of a number of troglodytic impediments to Australia's economic and social progress, and the general sense of practical scepticism indicated here should not be sidestepped: policy instruments may well have all kinds of unintended consequences, not least when there are substantial shifts in the ways of political economy. But what, then, should we learn from the past?

Arbitration, following colonial wages boards, was, if I remember, one of the great products of cultural traffic across the Tasman. Our side of the story is that it travelled from Adelaide to New Zealand and back before

Justice Higgins institutionalised its turf in the Harvester Judgement of 1907. That judgement, like others of Higgins, established the idea of a just wage – a traditional, medieval, sometimes Catholic, pre-modern, precapitalist and non-liberal sensibility which was eventually diluted into the notion of a basic wage. The idea of needs, in the meantime, has been thoroughly discredited in mainstream economics, though it works through the principle of eternal recurrence in ethical life – it keeps coming back, into the later part of the century in the form of Guaranteed Minimum or Adequate Income, and of newly vocal campaigns against global sweating. Marxists and feminists complained, meantime, that Arbitration denied class struggle by corralling it, or that Higgins' mentality was masculinist. Masculinist it was; yet the idea of needs talk itself is open to revision, or if you like, to radicalisation.

Arbitration was, as Hancock already understood in 1930, part of a strategy to insulate the antipodes from the shocks of the global economy. It was, in a certain quite striking sense, an anti-capitalist or at least anti-liberal strategy – enacted by new liberals. Where Kelly's concern here is directed to Arbitration, the greater impediment to modernisation was the absence of a virile industrial bourgeoisie and the consequent happy fallback reliance on primary commodity export production. Arbitration at least worked to canvas or to establish the idea of using regulated markets as agencies of potential redistribution, or fairness.

The idea of the Australian Settlement has become a new orthodoxy in Australian political and scholarly discussion. Paul Kelly's formula neatly summarises the Keating agenda, and it continues to do so. In a more recent article in the *Australian*, derived from Kelly's Alfred Deakin Lecture (17.10.2001), Kelly connects the goals of economic liberalism and social inclusion. Most of the argument as published concerns economic liberalism. Two alternative conclusions are open to us: one, that inclusion is the result of economic liberalism; the other, that inclusion presents itself as the subsequent issue to be addressed, not by economic policy, but rather by social policy. This latter was exactly the logic of the precise Labor Decade under Keating's ascendance, 1986-1996. It remains, in principle, more muscular than New Labour's Third Way but I don't think it represents an alternative civilisation. To use that word as a verb rather than a noun, the

result is more like a regulated than a civilizing of capitalism.

Kelly extended his purview to include New Zealand in another article in the *Australian* (8.8.2001). Helen Clark's project here is cast as an overreaction against the earlier overreaction. He pokes fun at Clark's image of New Zealand as "the Finland of the South Pacific", which I have to confess I also find an odd choice of parallel: Sweden, maybe? given the twentieth century problem of Finlandisation; maybe Australia here plays the role of Big Brother as a substitute for the Soviet Union with Finland, though I take Helen Clark's enthusiasms to be rather distant from those of Bob Catley or the push to modernising the antipodes and in this scenario especially New Zealand through unification. Talking on CNN (26.7.2001), Clark seemed rather to suggest that there was an alternative, distinct civilisational path in New Zealand, that its social democratic and equalitarian aspirations ought remain points of orientation for the future. Rather than a New Zealand Settlement to parallel the Australian Settlement viewed only as an obstacle, the past century then could be a counterimage of mixed modernity.

The antipodes could then be a source for thinking forward while connecting back. With due respect to the work of Paul Kelly, my sense is that we took a wrong turning toward the embrace of the idea of Australian Settlement, the recipe of which leads too readily to a sense of before and after. It may have been better to follow the initiative of Frank Castles, where the sense of comparison and historical specificity is higher. The arguments that turned through the idea of three, or four worlds of welfare capitalism seem to remain closer to the comparative sensibilities of historical sociology, and Castles was better able to retain a sense of the mixed blessings of modernity, where gains went together with losses.

This, I suggest, is the problem we face, in both of our antipodes. How do we shift forward without subscribing to the monomaniacal lists of the modernisers, where work, performance, and aspiration rendered as individual, liberal values take some to Nirvana –or Manhattan – while the devil takes the hindmost? How can we save, or at least learn from the best achievements of the social laboratory while engaging new futures for ourselves and our children? The least one can say here is that we should be well advised to move with caution, else we all end up in the utopia of work work work, some with abundant material rewards, as global tourists, others

as vagabonds, or as mere locals, the locals who hold up the world of the globals. Arbitration, let us remember, in places like the antipodes, went together with the masculinist and skilled but universalisable slogan, 8/8/8, equal daily shares of work, sleep and recreation. Perhaps it is time to revive the slogan of Paul Lafargue – The Right to be Lazy. Perhaps, more soberly, it is time to solidarise with Billy Bragg, and to reclaim our right to the weekend, which our forebears spent generations winning and which, as Bragg says, we have simply pissed up against the wall. Perhaps it is time to join the Slow Food movement. In any case, hyperbolic or not, we need to reclaim our right to mixed and alternative modernities, where values like the right to work, the need to work, are counterbalanced by others, freedom by dependence, innovation by reverence, initiative by loyalty, progress by traditions. Only in this kind of scenario is it possible even to imagine the time or space for contemplation and argument which would be the precondition of the possibility of reinventing politics.

A sociology of Australia, better, of the antipodes as an alternative modernity, and recognising here the limits of my own knowledge, would need to begin by registering its peculiarities – convict, state, imperial colonial origins; where the state precedes capital, and working class formation precedes that of an industrial bourgeoisie, resulting in our case in a kind of cultural centrality for the labour movement and its self-appointed, middle class representatives and mediators. Like some parallel cases in Latin America, the Australian configuration of modernity involves late industrialisation, via strategies of import substitution. The cultural peculiarities of Australian modernity include its geographical aspects; seventy percent of the land is desert, eighty percent of the population urban, so this is an edge culture, looking out. This is a civilisation based on invasion and genocide, with no treaty, and a practical postwar multiculturalism which has first had to break through White Australia. In comparison to the American model of modernity, its most striking attributes remain apparent: the centrality, into the twentieth century, of labour, the state, and an absence of the myths of foundation and mission which help hold up the American idea, the American dream. Australian civilisation has no telos, after the collapse of the utopia of independent Australian Britons: we simply are, and it is not clear that this is altogether a bad thing.

If there is, however, no national-social telos, this has not meant that there are no social goals or values or institutions to embed them. Indeed, the early twentieth century labour movements in the antipodes valued time, and valued the time outside paid work, as leisure, but also as the realm of social self-development. Perhaps this opening has been filled in the meantime by the Americanisation of leisure; but in that case, we need also to reclaim it, just as we might need or perhaps choose to claim a new sociology. On this note I shall end, with some observations concerning sociology and therewith a final, personal coda.

We are not, now, witnessing a return to the travails of the nineteenth century, though some aspects of that transition have contemporary parallels. Most strikingly, the historical process called globalisation coincides with the rise of the ideology of neoliberalism. Economic growth accelerates at the same time as inequality expands. Solidarity is under attack, just as Marx, Weber and Durkheim sensed in different ways that it was a hundred years ago. New forms of solidarity have yet to emerge. The scholarly imperative here is to reappropriate, to reinterpret the past outside the frame of the orthodoxy of Australian Settlement, which distances the twentieth century unnecessarily, by infantilising it. This means, for me, to renegotiate critical theory and historical sociology, for a new/old sociology needs to be regional, comparative, historicist. It seems to me that we need the edge of critical theory, or a weberian-marxism, to keep open the capacity to interpret culture in the face of power. If there were to be a new sociology, the imperative would be to balance the idea of solidarity with the critique of exploitation, the latter understood relationally, which claims to inclusion avoid.

Last, the personal note. Where might our intellectual responsibilities lie, in all this? Differently rendered they must be; each of us has to tell our truth, and to go our own way. As Bernard Smith observed on the occasion of the 1956, Melbourne Olympics, antipodean intellectuals are migratory birds. We are, all of us, cultural messengers. We keep moving, and our capacity to think and to innovate also comes of this movement. The famous distinction indicated by Arthur Hirschmann suggested three political alternatives, which transpose readily into the question of what we, as antipodean intellectuals, ought do: give voice, declare loyalty, or exit. My own, strong personal sense is that antipodean intellectuals need to keep

moving: we need to do all three at the same time, and our condition, itself, avails this. We should follow all these circuits – exit, voice, and loyalty – in order that we can earn the traditions we inherit, in order to innovate upon them, out of them, connecting old worlds to new, and on to better worlds, beyond.

Migrant Bodies: The Embodiment of Identity Amongst Samoan Fa'afafine in New Zealand

Johanna Schmidt

Abstract

Fa'afafine are biological Samoan males who express feminine gender identities in a range of ways. More traditional means of enacting fa'afafine identities are now expanding and shifting in novel ways as a result of globalisation and migration. Migrant fa'afafine must inevitably negotiate between their Samoan-based identities and the imperatives of new cultural discourses. In this paper, I focus on how these negotiations take place through processes of embodiment. I discuss how individuals reconstruct their embodiments in light of the various sex/gender frameworks they encounter in New Zealand, offering an analysis of these experiences using Pierre Bourdieu's concepts of habitus and field, and Judith Butler's theorisation of performative subjectivity.

Introduction

The Samoan word "fa'afafine" literally translates as "in the manner of a woman".[1] Fa'afafine are biological males who express feminine gender identities in various ways. Traditionally, these identities have been predominantly realised through undertaking labour generally understood to be "feminine", such as that which occurs in the immediate environs of the village.[2] A history of missionisation and colonisation dating back to 1830, the small size of the nation, contemporary processes of globalisation, and a highly mobile population have all had considerable impact on fa'aSamoa – "the Samoan way". As a result, fa'afafine, like all Samoans, are

1. I have opted not to italicise Samoan terms, as I feel that this practice contributes to the process of Otherising non-western concepts. "Samoa" refers to Independent Samoa, formerly known as Western Samoa. Migration to New Zealand is largely from Independent Samoa due to historical, political and cultural links. American Samoa's close ties with the United States have resulted in a significantly different experience of westernisation and pattern of migration, and thus is not considered within the parameters of my research.

expressing and defining their identities in an increasing variety of ways.

In my current PhD research, I am examining the impact of westernisation and migration on fa'afafine identities. I am focusing specifically on migration to New Zealand, which, due to a history of political, economic, and cultural links with Samoa, is a common destination for migrant Samoans. Fa'afafine experiences of migration echo those of the wider Samoan population in terms of motivations (education, employment, family obligations) and their experiences of racism, social marginalisation, and cultural alienation. However, there are aspects of the fa'afafine experience that are specific, in that they frequently encounter a (misplaced) homophobia in addition to racism, and there is often a lack of understanding of their identities. One of the more marked concerns to emerge from the data is the question of embodiment of identities, an issue which manifests itself in particular, and at times extremely problematic, ways for migrant fa'afafine. In this paper I focus on how respondents initially negotiate between the desire to embody particular identities, the need to function within New Zealand society, and the recognition of other aspects of their subjectivities. I then discuss the specific impact of access to medically managed body modification. I thus consider the effect of various discourses and technologies, both old and new, on enactments of fa'afafine identities within a new cultural context.

Before commencing, I should make some brief observations regarding the interviews drawn on in this paper. While the participants in my study have varied in terms of age (mid-20s to mid-50s), embodiment of gender, employment, historical era of migration, family backgrounds, there are notable commonalities among these participants in relation to age of

2. This understanding of "traditional" enactments of fa'afafine identities in fact only extends as far back as European contact, as recorded information and understandings about pre-contact fa'afafine tends to be inconsistent. Therefore, what is now considered to be a marker of the femininity of fa'afafine identities would extend to cooking, although in pre-contact Samoa cooking was largely the preserve of men. (See Schoeffel (1979) for a full discussion of the gendered division of labour in Samoa, and how this has changed as a result of colonisation.) In referring to traditional fa'afafine gender identities, I mean to indicate those which relate more to feminine labour rather than the sexualised enactments which I will discuss in more details below.

migration (late teens or early twenties), education (all have at least completed high school), and familiarity with the English language, which results in particular homogeneities in this group that I do not believe are typical of the population as a whole. I should also add that, in presenting this data, it has unfortunately been necessary to fragment individual narratives to a considerable degree in order to protect anonymity.

Theoretical framework

Within this paper, I intend to demonstrate that the processes fa'afafine go through in terms of embodiment can be understood using Pierre Bourdieu's concepts of field and habitus. Shifting from Samoa to New Zealand is, in very literal terms, a movement from one cultural "meta-field" to another in which fa'afafine's practices may not be intelligible to others due to a lack of shared cultural habitus (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 58). The manner in which these individuals have undergone various physical transformations during the process of acclimatising to life in New Zealand is a dramatic example of how "Agents create and mould their bodies in accordance with the fields in which they are involved and the demands of those specific fields" (Crossley, 2001, p. 107). While the lives of these migrant fa'afafine demonstrate with particular resonance how bodies are often *re*created according to the demands of a new field, they also suggest that early habitus cannot easily be unlearnt.

I also suggest that the manner in which fa'afafine adapt and adopt various means of enacting their identities resonates strongly with Judith Butler's (1990a, 1990b, 1993) concept of gender as "performative", created through its continual reiteration, and therefore always open to slippage. While the individuals whose narratives are drawn on for this paper do understand themselves as innately fa'afafine, it is also apparent from their stories that the meanings, embodiments, and enactments of identities that are understood as fa'afafine shift on both individual and social levels in response to a range of imperatives. Respondents understand themselves as active agents in the construction and representation of their own identities, although the level of agency that they exercise varies according to power dynamics. While many discourses around fa'afafine tend to focus on gender and, especially, sexuality (e.g. Mageo, 1992, 1996; Poasa, 1992;

Shore, 1981; Wallace, 1999; Worth, 2000)[3], the life histories provided by these fa'afafine suggest that their subjectivities are constructed and expressed through a range of identities which are prioritised according to the specifics of any given situation. Within this paper, I will draw attention to the manner in which these imperatives include more than just the sex/gender frameworks of both Samoan and New Zealand cultures.

Early experience of migrant embodiment

For most fa'afafine, as for most Samoans, migration to New Zealand involves an initial period of living with extended family members, for both economic and cultural reasons. This provides a safe environment during a period of cultural adjustment, but can also result in social isolation.[4] Migrant fa'afafine are more subject than most to family guidelines in terms of appropriate behaviour and appearance, as there is often a need to conform to New Zealand sex/gender discourses in order to gain the employment necessary to contribute to the family financially, and/or to avoid embarrassing the family socially.

One of my older respondents was brought to New Zealand by her family in the 1960s, when she was about twenty years old, to look after her sister's children in a small, conservative industrial town. Here she talks about her first weeks in New Zealand:

> The day I arrived, I can't stop crying, but ... my sister keep talking to me and I know that my father wants my sister to look after me because he knows that I'm not the person to do the plantation or anything like that. So when I came over here I was so heartbroken that I missed my friends in the island and, you know, everything that I used to do over there. When I came over here, it's completely changed, you know. I don't have any fa'afafine to talk to or go to, go around with and things like that. So, um ... I feel like going back

3. But see also Worth (2001) for consideration of the intersection of issues of sexuality/gender and those of ethnicity and poverty for fa'afafine living in South Auckland. Also see Dolgoy (2000) for a recent history of the shifts in expressions and constructions of fa'afafine identities in Samoa which takes into account both the complexities of Samoan culture and the influences of westernisation and globalisation.
4. See Macpherson (1997) and Macpherson and Macpherson (1999) for full discussions of the significance of extended family and cultural enclaves in the experiences of migrant Samoans.

> home, but I never talk to them! I never told them I want to go back home. I just cry and cry, and they keep telling me that it's all right, that after one, two months I will be all right and that. But I think, to me ... because I'm going to miss the lifestyle that I was in in Samoa, looking at what, you know, what would be ahead of me, is I'm going to be different. You know, when she told me that I had to cut my nails and ... you know, let the eyebrows grow and cut the hair short. I think it's those things that I miss the most from Samoa. That's why ... but I never told them, you know, "I want to go back", or "Pay my fare for me to go back". I just cry and feel like going back, but I can't say anything to them.

This narrative encompasses many themes common to stories of initial arrival in New Zealand, including reference to the physical changes the respondent made at her sister's insistence. Her inability to return to Samoa can be immediately understood as the result of her lack of financial resources, but on a broader level was also motivated by family considerations and aspects of Samoan culture. As a biological male, had she stayed in Samoa, she would have been expected to work on the family plantation, but her father felt that she was not physically suited to such labour, and thus sent her to New Zealand to assist her family domestically. In spite of the fact that living in this particular environment necessitated backgrounding the fa'afafine aspects of her subjectivity, to have ignored her father's wishes and shown lack of appreciation for her family's assistance would have significantly problematised her place within her family, a dilemma which must be understood against the context of the absolute centrality of the family to the construction of identity in Samoa.

For many New Zealand respondents, age, initial culture shock, and changed social environments impacted significantly on the levels of control they felt they had over their own bodies, and bodily expressions of femininity were often muted, usually by adopting a more masculine appearance. However, for this respondent, adopting an identity as a "man" is remembered as less than successful. In spite of attempts by herself and her sister to make her body more masculine, her sense of herself as feminine persisted:

> You know, they cut my hair short and cut the nails, but the way I walk and the way I talk, it's never changed.

Locating a space where she could socially enact the fa'afafine identity she felt she was denying in small-town New Zealand necessitated moving to a larger urban centre. In Auckland's embryonic gay scene, she found space to express her feminine self in a social context. Here she talks about the bar where she first met up with many of her fa'afafine friends from Samoa:

> So with the bar over there, you're not allowed women to go there, only the men. And sometimes, when we go over there with full make-up, we're not allowed to go inside [laughter] even though they know we are not women. "I'm sorry, you've got to go and clean a little bit down [indecipherable] before you're allowed to go in". So we have to, you know, just do our eyebrows and no lipstick or anything like that, to get in.

Although the extent of her feminine expression was still constrained, in the context of the incipient gay community and the presence of other fa'afafine, she felt she had more capacity to negotiate. This corresponds with the narratives of almost all migrant respondents, who spoke of being able to enact the more feminine aspects of their subjectivities once they located and began to associate with a fa'afafine cohort.[5] However, the feminine embodiment of identity supported by fa'afafine peers may still be subject to the imperatives of respect for family. Another member of the older generation of migrant fa'afafine tells of first "dressing in drag" in New Zealand after being encouraged to do so by his fa'afafine friends. His mother then arrived from Samoa, and although she accepted him as fa'afafine, she asked him to stop cross-dressing. He hasn't done so again to this day.[6]

Another informant who was sent to New Zealand in the early 1980s for education tells of how her mother prepared her for life at a boys boarding school:

5. See also Pulotu-Endemann and Peteru (2001, p. 132) regarding the significance of support networks for migrant fa'afafine.
6. Regarding my use of shifting gender pronouns in relation to fa'afafine participants, I should make clear that I refer to participants according to the gender they seem to mostly express, and how they refer to themselves and to each other. However, I recognise that this is a problematic issue – and also one that, significantly, does not arise nearly as much in the Samoan language.

> So before you came over to New Zealand, what did you think it would be like here? Did you ...?
>
> It was going to be different. The people were going to think different of me. Because I actually had quite long hair, but my mother cut it off. I think the reason why she cut it off was, um, I think she understood how the western world conducted ... themselves, especially people around me, so I think she sort of cut my hair off – it was really short, it was a lot short ... But me, I understood her view, because, you know, she didn't want me to go through the hard life, so I think she must have thought it was much more safe for me to look more masculine.
>
> But it didn't work very well?
>
> Not at all. I absolutely hated it. I didn't like it at all. I was called a faggot and a poofter and a bender and a cock-sucker twenty-four hours and seven days a week.

This suggests that palagi (European/non-Samoan) school students comprehend a "male" who fails to conform to expectations of adolescent masculinity as somehow "unusual", and that discourses of (homo)sexuality are the only ones readily available through which to understand such behaviour. Recognising this, and unwilling or unable to conform to the social expectations of heterosexual masculinity in New Zealand, this respondent actually consciously chose to present herself as a "gay man", which allowed some room for effeminacy while still being comprehensible within the hegemonic palagi sex/gender framework.

For another respondent, alignment with western models of gay identities has been quite a different process. He had never expressed himself as overtly feminine in Samoa – although he was understood by others and understood himself to be fa'afafine, he never identified with the "drag queen" element in Apia. When he migrated to New Zealand to live with his sister, biological changes such as his deepening voice conspired to make it easy for him to begin to represent himself as fully masculine. This masculinity was reinforced by his family's approval, a welcome change after years of being teased because of his effeminacy. Working in a trade further reinforced his masculinity, and he began to have girlfriends, ceasing to even think of himself as fa'afafine. Although he had been aware of the existence of gay

identities, other people's explanations of what it meant to be "gay" in the palagi sense led him to equate it with a specific mode of being fa'afafine:

> Someone actually asked me if I'm gay, and I said "What's that?" So I didn't know what the word means, until, when I was twenty-two, I found out from someone at the church I used to go to, because I asked, I said "What is gay?", and they looked at me funny and they said "Don't you know what gay means?", and I said "No", and they said "Oh, it's um ... it's people like "that"?" [indicates "limp wrist"], you know they do the hand thing. So I clicked, and I said "Ah, so that means drag queens?", because there was a lot of them back home. So I said "Oh, that was fine". But then I realised I will never be gay, because I'm not like that. I don't dress up in women's clothes. I don't act feminine any more, and so I thought "Oh no, that's not me".

It was only when a girlfriend took him to one of Auckland's gay bars that he realised that there was a possibility for him to express his own understanding of his fa'afafine identity – not feminine, but not heterosexual:

> ... she said to me, "Look, I'll take you to this club". And I said "What club?" And she said "It's the Staircase." And I said "Oh, I've never heard of the Staircase". And then she come out and said "Oh, it's a club for people like that". [Indicates "limp wrist".] And I said "Oh, really. Well that'll be cool". So I thought they're all drag queens. So I went along, and I walked into the Staircase, and there was more men than drag queens. And I said "I thought you said ...", and she said "Oh, they all are". And I said "What, all these men?", and she said "Yeah, they're gay". So I thought "Oh, my gosh, so I am ...". But the same night, I walked in with her and I walked out with a guy. [Laughter.] I think she made a big mistake taking me there! [Laughter.]

It appears that this respondent's understanding of what it means to be "gay" has changed through time. In the first quote, to be gay is understood as related solely (or at least predominantly) to physically embodied and particularly gendered ways of being. With a fuller introduction to western discourses of (homo)sexuality, by the second quote, to be "gay" is seen as related to sexual practices, and not contingent on specificically gender behaviour. While talking with me, this respondent quite explicitly stated that the specifics of palagi categorisations of gender and sexuality are

enabling. In Samoan culture, there is little space for men who do not see themselves as feminine, yet are not sexually attracted to women, but in Auckland he was able to find an identity that fitted with his personal perception of his sexuality and embodiment.

However, not all respondents experience the palagi cultural context as "liberating". For some, being able to enact fa'afafine identities in New Zealand society is a long process of adjustment and trial and error. For others, palagi sex/gender frameworks are only ever experienced as constraining in relation to their sense of themselves as fa'afafine. A relatively ambivalently gendered respondent who had lived in New Zealand for some time, but was interviewed after returning to Samoa, tells of the difficulties she had fitting into the palagi sex/gender framework in terms of her embodiment of her fa'afafine identity:

> You know, one of the most difficult things about being a fa'afafine in New Zealand is that I can't exercise my, the things that I want to do, that you see me do, you know, in my work in Samoa, or the things that you see me do in society here in Samoa. I can't exercise those things in a society like New Zealand or Australia. I can't go into work in New Zealand, you know, in a lavalava like what you're wearing now [indicates my long skirt], you know, or my hair coming down, or have a pony[tail], you know, a pony[tail] at the back – you know, I can't do that, I can't put on my foundation and go to work in New Zealand or Australia, it's, it's not allowed. My understanding about being a fa'afafine ... my understanding about being a person to work in place like New Zealand or Australia is if you are a fa'afafine and if you feel that you are a woman, you have to be ... it's either a woman or a man. So if you feel like that you want to pursue becoming a woman, then go for it, and make sure you turn out to be a woman, and you look exactly like a women when you go to work, and that people won't say things about you. If you're a man, you know, if you go half–dressed as a woman or a man to work, that is unacceptable, you know ... .

Others in New Zealand who at various stages in their lives choose not to pass as either men or women – or are unable to do so – often locate environments that allow for ambivalent sex/gender expressions. One spoke of feeling safe at the tertiary institution she had attended, which has a policy of non-discrimination. Another taught in a liberal school where she felt

comfortable wearing make-up while not fully passing as a woman. Others are part of workforces that are significantly Polynesian and female – while the wages are inevitably low, there is more chance of acceptance by workmates. Some younger respondents are largely self-employed in arts, design and fashion industries, where they have significant control over their working relationships and are more likely to interact with liberal members of the palagi population.

Thus the embodiment of fa'afafine identities in New Zealand is influenced by a range of factors, including family dynamics, employment opportunities, wider social relationships, the support of fa'afafine cohorts, and the specifics of pre-migration enactments of fa'afafine-ness. While these factors all impact on how fa'afafine identities are "performed" *with* the body, I will now consider how being fa'afafine in New Zealand can result in direct modification *of* the body through the use of feminising medical technologies.

Medical technologies

Before discussing the relationship between medical technology and migrant fa'afafine, I will first make some suggestions as to how fa'afafine bodies are understood in the Samoan social context. This discussion will relate primarily to the area of sexuality, as it is here that the discrepancy between fa'afafine's gender identities and their bodies would appear to be most apparent, and because most of my discussions with fa'afafine regarding genital reconstruction have implicitly or explicitly centred around issues of sexuality.

For Samoans it is the nature of the sex act, rather than the object, which is the central aspect of sexual activity. Because fa'afafine adopt a feminine gender, their sexual encounters with men are modeled on a heterosexual pattern (McIntosh, 1999, p. 11). Provided the man in these encounters remains the "active" partner and continues to demonstrate masculine social behaviour, their "manliness" is unquestioned (Shore, 1981, p. 210). Conversely, fa'afafine adopt the "passive" feminine position, and thus sex between a man and fa'afafine is no threat to the man's "heterosexuality". Even though most fa'afafine have penises, in Samoa "The sexing function of the genitals ... is derived from what is done with bodies as a whole,

rather than from some innate sexing quality of the genitals alone" (St. Christian, 1994, p. 97). Thus the manner in which the fa'afafine body is enacted during sex causes it to become something other than "male" (St. Christian, 1994, p. 183). It can therefore be suggested that in the Samoan context, while fa'afafine bodies are not seen as "female", they are also not seen as completely "male". This understanding then informs the varied reactions of migrant fa'afafine to the availability of genital reconstruction surgery and other body-modification technology.

Given that medically managed feminisation of the body is largely unavailable in Samoa,[7] one of the most apparent "opportunities" available to migrant fa'afafine is the possibility of becoming a "woman". One older respondent, who to all intents and purposes presents as a woman, discussed her feelings about genital reconstruction surgery:

> The only thing is that when you go out, you don't have to worry about what people will say to you, and that sort of thing. That's the problem I've got now. Because I already talked to my father. I went to my father [indecipherable] and when I talked with him, I asked him, and he say OK, as long as I don't do anything that will disgrace the name of the family. [indecipherable] I think it's best for me [indecipherable]. But my sister is the only one that stops me. My older sister, the one that was looking after me when my mother died. Even her children, you know, that I look after when I come to New Zealand, they talk to her. They want her to let me go through it, but she don't want to. She said "If God made you like that, you're supposed to stay like that. If you try and change anything, you know ...". But the boys and girls try to explain to her how difficult it is for me to go out all dressed up and people think that I'm a woman and then all of a sudden she introduce me to them, "This is my brother".

For this fa'afafine, desire for *total* embodiment of herself as female is significantly complicated by her respect of her older sister's wishes. For others, utilisation of these new means of expressing their femininity may be similarly dependent on family expectations. One respondent tells of how

7. There are rumours of fa'afafine in Samoa accessing hormones in the form of oral contraceptives obtained by female friends or family members, but any medical intervention such as gender reassignment surgery is not possible in Samoa.

she felt she had earnt the right to her own choices after fulfilling her parents' educational expectations:

> And then, um ... yeah ... and I finished, like I graduated, you know, got my big paper that says "diploma" across it, and went to Samoa with breasts, and like my family, like, spinned, it was like "What is that?". Well, they're actually quite OK about it, but they didn't even want to bring it up, but I knew that there was something about them. But I told them I graduated, so it's like "There. That's what you wanted".

However, this respondent and others I have spoken with who are on hormone programmes explicitly state that they have no desire for genital reconstruction. This is a fragment of one conversation about this issue, in which we had already discussed the effects of hormone therapy:

> Ah, OK, OK. And, um ... and so have you gave ... sorry, this is a slightly personal question [laughter] ... have you gone through with it, the whole way?
>
> No.
>
> Ah, OK. Do you think that you ever would?
>
> Um ... to me, because I was brought up as a religion person, you know. To me ... um, I don't think I can go through with the whole thing. It's just because, that, I don't mind to have boobs and everything, you know, and look like a woman. I will still keep my, um, my thing, because that's what, um, I was, I was born with that. God gave me that, and I don't want to do anything against him.
>
> Right.
>
> Boobs is tough enough for him. [Laughter.]

I have also spoken with fa'afafine who have consciously decided against both surgery and hormone therapy. One of these respondents feels strongly that any physical alteration to make her body better conform to other people's perceptions of her gender would be to submit to social pressure. She is also quite clear that even if fa'afafine alter their bodies to conform to social expectations, they are still judged on the basis of their particularly embodied histories – to be a "woman" who was once a "man" is just as socially unacceptable as being ambivalently or ambiguously gendered.

When people such as bank tellers question her about the apparent discrepancy between the sex indicated on her identification and her predominantly feminine gender presentation, she simply tells them she is a drag queen.

The possibility of direct bodily feminisation raises a further issue of whether fa'afafine who have undergone gender reassignment surgery remain fa'afafine, as the enactment of a feminine gender identity through a "not-female" body appears to be central to "being" fa'afafine. While Dolgoy suggests that gender reassignment surgery does not necessarily change one's status from fa'afafine to woman (2000, p. 138), there are indications of controversy over the participation of "off-shore" fa'afafine who are on hormones in Samoan "drag pageants". The 2001 Tutti Frutti pageant featured a category in which contestants were bare-chested in order to reveal that they were "totally male", followed by a category in which contestants presented themselves as "the total woman", suggesting that juxtaposition of both masculinity and femininity within the same body is integral to fa'afafine identity – at least in this particular context at this particular time. The situation for fa'afafine who perceive themselves as essentially feminine or actually women is further complicated by appearances in these drag queen pageants and performances, in which much of the humour rests on the fact that they are "really" men. Unfortunately, consideration of these Samoan events is not possible within this paper, but these are issues I will address in future work.

These various attitudes towards and uses of medical technology suggest a significant complexity in understandings of the embodiment of fa'afafine identities which is at considerable variance with western understandings of the transsexual as "a woman trapped in a man's body". That few fa'afafine, including those with access to gender reassignment procedures, find the masculine aspects of their body a source of "distress" (Finn and Dell, 1999) strongly suggests that fa'afafine understand themselves as "women" in particularly complex and situational ways, especially in relation to their embodiment. Thus, while the feminising medical technology that is available to migrant fa'afafine may initially appear to be an opportunity to fully realise themselves as women, it seems that for most migrant fa'afafine, hormone therapy and genital reconstruction surgery are more

often added to an ever-changing pool of available resources on which they may – or may not – draw in their enactment of feminine identities.

Analysis

I hope to have made explicit in this paper how these respondents have negotiated between the demands and opportunities of various fields in New Zealand and their sense of themselve as fa'afafine (Jenkins, 1992, p. 80; Swartz, 1997, p. 291). The dispositions inherited as part of the Samoan habitus predisposes migrant fa'afafine towards particular reactions to various situations, but the fact that these are dispositions rather than "rules" also allows them to adopt to the specific imperatives of the groups or fields with which they align themselves for various reasons (Robbins, 2000, p. 29-30), and within which they enact various strategies to preserve or improve their positions (Jenkins, 1992, p. 85). Thus, for fa'afafine working predominantly with other Samoans, forefronting the fa'afafine aspects of their subjectivities is more of a possibility than for those in a boys' boarding school, where "gay male" may be the only viable option – an identity that, for others, may allow for a fuller embodiment of their gender and sexuality within the context of gay urban communities. In other contexts, fa'afafine may use western discourses of transgenderism to describe themselves as "drag queens", an identity which many palagi will understand and one which will allow certain fa'afafine to express themselves as feminine without passing as women, while others utilise various medical technologies that allow them to pass as women in most social contexts without feeling the need to fully feminise their bodies.

The narratives presented here are frequently open to being read in terms of constraint of fa'afafine identities, and indeed the participants themselves speak of how at various times they have "pushed themselves into a closet", or of how, in spite of attempts to be more masculine, their sense of themselves as feminine persisted. However, these same fa'afafine locate their sense of self firmly within kinship structures, and maintain family obligations in ways that demonstrate the centrality of these actions to their sense of who they are. Therefore I suggest that while these periods of masculinity may involve constraint of their fa'afafine selves, they are also periods of emphasis of other aspects of what are, in fact, multi-faceted

identities. Therefore, in a social context where expression of an "out" fa'afafine identity might be problematic in terms of gaining the employment necessary to provide for families, or in terms of maintaining family reputations, participants often chose to background the fa'afafine aspects of their subjectivities in favour of their identities as brothers/sons/uncles/cousins. Meeting family obligations, or following religious convictions, or maintaining aspects of fa'aSamoa are also integral to these participants' sense of their "true selves", and they are thus engaged in a constant balancing of these various, and at times contradictory, aspects of their subjectivities.

As I have already suggested, these processes are strongly suggestive of Judith Butler's concept of performativity. That many fa'afafine who live in New Zealand choose to pass as women, and are successful at doing so, illustrates Butler's assertion that "Gender is the repeated stylization of the body, a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce the appearance of substance, or a natural sort of body" (1990a, p. 35). Yet the repetition of performance, while only producing an appearance of a particular sort of body, does inevitably result in some form of reality, in that "What is 'learned by the body' is not something that one *has*, like knowledge that can be brandished, but something that one *is*" (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 73, emphasis added). Thus fa'afafine enactments of femininity in the context of everyday life are not generally analysable using Butler's deconstruction of drag (1990a, pp. 137-139). When Butler suggests that "the transvestite's gender is as fully real as anyone whose performance complies with social expectations" (1990b, p. 278), she seems to miss the issue of intentionality – the transvestite "knows" that she is male, while fa'afafine's knowledge of themselves includes the innateness of their femininity, which is in no way an imitation or masquerade (Worth, 2001, p. 6). As one respondent who performs as a "diva" explained:

> Some drag queens, you don't recognise them – there's this very huge distinction when they are in drag and when they aren't in drag, but with fa'afafine, there isn't much of a distinction [when they're performing] – it's just an enhancement.

While some respondents have spoken of periods of conscious performance of masculinity, in later life it is this *masculinity* that is invariably remembered as a facade which inevitably dissolved once the individual moved into a different sub-field of New Zealand culture. It is thus these performances of masculinity, rather than enactments of femininity, that can be more easily read as drag, in that the respondents rarely *knew* themselves to be the men they performed.[8]

Conclusion

There are many other issues to be discussed in relation to the embodiment of fa'afafine identities, including the effect of the bodies individual fa'afafine possess, which can have direct impacts on whether or not they can pass as men or women. Furthermore, sexuality is an area that I have only briefly touched on in this paper. For some fa'afafine in relationships, the sexual satisfaction of their male partners is their primary concern, raising some significant questions about the dynamics at play in sexual relations for fa'afafine who enact a "feminine" sexuality in a "male" body. It has also been suggested to me that having an ambiguously sexed/gendered body may well be a "marketing tool" for fa'afafine sex workers, and also that "market demand" for such bodies may make the sex industry a field where fa'afafine with more masculine bodies may be able to express femininity more openly. Unfortunately, due to various constraints in the data collection process to date, neither sexuality nor the embodiment of identities by fa'afafine sex workers could be discussed in this paper.

In spite of these significant omissions, I hope to have demonstrated how fa'afafine experience a range of capacities in terms of negotiating various aspects of their lives, and how these negotiations include matters such as gender and sexuality, but are not limited to these components of their subjectivities. Gagné and Tewksbury suggest in their American-based study of transgenderism that "the majority of masculine-to-feminine

8. In suggesting that previous embodiments of masculinity are remembered as a facade, I am not suggesting that these memories lack veracity. Rather, these biographies are (re)constructed in particular ways so as to allow these individuals to make sense of those events in the light of their current identities (Ochs and Capps, 1996).

transgendered individuals are seeking neither to reinforce patriarchally defined gender stereotypes nor to disrupt the hegemonic gender discourse. They are seeking ways to be "themselves" without ridicule, attack or shame" (1999, p. 63). While the same can obviously be said of migrant fa'afafine, the manner in which these individuals have experienced and understood the "lack of fit" between their fa'afafine identities and the expectations of the new field of New Zealand society provides a particular perspective on and example of how the field functions as a whole, especially in relation to discourses of sex, gender, and sexuality (McNay, 1999, pp. 110-111; Worth, 2001, p. 1). Within this paper, I have gone some way towards demonstrating how the questions and challenges that arise during these processes occur because of, within, and through fa'afafine bodies.

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Sheep as Object: The Meaning of "Sheep" to Different Science Groups

Lesley Hunt

Abstract

The meanings of sheep are used as a tool to examine how scientific researchers in a changing policy environment negotiate their work to maximise their chances of survival in employment, and their chances of continuing to do work they regard as important.

Introduction

This paper is about the ways in which four different science groups in a Crown Research Institute (CRI) negotiate the representations they make of their work in order to achieve funding for their research. The research work of these groups is directly or indirectly related to sheep. I wish to examine the socially constructed meanings sheep have for each group (the ethical sheep, the invisible sheep, the sheep as gene map, and the sheep as laboratory), the groups' successes at gaining public funding, and the links to Government and organisational policy.

My interest in sheep arose as a sideline to an ethnographic study of these science groups conducted from 1999 to 2001 in which I examined the groups' experiences of work in a changing environment, using extensive interviews of group members dispersed over five sites, and observations at four of those sites. In this larger study I interpret the ways individual science workers make their work meaningful using an understanding drawn from symbolic interactionism. Here I apply the same perspective[1] to the meanings of sheep and the instrumental value of these meanings for each of the four science groups.

1. Of course, there are many other perspectives that could be drawn upon in such an analysis. For example, a science studies framework (Latour, 1999) using the ideas of Actor Network Theory (ANT) (Latour, 1987), might emphasise how the word sheep is "translated" (Latour, 1999, p.311; Akrich and Latour, 1992, p.264; Callon, 1991, pp.143-146) in order to fit, be understood, and serve the needs of the actors in the different arenas in which it is used e.g. agriculture, science, Government policy, FRST. An

The tool of symbolic interactionism

Symbolic interactionist methodology examines the meanings bestowed by social actors on everyday objects. Blumer (1986) was the principal architect of this interpretive approach to understanding social action and interaction. The theoretical foundations of Blumer's method rested on the work of Mead (Blumer, 1986, pp. 61-77). In essence, symbolic interactionism considers actions and objects to have no intrinsic meaning. Instead meanings are constructed and bestowed through social interactions and are negotiated by actors according to the specific social context. The constructs (notably language) come to "stand for" or "symbolise" the objects and activities, often in a "short hand" form (Blumer, 1967, 1986). The same word can often have different meanings, and therefore significance, to different communities. For example, "cool" means one thing to a weather forecaster, another to a teenage peer group. Meanings are neither fixed nor exclusive. Although, by common agreement, the word "sheep" symbolises the woolly, four-legged, grass-eating animal, the negotiable character of this meaning allows for both the possibility of other meanings (e.g. meat for some, clothing for others), and its tactical use in constructing action pathways perceived to facilitate desired ends.

In keeping with symbolic interactionist principles, I will show that science actors construct different meanings of sheep in order to safeguard and advance their livelihood. In effect, the relationship between Government policy, implemented through the funding structures of the Foundation for Research Science and Technology (FRST or "the Foundation"), and the science groups as they manoeuvre to obtain the funding necessary for their survival, turns in large measure on the meanings science workers negotiate for sheep. In keeping with the sociology of human action and social structure (Giddens, 1984, p.12), no assumption is made here that the outcome of the negotiated meanings of sheep is one that will succeed in the way intended by the actors or by Government.

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example of such a work is Callon's (1986) study of scallops and fishermen. Adopting a slightly different slant to ANT one might investigate how innovators construct different representations of the end user associated with their innovations, and work to meet those representations (Akrich, 1992, 1995). Social constructivism (following Scarce's (2000) work on salmon, nature and science) would emphasise how society shapes science and constructs sheep as "natural actors".

Setting the scene

Since the early 1980s there has been a strong message to the research community that agriculture is no longer central to Government thinking in the way it had been. At present the future of New Zealand's economic wellbeing is seen to lie with the "knowledge society"[2] (Maharey, 2000). Except as a spin-off for biotechnology, agriculture is not regarded as an important contributor to this "society" (Hodgson, 2000a, b, c, d). This is illustrated by an excerpt from a speech by the Minister of Research, Science and Technology:

> Transformation means moving New Zealand beyond its traditional dependence on the primary industries for the generation of wealth. We are extremely good at primary production and processing. It is a vital part of our future and we continue to post remarkable productivity increases. But it's not enough ... wealth is increasingly taking the form of knowledge rather than stuff. (Hodgson, 2000a, pp.1-2)

Trends in the allocation of public research funding through the Foundation have followed this declining emphasis on traditionally defined agricultural products. The recent *Investment Change Process November 2000* document (FRST, 2000) states:

> ... the Foundation will progressively shift its research portfolios from mature areas of commodity cost-reduction activities towards RS&T that underpins high value-added export industries (Section 1, p.2). Where research primarily underpins the achievement of efficiency gains in undifferentiated commodities ... [it] will be targeted for disinvestment. (Section 2, p.3)

With the complete "disinvestment" process expected to be completed over the next five years, the sheep industry, and the wool industry in particular, are conspicuously threatened. Wool research is seen to be a very mature science in which knowledge about wool production is so advanced that any additional research is presumed to be incremental and unlikely to have a large impact on production processes, efficiency and intellectual property

2. The Labour Government uses these words interchangeably with those used by the previous National Government which focused on a knowledge "economy".

(IP), or obtain benefits that justify R&D costs, in an industry already producing a low value product.

There is an obvious desire by Government to change the image of New Zealand as a country full of sheep and therefore associated with low value commodity production, to one focused on knowledge and innovation. Researchers have responded to this threat in a range of ways. Words like "commodity" and "production" have disappeared from research proposals as researchers attempt to distance their work from the discredited efficiency and primary production aims. To align itself with this trend, AgResearch, one of the CRIs formed in 1992 to service the primary sector during the restructuring of the public research funding system, no longer refers to itself as an agricultural research institute but as a "life sciences company" (AgResearch Strategic Plan, 2000-2003). Ironically, these adjustments are considered necessary even though record overseas exchange earnings have just demonstrated the importance of the agricultural sector to New Zealand's economic well-being for the year of 2000-2001 (INFOS Database, Statistics NZ).

The issues and responses of the different science groups

In 1999 the CRI under study was restructured into eleven Science Platforms replacing the former four Divisions. Each Science Platform consists of about fifty to seventy scientific workers organised into four or five different science groups, managed by a Science Platform Leader. The Platforms are organised under common research themes and it was hoped that with this restructuring the boundaries between the groups within each Platform would be broken down in sympathy with the Foundation's explicit move to fund larger programmes and to encourage collaborative research. This diverse organisation has been held together by its interest in the particular area of the primary sector it was designated to serve on the formation of the CRIs. Also there is little else on offer in the way of employment for those scientific workers employed in this CRI who wish to remain in New Zealand and perform full-time research, but not work in a university.

Forty-five percent of the revenue of the CRI in the year ended 30 June 2001 came from FRST funded programmes. The rest came from commercial contracts, contracts with other CRIs and from the CRI's subsidiary

companies. This was the first year so-called "commercial" revenue has outstripped that from FRST in the history of this CRI (2001, Annual Report).

Wool and Skin Biology Group (W&S Group)

After the internal restructuring in 1999, the W&S Group was placed in the AgSystems Platform, despite its seven members preferring to be in the Animal Genomics Platform. Its leader made many submissions to this effect but did not feel he was listened to. Officially the move was to avoid further dilution of the molecular genetics capability of the Animal Genomics Platform but it may well have been that they were placed in this Platform to even up the numbers. The AgSystems Platform consists of very diverse groups ranging across farm systems, to modelling, to social science, and its focus is work in the food product supply chain. This work requires searches for funding from industry sources. The W&S Group with its focus on non-food by-products, was adversely affected by reductions in Government funding and found little R&D investment in a "sunset industry".

The W&S Group's members see it as ironic now that their research proposals in 1999 were used internally as exemplars to other groups of the shift the organisation wished to make in order to demonstrate to FRST how it had aligned itself to Government policy. This was to be done by focusing on quality and adding value, rather than commodity production. Now the requirement is for "new and novel products that will add wealth to the primary sector" (from the abstract for the "Low Chemical Systems and Associated Branded Products", FRST programme 2001).

The Group has an applied science orientation as members want their work to be useful to the farming industry. They are not in science just for the sake of adding to scientific knowledge. In the course of an interview, Grant[3], a scientist in the Group, epitomised these attitudes when he said, "I love sheep".[4] Others in the Group also chose their work because of their agricultural interests, as indicated by Bert and Colin's comments:

I always had a fascination with agriculture and particularly when I

3. Pseudonyms are used throughout.
4. All members of the group were interested in sheep but three in particular could be said to be particularly fond of them.

> got on to my teen years. I enjoyed yeah, going on holidays to relation-type farms. And I got a lot of personal satisfaction out of being outside working with animals - stuff like that. (Bert)
>
> ... everything we did was for the good of the New Zealand farmer. (Colin)

The members of this group actually like, if not necessarily love, sheep. They like working with them and they are concerned for their welfare and for the welfare of sheep farmers. This has strong implications for the orientations of the group. It wants to save the sheep industry or, to put it more moderately, to help the sheep industry, and (particularly for Grant) the wool industry, survive. This has led the group to consider animal welfare issues because it believes such issues could be a major factor in future marketing of NZ sheep products overseas. For example, some practices to reduce the impact of flystrike in the sheep industry add to the costs and work of farmers, involve the use of chemicals, or may involve short but painful procedures to sheep, in order to prevent the slow death that flystrike can cause. In this context, Grant came up with the concept of "the ethical sheep", a wool-producing sheep with a bare bottom and head, and bare legs, which is in the process of development through traditional breeding methods. Initially money for this research came out of other budgets and, as Grant popularised the idea, it was first funded through a wool programme and now is funded within a programme on low chemical use. Three years down the track the whole research policy focus of the Foundation has changed and this Foundation funding is unlikely to be continued[5] (Scobie, 2001). The Group's present focus is to apply for Meat and Wool Board funding but these entities are in disarray and the Group's future is uncertain.

In its attempts to survive, the Group has also encountered difficulties within the CRI. After trialling titles for the ethical sheep programme proposal incorporating sheep welfare, flystrike and sheep breeding, a suitably unrelated title was accepted at the third attempt and it was fitted

5. Some of the hard won funding of this research group has also been redirected internally, by the Science Strategic Manager, to the FRST programme "Control of Human and Animal Hair Growth and Characteristics" i.e. it has been redirected to study baldness!

into the Low Chemical Systems Programme. This is a deft reference to organics without using the word and all its complicated referents. The content of the proposal had not changed. It was surmised that the AgSystems Platform does not research any issues to do with animal welfare, or animal breeding. To do so would be seen to step on someone else's "patch". Another survival tactic has been to diversify into research on leather and particularly deer leather. The Group has also looked for work with other fibre and meat related industries but as these are very small there is little money available for research. One member brings in some alternative income by auditing and registering farmers for two meat companies under contracts to the CRI. Two of the Group members were made redundant in the repositioning round carried out in 2000.

This group has not been quiet about its plight. It is continually presenting ideas to its Science Platform Leader. It works hard to maintain links with the meat and wool industries. The group leaders have made presentations on their work to the Board of the CRI on its trips around the different campuses and farms. From its inception, however, the platform structure of the organisation has impacted negatively on the group, giving it a strong message about how it does *not* fit.

To the W&S Group then, "sheep" mean "sheep" as commonly understood. But sheep are also a symbol of the survival of a certain group of farmers. With this in mind this group has devised a particular way of addressing these two concerns by focusing on animal welfare issues, but because for Government policy "sheep" mean "commodity" and therefore are associated with production and efficiency rather than "new and novel" products, applications for public research funding are not being supported. Reasonably enough perhaps, the Government sees the sheep industry as being able to support this research itself.[6]

6. Business expenditure on R&D (BERD) as a percentage of GDP was 0.31% in 1999/2000 compared with the OECD average of 1.53%. This is actually a slight drop from 0.32% in 1997/1998 though its actual value increased by 3.7% (MORST, 2002).

Molecular Biology Unit (MBU)

The MBU is in the Animal Genomics Platform and is made up of thirteen or more scientific workers who undertake the molecular biology components of the research for their five different science groups. In the past sheep have been the flagship for all the MBU's research. The group is working hard to reduce its dependence on sheep and wants to move away from work on product traits, such as identification of the genes that affect fleece-weight, fibre diameter, or leanness of sheep, to applications of DNA tracing such as a saleable product that identifies a sample of DNA back to its source. The prime focus of the MBU has been on gathering DNA information to form the Sheep Gene Map. This sounds, and is, a clinical interest, but for some members of the group this clinical interest is underpinned by more human interests. Eric, a member of the MBU tells his story:

> ... right now what would make me feel good would be if I could find a gene for facial eczema. The first case of facial eczema was in about 1887. Now it's 2000. We've had that problem for 120 years. We are putting up with it. Other countries don't have that problem because the fungus that causes it is not found there ... and our company and our Government are saying that since it's only a NZ problem, if we had a great discovery, it doesn't generate money for [the CRI] or NZ, because you can't sell it overseas ... I would have so much satisfaction if I can do something which the farmers have been putting up with [for so long]. So that is more on the sentimental side because I know the historical aspect of it ... when we first discovered a ... gene could be involved in it, we tried to patent it. The lawyer said, is it worth it? $15,000 a year for the patent and how much can we generate from the patent? We come up with no profit, you see...

The MBU's recent work on the Inverdale gene responsible for multiple births and sterility in sheep (Galloway et al., 2000) has been publicised nationally and was published in *Nature Genetics*, the journal with the most status in the molecular biology field. Another group in the MBU is working on the Booroola gene which also affects fertility, and others are working on leanness as a genetic trait, and the genetic resistance of sheep to internal parasites.

How does this group continue to obtain funding in the present environment? It focuses on how the sheep genetic map is very closely related

to the human gene map. It is argued that the sheep map is much closer than the "mouse map" and most people looking at human health issues use mice. This link to human health issues and human reproduction is emphasised in projects. For example, the way in which facial eczema damages the liver is of interest in human medicine.

The science groups that make up the MBU have no funding problems but are aware that they are riding the wave of interest on the part of biotechnology industries in genomics, and the belief that this is one of the areas of research that distinguishes a knowledge society from others (Hodgson, 2000d). As Frank, a scientist in the MBU, said,

> ... at the moment the molecular stuff seems to be the winner, but that's just the flavour of the month. I mean, I know the sustainable people think that they're not flavour of the month, but a few more Greens in Parliament and they'll all be the flavour of the month. I just realise now that even from the Government down, it's in-words that are the flavour of the month.

To the scientists in the MBU, sheep are the means by which its members can contribute to answering the question that so fascinates humankind – our genetic make-up and its implications for our health (Nelkin & Lindee, 1995) – while still helping farmers. The work of molecular biology is the focus of the technical staff.

Microbial Control Group (MCG)

The Microbial Control Group, which consisted of fourteen members at the time of interviewing, has had a long interest in grass grub and has been established through the drive of one person, an entomologist, who told me, "God must love beetles because he made so many of them". Like the fungus that causes facial eczema, grass grubs are endemic to New Zealand. Grass grubs affect the production of ryegrass by eating away at the roots. Sheep eat ryegrass. But does one ever hear sheep being mentioned by any members of this group? No. Their work has been positioned in the area of the biological control of pests and the protection of the environment (FRST programme title: Pest Management Technologies for Enhanced Environmental and Product Quality). The programme description mentions that:

> ... the research will assist New Zealand's primary industries in realising their increasing economic potential. Management systems will be based on beneficial organisms and related gene products; the latter will provide the foundation for planned new, advanced biological industries.

This Group has been very successful at acquiring funding and it has not found it necessary to make a link to sheep. A formulation chemist[7] in the MCG is developing innovative methods for placing a bacterial biological control agent in soil to control grass grub. His work has implications far beyond grass grub because pharmaceutical companies all around the world are interested in finding better ways of storing bacteria.[8] The MCG also has internal CRI funding for this formulation work because of its potential for intellectual property (IP), and potential for profit from licensing and making products of interest to the biotechnology industry. This aspect of the group's work is well supported by the CRI's Strategic Plan for 2000-2003. The Group has also moved into using molecular biology for the study of pathogenic bacteria in soil, hence making the most of the present international focus on such DNA technology. Biosecurity is playing an increasingly greater part in the group's work. This area is of great strategic concern to New Zealand as it tries to protect New Zealand's isolation from such things as foot and mouth disease and potential insect pests.

To scientists in the MCG, sheep are completely invisible, as demonstrated by the above description of their work, despite the fact that the work on grass grub is directly relevant to New Zealand's pastoral sector. The MCG is just not interested in sheep. The leader of the Platform in which this group is located, reflected the views of the group when he told me, "I'm not an agriculturalist. I don't like farms much". Another scientist in the group said that farms "are places of unspeakable filth and cruelty". The scientists in this group are quite clear that their interest lies in science not agriculture.

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7. A formulation chemist works on ways of making a saleable product from a scientific product. This product has to have a reasonable shelf life, be produced to a consistent standard in large quantities at a price the user can afford, and be applied in a form that is practical to the user.
8. This offshoot was completely unanticipated. The patent attorney thought of it. The MCG had 5 patents pending in early 2001.

Endophyte Group

My final case study, also very much concerned with sheep, is the Endophyte Group (E-Group). This is a true multidisciplinary group informally drawn together by interest in endophyte[9], a fungus in ryegrass, which causes ryegrass staggers and heat stress in animals, and also confers some insect protection on the grass. Endophyte, as the cause of ryegrass staggers, was discovered by one of the researchers in this group through his observations of sheep in an unrelated experiment. For the E-Group, sheep are experimental units used to test different strains of endophyte.

The E-Group has developed techniques for the inoculation and storage of grass seed containing different endophytes and this has produced many saleable (and patentable) technology products for both the New Zealand and overseas markets. Endophyte affects the efficiency of the production of meat, wool, and dairy products. This group does not have to be so concerned about the risk of interpreting sheep as a commodity, because of its commercial relationships with seed companies, both internationally and locally. The group also promotes the impact of endophyte on animal health, and endophyte's potential as a "non-tariff barrier to market access" (FRST Proposal 2001: Forage and Symbiont Genomes).

To further the exploration on other properties of endophyte, the E-Group is also using the tools of molecular biology, hoping to exploit the interest in this area. This aspect of its work, which does not need to mention sheep, is successful in receiving public funding and also involves collaboration with a university (FRST Programme: Genomics of Plant-fungal Relationships). Such collaborations are a requested part of Government science policy.

The E-Group is discovering that it enjoys its relationships with commercial clients because it is able to negotiate with them in a satisfying and rewarding way and demonstrate the skills and potential of its members to contribute something useful to those clients. As Fred said:

9. Because of this informal nature it is difficult to say how many staff are in this group. I interviewed thirteen but only about three of these could be considered to be working full-time on endophyte. Three of those interviewed actually worked with sheep. The rest were in laboratory (biochemists, entomologists, mycologists) or plant-based research (agronomists, plant breeders).

> I get satisfaction from working more recently – you know, the discussions we are having with private companies that are funding aspects of our work – working out what they want, hearing them say what they want and developing a programme that meets their needs and fits within our parameters.

This two-way accountability is more satisfying to E-Group members than the one way, report-writing, accountability experienced in their relationships with the Foundation, and the continual policy changes associated with Government funding.

The profits generated by the E-Group could fund its future work: maintaining the endophyte research, improving present products, and studying all the many other aspects of the endophyte-plant-animal interaction yet to be explored, which, incidentally, may be a rich source of future products. But the E-Group feels there are signals from corporate office that it may wish to use the profits for other research of a higher organisational priority. This makes group members feel insecure and indicates that even though the E-Group is in harmony with the organisational strategic direction, this is no guarantee of organisational support in the future.

Sheep are part of the way members of the E-Group can study something that fascinates them – a fungus that is part of an animal-plant interaction. Almost incidentally this subject has become a way in which they can produce IP and products for both local and international markets. They have discovered they enjoy the relationships this brings and by increasing their commercial contracts they hope to make themselves more independent of organisational and Government policies.

Discussion

All the groups studied have something to do with sheep in one way or another. Only in the case of the W&S Group, however, is the meaning given them attached to the animals we see on our farmland. The W&S Group is interested in sheep as animals with rights, and also as a symbol of the survival of a particular group of farmers and a way of life in New Zealand. Hence this group has no room for negotiation except by moving into other areas of research that do not elicit the same motivations of its members.

The present organisational and political structures have been particularly difficult for them to negotiate and they are suspended in the vacuum created when Government looks to industry to pick up funding on efficiency and commodity production. As industry dithers, this group is losing people with skills and expertise in these areas of research.

The MBU is exploiting as much as possible the close relationship between the human and sheep DNA maps. In the case of this group, the meaning of sheep as a gene map has placed its members at the forefront of this global interest and enabled them to gain international contracts against global competition:

> I'm very proud of the fact that we've managed to take – have you heard of the [American] Beta Company? We've taken business away from them, and we've just recently taken business away from GammaCo – you know, that company in Auckland.[10] (Bert)

This image of the organisation as able to compete with well-known biotechnology companies is very important to the CRI.

Work on the sheep gene map in the MBU has implications for research on human health, which can be used to take the emphasis away from agriculture. This emphasis is not to the liking of at least one scientist in the MBU who said:

> We are not here to feed people ... and this is why it is very hard in agriculture to get funding because funding comes from rich people. Rich people will be the last on this earth to run out of food. So food has never been their greatest fear. And therefore these people are not going to put any money into agriculture because they never die from hunger. But these people will die from other things ... so that's where they put it – medicine.

This respondent was observing that as people become concerned about living healthier and longer lives, so research is increasingly focused on human health. Products like nutraceuticals which could come from sheep, are indicators of New Zealand entering a knowledge economy and society (Hodgson, 2000d).

The MCG gives no indication that its research programme has anything

10. Pseudonyms are also used for company names.

whatsoever to do with sheep. For this group, sheep are invisible. This group knows the climate of the Foundation well and is aware that this climate is always going to shift. Its tactic of keeping its research as wide open as possible, thus allowing it to adjust to trends, has paid off in the past. Formulation work by the MCG is being exploited because it has produced some potentially profitable patents, demonstrating to the Government and the organisation that this group is contributing to the "knowledge society".

For the E-Group, sheep represent experimental units on which it can test its science and its potentially saleable products, but when one of its members says he also has an interest in "making life better for animals", then in this sense the E-Group is similar to the W&S Group in its concerns. One of the E-Group's products, licensed to an overseas company, has the potential to bring in millions of dollars annually, but the E-Group still feels the insecurity of the present political and organisational environment, and the lack of assurance that the research of the group as a whole will be able to be maintained. This has encouraged the E-Group to seek more of its funding in commercial areas which would make it more independent of Government policy and less exposed to possible organisational interference.

The present interest and fascination in gene technology has been a common way for all the groups, except the W&S Group, to present themselves as in tune with current funding priorities. (The W&S Group may have been able to exploit this more if it had been placed in another Platform at the time of restructuring.)

The CRI places importance on acquiring patents which all of the groups, except the W&S Group, have succeeded in acquiring so far. It is not possible to patent the sort of knowledge the W&S Group is producing. Hence all groups, except the W&S Group, are able to compete in the international market for IP.

Conclusion

All the science groups studied exhibit a strong wish to continue to work in their chosen area of scientific research and show a strong commitment to it. I have used the different meanings sheep have to each group to illustrate some of the strategies they have used to make this wish a reality. In the case of two groups (MBU, MCG) their success in doing so has given them

greater power to negotiate within the internal organisational environment. The E-Group is seeking to make itself less dependent on Government funding and organisational support by increasing its commercial funding. In the case of the W&S Group, the combined impact of Government policy and its perception of sheep as commodities, and the maturity of their science, has been too strong, putting their survival at risk.

Returning briefly to Akrich's (1992, 1995) works on "representations", my example of "sheep as object" suggests that scientists construct different representations of sheep in their research programmes in order to meet their ideas of what FRST requires. In other words their research has become focused on what the funder wants, rather than the needs and requirements of the end users of their research. This illustrates an inherent weakness of a funding system that supports Government's interest in international markets at the expense of the local. It also illustrates further the fragile nature of such directed research, as Government policy is open to continual change. As Frank, one of my respondents, reminds us, it would only take a shift in power towards the Greens for the whole research agenda to change.[11]

While the emphasis in this paper is on the role of "agency", the data shows that actors are coming to terms with, rather than challenging, structures. All groups demonstrate that changing the funding structure is perceived to be beyond their control. Each group has to negotiate the structures – to find a way through and/or around them. As Harry said, "We pander to deafened ears basically, whether it's a politician or a CEO". There is the understanding from past experience that structures are going to change because Government policy is always changing, but such change will not be the result of input from science groups (or the CRI).

According to Giddens "structure is not to be equated with constraint but is always both constraining and enabling" (1984, p.25). Without public funding, none of these groups would exist. However, the way in which the Foundation and the CRI implement Government policy constrains the ways in which these groups interpret and communicate the work they do, and

11. Ironically, I have recently been told that research may be swinging back to sheep with the realisation of the importance of the agricultural sector to New Zealand's economic well-being.

the choices they make about the directions of their work. At the same time, three of the science groups studied (and the fourth to a lesser extent), indicate they have sufficient confidence in their own autonomy to find ways of maximising their control over the work they do in the belief that they can make a difference. The structures resulting from Government policy may have influenced the way the groups represent and understand what they do, but the variety of responses indicates the structures have not completely dictated their actions. There has been some space for covert negotiation.

Thus, my observations illustrate that when structures are put in place, people negotiate them in their different ways, consciously or unconsciously, in order to satisfy their own objectives. Much of life, like much of science, is a subversive activity. Scientific research is a long-term enterprise (Hill & Turpin, 1994), poorly adapted to cope with quixotic shifts in Government policy or corporate strategies. The present environment jeopardises research programmes aiming to solve problems considered by scientists and/or the agricultural sector to be important for farming, science and New Zealand. Scientists, quite naturally, seek ways of sustaining the projects that they consider important, personally interesting, challenging, and vital to their survival for at least another funding round.

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Contested Territories: The Construction of Boundaries Between Alternative and Conventional Cancer Treatments

Alex Broom

Abstract

Set in the context of the recent controversy in New Zealand over the treatment of child cancer sufferer Liam Williams-Holloway, this article illustrates the role of health practitioners in the construction and reconfiguration of alternative and conventional medicine. Analysis of the discursive practices of alternative and conventional health practitioners demonstrates how they both strategically consolidate and contest so-called natural distinctions between alternative and conventional medicine to validate their professions. It is argued that science, certainty and holism are used discursively by *both* alternative and conventional practitioners to do boundary work. Their competing translations of what these actually constitute result in ongoing attempts to define science, certainty, and holism as practitioners attempt to protect their respective territories and contest the claims of others.

Introduction

Alternative cancer treatments are becoming increasingly popular in many countries including New Zealand (see Boon *et al.*, 2000; Broom, 2001; Burstein, Gelber, Guadagnoli, & Weeks, 1999; Ernst & Cassileth, 1998; Fernandez, Stutzer, MacWilliam, & Fryer, 1998; Richardson, 1999). Studies are now showing that a significant proportion of cancer patients are using alternative treatments either in addition to, or in combination with, conventional cancer treatments (Ernst & Cassileth, 1998). This increase in cancer patients' usage of alternative therapies and exposure to alternative paradigms of care has resulted in questions being raised regarding the limitations of biomedical cancer treatments. Growing public uncertainty about the benefits of science and scientific development, combined with an increasing push towards individualised preventative care and patient–

controlled healing, has resulted in public debate over the healing potential of alternative therapies. These developments have threatened to disrupt established occupational territories, resulting in ongoing attempts by individual practitioners and health organisations to reassert difference and reconstruct blurred boundaries.

Set in the context of the recent debate in New Zealand over the treatment of child cancer sufferer Liam Williams-Holloway, this paper analyses one moment of boundary work around cancer treatment. Liam's parents' refusal to continue chemotherapy treatment for his neuroblastoma and the Family Court's subsequent attempts to enforce treatment sparked heated public debate over the way medical treatments are validated and the potential benefits of alternative cancer treatments. The uncertainty produced by this particular public debate resulted in considerable boundary work by medical professionals, politicians, alternative practitioners and many other actors, attempting to reinforce and at times contest the validity of particular practices (Broom, 2001). In this paper I explore how a particular group health practitioners involved in the treatment of cancer use discourses of science, certainty, and holism to both construct and contest boundaries between alternative and conventional cancer treatments. Analysis focuses on these practitioners' discursive strategies; strategies that both reproduce and at times disrupt what certain actors (i.e. the media, politicians, lobby groups) construct as the essential differences between alternative and conventional medicine. Finally, it illustrates that these practitioners' descriptions of their own occupations and those of other practitioners are discursive strategies attempting to gain or reinforce occupational control (Norris, 2001, p. 25).

Research design

The research involved qualitative semi-structured interviews with health practitioners practicing in Christchurch. Using the snowball technique, I identified eleven health practitioners (five alternative and six conventional) who have been, or are currently, involved in the treatment of cancer patients. The conventional practitioners interviewed included a senior oncologist with an academic appointment, a gynaecological oncologist (surgeon), three house surgeons and one general practitioner. The alternative practitioners included two herbalists/lecturers in herbal medicine, a naturopath, a

healing touch therapist and a craniosacral therapist.

My aim was to select a range of practitioners, including some in teaching roles and some in private practice. In the interviews I focused on the following questions: (i) What discursive strategies do these practitioners use to validate their modalities and thus their treatment practices? (ii) How do they contest the positions and discursive strategies of other health practitioners? (iii) How does their talk contribute to the construction and at times disruption of difference between alternative and conventional medicine?

It is important to stress that I do not claim that these practitioners are representative of their respective occupations. They are just some of the local actors who contribute to discourses surrounding alternative and conventional medicine. However, they do provide an indication of how some differently positioned practitioners talk about their own practices and those of others.

Boundary work

In this paper I engage with the concept of "boundary work" from an actor-network theory perspective (see Latour, 1988, 1993, 1999; Law, 1992; Law & Hassard, 1999), considering boundary work as a fundamental process in the placing, maintaining and challenging of particular social categories. The following discussion illustrates how the boundary work put in by this particular group of health practitioners contributes to the production of what is viewed as alternative and conventional in health care. It shows how their boundary work is part of the process of establishing systems of difference, classification and category building (Latour 1988, p. 171). I will argue that the statements of these practitioners contribute to the generation of attributes – they are involved in the marking of social phenomena as having certain qualities and features.

Boundary work is viewed in this paper as a complex process that involves reciprocal inscription and modification (Latour 1999, p. 147). This process is seen vividly in the presented material as certain actors are torn between embracing the qualities of the other and maintaining difference – a tension that produces heightened efforts to consolidate boundaries while simultaneously making visible the interconnectivity of alternative and

conventional medicine. In the following three sections I focus on science, holism and certainty as sites of boundary work, illustrating the ways in which they are used discursively by this group of practitioners to do boundary work.

Strengthening boundaries with science

Recent public debate in New Zealand has featured considerable controversy around the primacy of science in medical decisions about the treatment of cancer (Broom, 2001, p. 104). I explored the ways in which the health practitioners I interviewed used discourses of science to protect their occupational territories.

In her study of boundary work between a variety of health care professionals treating musculo-skeletal problems, Norris (2001, p. 35) found that orthodox practitioners rarely mentioned science to distinguish their practice and occupations from others. In contrast, the doctors I interviewed relied heavily on the notion of science to construct boundaries between alternative and conventional medicine. The oncologists in particular repeatedly emphasised the importance of clinical trials or scientific evidence to legitimate medical treatments:

> We can list for them [the patients] the percentages, we can say what will happen and we even talk about the one-percent risks. Any treatment now which is used, has to have been subjected to a big stage three trial. For treatments that we are already using, for another treatment to be brought in as a standard treatment, there needs to be big randomised trials. The exceptions are the very rare cancers, but even then, the preference is for them to join a trial group and treat them within that trial. (physician oncologist)

The above extract shows the most pervasive discursive strategy of legitimation and demarcation used by doctors: they stipulate the scientific basis of conventional medicine. The doctors interviewed viewed randomised controlled trials (RCTs) as ensuring that only scientifically proven treatments "find their way into conventional medicine". The significance of this discursive and regulatory strategy is that it is by establishing and securing this yardstick of legitimacy that the boundaries between alternative and conventional medicine are consolidated. In effect,

RCTs are a mechanism by which the medical community draws the line between conventional/alternative, valid/invalid, scientific/quackery and effective/ineffective (Dew, 1998). The process of going through an ethics committee, getting funding, organising a research team, doing the actual research and getting a medical journal to publish the results, is viewed as a fail-safe process that weeds out questionable therapies. Thus, according to these practitioners, any proper treatment can be legitimated if funnelled through this process, and thus, the responsibility lies purely on willingness to "put in the work".

Unlike Norris's (2001) practitioners who were involved in the treatment of non-terminal chronic musculo-skeletal problems, the doctors interviewed here (with the exception of the general practitioner) mostly treat people who are terminally ill, often prescribing extremely potent treatments that have the potential to do irreparable damage. The result, as one oncologist suggested, is a heightened need in oncology (compared with other medical specialities) to prove everything through science – to only provide patients with treatments that have "been through big stage-three trial[s]". Secondly, in contrast to the practitioners Norris interviewed who often borrowed practices from each other (2001, p. 36), none of the practitioners here had any desire to use the practices of alternative practitioners.

The alternative practitioners interviewed contested conventional medicine's use of science as a source of validation, arguing that doctors "hide behind the veil of science". Of particular concern to this group of alternative practitioners was the effect of RCTs in blocking out alternative paradigms of healing. They all maintained that RCTs reduce healing to the physiological, excluding the possibility of the mind and the spirit in the healing process, thus undermining the effects of many alternative treatments. RCTs, a herbalist claims, do not allow for individuality in treatment:

> This catch phrase of science really means a double blind trial which is invalidated before it starts because it assumes that everybody is the same, and that's a joke. So your premise from zero base is invalid. The concept of "evenly matched" defies the reality of genetic makeup. They [doctors] identify a patient's "medical condition" and look at it in isolation. People are all very different with moods that

> swing with the day, the hour or the year, or with what's going on in their lives. (herbalist/lecturer)

Moreover, according to another herbalist, current scientific measures cannot capture the whole effect of the herb in herbal medicine, as the focus is on isolating a single active ingredient, rather than understanding its whole effect as seen in the healing process, not in the laboratory:

> One of the problems of conventional research, with regard to, for example, herbal medicine, is that nobody really understands how the plants work. They work in some ways quite directly and in some ways indirectly. Once you start isolating out ingredients, the whole plant is no longer being considered ... I think the current [biomedical] research paradigm is not a good one for herbal medicine. It tells us something, but it's not telling us the whole story. (herbalist/lecturer)

Based on the utilisation of holistic principles (individuality, flexibility and the incorporation of the mind, body and spirit), this practitioner contests the legitimacy of RCTs as a scientific measure. The herbalists interviewed contest conventional medicine by representing it as de-individualised, disjunct from real life, with its practitioners lacking a real understanding of the healing process (Broom, 2001, p. 132). On one hand, by contesting the RCT and disrupting the notion of conventional medicine as inherently scientific, these practitioners contest occupational boundaries based on efficacy and validity. On the other hand, in order to critique conventional medicine and the RCT, they use discursive strategies that reproduce holistic/scientific, subjective/objective oppositions thus reinforcing boundaries between alternative and conventional medicine.

The apparent refusal of alternative practitioners to scientifically validate their treatments leads the doctors interviewed to conclude that this is because they are "lazy", "stupid", "ill-informed" or "just plain devious". An oncologist explains why he thinks alternative practitioners do not seek scientific validation:

> There's a lack of funding, and a lack of desire, because a lot of these people couldn't be bothered to do a study. They can't be bothered with the hard work and the discipline involved with creating a study and writing it up, because it's hard work, and takes a lot of time

> and a lot of effort and they can't be bothered. Like the nurses on the ward with the healing touch therapy - they're buggered if they're going to give up their free time to do the study. (gynaecological oncologist)

A herbalist gives a different version of why his particular modality has not achieved scientific validation:

> We are not anti-science at all. The truth is, and doctors will deny it, if you look at our reference books they're all referenced at the back with heavy-duty science. It's all in there. The research has been done, but [doctors] don't want to read it. (herbalist/lecturer)

The doctors interviewed claim validity for their practices through science and believe alternative medicine is suspect predominantly because it is not scientific. When science is used by alternative practitioners doctors talk about it as "pseudo science"; as one house surgeon said, "it's a case of a little knowledge being a bad thing". We can see that what is scientific is contested, with doctors constituted as those who best recognise good science. Thus, the more work alternative practitioners put into talking science, the more work doctors put into clarifying what science is:

> A lot of the alternative medicines that are widely supported are based on the sort of pseudo-science, so it's sort of fudge-science – science that people have made up basically, to make it sound right. It's presented in a way that people can understand it, and it can be put in a fairly simplistic way without too many facts having to spoil a good story. (gynaecological oncologist)

The result of pressure from the medical community to get scientific has resulted in alternative and conventional practitioners entering into a contestation over what constitutes science. The oncologist quoted above reacts to what he views as the simplification of scientific explanation by alternative practitioners. He argues that alternative practitioners use the public's support for and basic knowledge of science to market their treatments by offering plausible but erroneous explanations about their effects on the body. Undoubtedly certain alternative practitioners do use science to mislead patients about the merits of their treatments (Green, 1997, p. 39), just as it is certain that some doctors also mislead patients through dubious scientific explanation. What is interesting is the discursive

contestation over what science is, as alternative practitioners attempt to insert themselves into the rhetoric of science that has maintained the dominance and legitimacy of biomedicine. This insertion results in the swift re-categorisation of science by the medical practitioners. As Star and Griesemer (1989, p. 391) argue, once the categorisation of what constitutes science has "established an obligatory point of passage, the job then becomes to defend it against other translations threatening to replace it". This defence is clearly taking place as the encroachment of the translations of alternative practitioners results in louder claims about what science really is, backed by reference to "true" scientific measures such as the randomised-controlled trial. As Latour (1999, p. 147) observes with reference to scientists and microorganisms, "the more activity there is from one, the more activity there is from the other". The competing translations of science from alternative modalities modify conventional medicine and vice versa. Activity from either side results in the re-articulation and thus reconstruction of boundaries; a process which results in some degree of reconfiguration depending on the mutability of the translations.

Constructing and contesting certainty

An issue strongly debated within the Liam Williams-Holloway case was the fallibility of medical treatments, and the uncertainty involved in medical practice. An important discourse presented by media outlets within this controversy was of the misinformation presented by the medical community, evidenced in the glossing over of side effects and the boosting of survival rates for neuroblastoma. Some local media groups reported public concern that the medical community was projecting false certainty to protect its autonomy and maintain its monopoly over health provision (Broom, 2001, p. 78). In the interviews I explored how this group of practitioners used "certainty" (or uncertainty) to do boundary work.

When interviewing the doctors it was clear from very early on that they were aware that many of their medical treatments, especially in the case of rare conditions, are not based on any good scientific evidence:

> We get told at times that fifty percent of what we do in medicine has no basis and there is no good evidence to back it up which is pretty scary at times...It is true at times that [medicine] doesn't have the

> evidence to back it up, but from the best knowledge you have so far, you are extrapolating. (house surgeon)

Despite the lack of scientific evidence for many medical treatments, and the variability of individual responses to treatment programs, the need to project certainty remains strong. Medical education contributes to this, fostering the notion that uncertainty is a manifestation of ignorance, weakness or failure (Logan & Scott, 1996, p. 596). The house surgeons interviewed talked about their medical education as instilling in them the importance of accuracy and objectivity. The reality of clinical practice – that uncertainty and complexity are indeed the only certainties – may result in the defensive adoption of a dogmatic authoritarian approach, with doctors focusing in on those aspects of illness most amenable to investigation and avoiding those untidy areas which do not fit existing medical knowledge.

Abstraction and quantification allow practitioners to maintain an image of exactitude and certainty despite the fact that such abstract models may not in any way accurately predict an individual's response to treatment (Logan & Scott, 1996, p. 595). The following extract shows the medical community continually trying to refine their predictive capacity through clinical trials and new technologies to establish a perception of certainty:

> The problem is for an individual patient you don't know what's going to happen. We are still poor at that. You can sort of adjust their risk a little bit. People have designed computer programmes to combat this problem so you can actually do it very specifically. The more prognostic data you have, the closer you can get to the likely outcome but you still can't say exactly what's going to happen. But we would be closer than any of these alternative folk. (physician oncologist)

As this oncologist states, it is impossible to provide an accurate prognosis for an individual. The key phrase here is "you can sort of adjust their risk a little bit". Adjusting the risk as the patient goes through conventional treatment when you have "more prognostic data", allows the medical community to continually reassess the probable outcomes. The response of the medical community to patients who vary greatly from the medical prognosis, or do well with alternative therapies, is that it was a spontaneous

remission (one in ten thousand), or the practitioner did not have enough data at the time to give an accurate prognosis (McKee, 1988). These discursive strategies that explain inconsistencies between prognosis and outcome assist the claims making that consolidates the legitimacy of biomedical treatments. The oncologist acknowledges the uncertainty within conventional medicine but also uses this notion of uncertainty to construct boundaries between alternative and conventional medicine. Stating "we would be closer than any of these alternative folk", she presents "alternative folk" as less accurate, less certain, and doctors as better predictors of outcome, differentiating between the level of uncertainty in conventional medicine and the uncertainty of alternative medicine.

Christakis and Lamont (2000, p. 469) studied uncertainty in medicine, finding that physicians regularly disagree on and are inaccurate with respect to the diagnosis, treatment or evaluation of care. The need for exactness and control amidst uncertainty results in institutionalised coping mechanisms that may compromise patient safety (Logan & Scott, 1996, p. 597). The doctors interviewed here talked about a norm of understanding and forgiveness between physicians. The junior doctors suggested that in the current medical culture criticism is discouraged and mistakes that would otherwise be seen as a professional emergency are considered a normal part of everyday practice. As Peitro, Shyavitz, Smith and Auerbach (2000) have argued, the commitment to precision dissolves when errors happen; the concern is more with limiting punitive investigation by appealing to the complexity and subjective side of medicine. On the other hand, the medical community promotes peer review as a means of maintaining professional standards and ethics, a direct contradiction to the norm of non-criticism. Thus, one can see a complex medical culture that accommodates the contradiction between perceived control and achieved control over illness to ensure patients are presented with a high degree of certainty. This collective effort has the effect of separating alternative and conventional medicine, representing conventional medicine as more certain, objective, controlled and consistent – a difference made possible by unspoken rules of the trade.

These doctors construct certainty as a characteristic of conventional medicine – their talk (combined with the many other facets of medicine

including the culture of accommodation, prognostic data, computer technologies etc) contributes to the inscription of conventional medicine as able to predict – as being certain (relative to other modalities). As Mol and Law (1994, p. 646) suggest, when a region (in this case conventional medicine) is defined, the differences or complexities inside it are suppressed. Numbers, statistics, measurements are used to represent biomedical treatments as consistent and certain, and alternatives as uncertain – they ensure a homogeneous space within which comparisons (between alternative and conventional medicine) make sense, reinforcing the boundaries between us and them (Mol & Law, 1994). Variations between the elements of the region are averaged and fixed. These strategies are accompanied by the inscription of alternative modalities as uncertain and unpredictable through the description and thus categorisation of alternative practices as "airy fairy", "ad hoc", "non-quantified" and "unpredictable". These statements become "hard" as they are institutionalised; taught in medical schools, passed on by senior physicians, published in medical journals and newspapers, and so on. In this way, certainty or uncertainty is used to mark alternative modalities, to assign them a place and reinforce distinctions between them and us.

Claiming holism

"Holistic" has long been the key term for describing alternative therapies (see Coward, 1989; Frohock, 1999; McKee, 1988). Alternative modalities have been consistently constructed within the media and within the academic literature as holistic, integrating the mind, body and spirit, and promoting respect for nature and individual rights (Broom, 2001). Perhaps more importantly, these so-called characteristics have also been consistently used by media outlets, medical organisations, medical practitioners, politicians and other important actors to debunk alternative modalities. Alternative practitioners have invariably been criticised for being inconsistent, naive and unethical, and their treatments constructed as ineffectual, lacking potency, and at best palliative (Broom, 2001, p. 94). Within the interviews I explored these health practitioners' understandings of holistic care, with a focus on how they use holism discursively as a source of validation.

Although interpretations of what holistic medicine actually constituted

were contested between these actors, all the practitioners (both alternative and conventional) acknowledged to varying degrees the importance of a holistic approach to health care. In fact, both the alternative and the conventional practitioners used the notion of holistic medicine as a mechanism to support their treatment practices and differentiate their practices. Both the oncologists interviewed used the term holistic to describe what they considered to be an alternative treatment, but they also insisted that they too provide a certain level of holistic care, a contradiction worthy of further scrutiny.

When asked about the importance of holism in the hospital setting an oncologist responded with the following statement:

> I believe very strongly that you shouldn't just be treating people with surgery and drugs and radiotherapy. You need to be treating them as a whole person and caring for them, I think caring is a good term ... I think we do try and we have a team of social workers and nurses and dieticians and physios. We work as closely as we can with the community carers to provide something that does flow and does answer people's needs on a greater level. (gynaecological oncologist)

This talk about caring for the patient's emotional needs was prominent when the doctors were asked about the role of holistic care in the hospital system. The oncologists stressed the value of a holistic approach to cancer treatment, both suggesting that, to a certain level, their departments provide this type of care to cancer patients. Although they perceived this facet of treatment as underdeveloped in conventional medicine, they both considered that conventional cancer treatment is moving towards a more integrated approach to illness. Another oncologist expresses her views on holistic health care:

> We would say we offer holistic care in a sense. We have social workers and nurses and people to talk to them, dieticians, that type of thing so they do get that. I think in the current climate we would have trouble offering touchy feelies and things like that...we would need funding. We couldn't do it on our current budget. (physician oncologist)

What develops here is an acknowledgment of the importance of holism

from both the oncologists, followed by their version of what this constitutes i.e. "social workers, nurses and dieticians", and lastly, a deliberate separation of this approach from the "touchy feely" approach of alternative practitioners.

As I talked further with the doctors it was clear that although they viewed holistic care as beneficial for the patient, they believed it had little or no influence on the actual symptom or disease, and thus, should remain secondary to conventional methods. All the doctors interviewed expressed some support for holistic medicine but were also in agreement that it was not financially viable for the hospital system to treat those facets of the patient that were not factors in a "cure":

> ...we need to build up a team that does address the whole needs of the patient. But there's always an extent to which you can't, you can't go into people's homes and lives and minds, and answer their entire problems, a lot of which may be nothing to do with their disease, whether they be socio-economic or emotional. (gynaecological oncologist)

The implication is that, although these medical practitioners viewed alternative practices as "good for the mind and the soul", they tended not to associate this with the actual treatment of disease. An inherent contradiction exists in that these medical practitioners emphasise the importance of the patient's attitude towards the treatment provided, and the influence this has on the outcome. They emphasise that "invariably it's those with the positive attitude that do well" (physician oncologist), but this is viewed as a personality trait rather than a product of the treatment process or the doctor-patient interaction. Thus, we have a discourse surrounding the palliative nature of holistic care, alongside recognition of the influence of attitude on outcome for cancer patients. The contradiction is obvious; those patients who have a positive attitude do the best, but it has no influence on the treatment.

What is significant here is not whether or not a particular approach is holistic, but rather the degree to which holism is embraced and how discourses of legitimacy are constructed in relation to this concept. When asked about teaching a holistic approach, one oncologist stated:

> I don't give teaching in this area to medical students. I don't even have time to cover the basis of gynaecology with students. I like to talk to them about holistic and patient centred care, but you do see them switching off – they seem to say "all right then, we know all this shit, let's get onto the real stuff", the stuff they'll need to know to pass exams. It's no good being the touchiest, feeliest person in the world if you don't know anything. Bottom line, good knowledge is the basis of our treatments, and if you don't have that knowledge people are going to miss out. (gynaecological oncologist)

The two important points here are that firstly, medical students are taught to undervalue or even avoid the non-scientific, and secondly, although these practitioners view holistic medicine as therapeutic they considered it of little or no benefit to the patient's condition. Of course these two positions are self-perpetuating: if the specialist sees no worth in holistic approaches to health care or treatment (in terms of treatment of particular symptoms), the medical student stops listening. As one can see from the oncologist's statement, he contrasts holistic care with knowledge; patient-centred care is "touchy feely", whereas evidence-based medicine is knowledge-based treatment. He suggests that a focus on holistic medicine neglects the most important part of treatment – science – such that holistic care results in people missing out on the evidence-based medicine. For these practitioners, allocating time to talk in-depth to the patient would merely result in neglecting other patients. A house surgeon suggests that more time is not necessarily productive:

> If you went to see your GP you would have tops 10 minutes, 15 minutes for you and that's it; end of consultation. With alternative treatments usually there is more of an opportunity to open up and to chat; not like a consultation where you are focusing on a medical problem. It's more of a social thing. (house surgeon)

The statement "it's more of a social thing" is particularly important as it illustrates the view that many in the medical community have towards holistic care. If the focus is taken away from the physiological symptom, valuable time is wasted which could be spent treating other patients. This constructs a discourse surrounding funding allocation: only symptomatic, non-social therapies should be funded by the state. It is this discursive practice within the medical community that shapes what the state will fund.

Thus the medical community reproduces, in the form of discourses around funding priorities, its own belief system.

This illustrates the process by which the medical community both encapsulates and reconstitutes what is meant by holistic care, using this concept as both a method of nullifying alternative treatments and legitimating their own practices. This connects to Star and Griesemer's notion of translation. They argue that "entrepreneurs gradually enlist participants...from a range of locations, re-interpret their concerns to fit their own pragmatic goal and then establish themselves as gatekeepers" (1989, p. 389). In this case, these doctors enlist holism as an ideological stance, providing their own translation or interpretation regarding the significance (and effects) of this model of patient care. Holistic care is translated as being palliative, beneficial, but peripheral to treatment. It is captured, translated and reapplied to alternative modalities as a justification for their ineffectiveness - espoused when complementary, but debunked when it is the primary focus of treatment.

It is through this process that the medical community establishes a boundary between additional holistic care (social workers, dieticians, counsellors etc) and the holistic practices of alternative practitioners. The claim of holism by conventional practitioners negates the worth or usefulness of alternative therapists who seek to use this concept to differentiate themselves from biomedicine. In effect, it is a discursive strategy to weaken the mechanism that alternative practitioners have traditionally used both to legitimate their practices and critique symptomatic medicine.

All of the alternative practitioners interviewed considered their practices holistic, using terms such as "patient-centred", "individualised", "empowering" and "spiritual" to explain their paradigm of health care. These practitioners used the concept of holistic care in much the same way as the medical practitioners used RCTs. They viewed symptom focused and technologically invasive medicine as destructive and reductionistic, contesting the ability of biomedicine to integrate the mind, body and the spirit. Holism is used by these practitioners to promote particular features of their treatments that were "better" than those of conventional medicine. As Norris (2001, p. 37) found in her study, each practitioner had a different

understanding of what constituted holistic care, but each used discourses of holism to both distinguish and validate their treatment practices. The healing touch therapist expresses her view of holistic care:

> I see the patient sitting in the middle of a circle and on that circle I see the physician or the appropriate medical person, but I also see the nutritionist, the physiotherapist, and I see the iridologist, and the energy worker and the craniosacral and I will see all these people on the circle because every single one of them has got a section to offer – no-one is any greater than anyone else, but they are making up the whole.

This practitioner expressed her understanding of what constituted holistic treatment in a similar fashion to the oncologists (see above): as an integration of multiple actors into the treatment of a person. One can clearly see the similarities between these conceptualisations of holistic care. The healing touch therapist views holistic treatment as integrating multiple paradigms of healing by collaboration between various modalities. In this view, holistic medicine includes multiple knowledges within health treatment.

Similarly, the oncologists viewed holistic care as the provision of multiple services by specialised teams, rather than an integrative health treatment. In contrast, this naturopath describes what she views as a holistic approach to health care by describing what she does in practice:

> I would look at their iris with a torch...I would definitely work on the feet and I would look at whether there been any major stresses in their life like death or a major crisis or marriage separation – anything that may have been a cause to the depression. If there is nothing majorly gone wrong I would work on the feet and say, are the adrenal glands down, and, "are your blood sugars up and down". Sometimes they will come in with a diagnosis of depression and I would say, "I think you have got adrenal exhaustion". They've been working 70 hours a week for the last ten years with no holiday...I would just balance their diet taking away the things that are stressing their adrenal glands and give them a product which allows the body to produce adrenaline again. I would suggest they go away for a week on holiday.

This naturopath constructs holism as attention to multiple factors in diagnosis and treatment, as opposed to integrating multiple actors. She

also includes symptomatic diagnosis and treatment as part of treating the whole, and scientific explanation as playing an important role in holistic healing. She suggests that the client should go on a holiday, talks to them about their emotional problems, but also prescribes a medicine to treat the particular symptoms. Furthermore, she explains "scientifically" how this particular substance acts on the body. This disrupts holism as in opposition to science, to the physical, constructing a holistic approach to healing as integrative, rather than prioritising the emotional or the spiritual. For this naturopath, holism means using multiple knowledges, substances and methods of diagnosis in treating illness. She promotes self-sufficiency in treatment, with a single practitioner incorporating the whole needs of the patient. Feet (reflexology), eyes (iridology), story (psychotherapy), and symptoms are all integrated to uncover the nature of the problem. The herbalists have a similar view of holism. They argue that having a holistic approach to medicine does not mean rejecting science, symptomatic diagnosis, statistics or invasive techniques. On the contrary, they argue that these are all important dimensions of the practice of holistic medicine. They suggest that holism by definition does not exclude – it is the integration of multiple paradigms, practices and techniques.

These alternative practitioners are involved in both articulating and contesting what is holistic, interpreting what it means according to their own position. The reaction of many within the medical community to this method of boundary work has been to push for the integration of holistic principles in the medical profession (see Holland, 1999, p. 1759). This is, in part, an effect of the challenge from alternative modalities in terms of their ability to offer aspects of treatment neglected in conventional medicine. In order to promote practices, practitioners must incorporate aspects of other actors, but also maintain territory, by contesting the use of one's own mechanisms by other actors. Once again we are drawn back to Star and Griesemer's "entrepreneurs" enlisting participants (in this case an approach to treatment) to fit their own pragmatic goal and then establishing themselves as gatekeepers (1989, p. 389), but then having to defend their translation against other groups attempting to displace them. As a result we see competing claims about what is holistic as practitioners attempt to both retain this source of legitimacy and also challenge the translations of

others. This produces a constant tension between integration to ensure progress and meet consumer demands, and exclusion to reproduce difference and retain occupational control.

Conclusion

I have shown how science, certainty and holism can be used discursively by both alternative and conventional practitioners to reproduce and contest occupational boundaries. "Boundary work" is central to the process of categorisation and establishing difference. As Latour states, things are not given, they are assigned a place and marked as such (1988). Health practitioners (aided by a multitude of other human and non-human actors) contribute to the marking of alternative and conventional as having inherent qualities. They create distinctions that justify their positions, whilst using the perceived qualities of the other to validate their own modality. This process is captured by Latour's notion of reciprocal inscription and modification (1999, p. 147). Alternative and conventional modalities are inscribed by each other; they are each, in part, a product of their respective discursive practices. Moreover, this interconnectivity results in a continual tension between the contradictory need to generate difference and to seek legitimacy through alignment with the other. The oncologist, realising that holism is valued by many consumers of health care, explains the way medical patients are treated holistically, while at the same time maintaining his/her position as objective and scientific. The herbalist sees the power of alignment with science, and attempts to balance this with his/her orientation around nature and the individual. These are all strategies by which these practitioners occupy and contest particular positions. Incongruities arise, and boundaries are blurred, as seemingly opposing actors attempt to claim the same qualities or use similar strategies of validation. Boundaries are reconstructed and consolidated as actors attempt to articulate their differences by disputing the use of particular mechanisms. It is through this process that representations of alternative and conventional health practices are constantly constructed and reconstructed.

As Latour argues (1988, p. 179), we should see human actors and artefacts as configurations of practical knowledge whose character is more about process and less about the nature of their components. It is thus

important to consider that all statements about the world, and in this case about alternative and conventional medicine (i.e. "this is natural...", "we are scientific...", "to be truly holistic you have to...", "being professional means...") begin as fragile assertions made by an individual or a small group. Weak assertions become hard facts as they find their way into textbooks, lectures and publications. In this way, they become symbolic of particular groups or organisations, and ultimately such representations come to be viewed as reflective of a natural order.

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Credentialism and the Governance of Popular (Restorative) Justice

Warwick Tie

Abstract

The credentialisation of New Zealand restorative justice practitioners is being mooted. Ideologically, credentialism provides a means of regulating popular justic movements that threaten the integrity of Law, by constructing them as governable spaces. Notwithstanding such effects, a range of "popular" and "fundamental" fantasies make credentialism appealing. The goal of radical social-legal intervention in such circumstances is to "traverse" those fantasies, neutralising their ideological effects so as to produce space for alternative courses of action.

A compelling message of *Critique and radical discourses on crime* (Pavlich, 2000) is that new modes of governance arise unexpectedly from laudable attempts to eradicate social harm, creating social effects more pernicious than the harm they were designed to address. The "war against crime" exemplifies this. So too does the "war on terrorism". In that same vein, this paper explores the rise of new modes of governance that occur in the name of *peace*. It takes as its orientation point the credentialism of New Zealand restorative justice practice. Interestingly, a range of interest groups in and around restorative justice support accreditation in some form.[1] Critically, this paper cuts across this growing confluence of agreement by asking about the forms of governance that will emerge as a consequence. Its argument is that the move to credentialise restorative justice has an important ideological affect – the consolidation of centralist law – and that this move is sustained by popular, though paranoiac, fantasies. Moreover, the paper suggests that the regulatory effects of credentialism threaten to spill beyond restorative

1. The strength of interest and variety of viewpoints on credentialism was brought to my attention during 2001 when groups representing different sets of interests within New Zealand's criminal justice scene approached me to facilitate conferences on the issue.

justice and into the governance of the wider mediatorial movement. Following the lead of psychoanalytic theorist Jacques Lacan, the goal of radical social-legal intervention under such conditions becomes to "traverse the fantasies" that support credentialism, such that the positive benefits of credentialism can be realized and its questionable ideological effects subverted.

Contextualising the debate on credentialism

Questions about the credentialism of restorative justice cannot be divorced from debates about the preferred form that restorative justice should take. Such debates, comprehensively surveyed by Kent Roach (2000), encompass the following issues: the relationship of restorative justice to orthodox law, to the State, criminal justice professionals, crime victims, women, and indigenous peoples; plus the role that restorative justice might play in the legitimate pluralisation of justice; the expansion of the criminal justice "net"; the dispensing of retribution; and the quest for interpersonal healing.

Within the New Zealand context, the broad contours of that debate also emerge in questions about the extent to which restorative justice is a *social movement* whose goal is the displacement of retributive law (in favour of restitutive law), and/or a *set of conflict-resolution practices* whose more modest purpose is the augmentation of adjudicative processes with participatory ones. As sociologist Vern Jantzi (2001) informs more generally about the New Zealand situation, restorative justice is caught between

> the pressure to move towards a clearer definition of practical issues – e.g. identifying best practices, establishing uniform standards, achieving greater efficiency in practice, assuring organizational sustainability, expansion of the movement, etc.- and the need to engage in reflection, analysis and theorizing to foster rich conceptual development that will constantly expand current vision and understandings.

At stake within the discursive space that exists between these options are the prospects for New Zealand's field of restorative justice.

This debate about the preferred image of the movement occurs within a context that is beyond its own purview, namely the political imperative of social governance. Itself a perpetually shifting field, the domain of

governance – following Foucault – has witnessed an expanding array of rationalities involving juridical, disciplinary, and governmental modes of power. Indeed, as Mitchell Dean (1999) notes, recent history has revealed a repeated joining of juridical and governmental modes of governance in the quest to manage the social (within Nationalist Socialism, Communism, liberal democracy, and authoritarian democracy), leading to the further complication of the field of *governance* and the need to recalibrate the very meaning of *resistance*.

The field of restorative justice is inexorably linked to this matrix of increasingly imbricated modes of regulation – indeed it cannot stand beyond its imperative. It cannot do so because it seeks to interrupt the terms under which the state authorities respond to conflict. It does so by either seeking to displace the State's main juridical tool for responding to social conflict (that is, the accusatory, adjudicative legal paradigm) or by reconfiguring itself as a bio-political mode of governance (through becoming a set of practices for neutralizing a particular class of conflict) that can be utilised in a number of regulatory sites. Significantly, both options require that restorative justice develop auspices that can sustain its own desire to act in a governing manner.

Where restorative justice is viewed as a substitute for retributive law (and thus, as a socio-legal movement), auspices are searched for in extra-legal sources as wide ranging as indigenous law, religion, and contemporary popular culture. Alternatively, where restorative justice is viewed as an adjunct to formal legal processes the preferred auspices resonate more powerfully with the prevailing politico-legal culture. Such auspices include social science (evidenced in empirical studies which demonstrate that restorative practices "work"), bureaucratic practices (that contractually bind restorative groups to other authorities), and credentialism (that standardises performance). Such auspices are intrinsically ideological in nature in that they constitute platforms upon which the exercise of power is authorised. Their veridicality thereby becomes inimical compared to their abilities to facilitate restorative justice's entry into the field of social governance.

It is in this context that credentialism is best understood, as a technique for legitimating a particular exercise of power, an exercise that is both sought by restorative justice practitioners (in support of their own professional

status) and State authority in terms of its capacity to extend its regulatory functions to the level of local communities and disperse the risk associated with small-scale disputes. This cannot be explained in purely ideological terms, however, as either a Machiavellian quest on the part of restorative practitioners "to rule" or as an ideological duping of practitioners by the prevailing relations of rule. As this paper argues, credentialism does have strong ideological effects in so far as it supports prevailing constellations of power. It also has potential, however, to advance the position of restorative justice as a critical social movement.

The terms of the debate

Debates about the desirability of credentialism are complicated by the different forms that the standardisation of restorative justice practice could take. In the context of New Zealand's restorative justice, a variety of forms are posited and two prevailing versions are outlined here[2]. In the first, protocols are envisaged between local restorative justice groups and their main stakeholders (local courts, primarily). In a second version, national standards are envisaged that cover areas of practice such as training, qualifications, practice principles, and supervision. The latter would possibly be established and monitored by something akin to a legally authorised national association. The former would most likely accredit local groups while the latter might validate individual practitioners under the auspices of a national entity. These possibilities are, however, only speculative.[3]

In support of credentialism

The standardisation of restorative justice practice has much to commend it. For key stakeholders such as the judiciary the accreditation of service providers provides some measure of assurance that they can be held accountable. Phrased differently, the accreditation of providers furnishes

2. These emerged for national discussion in a workshop on 'Standards and Protocols' held at the National Restorative Justice Hui: Te Ara Hou, Auckland, March 2002.
3. A working party has been established under the auspices of the Restorative Justice Network to investigate the options for accreditation more fully.

key stakeholders with confidence that the future can be as it is envisaged in the present: understandings that are formed in the present about how people will act in the future are guaranteed by the promise of sanctions. This knits with a fundamental role played by legal reasoning, to define the future in terms that presently prevail. For service providers, alternatively, accreditation provides an auspice through which power can be downloaded, enabling them to act in the name of an authority greater than themselves and, as a consequence, to incite others to respond appropriately to them. To this end, credentialism is an enabling force.

In critical response

Notwithstanding the administrative advantages and legitimacy that credentialism brings for stakeholders and practitioners, respectively, the standardisation of restorative justice practice has pertinent ideological effects insofar as it consolidates existing power relations. Specifically, the credentialism of restorative justice bolsters juridical integrity at the very time at which the unitary conception of law is challenged by popular justice movements (including restorative justice).

The move to credentialise New Zealand's restorative justice movement contains a series of ideological effects that have the potential to position the movement in the service of the State's security-related needs. In the first of these moves (what John Thompson (1990, p. 61) calls a *legitimatising universalism*), the interests of a particular group are given as fulfilling the interests of all. This is seen most powerfully in the way in which State initiatives such as the New Zealand Department for Court's *restorative justice pilot project* have been positioned as a core element within the general field of restorative justice, notwithstanding the rhetoric that it is only one expression of the activity.[4] To this end, it is the Ministry's stated policy position that the project "is in addition to, not a substitute for, the range of restorative justice services already available" (Department for Courts, 2001a, p. 19). Most importantly, the attributes that are attributed to the project

4. The court-referred restorative justice project is a four year undertaking whose goal is to make recommendations to government on "the most effective ways to incorporate restorative justice in the criminal justice system" (Department for Courts, 2001, p. 20).

have the potential to become the features against which the legitimacy of community-based initiatives is measured. It is under the auspices of this belief, for example, that the Minister for Courts suggests that the project gives "credibility" to others working in restorative justice (Department for Courts, 2001b, p. 2). It is as if the Minister's apparently innocent comment expresses the administration's unconscious self-understanding that State programmes do indeed constitute the norm against which voluntary-sector approaches will be evaluated. To this end, the Department tacitly positions itself as a unifying emblem of restorative justice in a manner that extends beyond its role as sponsor of initiatives such as the *court-referred project*.

At the same time as State-sponsored symbols of national unity arise with powerful icons such as the *pilot project*, potential for disparity emerges amongst groups on the basis of the degree to which they share or depart from the norms established for practice by such projects. The existence of such projects thus ironically has the potential to fracture the movement at the same time as provide a point of symbolic unity. In effect, a hierarchy of restorative justice providers is created that has both political and pragmatic dimensions. In political terms the programmes that are either fully sponsored by the State (such as the pilot project or Timaru's *Project Turnaround*) or partially funded by the State (such as Hawke's *Bay's Restorative Justice Te Puna Wai Ora, Inc.* and the *Wanganui Restrorative Justice Programme*) gain administrative legitimacy from their close association with the State. In pragmatic terms, such initiatives stand a better chance of surviving in the longer term through their superior financial tenure (Jantzi, 2001). Indeed, as Janzti notes in bald terms, most will need State funding and support in order to survive.

In addition to the symbolic measures through which the State casts its restorative project as a unifying symbol within the movement, the Department for Courts has unintentionally advanced the concept of credentialism through its thorough-going *standardisation* of practice within the court-referred project. In Foucaultian terms, this represents the deployment of a disciplinary power that both normalises behaviour and optimizes performance towards ends that support existing relations of rule. This is most visible in the Department's selection, training, supervision, and assessment practices.

Although not labeled as credentialism, per se, the process *is* thoroughly credentialist, with aspiring practitioners in the project being accepted or rejected on the basis of their conformity to Department-inaugurated, cognitive-behaviorist screening and training programmes. A strong possibility exists that these criteria will be extended to programmes that are affiliated with the State. As Jantzi (2001) notes, few voluntary-sector programmes will survive in the longer run without some form of central funding. Even though, as Jantzi again notes, the Minister has expressly stated that the Department should not take upon themselves the prerogative to define the standards and practices for the whole field, it is a tendency of central administration to do so, especially as a way of ensuring the "accountability" of funded projects. Given, also, the administration's apparent faith in the standards that have been devised in its pilot project, their appearance within contracts between the Department and voluntary-sector restorative groups can be reasonably predicted.

In addition to these ideological processes, credentialism has the effect of *reifying* established patterns of power. An initial manner in which this occurs is through the *naturalisation* of particular aspects of restorative practices such that they come to be seen as quasi-biological imperatives. This can be seen in the status that is accorded to *victims*. An exemplar of this is found in Charles Barton's (1999) notable contribution to discussion on the preferred terms for understanding restorative justice. For Barton, victims – by virtue of their experiences – *naturally* have a form and level of insight into conflicts that is beyond the knowledge of other parties involved. At the same time as restorative practices recognise this superior insight, however, they are unable to protect the rights of those victims because of the barrier that exists between restorative principles and the formal law which (alone) can secure those rights. In order to resolve this stalemate, Barton displaces debate about the "correct" location for the protection of rights (formal or informal law) with the discourse of *empowerment* and, in so doing, interrupts the (intrinsically unhelpful) dualistic construction of justice as being either retributive or restorative in nature. What is most important, he avers, is the manner in which participants are empowered to act, not where the source of empowerment lies. This solution takes debate into difficult essentialist questions, however, about the robustness of the

auspices under which those rights are ultimately legitimated. The solution is initially signaled in "observations" that, for example, the ethos of empowerment lies within a "quest for justice [that] must be as ancient as mankind" (p. xiii). Ultimately, such observations suggest that the realm of justice exists prior to language, in a quasi-transcendental zone wherein justice pre-exists the emergence of humanity (such that part of the human condition becomes the quest for "that" through which humankind might live with itself). Victims (like workers, women, and indigenous peoples in other theoretical frameworks) become the seers of that realm (that is, *justice*). It is as if they can actualize an intuitive dimension of subjectivity that exists prior to the differentiation of objectivity and subjectivity (as Dorothy Smith (1989, p. 38) refers to that realm), such that they can *know* what justice demands in their cases. To this end, the status of "victim" – when empowered through the law – becomes thoroughly naturalised.

The category of "victim" is, however, as cultural theorist Slavoj Zizek (1994, p. 213) notes, thoroughly ideological. It positions the "victim" in a subordinate position to the field of criminal justice expertise. As such, it is an ideological tool in the worst imaginable form because of the way in which the term appears to be totally beyond ideology, representing a morally pure mode of subjectivity that falls outside the remit of official description. Perniciously, however, it disables the ability of the "victim" to act in ways that lie outside the prevailing social conventions for "the wronged". It is for this reason, for example, that the women's movement has promoted the concept of "survivor" for those subject to domestic violence or child abuse rather than "victim". To be a *victim* is to be positioned. And arguments such as the above naturalise such positions (as well as the practice of positioning others), reinforcing prevailing relations between those who have been injured and those who haven't, such that the injured are positioned within an authorised set range of reactions to the injustice that they have experienced. As David Garland (1990, p. 139-40) notes, this administrative colonisation of victims' psychological responses results in an array of other intra-psychic problems. To this end, the ostensibly laudable recognition of "victims" has the potential to position survivors of crime in politically conservative ways that are psychologically disadvantageous.

The *naturalisation* of restorative justice also occurs as a consequence of

being subordinated to the gaze of empirical social science. State-sanctioned research into restorative justice has been largely empiricist in its form (emblematic of this is Maxwell and Morris, 2001). Within such research, the recurring research questions posed of restorative justice have concerned the impact of its processes upon offending behaviour. Phrased differently, the goal of such knowledge is to enhance the instrumentalist crime-controlling potential of restorative processes (as compared to its "restorative/healing" or socially transformative qualities). The cumulative effect of these studies is to locate restorative justice in an uncritical manner squarely within the remit of the state's security requirements. Reference to restorative justice, as a political social movement, becomes inimical to such discourse.[5] In this same vein, public policy on restorative justice supports *naturalisation* of the concept, further facilitating its governance by scientific means. New Zealand's Crime Prevention Unit in the Ministry of Justice[6], for example – which has been a principal sponsor of restorative projects – unsurprisingly locates its activities in "facilitating the crime prevention and community safety partnership and the development of specific crime prevention responses" (http://www.justice.govt.nz/cpu/intro/index.html). Moreover, the manner in which it does so is explicitly empiricist. Its primary "specific function" is to provide "*evidence-based* advice about what works in crime prevention" (emphasis added). Adding detail to such policy statements, Unit member Brian Webster (2000) unambiguously cites the reduction of offending behaviour and financial responsibility as the two criteria upon which the validity of any particular restorative group is to be determined.

That said, the forthcoming evaluation of the pilot programme (by the Criminology Unit of Victoria University) does seek to determine the degree to which the project resolves the effects of crime for victims and leaves them satisfied with the criminal justice process (Department for Courts,

5. Exceptions to this appraoch that have none-the-less emerged from similar structural locations include Tauri and Morris' (1997) paper on the relationship of popular (Maori) justice to law, though it does remain fully within the framework of orthodox legal theory. In a more subversive manner is Juan Tauri's (1999) work on the same issue.
6. The Unit was formerly located in the Prime Minister's Department.

2001b, pp. 2-3). It will be an important issue as to how the Department weighs these criteria relative to the more instrumentalist goal of reducing reoffending rates. As intimated above, though, the issue is less significant than it first appears because the very notion of "victim's satisfaction" is ideologically saturated and represents a subordinating political positioning of those affected by crime.

An additional ideological means through which established social relations are *reified* by credentialism is through their *eternalisation*. In the case of restorative justice, credentialism eternalises the notion of a singular Rule of Law. Credentialism stabilizes formal law at the very moment that law is required to incorporate movements – such as restorative justice – which have the potential to subvert its adjudicative and retributive ideologies. This need to acknowledge the popularity of such movements through their incorporation into official procedures produces a governance problem for formal law insofar as it must construct mechanisms through which its power can be devolved without an appreciable distortion occurring to that power. The credentialism of those to whom power is devolved – through either local protocols or a national framework – is one such mechanism. Others might include patronage-based systems between group members and key stakeholders. Credentialism is the bureaucratically preferred method, however, because it is less contingent upon personalities and can be measured for "efficiency". In this way the asymmetricity of the relationship between formal law and popular justice movements is preserved and the degree of that asymmetricity rendered calculable.

In summary, the credentialism of restorative justice functions as an ideological support for juridical integrity at a period in history when popular justice movements are challenging the hegemonic centralist conception of law. It does so through modes of ideology that legitimate existing social relations, that simultaneously unify and fracture those movements, that naturalise aspects of those movements in ways that render them useful for existing social relations, and that reify prevailing patterns of power. The significance of credentialism thereby reaches far beyond the immediate desires of restorative practitioners to bolster their official standing with key stakeholders.

The fantasmatic underpinnings of credentialism

The ideological dimensions of credentialism only work in so far as they resonate with widely held affective sentiments. Without that connection such an idea only remains an "optional notion" and, given its contestable value, is unstable. Instead, the success of credentialism is explicable in terms of the manner in which it finds widespread support in the psychical constitution of its audiences.

The favorable reception that an ideologically saturated idea such as credentialism receives appears to be the consequence of a widespread psychical structure, paranoia.[7] The distinguishing feature of societal paranoia of this genre is that the psychical structure has been normalised. Normalisation occurs as a consequence of the routine operations of diffuse hegemonic authorities, such as the legally constituted social order, that seek to minimise – if not eradicate – contingency from human interaction. The legally constituted order, for example, seeks to ensure a continuity between present and future by ensuring that change is always orderly (that is, rendered knowable) and that the social institutions charged with the responsibility for ordering social life (particularly law, science, and religion) remain structurally consistent. The future represents a foreboding entity whose substance perpetually resists reduction into the ideas in present use (that is, the symbolic realm). Like death, the future remains a compelling mystery – both pernicious and enticing, compellingly obscene.

In the terms suggested by Lacanian psychoanalysis, the abhorrent realm of contingency (in Lacan's terms, *the Real*) is kept at bay by institutions that manage contingency, such as law. The cost of this, however, is the

7. The use of the term here does not refer to a set of pathological symptoms.Rather, the condition is being refereed to here in the same manner in which Lacan approached the condition of hysteria, as a particular psychical structure (as outlined by Evans (1996, p. 78)). Indeed, knowledge itself is paranoiac in form (p. 134). In order to "know" that which presently elides understanding, the subject must possess a cognitive architecture that is paranoiac in form. That is, the motivation to bring into consciousness that which is presently not understood is anxiety of a paranoiac type. To this end, a subject could be diagnosed as being paranoiac without exhibiting behavioural pathologies. In this same manner, a form of social life like post-Enlightenment culture could be interpreted as being paranoiac without the connotation that the condition is perniciously pathological.

normalization of a paranoiac condition throughout the social realm. Only a shared paranoiac state that perpetually seeks to render the unknown knowable can alloy the excruciating experience of an uncertain space such as *the future.*

This paranoiac condition – that also underpins the psychical impulse to credentialise – prevails only as far as it can be sustained in *pleasurably meaningful fantasies.* The discourses that support such practices (law, for example) are insufficient in themselves to account for the emotional energy that they "canalize and release" (Rustin, 1995, p. 234). For Lacan, as with Zizek, an enigmatic "substance" is responsible for the way in which some discourses "grip the minds of the masses" such that they become a "material force", as Stuart Hall (1983, p. 59) suggests in his own cognitivist interpretation of the phenomenon. That substance is *enjoyment* – the "traumatic kernel of ... being" (Zizek, 1994, p. 178). In order for a discourse to motivate, it must mesh with the audience's particular sources of motivation, their kernel(s) of enjoyment. Importantly, these kernels can only be known obliquely, through the fantasies that subjects use to negotiate their social worlds.

Such fantasies abound in a range of popular narratives that repeatedly hold out the promise of psychologically reassuring states such as *security, fulfillment,* and *love.* Narratives about security, for example, abound in social, cultural and political discourses as widespread as state-welfarism, religion, and "Safer Communities" policies. At a surface level such fantasies allay the plethora of fears that arise from the welter of ambient threats associated with contemporary social life (global warming, terrorism, genetic misadventure, nuclear accident/warfare, street crime, redundancy). To this end, they provide readily accessible narratives through which the omnipresent possibility of harm is occluded, enabling subjects to live their lives progressively.

For Zizek, (1994) popular fantasies such as these are only surface manifestations of more 'fundamental' fantasies (p. 178). These latter fantasies hold the key to thoroughgoing change as they represent an important way in which the subject is oriented towards that traumatic – though thoroughly ineffable – kernel of enjoyment that animates the subject as a living being.[8] Fundamental fantasies have substantial personal

consequences, as they lock subjects within set modes of response. The "traversal" of such fantasies enables subjects to partially transcend those set modes. They allow them to either gain some measure of "distance" from the fantasy through the metonymic development of ancillary discourses in and around the phantasm or (re)present established practices and modes of thought as compelling questions that incite responses in others.

A popular fantasy that is associated with credentialism is the sense that *a codified set of expectations will provide restorative justice practice with legitimacy.* This fantasy functions through a perception that credentialism operates as a mirror, reflecting to practitioners an idealised view of themselves as professionals. In the same way that the individual human being can see themselves only indirectly through images given by mirrors, photos, or the responses of others to them, so too can the practitioner only view their professional standing in an oblique manner through devices that are exterior to them. *Accreditation* to a set of national standards is a good example. Mirrors such as accreditation authenticate the professional standing of the practitioner, fostering other fantasies about esoteric qualities such as competence and integrity. Such fantasies are necessary for the proper functioning of subjects whose work roles routinely involve the casting of judgements in ambiguous situations (such as prevail in mediatorial settings). Without a self-perception of competence, the individual would be prevented from acting in such circumstances.

The point to be taken from psychoanalytic theory is that the basis for that sense of competence is exterior to the individual and remains in place only so long as that individual can see themselves reflected in that exterior body. Moreover, the desire that is enacted in the fantasy is *the Other's desire* (Zizek, 1994, p. 177), that is, the symbolic Master whose coherence is totally contingent upon the coherence of those it names. For example, the desire presently being expressed within restorative justice for recognised levels of competence is the Other's desire for the movement, especially that of Law. Expressed from the other direction, in order for Law to function it

8. In Lacanian terms, these "fundamental fantasies" are synonymous with *object petit a.*

must imbue popular justice with competency. It is for this reason that ideas such as credentialism and professionalism are as pertinent to formal law as to popular justice. Without "mirrors" such as credentialism, members are unable to "see themselves" as others desire them to be – in this case, competent practitioners engaged in an equal footing in the highly professionalised field of law.

A second of the popular fantasies that sustain credentialism is of the *ultimately consensual society.* It suggests that all parties to a dialogue will ultimately understand one another once the impediments which distort communication are removed. Phrased differently, it posits that *intersubjective understanding* is a very real possibility, a communicative norm that sustains visions of the progressive, consensual global community. Emblematic of this fantasy is Jürgen Habermas' notion of *communicative rationality.* This genre of fantasy suffers from a terminal problem, however, as Jacob Torfing (1999) outlines, that it masks the "failure of the social to constitute an all-encompassing space of representation" (p. 11). In other words, the fantasy of intersubjective understanding erroneously assumes that the realm of knowing can fully correspond with actuality. Partial success in this quest for knowledge – such that we *do* come to know the truth about some aspects of social life – is routinely misread as signaling the possibility of full epistemic clarity. In contrast, following Zizek, belief in the possibility of intersubjective understanding is never anything more than a phantasmatic wish (Zizek, 1997, pp. 8-10). The possibility of full and final intersubjective understanding exists, therefore, only as an ideological artifact of conservative relations of rule, a fantasy of power.

Conjecturally speaking, the form that the popular fantasies around restorative justice take suggest that the movement is underpinned by a deeper and collectively held fundamental fantasy that is *hysteric* in structure. Hysteria, for Lacan is, again, a psychic structure over and above a set of pathological symptoms. It refers to the manner in which the structure of a subject's desire is given by the Other, arising as a consequence of the subject's strong identification with that Other in their quest to create a meaningful life (Evans, 1996, p. 79). With regard to restorative justice, the notion of a hysteric structure explains how the movement has sought to appropriate the law's (the Other's) fundamental desire – to be the Law of the Law[9], to

be in a position to authoritatively enunciate the terms of its own being and, thereby, of others.[10] It is this ability that then provides the assurance that it can complete difficult and socially significant tasks such as authorising particular responses to conflict.

Fantasies do more than support ideologies, however. They also subvert prevailing ideas. They channel energies that have been incited by phantasmatic discourses towards the undoing of those same discourses. For Zizek, this makes *fantasy* a highly significant realm for political intervention.[11] In Lacanian terms, progressive intervention involves a "traversal of the fantasy" upon which political and social aspirations are built. They create distance for us from "our most 'authentic' dreams" (Zizek, 1994, p. 82) such that the consistency which those dreams promise comes to be seen for what they are – no more than (necessary) fictions. The act of traversing the fantasy involves a self-conscious "overidentification" with the fantasy such that the act of parodying the fantasy denudes its "efficiency" (pp. 71-2). Thus, by bringing the fantasy to awareness and bursting asunder its organising structure through the deliberate accentuation of its central features, the subject is enabled to continue their flirtation with the fantasy but on terms that recognize its thoroughgoing contingency and, thus, malleability. Rather than being simple parody, however, acts of traversal self-consciously portray problematic practices and beliefs with such impassioned conviction that their representation forces public questioning about their meaning, in effect frustrating the system and in a way that simple imitation of those practices could not. By way of illustration Zizek gives the example of an ostensibly left-wing Slovenian post-punk band (*Laibach*) that religiously conveyed right-wing nationalist messages in the moment of socialism's disintegration. They functioned "*not*

9. A term coined by Douzinas, Goodrich, and Hachamovitch (1994).
10. Indeed, this was the basis of Foucault's (1972) criticism of Maoist popular justice. In Lacanian terms, the Maoists failed to recognise the hysteric nature of their fundamental fantasy, instantiated in their passion to appropriate the desire of the Other through identifying with them. As a consequence, the Maoists, in Foucault's view thereby reproduced the elemental aspects of formal legality in the resurrection of basic icons of rule, such as the table. The same can now be said of restorative justice in those of its guises where it desires to be a full theory of justice (on this point refer to Roach (2000)).
11. For further elaboration of this point, refer to Rustin's (1995, pp. 234-6) clear exposition.

as an answer but as a question" (p. 72. Original emphasis), undermining the conservative discourses that were gaining influence.

The possibility for traversal emerges from Hegelian dialectical insight into the manner in which all entities are made up of competing forces and dynamics (Zizek, 1999, pp. 227-32). The issue of *power* is instructive here. The conditions of existence for any exercise of power (legal, for example) are always given within itself and involve an "inherent transgression" of that power, involving a form of self-censure that simultaneously strengthens and critiques that exercise of power (Zizek, 1997, p. 26). These "conditions of existence" are instantiated in fantasies that occlude the dismembering effects of that power's exercise. A good example of this is the manner in which law's exacerbation of conflict (thought its positioning of parties as antagonists) is elided by fantasies about law's superlative power to resolve disputes (as highlighted by Moore and McDonald, 2000, pp. 27-29). Such fantasies function through popular, emotionally appealing images of communal unity and, moreover, of desires for "the Other's desire". Importantly, they simultaneously resist the subject's urge to become the object of the Other's pleasure. Emblematic of this is the desire of restorative justice to become "the law" without becoming "law-like". Significantly, these fantasies incite the exercise of juridical power by causing it to attend to and police that which it stands against – precisely, *disorder*. That "disorder" is a realm of vague and ambient threat that exists to the exercise of power, which – tautologically – must be held to exist in order that the strong unification impulse of the fantasy can be substantiated. To this end, power is radically decentred, divided against itself even before it incites "the actualised other" that arises in resistance (Zizek, 1997, p. 26). Indeed, this *virtual mode of transgression* inhabits the fantasmatic architecture of every ideological position.

"Inherent transgression", as discussed, fuels counterhegemonic activity. It is the source of affective energy through which the dispossessed are enabled to rise in resistance. Without it, arguments in support of resistance remain mere "alternative discourses", with no affective pull on their audience. As will become evident below, the discourse of credentialism – as circulates in New Zealand restorative justice circles – already displays its own inherent transgression, providing possibilities for the progressive

counter-hegemonic traversal of the fantasies that sustain it.

To summarise, a range of vectors intersect *credentialism* and give it form. Variously, these include the terms through which centralized power can be legitimately devolved, the ideological terms through which credentialism supports centralised power at the very moment in which power is contested, and the fantasmatic terms through which the quest to standardise life is rendered pleasurably meaningful. Our argument here is that the implications of credentialism reach far beyond pragmatist questions about the apposite way to devolve judicial power. Rather, the ideological and fantasmatic dimensions of credentialism highlight the manner in which the practice supports established relations of rule, primarily, the primacy of a singular conception of legal authority.

The implications of credentialism

The instrumentalist tenor that is evident in the ideological dimensions of credentialism has long been the norm within criminal justice (Garland, 1990). As such, it is unsurprising that the more involved restorative justice becomes with the formal administration of justice the more likely it is that it will be exposed to the instrumentalist impulse. As Jantzi (2001) portends, this is a likely outcome for the restorative justice movement given that most groups require State support in order to survive.[12]

Fueling this tendency for the State to supervise popular justice is a prevailing perception that the field of conflict resolution comprises a continuum of approaches and that formal law possesses key characteristics (such as objective rationalism) that are most suitable for evaluating the other forms of conflict resolution. In contrast to this idea, conflict resolution can also reasonably be viewed as a diffuse field that operates through a variety of interests, rights and norms (Picard and Saunders, forthcoming). The diversity of these underpinning auspices (of various interests, rights and norms) is masked, however, when mechanisms are developed for regulating conflict resolution. The key issue at stake is the stymieing effect that these

12. It is Jantzi's hope, however, that a balance can be struck between State imperatives and those of the restorative movement. This paper does not share the same functionalist expectancy.

regulatory regimes have on the "transformative, empowering and communatarian" ethos of mediatorial responses to conflict (forthcoming). This is particularly pertinent given the instrumental nature of the State's present gaze on restorative justice. Indeed, the very notion of regulating a transformative response to conflict seems an oxymoron, having the potential to calcify mediation practice around a narrow range of expectations and thereby diminishing the very notion of *transformation*.

From a Lacanian perspective this is to be expected. In so far as the general field of conflict resolution is sustained by a fantasy of communality that perpetually "transgresses itself" (such that it presupposes a field of disorder), the fantasy of communality (that is, law) must assert itself. The outcome of this is that approaches which actively utilise the concept of contingency – such as "transformative conflict resolution" – are marginalised in favour of those that create closure around conflict. This happens in spite of the recognition that is routinely given to the less tangible social benefits that accrue from mediatorial approaches, such as the teaching of conflict resolution skills to participants (Bush and Folger, 1994), the healing of damaged relationships (Consedine, 1995), the transformation of intra-subjective perspectives (Winslade and Monk, 2000), and the transformation of wider patterns of social relations (Lederach, 1997).

The implications of this reassertion of law go far beyond the immediate arena in which credentialism is being proffered (in this instance, of restorative justice). Rather, the implications extend into the wider mediatorial and peacebuilding movements, where models of governance developed for particular fields of activity (such as restorative justice) have the potential to become blueprints for the regulation of other sites of mediation practice. These blueprints travel through time as sets of expectation about the value of particular styles of mediation and of their outcomes. Fields of mediation that value decisive outcomes, such as criminal justice, have the potential to reproduce those same expectations in ancillary fields, thereby eviscerating the value of approaches that emphasize social and cultural transformation rather than smaller-scale calculable results. Indeed, this was the case within the North American popular justice movement in the 1970s and 1980s, when both socio-legal academics and lawyers criticized the movement for reasons that were associated with law-

related issues rather than those allied with social transformation (Picard and Sanderson, forthcoming). Within the contemporary New Zealand context, this same issue will emerge in future years in light of the close (though contentious) connection that has developed between criminal justice and education-related mediation practices and policies.

In summary, at stake beyond the construction of restorative justice as a governable space is thus a wider concern that its regulation might foster "the control, appropriation, and conquest" of the wider mediation movement by professionalised justice (Picard and Sanderson, forthcoming). The major concern is that those mediatorial approaches will likewise be cannibalised for their less meaningful and more profitable aspects, such as the production of "robust resolutions". In the process, their potentially more productive dimensions – such as the transformation of the terms upon which destructive social conflicts are played out – are marginalised in light of their unprofitable, unquantifiable, and relatively unruly nature.

Traversing the fantasies

It is evident from the argument presented in this paper that a nationalised form of credentialism – through which restorative justice practitioners are accredited by a national body on the basis of a range of criteria relating to qualifications and transparency of practice – has questionable ideological implications. Namely, national forms of credentialism have the potential to uncritically strengthen an adjudicative conception of law at the very time at which that image of legality is legitimately being challenged by the very practices that are being credentialised. Put another way, national credentialism has the capacity to seriously erode the "social movement" dimension of restorative justice. Moreover, it supports – again in an unintended manner – a series of popular fantasies through which the adjudicative conception of law functions, namely the fantasies of subjective integrity and intersubjective understanding. In the same vein, therefore, the national credentialism of restorative justice stands to bolster the very image of legality that restorative justice *as social movement* has the potential to critique in a socially useful and sustained manner.

Notwithstanding these questionable ideological implications, credentialism does have the potential to provide restorative justice

practitioners with a form of legitimacy that is difficult to achieve through other means. From a Lacanian perspective progress can be made on this point by identifying the fundamental fantasies that structure the movement towards its own "traumatic kernel of enjoyment" and, then, by traversing them. To this end, benefits associated with credentialism might be gained in a manner that displaces the problematic ideological implications of accreditation.

By way of illustration, this paper suggests that something akin to an elemental *hysteric* fantasy might well filter the movement's self-perceptions. As a consequence of this, the restorative movement identifies with the same general discursive fields that law inhabits (such as *conflict resolution, peace, social authority,* and *legal theory*) and, to this end, seeks to credentialise its practitioners in keeping with the manner in which it has come to reflect the desires of law.[13] At the same time as taking on the desires of law, restorative justice resists becoming the object of law's desire (that is, becoming totally incorporated by and, thus, synonymous with law) because incorporation would signal the existence of a primal inability on the part of the restorative paradigm to compete with law upon its own (accusatory, adjudicative) terms. Indeed, incorporation would "open the wound of privation" that lies at the heart of the hysteric condition (Evans, 1996, p. 71).

Under these conditions, the goal of progressive socio-legal intervention is to traverse the hysteric fantasy. In do doing, the restorative justice movement identifies with the law (through taking a decision to credentialise) but does so in a manner that subverts the totalising fantasies through which law operates (of unity and closure). Two possible pathways exist for doing so, one more moderate than the other. In the more limited sense, the movement could employ credentialist models that resist closure. In this way the restorative movement dismisses itself from the pursuit of ultimate authority (that being a primary characteristic of the accusatory legal paradigm) and in so doing alleviates the movement's relative sense of impotence before the law by undermining law's totalising impulse. This would have the effect of breaking the hysteric bind that the restorative

13. In this vein, Roach (2000) outlines the manner in which restorative legal theory, like orthodox legal theory, has now taken on the form of a unified, totalising paradigm.

movement finds itself in with respect to formal law, by placing responsibility with the movement for the manner in which its relationship to the formal administration of justice evolves.

Models of credentialism that could achieve this – that take contingency as a core organizing principle – are always already assumed by the legal paradigm, being the spectral "other" against which the regulating impulse of legalese is pitted. Emblematic of these might be *localised protocols that are aligned with a national set of guidelines*. At an immediate level, these guidelines could alert local groups to the issues involved in negotiating with an institution that has immensely greater social and political resources. At an ideological level, more significantly, a national movement that exists only in an unofficial sense (as does the restorative movement) – but which has sufficient standing to issue guidelines for action by its affiliates – cannot easily be calcified into a set of characteristics through which it can subsequently be regulated (as would be the case with the other main option, that of a legally incorporated national association that has responsibility for credentialising its members). To this end, a *national set of guidelines for the development of local restorative justice protocols* has the potential to traverse (in a moderate manner) the fantasies that sustain credentialism.

Alternatively, and in a more thorough-going act of traversal, the movement could deliberately *overidentify* with the image of credentialism being touted by the formal administration, with the goal of frustrating the administration's control of the process through which the movement and its practitioners are shaped and optimised for performance. This approach subverts the presupposition embedded within the former option, that sustained dialogue will necessarily produce outcomes that are mutually beneficial for both parties. Instead, it assumes that intersubjective misunderstanding is more likely to prevail and, with this in mind, it structures the relationship between the movement and key justice stakeholder as a series of interactions that will render problematic the "ownership" of the process. Empirical proof of "success" in this strategy might be the emergence of criticisms that the enthusiasm of the movement is displacing the authority of established constellations of administrative interest. Indeed, such a criticism (of over-exuberance) would suggest that the movement was indeed taking the issue very seriously.

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The "Maiden Stakes": Ritual and Rhetoric as Masks of Political Diversity in First-time Political Speeches.

Su Olsson and Marianne Tremaine

Abstract

In the New Zealand Parliament the change from a First Past the Post electoral system to Mixed Member Proportional Representation (MMP) constitutes an attempt to counteract the politics of exclusion. The MMP system balances the largely conservative candidate selection in the electorates with party list candidates who tend to be more diverse in background, ethnicity and gender. For all successful, first-time candidates, the official debut is their maiden speech to parliament. This paper analyses the three maiden speeches that achieved news coverage from the first sitting in 2000 of the second New Zealand MMP parliament. Drawing on dramatistic and role criticism, we examine how ritual and rhetoric function as masks, that both contain and exploit the speaker's political diversity. Finally, we explore the paradox that the news coverage of the "maiden stakes" selects and celebrates diversity within the exclusivist rituals of political theatre.

Introduction: the parliamentary context

The New Zealand parliamentary chamber is the country's foremost venue for political debate and speechmaking. Conventions and ritual surround parliamentary procedure. At the beginning of a parliamentary career, new members have the opportunity to create a first impression in an uninterrupted 15 minutes of a maiden speech. In February 2000, *Hansard* (the verbatim written record of Parliament) lists 21 maiden speech-givers. Media coverage is an important and contested prize for these entrants in the maiden stakes and may affect their political futures.

The current term of Parliament is the second when MPs have been elected under a new system, which gives voters two votes – one for the person to represent their electorate, the other for the party they support. Consequently, parliament consists of a combination of two types of MPs; those who have been voted in by their electorates, as well as those who are

list MPs and have come into the House because of their ranking on their party's list. This system of Mixed Member Proportional representation (MMP) has balanced the largely conservative candidate selection process in electorates with the list MPs selected by the party tending to be much more diverse in background, ethnicity and gender. In this way MMP has increased the proportion of women and Maori and has resulted in a number of "firsts", including the first Pacific Island woman MP and the first Asian woman MP. In addition to the two major parties, Labour and National, MMP has also enabled the representation of five minor parties: the ACT party; New Zealand First; Alliance party; the Greens; and United. In empowering these diverse voices, MMP constitutes an attempt to counteract the politics of exclusion, which had come to dominate the earlier First Past the Post electoral system. At the same time, the ritual and conventions of the Parliamentary chamber function to mould successful candidates to the mandates of an exclusionist, though often unruly, forum. In this sense, the rules and rituals of parliamentary speech-making inscribe and nullify would-be diversity.

This paper analyses the three maiden speeches that achieved news coverage from the first sitting in 2000 of the second MMP parliament. Two of the three place-getters in the "maiden stakes" had already achieved some media coverage in the run-up to the election because of their diversity or "newsworthiness", and all three represent a challenge to the conservative candidate selection processes. The three speeches are those given by the first transsexual MP, Georgina Beyer, the first Rastifarian MP, Nandor Tanczos, and long-time activist for the rights of the unemployed, Sue Bradford. Tanczos and Bradford are list members of the Green Party (left), and Beyer is an elected MP of the Labour Party (centre left). Although the vast majority of maiden speeches gain very little media attention, all three of the MPs whose speeches have been chosen for analysis gained coverage in both print and television media.

Drawing on dramatistic and role criticism, we examine how ritual and rhetoric function as masks, that both exploit and contain the speaker's diversity. We show how these masks contribute to a political persona or "character" by employing verbal strategies and images, which align each speaker with archetypes of leadership: the performer or "chosen one"; the

priest of the people and defender of youthdem; and the protestor or "scarred warrior". Finally, we point to the paradox that news coverage of the "maiden stakes" selects and celebrates diversity, but only within the limitations of the exclusivist rituals of political theatre.

The maiden stakes: ritualised theatre

Maiden speeches constitute a form of political speaking that brings together text, performer and audience in the theatre of a political debut within the parliamentary chamber. Ritual determines both the structure and the dramatic constraints of the performance. The Speaker of the House announces the new member, their party affiliation, and their electorate (if relevant), and then calls upon the member to address the House. In turn, the debut member acknowledges the Speaker, claims their party membership, and pays tribute to significant others, including those who have shaped or contributed to their political career (Horn, Leniston & Lewis, 1983; McGee, 1994). The speaker engages in a positioning of self in respect to a party, a specific constituency and the wider New Zealand public. In so doing, the speaker also positions him or herself within the traditions of parliamentarians as leaders of the country. The "maiden stakes" are the first official step in the leadership stakes of a political career. Within these constraints the drama of the text (the words uttered in the chamber and reproduced in Hansard, on party websites and in the media) comes from the speaker's rhetoric or verbal strategies.

Most immediately, ritual and rhetoric combine in the speaker's creation of a political persona. The term "persona" was originally "the Latin word for the mask used by actors in the classical theatre, from which was derived the term dramatis personae for the list of characters who play a role in the drama" (Abrams, 1988, p. 135). In literary criticism "persona" has come to refer to the first-person narrator, or the "I" of literary work. Cherry (1997) suggests that the term now extends to the distinctive image of self, created within other forms of speaking performance and role:

> The term persona gradually acquired other meanings beyond its intitial meaning of 'theatrical' mask, among them the notion of 'role', both in a dramaturgical sense and in the broader sense of a social role.

While persona describes the individual image-making and particular political role adopted within a maiden speech, it also retains connotations of the public mask of the speaker. Hart (1997) makes the point that person cannot be equated with persona: "The former is hidden within layers of self-hood while the latter is presented for public inspection" (p. 212).

More particularly, the positioning of a political persona within the rituals of parliamentary leaders involves drawing upon leadership as archetype. Abrams (1988) defines archetypes as "narrative designs, character types, or images" (p. 201), which occur within a wide diversity of phenomena from works of literature to modes of social behaviour. Archetypes of leadership consist of images and patterns within the representation of a particular character or persona, which seem to be elemental and universal to the nature of leaders (Abrams, 1988). The effective embodiment of these images not only provokes a profound response in the audience or reader, but also situates the political persona within the wider cultural and discursive history of leadership. As Sinclair (1998) points out, "An archetype of leadership is not a style which is a reflection of an individual personality, but a social construction" (p. 31). In drawing upon leadership as archetype, a political persona attempts to tap into cultural and subconscious images and expectations of leadership.

The audience constitutes the final element of ritualised theatre. Audience members accord ethos or source credibility to the presented persona. In other words, the audience assigns "motive" and assesses the "personal character" and leadership qualities of the speaker (Abrams, 1988, p.135) on the basis of the public performance. While this process may be affected by both the speaker's previous reputation and the party affiliation, it is the persuasive power of the speaker's oratory that determines the extent to which the audience reacts by either rejecting or accepting and collaborating in the social construction of the presented persona. Ethos or source credibility is based on how the audience evaluates three major aspects of the speaker's character: "trustworthiness, expertise, and dynamism" (Brooks & Heath, 1989, p. 215).

Understanding the "maiden stakes" as ritualised theatre reveals how the interrelated components (of drama, character and audience expectations of leadership) function to contain, control, and to some extent "homogenise"

the identity (Salzer-Morling, 1998) of both conservative and non-conservative new members. In this way, ritual contributes to a mask, which contains and limits diversity and renders it part of an exclusivist tradition. Diversity is nullified to become "safe" and non-threatening through being accepted and subsumed into the stylised ritual of parliamentary procedure and a parliamentary "persona".

An analytical approach to rhetoric in speech making

While ritual contains the structure of the "maiden stakes," rhetoric constitutes the speaker's choices of specific verbal strategies. This paper draws on two interrelated approaches to the analysis of rhetoric in speech making, one drawn from dramatistic criticism, one from role criticism.

Dramatistic criticism focuses on the rhetorical devices of the drama: "Through rhetoric . . . life becomes a choice among dramatic scenarios" (Hart, 1997, p. 266). The dramatic scenario involves two main principles. The principle of hierarchy poses the central questions and conflict of the drama, using overstatement to both persuade and goad an audience, "inspiring us with the Highest Highs, frightening us with the Lowest Lows" (Hart, 1997, p. 268). For example, a speech which depicts the growing gap between rich and poor in New Zealand, plays upon the hierarchy to point to the "Lowest Lows" of ignoring the poverty trap. The second principle of transcendence provides the answers to the central questions of the drama. To continue the previous example, a speaker might suggest that by giving the government a mandate to redress the poverty gap in New Zealand, the voters are involved in righting the wrongs of previous, less enlightened governments. In other words, they are doing something important or "transcending" their ordinary concerns. In providing answers or at least the promise of transcendence, the speaker positions him or herself as a leader of the people who, with their mandate, will right current wrongs.

These principles of hierarchy and transcendence are developed within the line-up of significant symbols to produce the conflict at the centre of the drama. The basic plot often involves an opposition of good and evil and may scapegoat a particular group, movement or idea (Hart, 1997). Thus analysis of plot, imagery and representative anecdotes reveals the specific rhetorical strategies a speaker uses in the construction of the drama.

Role criticism focuses on the speaker's persona within the drama. As Hart (1997) points out, "Rhetoric requires the speaker to make choices in self-presentation" (p. 215). These choices include but go beyond role, to constitute the persona or self-portrait the speaker presents. The distinction is a fine one. For example, a political speaker may be recognised in the role of Agent by "spouting the party line" but also be adjudged as "a leader for all that" on the basis of his/her persona.

A major means of examining the creation of persona is by looking at the speaker's self-references or I statements in the text. Hart (1997) claims: "I statements are particularly important . . . because they index a person's feeling and ambitions in especially prominent ways" (p. 255). Goffman (1981) also points out that as speakers:

> We represent ourselves through the offices of a personal pronoun, typically 'I' and it is thus a *figure* – a figure in a statement – that serves as the agent, a protagonist in a *described* scene, a 'character' in an anecdote . . . . (p. 147)

In other words, linked to I statements is the speaker's positioning of self within imagery, themes and drama. An analysis of these aspects of the rhetoric, reveals both how and the extent to which the speaker draws on archetypal tropes of leadership. In a discussion of business executives, Streyer (1998) suggests leadership is "operationalised" through four "decidedly masculine" archetypes: the father, the hero, the saviour, and the king. The most appropriate of these for fledgling politicians are variants on the hero and the saviour. While such choices in self-presentation contribute to the persona, they are also appeals to social collaboration in that they seek to tap subconscious images of leadership that evoke deep responses in the audience.

While self-references are significant to an analysis of the persona, Beason (1991) argues that they also constitute "the appeal to ethos (also called the 'ethical appeal')" (p. 326). In other words, they form rhetorical strategies through which the speaker attempts to gain credibility with an audience. At the level of archetype, self-references are appeals to social collaboration in that they seek to tap subconscious images of leadership that evoke deep responses in the audience. At the level of personal character, Beason (1991)

calls self-references "signalled ethos" and he delineates five categories that emerged in a rhetorical analysis of business speeches: "The categories are based on five character traits: deference, self-criticism, similitude, expertise and the inclination to succeed" (p. 327). The appeal to deference involves the speaker's respect for the rights, capabilities, values and feelings of the audience. For example, when the speaker uses phrases such as "In my opinion", "As I see it", "I would like to", he/she acknowledges other possible views or alternatives may exist for the audience and, in so doing, seeks to enhance the credibility the audience accords his/her persona. Self-criticism suggests the honesty of the speaker. Similitude is the attempt to establish similarities between speaker and audience and often includes the use of the first person plural pronoun "we" to establish a sense of community. Expertise includes qualifications and/or first-hand experience. Finally, signalled appeals to the inclination to succeed draw upon past histories of success and/or forecasts of success, which are implicitly extended to and include the audience (Beason, 1991). Often the appeals work in tandem. For example, the speaker may establish community through the appeal to similitude, coupled with forecasting success for the community through the appeal to the inclination to succeed.

While Beason's (1991) five categories of signalled ethos attempt to gain credibility for the speaker's character, they also work both to support and to balance the speaker's leadership claims. These claims often involve elements of self-praise, a "blowing of one's own trumpet" that tends to be resisted in the New Zealand psyche. However, self-praise is mitigated by strategies such as similitude and deference, and supported when the audience is drawn into the speaker's vision through the appeal to the inclination to succeed.

Like ritual, rhetoric involves conventions and established strategies that contribute to the speaker's persona within the drama. At the same time, rhetoric enables the speaker's choices of self-presentation. In other words, rhetoric contributes to a mask that not only contains, but may also exploit social diversity.

In now turning to the three maiden speeches in the New Zealand parliament that achieved media coverage, we focus on the only speeches that gained coverage in Television news and current affairs bulletins. We

analyse the rhetorical strategies of the drama as these are constituted in the major symbols, imagery, plot, and representative anecdotes of each dramatic scenario. Within this scenario we examine the speaker's role and choices in self-presentation, including the appeals to ethos for character and leadership.

The maiden stakes

The three first place-getters in the maiden stakes, based on television coverage their maiden speeches gained in news bulletins, were Georgina Beyer, Nandor Tanczos and Sue Bradford. For somewhat different reasons, all three had already achieved the notice of the media before the election. Beyer, since 1993, had been the mayor for Carterton and part of the public speaking circuit. Part of her "newsworthiness", however, arose from the fact that she was the first transsexual mayor in New Zealand. Tanczos had come into prominence in the lead up to the election as a Rastifarian and an acknowledged advocate of the decriminalisation of marijuana. Part of his religious practice, he explained, involved the smoking of cannabis. Finally, Sue Bradford was a long-term activist for the rights of the unemployed who over the past couple of decades had featured on television news clips at the head of protests and demonstrations, talking doggedly to the camera and/or often being bundled away into a police van. Thus, all three had achieved, if not exactly initial "ethos", then certainly a media profile in the past. Moreover, previous parliamentary "firsts" arose from a mix of ethnographic and demographic factors – for example, the first Pacific Island woman MP and the first Asian woman MP. However, Beyer, Tanczos, and Bradford represent social diversity through their membership and/or association with marginalized social groups: transsexuals, Rastifarians and the unemployed.

Georgina Beyer: performer, "modest hero" and "chosen one" of the people

In the immediate responses of the media, Georgina Beyer was the winner of the maiden stakes. Elected Labour party member in the new coalition government, Beyer was also at the time of speaking still the Mayor of Carterton. What dominated the media coverage of her speech, however, was neither her party politics nor her local government experience, but

rather her position as first transsexual MP in the world and her consummate performance and sense of comic timing. While this response implicitly acknowledged the dynamism of Beyer's performance, scant attention was given to her leadership claims.

The central dramatic scenario and keynote of Beyer's speech consists of the triumph over adversity. Within this dramatic scenario, Beyer establishes the role of the performer, in two senses of the word. She is the performer in terms of the party political and leadership qualities she constitutes in the text, including archetypal images of the modest "hero" and the "chosen one" of the people. She is also the performer as entertainer through the creation and public delivery of her speech.

In her opening statement, Beyer introduces the key themes of triumph and leadership through her acknowledgement of the Labour Party Leader and new Prime Minister, Helen Clark, "who led the current Government to victory on 27 November last year". Beyer aligns her own political aspirations with Clark, combining the inclination to succeed with deference: "She (Clark) is a woman whom I have admired and I aspire to at least have the political nous to be able to be half as good as she is. I certainly hope that will be the case."

Central to the verbal strategies of Beyer's speech is the construction of an engaging persona. She uses a massive 88 "I" statements in the fifteen minute speaking time and also makes use of the first person possessive case to point to "my experience", "my involvement", "my priority", my tenure", "my electorate". This strategy not only uses self-disclosure to suggest the honesty of Beyer's feelings and "motives"; it also makes Beyer's persona the focus of a dramatic scenario centred around leadership. Hart (1997) states: "Speakers who use a great many self-references hint strongly that a special persona is being created in the texts they produce" (p. 229). Beyer balances archetypal tropes of the "hero" with flashes of deference and humour that balance her claims of leadership.

A disarming mitigation of self-praise occurs in the ritualised establishment of credentials after the initial greetings of the speech. Beyer declares her, impeccable in political terms, descent from four Maori iwi or tribes, then adds with a touch of laconic humour that undercuts ritual, "and that should be quite enough for anyone I would have thought!" Images of

leadership and aroha are merged as Beyer acknowledges the importance of her heritage: "The strength and aroha that I hope to bring to this House will be forged from those heritage and whakapapa links". But the theme of leadership begins to dominate as Beyer names her mentors. She aligns herself with two major women leaders of the past, one Pakeha, one Maori. Sonja Davies, former MP and "New Zealand icon" is Beyer's political mentor. And the late woman leader in the te reo (Maori language) movement, Hana Te Hemera, Beyer's cousin, "though she liked me to call her 'aunty'", is described as both mentor and support in all Beyer's past ventures. With the acknowledgement of her cousin, Beyer first introduces the metaphor of "times of adversity", but delays developing this strand of the dramatic scenario.

Instead Beyer continues the theme of leadership through tropes of the "hero" by fore-fronting the Labour party and her personal triumph in the Wairarapa electorate. This is imaged as *"a stunning victory"* in the combative political arena, and the extent of the victory is explicitly mentioned, "a 32 percent swing to the Labour Party this time round". For the first time, Beyer uses "we" to signal similitude and membership of her party, "but also we won the party vote". This achievement is underlined as "quite remarkable" in the rural heartland considered to be "a stronghold for National".

The converse of victory, however, is defeat. Typical of Beyer's strategy is the use of humour to defuse the conflict of political combat and to suggest both past and present cooperation with the vanquished Wyatt Creech across party lines. She does this by playing on the word "member" in one of the most quoted and televised moments of the speech:

> But I must pay acknowledgement to my former member, the Rt Hon. Wyatt Creech. I have had reason to work with him in my capacity as mayor of one of the Wariarapa districts, Carterton. We have had an amicable relationship, and I certainly hope I shall do my best, and his best has assisted me to get where I am today. I say that in a loving way.

Similitude and identification with her electoral community are employed, as Beyer develops the theme of the hero's triumph over adversity and her emerging leadership role. The principles of hierarchy and transcendence both underpin Beyer's account of her personal journey from her arrival in

Carterton "unemployed and in receipt of a training benefit" in 1991 to her second term re-election as Mayor with a 90 percent majority in 1998. This triumph is set within the context of the community she identifies with. The adversity faced by low-income people and those on benefits after the "devastating" effects of the 1991 budget initiated Beyer's move into politics. She depicts this as a form of community transcendence: "The spirit of the community is one that makes sure that in the hardest of times people pull together and in that togetherness they look for leadership among the people". Implicit in this rhetoric is the image of Beyer herself as the people's chosen one, counteracting any connotations of personal ambition. Instead, Beyer is the modest hero who dons armour to fight for her people: "I went out to bat for them as best I could to deal with the onslaught of the effects of those changes". This scenario sets the stage for Beyer's parliamentary career, her "advocacy of the people", and her at least "reluctant" and apparently modest leadership role as "chosen one" of the people: "Parliament seemed a natural progression in the eyes of others. I was not so sure, but I have now come to learn that I should be very sure of that".

In the final phases of the speech Beyer focuses on transcendence through appeals to the inclination to succeed. She mentions New Zealand's past history of success, "We lead the way for women getting the vote". She mentions the firsts of the new Parliament, the first Rastifarian, the first Polynesian woman member, and almost incredibly, but adroitly she positions her own diversity as the highpoint and climax of these firsts:

> And, yes, I have to say it, I guess, the first transsexual to be standing in this House of Parliament. This is a first not only in New Zealand, ladies and gentlemen, but also in the world. This is a historic moment.

Again, the engaging and conciliatory persona balances the rhetoric of leadership as Beyer reverts to humour and draws attention back to her role as Performer in the sense of entertainer:

> I was once quoted as saying: 'This is a stallion who became a gelding, and now is a mayor.' I suppose I have to say I have now found myself to be a member! I have come full circle, so to speak – not that I wish to be degrading in this House in any way, but I understand that a sense of humour is welcome. I hope that members will enjoy

my sense of humour from time to time.

Any possible artifice attaching to the role of entertainer is dispersed in an appeal to the trustworthiness, genuineness and good will of Beyer's persona, which, nevertheless, points to the brilliance of both her rhetoric and her performance: "People were concerned that I did not have a written speech. I find it difficult. I have to speak from the heart, and I have to be genuine about that".

While the analysis of Beyer's text cannot encompass the non-verbal features of the performance, it points to the deceptive simplicity of her use of rhetoric. She constructs a dramatic scenario of triumph over adversity, which celebrates her role as political performer and chosen leader. She draws on the principles of hierarchy and transcendence creating a sense of cooperation and community through the appeals to similitude and the inclination to succeed. Throughout the focus is always on Beyer, the Performer and the presentation of a public persona that is both engaging and disarming. But perhaps the overwhelming "triumph" of her use of rhetoric lies in the way she depicts social diversity as part of the criteria for leadership. The mask both contains and exploits diversity.

Nandor Tanczos: priest of the people and defender of youthdem

Nandor Tanczos is another first, the "dreaded Rastifarian" (NZTV 3) complete with dreadlocks. He came into Parliament as a list MP and the Green party spokesperson for justice. However, media interest before Tanczos' maiden speech centred primarily on whether or not he would smoke cannabis in Parliament. Aligned to this was the buzz surrounding Tanczos' announced intention to have a suit made from hemp especially for his political debut.

What dominated the initial media coverage of his speech was the dramatic opening in which Tanczos let down his previously pinned up locks, tossed them back, and intoned the words: "Greetings in the name of the creator the most High Jah Rastafari". While his ecopolitics and restorative justice were also mentioned, they were almost secondary to his youthful following in the gallery, and the human interest story of his mother and father (his father had suffered a heart attack the week before) flying from England to be present at their son's political debut.

The central dramatic scenario of Tanczos' speech is the battle of the forces of hope and community against the forces of destruction in the world. Within this scenario Tanczos positions himself as priest of the people, a variant of the "saviour" archetype that is initiated by turning the opening ritual of acknowledgements into the chanted litany of a prayer through the repetition of "greetings". An excerpt demonstrates the church-like rhetoric:

> I give greetings to the earth that sustains all life and to the sea that surrounds us.
> I greet this house that has watched over so many important decisions.
> I greet the spirits that guide and protect.
> I greet the guardians of this area – Te Whanganui a Tara.

In all Tanczos presents 14 repetitions of greetings that include the Speaker of the House, the immediate and radio audience, friends and supporters, his partner and his parents.

Tanczos' rhetoric reflects the function of his role as preacher to develop a sermon on the redemption of the world's evils. The promise of transcendence though the restoration of community and of balance dominates the depiction of hierarchy in the drama. Hart (1997) suggests, "Rhetoric has transcendent themes because people want to feel . . . . that they are rising above the ordinary...meeting these needs turns rhetoric into a kind of secular prayer" (p. 269). Tanczos begins with the rhetoric of transcendence: "We live in exciting times. As human beings we face the greatest challenge yet in the history of our species".

Within the dramatic scenario Tanczos' role dominates in his public persona. In contrast to Beyer, Tanczos uses 35 "I" statements, 14 of which are in the opening litany. Instead, he establishes similitude and identification through the use of 38 "we" statements, which underlines his major theme of community and implicitly positions him as a messiah.

The conflict of the drama opposes individualism to community. Tanczos aligns the profit motive of short-term self-interest with both "ecological devastation" and "social destruction". Perhaps unwittingly, Tanzcos implies his role as messiah in his depiction of the failure of governments and business leaders to deal with these problems: "For them it has been business as usual – taking their cues from their Roman predecessors". Against the forces of destruction, which have resulted in the "despair" of many and

the so-called "apathy among young people", Tanczos presents the vision of a promised land, not in the next world, but in the concept of EcoNation Aotearoa as the "spearhead of a global ecological evolution". The rhetoric is that of the preacher.

The core theme of EcoNation Aotearoa is the restoring of balance, not only between people and the land, but "in all our relationships". Within this thematic framework, Tanczos specifies the key platforms of the Green vision for New Zealand. He prioritises honouring of the Treaty of Waitangi as the mandate for both Maori and Pakeha to live in harmony and supports the recogniton of "Tino Rangatiratanga" or Maori sovereignty. He refutes the argument that there can not be one law for Maori and one law for Pakeha by condemning the present principles of hierarchy inherent in both legal and economic systems: "We have always had one law for Maori and one for Pakeha. That split has often coincided with one law for rich and one law for poor". He calls for a restorative justice system that involves the community. And he urges the adoption of policies that will lead to a prosperous EcoNation. These policies include "organic farming", an ethos of "buy local", and a focus on small businesses and family farmers as the "backbone of the economy". Against these policies is the threat of transnational corporations and agreements that take away from communities "the right to make decisions for themselves", This conflict sustains the drama throughout the speech.

At key points in the speech, Tanczos uses rhetorical questions to moderate his declarations of the collective guilt attaching to the wrongs of the past and present. Hart (1997) defines the rhetorical question as "a declarative statement taking a (falsely) interrogative form" the function of which "generates a sense of commonality between speaker and listener via imagined dialogue" (p.151). A representative example occurs in Tanzcos' defence of young people: "If the yout'dem were not used as a scapegoat for all the social ills brought about by the conduct of the previous generations would they not behave in a more respectful way?" The sense of "commonality" works to acknowledge and so to purify the guilt of the false "scapegoating" of the young, while drawing listeners to consider the benefits of righting this wrong.

Tanczos ends by circling back to the beginning of the "sermon" to

provide a statement of faith together with the prophetic rhetoric of a warning:

> We do indeed face our biggest challenge yet in the history of our species. I have faith that we have the wisdom and the strength to meet it, but it is not yet decided. Take warning. It is said, 'Man disappears / But the mana of the land remains.'

In a very different way from Beyer, Tanczos creates a dramatic scenario that opposes hierarchy and evil with transcendence through community, in the vision of EcoNation Aotearoa. Where Beyer is the performer, Tanczos is equally dramatic in his role of priest. In the ritualised theatre of the maiden stakes, Tanczos' rhetoric constructs a secular prayer and a secular sermon that has its predecessors in the compelling rhetoric and emotional resources of American black preachers with their visions of a better way for their communities. Like Beyer, but through a very different persona, Tanczos constructs a political mask that both contains and exploits his diversity.

Sue Bradford: protestor and battle-scarred warrior of the powerless

Like Tanczos, Bradford entered the House as a list MP for the Green Party. Unlike Tanczos, she attracted little media attention in the lead-up to the elections. Nevertheless, Bradford had a media profile based on her past history as protestor. She was the third parliamentary newcomer to gain television news coverage and featured in brief clips that merely mentioned her impassioned plea for the unemployed.

In her speech, Bradford develops a comparable dramatic scenario to Tanczos of good and evil. In contrast to Tanczos, however, Bradford constructs a personalised and specific no-holds-barred attack on what she represents as "the rotten heart of the old system" in which she condemns exclusivity and challenges people "to work across party lines" to right current wrongs.

Within this scenario, Bradford's variant of the heroic archetype is her role as long-time protestor and battle-scarred warrior of the powerless. Most immediately, she situates herself as part of national and international Green parties' movements. Within this opening statement of affiliation, Bradford lines the troops up and takes her first swipe at the opposing forces:

> Collectively we (the Greens) are part of the shape of the future of politics, here and internationally, whether Treasury or the Business Round Table or some of our fellow political parties like it or not.

Used to the rhetoric of confrontation, Bradford exhibits a certain discomfort in constructing a political persona within the system she attacks. She attempts to resolve the paradox in two ways. First, in a curiously phrased celebration of her activism, she declares, "I stand on my record, and do not seek to run or hide from my past," adding "There is no shame in being in the front line". She juxtaposes the police arrests that were part of this record, with the vision that fueled her activism for the rights of the unemployed, beneficiaries and low-income workers:

> There are times in the last 16 years when I have sat in a police cell or courtroom and hoped that one day, my dream of a job and a living wage for all in this country would come true.

The rhetoric of the dream works to reduce the contradiction inherent in leaving the "street" to enter the Parliamentary chamber. Second, Bradford highlights the story of her personal persecution, "marginalised" and "brutalised" in the struggle to achieve the dream. She is the battle-scarred warrior. Now, Bradford implies, she has moved her battle from the streets to a new arena: "I had had enough of battering my head against brick walls and lines of police, including outside this very building". Hart (1997) states, "This 'I've been there approach' is universally compelling and .... especially appropriate for a person trying to build bridges" (p. 224). The image of building bridges to access the right of the underprivileged resolves the contradiction of Bradford's political persona. In doing this, however, the warrior retains the rhetoric of the battlefield: "I am here on a mission", Bradford states.

Hart (1997) points out that, "Rhetoric is fuelled by the negative"(p. 269). Bradford compiles compelling images of the plight of the unemployed, that heighten her searing condemnation of government departments such as Work and Income New Zealand:

> Unemployed people and beneficiaries have had enough of being treated like dirt, taking the blame for every problem in society. Previous Governments have institutionalized another form of apartheid in Departments like WINZ, where a culture of contempt

> underlines dealings with so-called customers as well as with hard pressed frontline staff.

The negative also forms the springboard for her plea to restore the rights of the underprivileged through the immediate relief of poverty, increases in the minimum wage, the end of the "work for the dole" scheme, and the restoration of the family benefit for those "who have the courage to bring children into the world in an overwhelmingly child-hating society". "Rhetoric is filled with overstatements" (Hart, 1997, p. 268). The chilling power of Bradford's images of "apartheid" and "an overwhelmingly child-hating society" uses negative overstatement, not only to suggest her heightened passion, but also to goad the audience to action.

The line up of significant images, emphasises and condemns the hierarchy that constitutes the divisions between Maori and Pakeha and between rich and poor in New Zealand society. Maori unemployment rates continue to be three times the rate of Pakeha, "To the eternal disgrace of this country". And in a version of the apartheid imagery, Bradford constructs the vision of two New Zealands in which the rich are indifferent to the plight of the poor:

> There are two New Zealands living side by side right now – one of poverty and addictions, unemployment, guns, alcohol, abuse, sickness, despair and suicide – the other of people who have nice clothes and highpaid jobs and know little and care less about the rest.

Within the public persona, Bradford combines the role of protestor with the first-hand experience of victimisation to establish her credibility. She uses 48 "I" statements, and 19 "we" statements. The "I" statements either register Bradford's commitment to the "side" of the underprivileged or depict her own suffering at the hands of the system. Her fight against the "apartheid" of New Zealand's divisions, reverberates with the victimisation and vision of a Nelson Mandela. Now within the heart of the system, Bradford vows never to forget:

> I hope never to forget what I've learned, from many different parts of my life – locked up in Mt Eden women's remand wing .... turned away from social welfare after waiting for 6 months for my benefit to come through because they'd lost my file .... rejected for jobs in

> my chosen profession because I was a solo mother with twins . . . and most of all, seeing first hand the realities of life for so many others who had none of my advantages.

The warrior's scars of experience become criteria for leadership and also function to deflect attack that might possibly result from the accusatory rhetoric of her role as protestor. To support Bradford's plea for the underprivileged, is to assuage the guilt of responsibility for her story and the plight of those she identifies with. As Hart (1997) points out, "When sharing rhetoric with one another, (people) use "collectivist effort" to slay the "guilty part" of themselves and become purified" (p. 269).

Within the theatre of the maiden speech, confrontation and victimisation construct a story of tragedy that culminates in audience catharsis. While this moment of poignancy arises almost incidentally, it captures the personal depth of her pain. In the final acknowledgements of the people who have helped Bradford on her journey to "this place", she honours her mother and father, and then her husband and children:

> Bill and the kids who are living this journey with me . . . and I remember my oldest son, Danny, who died in the maw of an inadequate, under-resourced and unaccountable mental health system.

The commitment to the dream remains and the catharsis or "purification" experienced by the audience frees them to put aside confrontation and apathy and work towards the realisation of the dream.

In the immediate media response, the emotional intensity of Bradford's speech gained coverage. In her delivery, she had none of the panache of Beyer or the idealistic flair of Tanczos. On TV 3 she was described as "a very nervous Sue Bradford" and television clips show her looking down at her notes, stoney-faced but determined. Yet, such is the power of Bradford's rhetoric, as revealed when analysed, that she gained media coverage. The role of protector of the powerless is personalised in the public persona of the scarred warrior. The raw intensity of the dramatic conflict builds to a cathartic climax in the personal tragedy of Bradford's son's death.

Like both Beyer and Tanczos, Bradford's rhetoric of the "outsider" challenges the politics of exclusion and presents diversity as part of the criteria for leadership.

News coverage: personalisation, entertainment and collaboration

Paradoxically, in terms of the nature of maiden speeches within parliament as exclusivist rituals, the news media coverage of the "maiden stakes" selected and celebrated the performance of three speakers who represented social diversity. Moreover, what dominated television coverage of the trio was neither the leadership claims, nor their policies although these were mentioned briefly. Instead what dominated were personal aspects of the speakers' diversity: Beyer's sexuality and wit, Tanczos' hair, his hemp suit and his "hemp", Bradford's awkwardness, passion and activism. In this sense, television coverage trivialized the possible political diversity represented by the candidates, thus, albeit inadvertently, contributing to the politics of exclusion.

McGregor (1992) points out that the values of "newsworthiness" include "immediacy" "status" and "personalisation". Personalisation is about personalities and is linked "with the commercial rationale of the media and entertainment" (p.186). "Immediacy" was not a factor in the messages presented by Beyer, Tanczos and Bradford since the political policies and visions of their parties had been done to death in the run up to the election. Similarly, while all three had a prior media profile, as newcomers to parliament they lacked political status. In terms of media values, then, the "newsworthiness" of all three must be attributed to "personalisation" linked with entertainment value. In the context of the "maiden stakes", the "personalities" of all three place-getters are the political personae or masks created through ritualised theatre and rhetoric.

Certainly, personalisation and entertainment were major features of the television news coverage of maiden speeches. In both TV 1 and TV 3 news items of the 9 February 2000, Beyer was introduced as the first transsexual MP and her priorities were said to be gay and lesbian rights and working for her conservative electorate. Shots of Beyer's mentor, Sonia Davies, in the House for the speech also featured in all news footage. Similarly, Tanczos was introduced as the first Rastifarian, "letting his hair down to public applause" (TV 1, 10/2/90), and termed the "dreaded Nandor", "dreadlocked and hemp suited" by TV 3 (10/2/90). While both channels mentioned Tanczos message, New Zealand as "the spearhead of a global evolution", both spent equal time on Tanczos' failure to mount the plea to

legalise cannabis for personal use that was contained in the written notes of his speech: "staff said he ran out of time" (TV 1, 11/2/2000). Brief shots of Tanczos' youthful audience were included and he was described as the MP who "captured the imagination of the nation's youth" (TV 1, 11/2/2000) and who "breathed new life into the hallowed halls of Parliament" (TV 3, 10/2/2000). Bradford got brief clips, which mentioned the impassioned nature of her plea for the unemployed. Thus, personalization reinforced the speaker's persona rather than the speaker's message to trivialize political diversity.

In the TV 3 news wrap up of "The Week in Politics"(11/2/2000) the image of diversity as breathing "new life" into "hallowed halls" was reworked in implicit rationale for coverage, which referred to the "more colourful nature" of the trio within Parliament. But the hype continued with newsreader, Darren McDonald referring to "a dreaded Rastifarian and a wisecracking transsexual". Similarly, political commentator, Jane Young, highlighted Tanczos' dramatic opening, encapsulated his speech as "extremely ecologically driven" and gnawed at the omission of the "call for legalisation of marjuana for personal use". With Beyer, Young emphasised the performance without speech notes, referring to Beyer's acting experience, "Ex Close to Home" and "Ex Shortland Street", and to her "comic timing". When after a clip of the comic timing in action, McDonald interjected, "Now behind that, Jane, there is in fact a very serious committed woman," Young responded with a brief nutshell of Beyer's concern for her electorate and then pointed out (in the first television comment to do so) that Beyer put her representation of gay and lesbian issues "in the context of the issues that most New Zealanders need to know about, education, health, that sort of thing". Young next introduced Sue Bradford as a person "more known for being on the other side of Parliament". While acknowledging Bradford "gave a very serious speech, at times it was very moving" the implicit focus was on the protestor, as Young added "but it was a real Bradford statement" and the accompanying clip featured Bradford's confrontational rhetoric, "I am here on a mission . . . ."

Finally, Young acknowledged the criticism resulting from the selection of the "colourful" trio for media coverage, but provided her own rationale

that implicitly reinforced the entertainment basis for this selection:

> We're coming into a bit of criticism for focusing on those people. I have to tell you that there are a lot of maiden speeches. We're grinding through them. If we played some of them people would switch the television off, I'm afraid. (Young, *The Week in Politics*, TV 3, 11/2/2000)

In an analysis of American television news, Bayam (2000) states, "Network news eagerly exploits the entertainment capabilities of the television medium" (p. 321). The New Zealand media coverage of the maiden speeches suggests a comparable focus on entertainment factors in both the selection and the presentation of material. Moreover, "personalisation" formed the basis for "the commercial rationale of the media and entertainment" (McGregor, 1992, p.186). In other words, the media – as an institution with the ability and social responsibility to do so – failed to provide a critical lens on either diversity within the politics of exclusion ("the hallowed halls") or on the leadership claims of the speakers. In this sense, the media collaborated with the presented personae of ritualised drama. And even though media economics may dictate economic priorities, the so-called Fourth Estate lays claim to the role of public watchdog, upholding the notions of "objectivity" and critical focus.

Instead, as Atkinson (1996) explains, it is a "struggle for survival" for quotations from politicians' speeches to first, gain audience approval, and then to be part of the minority of extracts, which are selected for quoting by the mass media. Politicians and the media are playing a symbiotic game of "musical quotes". To reach a wider audience through the media, politicians must create a memorable persona and articulate messages which dramatise the familiar persona in a way that has media appeal. Diversity becomes an oversimplified caricature.

The importance of an analysis of ritual and rhetoric in political speeches

By contrast, a close analysis of ritual and rhetoric in political speeches provides an important critical lens. Rather than collaborating with either exclusivist rituals or "masters" of oratory, we can recognise the strategies that seek to contain and exploit us as an audience, leading us to a

"suspension of disbelief".

More specifically, the analysis of rhetoric can provide a critical lens on the leadership claims and strategies of political figures. This is important because, effectively used, the persuasive power of rhetoric can constitute not only a Mandela but also a Hitler. Similarly, the power of rhetoric can be used by George Bush and Tony Blair to win public support for the Afghanistan campaign. In a critique of four New Zealand former Prime Ministers, Hayward (2001) suggests that while the speaking skills of David Lange won him widespread public support, he was also used as a frontsperson for the actual policies of Roger Douglas to the point where, unable to gain support from his colleagues to resist Douglas's economic policies, Lange resigned. As New Zealand has now moved into a third election under MMP, the analysis of the rhetoric of political speeches can provide a critical lens both on political parties and on individual candidates.

Moreover, while the persona is a "mask" and cannot be equated with the "real" persona, an analysis of the rhetoric suggests the ambitions, values and feelings of the speaker. Similarly, the rhetorical strategies involve self-references, which are appeals to credibility or ethos for the presented persona: at the level of archetype, self-references appeal to social collaboration by seeking to tap subconscious images of leadership in the audience; at the level of personal character, strategies of signalled ethos seek to establish the speaker's honesty, trustworthiness, deference and community with the audience.

Conclusion

In New Zealand Mixed Member Proportional representation (MMP) constitutes an attempt to balance the politics of exclusion by enabling a greater diversity of political parties and voices to gain representation in Parliament. In arguing for an analysis of ritual and rhetoric within Parliament, we are not advocating a puritan rejection of the entertainment factors, which are present to a greater or lesser degree in all forms of political theatre or speech-making. Rather, we are arguing for a critical lens with which to balance the possible "suspension of disbelief" and audience collaboration in both the rituals and the personae or masks of political speaking. In terms of the maiden speeches, we suggest that the media,

whatever its role, has largely failed to provide this balance.

Yet, an analysis of the maiden speeches in the second New Zealand MMP parliament as ritualised theatre reveals how the interrelated components of drama, persona and audience expectations, function to contain, control, and even homogenise the public masks and leadership claims of political speakers. In this sense, the political debut is an initiation into the rites of an exclusivist forum.

Like parliamentary ritual, rhetoric involves the use of conventions. At the same time, rhetoric allows the speaker choices of self-presentation and imagery. On the one hand, dramatistic criticism reveals the speaker's use of the principles of hierarchy and transcendence and the positioning of his or her role within the dramatic scenario. On the other hand, the analysis of the verbal images and strategies reveals the choices that constitute the speaker's persona within role and drama. In this sense, rhetoric consists of choices in self-presentation, which can both contain and exploit diversity.

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What Causes Social Difference in Educational Attainment?: A Critique of Psychological and Economic Accounts of "Disadvantage"

Roy Nash

Abstract

Substantial differences in the educational attainments of social class and ethnic groups in New Zealand are among the most persistent of the "gaps" that have been placed at the centre of recent policy initiatives. Government policy makers have a legitimate concern to obtain high quality advice on the causes of social ills and the means to remedy them. There is reason to believe, however, that a preference for quantitative rigour and economic modelling may introduce certain biases to the information provided. This case is made in the context of a critique of a literature review on the effects of family and community resources on access to education. It is argued, substantively, that any discussion of IQ, particularly where hypotheses of the genetic origins of class and ethnic differences are concerned, should be treated with great circumspection. The paper concludes with some remarks on the problematic relationship between critical sociology and the liberal state.

Introduction

The "gaps" between social classes and ethnic communities in New Zealand in their income levels, standards of education, health, housing, and general well-being are more than extensive enough to have motivated a major government policy intervention (New Zealand Treasury, 2002). There is an entire literature, however, that does not acknowledge the root cause of these differences in relations of social class and ethnic origin. Social causes regarded as all but self-evident to sociology and anthropology are deemed by certain economic theories to have a merely contingent association with class and ethnicity. So indifferent is this perspective to the conventional wisdom of critical social thought that it maintains in all seriousness that, considered in isolation, variables such as income have little or no effect on

educational and social "outcomes". One might be left wondering why, in this case, there are any "gaps" at all. This economic reductionism is, however, influential in policy-making circles, and is certainly worth the effort of critique. This paper, is, in fact, written as a response to one of a number of literature reviews commissioned by the Ministry of Education as part of its Strategic Research Initiative. In the words of the Ministry's preface, the reviews "offer an overview of the most current thinking and developments in their area and will feed-into the Ministry's decisions about its research priority-setting and identify key gaps in the Ministry's knowledge, and the nature of the research that might address these gaps". One of these reviews (Nechyba, McEwan and Older-Aguilar, 2000), on the impact of family and community resources on student outcomes, has an importance that transcends the boundaries of education. Its authors are American economists with a limited experience of New Zealand, education, or sociology, and it does not seem inappropriate that their work should be examined by a New Zealand sociologist of education. It is, in fact, a remarkable document with far-reaching implications for interdisciplinary research.

Those who provide governments with advice on social and educational policy have a great responsibility to ensure that the information they present is accurate and free of intellectual bias. It is always possible, of course, to take the view that as all knowledge is a "social construct", necessarily subject to the filters of theoretical and political perspectives, that this end cannot be achieved even in principle. To conclude on that basis, however, that critical analysis across intellectual boundaries can achieve no purpose would be to accept defeat in advance. This commentary is offered in that context. It is not intended as a review, but as a response to two specific areas of substantive concern: first, its interest in the genetic resources of families and communities and, second, its approach to the search for the "true effects" of economic variables. Any research that raises the issue of genetic differences between social groups in New Zealand, and that as a matter of methodological principle attempts to strip away the connections, for example, between poverty and family practices, is worth close attention. Nechaya's review devotes an entire chapter to a discussion of "Heredity versus environment as a causal link" and the implications of this are so

important that this matter must be given priority. It is important because "economic socio-biology" threatens to eliminate sociology as a causal analytic science and relegate it to a low-level descriptive activity producing material with a limited use for mandated courses in "contextual studies" where students are required to be exposed to such propaganda. The fact that critical sociology has generally responded to this threat to its existence as a science by ignoring it, and by remaining largely uninformed about the arguments of genetic theory in particular, has not strengthened its own position as a discipline worthy of respect among students or policy-makers.

The muddle about genes: what do education policy-makers need to know?

The sociology of education once accepted that variability in social class access to education to some extent reflected intellectual differences between social classes caused by environmental and genetic processes. Jencks *et al.* (1972) included a genetic component in their causal models of educational inequality. Boudon (1981) distinguished between *primary effects* on attainment (those that might be attributed to intelligence) and *secondary effects* (those that remain evident between social classes when prior attainment is controlled). As secondary effects were a more important source of inequality of educational opportunity in his models than primary effects, sociology was not unduly limited by this decision to work within the variance unaccounted for by individual differences in intelligence. The majority of sociologists, however, dismiss this area of psychological research on the grounds that "intelligence" is a "social construct" with little theoretical credibility. Bourdieu (1993), for example, rejects the entire approach: "I think one should purely and simply refuse to accept the problem of the biological or social foundations of 'intelligence', in which psychologists have allowed themselves to be trapped" (p. 178). Nevertheless, the importance of IQ or "ability" tests in multivariate models of class differences in attainment is too important for many social scientists to ignore: the best "predictor" of educational attainment in any subject is a test of attainment in that subject at an earlier time, but tests of cognitive ability, which are designed as a matter of "validity" to provide the highest possible correlation with attainment in academic subjects, are also good predictors of school success. It is simply a fact that scores on tests broadly

related to performance at school at one time almost always correlate with scores on similar tests at a later time. The power of IQ theory to explain the largest proportion of the variance in academic attainment rests precisely on this relationship. It is crucially important to understand what is at stake in the debate about intelligence and heredity: unfortunately, muddle and misinformation beset the literature.

There are few intellectual domains, it is true, more difficult and more open to contestation than IQ theory. The often re-cycled controversy was sparked most recently by *The bell curve* (Murray and Herrnstein, 1994). This notorious work, which suggested that success in life was largely dependent on genetic endowment, raised the spectre of a biological basis for racial and social inequalities. An interesting "state of the art" response to *The bell curve* was prepared with the authority of the American Psychological Association in response to the intense public interest. Neisser *et al.* (1996) have provided, in fact, a remarkably cautious statement of "knowns and unknowns". The document attempts to construct a consensus between psychologists engaged in the debate, whether defenders or critics, and does not for that reason focus on areas of contradiction. There is some point, therefore, in presenting what informed thinkers regard as established knowledge, in order to examine substantive contested areas. The arguments will be presented under seven headings.

(i) *Theory of IQ*. The theory of general intelligence, *g* theory, maintains, at least, the following propositions, (i) intelligence is a property of people (in fact of brains), (ii) intelligence is an efficient cause of scholastic learning, (iii) intelligence can be constructed as an object of measurement, (iv) intelligence is normally distributed in the population (necessarily as the result of genetic organisation), and (v) IQ tests can be distinguished, conceptually and practically, from attainment tests. This theory has been subjected to rigorous critique. However, the *application* of such critique is relatively limited. In fact, it is necessary to accept that even if every proposition of standard IQ theory were false it would not matter as far as the development of effective cognitive skills in socially variable early childhood environments is concerned. The Ptolemaic theory of heavenly crystal spheres proved to be absurdly wrong, but observations and methods of calculation within that framework did enable the apparent movement

of the planets to be predicted to the practical satisfaction of mariners and others for many centuries. It similarly may not matter, for certain purposes and in certain respects, that IQ theory is wrong. The popular argument that "intelligence" is a "social construction", and hence need not be treated as a causal property of individuals, simply fails to recognise the issues at stake.

(ii) *Social class differences emerge early in childhood.* The average difference between the assessed intellectual level of children brought up by professional and unskilled working-class parents in New Zealand and in all similar states amounts to more than a standard deviation as they enter school (Shavit and Blossfield, 1993; Willerman, Broman and Fiedler, 1970). It may be a specific kind of intelligence, and one that is no doubt over-valued, but it has been widely recognised for a long time. The broad set of acquired cognitive skills that psychologists recognise as indications of the operations of an intelligent brain – they are extremely difficult to define and differences in cognitive performance within the normal range cannot be identified reliably with any distinctive neural property – might be expected to be peculiarly sensitive to forms of education and training. Early childhood educators, for example, are convinced that intellectual stimulation of an appropriate kind in the first few years of life can lead to the development of lasting cognitive skills (Hoskins, 1989). In an early report from the influential Dunedin longitudinal study, McGee and Silva (1982) noted that significant differences in IQ could be observed at age 5, after only a few weeks at school, between children from different social origins. The Stanford-Binet IQ means of their sample at this age are: professional, 110; lower professional, 104; white collar, 101; skilled, 98; semi-skilled, 93; and unskilled, 89. Note the substantial difference within the professional middle-class: it is not known why the little children of lawyers, doctors, and senior executives score so much more highly on intelligence tests than those of journalists, social workers, and primary school teachers. The difference is unlikely to have a genetic cause, for reasons discussed by Flynn (1998), and is almost certainly the result of specifically literate forms of early childhood socialisation. This can be interpreted as cogent evidence that middle-class parents, particularly those from the professional elite, provide their pre-school children with experiences that – it must be quite

literally – structure the developing brain in configurations greatly suited to forms of abstract thinking recognised by the school (see also Jencks and Phillips, 1998).

(iii) *The secular rise in IQ scores.* Flynn's (1987) demonstration that mean IQ scores rose throughout the developed world between, in round terms, 1930 and 1980, continues to provoke intense thought. The finding does not necessarily mean, as Flynn points out, that people have become more intelligent, and he is sceptical about the implication that there are now several times more geniuses than there were 60 or 70 years ago, but it does mean that the specific ability to solve abstract logical problems has become more widespread. The discovery has some crucial implications. It undermines the essential theoretical assumption of heritability research because it demonstrates differences in the cultural environments responsible for generating this tested cognitive skill, between, for example, the Holland of 1930 and 1980, where the effect is particularly large, that no one would have suspected. Differences of 15 or more points between generations within the same population are much too large to be accounted for by genetic determination. To state the facts plainly, the mean performance of African-Americans on IQ tests, in real terms, is about the same as that of European Americans 40 years ago. In order for the existing IQ difference between African-Americans and Europeans in America to have an entirely environmental cause, Flynn points out, one has only to suppose that the average difference between those groups in the properties of the social environment responsible for cognitive development are about the same as those that separate contemporary European people from those of a generation or two ago. He does not find that proposition implausible. The "Flynn effect" has thus brought a sense of urgency to the investigation of those characteristics of the cultural environment responsible for this observed secular rise in IQ scores.

(iv) *The consequences of early childhood deprivation.* There is little doubt that social deprivation of a rare and pathological kind will inflict permanent damage to the linguistic and cognitive abilities of children. Recent history has provided opportunity enough to study the effects of deprivation in early childhood. Studies of Romanian orphans, for example, have shown that children have an impressive capacity to recover from severe early social

and intellectual deprivation, but this adaptive resilience should not be overstated. The most recent longitudinal study (O'Connor *et al.*, 2000) reports that at the age of 6 years children who spent 6–24 months in deprived conditions had cognitive scores almost one standard deviation lower than a sample of UK adoptees. They were probably closer to two standard deviations behind the norm reached by middle-class children of that age (these orphans were adopted mostly by middle-class families) and their future course of development does not seem promising. The analysis shows that the effects of deprivation are more or less linear. The longer the period of institutionalisation the worse the prognosis for their recovery: children who had spent between 24 and 42 months in institutions were distinctly retarded.

(v) *The estimation of "shared rearing" effects.* Heritability is a population statistic easily – perhaps too easily – calculated from trait correlations between individuals whose degree of genetic relatedness is known. The correlation between monozygotic (MZ) twins reared apart is regarded as a direct estimate of heritability because the correlation must be entirely caused by their shared genetic endowment. Adoption studies that enable correlations between genetic siblings and unrelated siblings to be compared also provide estimates of heritability. Rowe (1994) summarises the findings in these words, "results from the Minnesota, Colorado, and Texas adoption studies, and from other adoption work ... reduce the estimate of rearing influence to some small value when rearing environments fell in the range from the working to professional social classes" (p. 110). Rowe reports data from Bouchard and McGue (1981) showing the correlation between related siblings as .47, and that between unrelated siblings as .29. Some well-conducted adoption studies have reported unrelated sibling correlations for older children close to zero, which has profound implications for theories of cognitive development. The implications of these data are not fully appreciated by Nechyba *et al.* The point is not only that they suggest that within-family resources and practices, everything from bodily contact to bedtime stories, have only a limited effect on the development of intelligence, but, much more importantly, that they leave the sources of between-family variance bewilderingly obscure.

A heritability statistic applies only to the population from which it was

calculated. It is obviously a fallacy to suppose that a datum relevant to one population can be applied to another. Nechyba *et al.* thus take pains to stress, within this formalist position, that "the evidence only states that *differences in shared home environments for the great majority of households cannot explain rather large differences in outcomes*" (p. 35 original italics). They mean, of course, *"even when the children are not related"*, otherwise the point is tautologous (differences in cognitive ability between siblings are self-evidently not caused by *shared* properties of their home environment); however, the real bite in the adoption findings comes not from this rather innocuous conclusion, but from the magnitude of the differences in the related and unrelated sibling correlations and the difficulty of accounting for them by reference to family resources and practices. Nechyba *et al.* offer a "thought experiment" where genetically identical wheat is grown in two different environments: "one full of nutrients conducive to the growth and development of wheat and the other lacking in nutrients" (p. 24) to illustrate the interaction between heredity and environment. The example is a commonplace of introductory genetics. Nechyba *et al.* miss the point, however, in the context of this debate. If parents read bedtime stories to their genetic offspring Janet and John, and to their non-genetically related adopted child Jason, and it proves that the correlation between Janet's and John's IQ scores is .47, and those between them and Jason is a mean .29, then differences in cognition between children are unlikely to be due, in great measure, to bedtime stories. Yet it is to practices of this kind – the "nutrients conducive to growth" – that all environmental accounts appeal as the cause of the variance between social classes! This area is a matter of intense current debate, but it is most unlikely that there is no degree of genetic influence on cognitive development (Cherney, Fulker, Emde, Plomin, Corley and DeFries, 2001). Stoolmiller (1999) argues that the restricted range of family environments in adoption studies leads to the serious underestimation of within-family effects, and, in any event, it is widely accepted that this partition of the variance is much easier in practice than in the real world. The extremely interesting analysis by Dickens and Flynn (2001) of the entire paradox that results from the contradictory implications of models based on good evidence for at least moderate heritability estimates and those based on incontrovertible evidence for large

between generations environmental effects, should be required reading. Dicken's and Flynn's rigorous mathematical models demonstrate that the paradox can be resolved by granting a larger role than permitted by standard genetic models to gene-environment matching.

(vi) *Thinking is done by brains.* Thinking is effected by brains, and the structures of neural organisation dedicated to cognition in different brains are not identical. The efficient neural properties of cognition obviously develop under genetic control in a specific environment. If certain efficient neural properties vary, as the result of development, it is more than reasonable to expect those differences to be reflected in cognition. In other words, it is likely that some differences in test performance and schoolwork are due to differences in relevant brain properties. The significance of this is not lost on IQ theorists. It is virtually certain that evidence will be proffered in the near future that will be interpreted by IQ theorists as support for their position. First, investigation of the now completed human genome map will almost certainly identify a number of genes regulating the development of neural properties and, consequently, associated with variance in cognitive operations. Second, developments in brain imaging technology will probably reveal patterns of individual variation within the living and working brain causally associated with specific forms of cognition. Any such property found to be associated with variance in thinking of the kind required by IQ tests, particularly if it is observed in early infancy and proves to be relatively stable, will be taken by IQ theorists as strong support for their position. It would be as well to face the likelihood that such may be the nature of the world, and if these research programmes show that to be so, scientific realists will have no choice but to accept what is demonstrated to be the case.

(vii) *IQ is a limit theory.* IQ *theory* is actually the real *practical* problem: it has the form of a "limit" theory. It has always promised a technology of assessment for the practice of selection. Textbooks of psychology once listed occupations with the IQ level appropriate to their normative performance. Pintner (1924), for example, drawing on army intelligence test data, offered, Labourer (C-), Bricklayer (C), Filing-clerk (C+), through to Medical Officer (B) and Engineer Officer (A). The limits of learning are, however, entirely unknown. The most that can be said is that, as a matter of empirical fact, in

educational systems *as they are now constituted*, the limits are those they are observed to be. What they could be under different conditions is impossible to determine except by investigation. Those who have some knowledge of the history of pedagogy will, no doubt, have formed their own idea of what is and is not possible in practice. Most educationists believe, at least, that all students without some organic intellectual disability can be taught to read to a level of better than that of the average 8-year-old, and if that is so then the "limit" has by no means been reached by many who enter (and leave) our educational system. IQ theory simply does not, and cannot, prescribe *limits* other than by reference to what those limits actually are in existing educational systems. It has been established, however, that there are threshold effects, so that above a certain level – no more than average in the language and plastic arts – an intelligence score makes little practical difference to attainment, or at least does not rule out the possibility of reaching the highest levels of creativity. Jensen (1981), perhaps the most uncompromising of all *g* theorists, advises that no student with an IQ score in the average range should be denied admission to college to read for a degree. These questions, which have always been central to the practical critique of IQ, will retain that impulse irrespective of any new material evidence produced by science on the development of cognition.

What does all this mean? It means that the construction of a coherent theory of cognitive development from these elements is extremely difficult. The problem is that several of these elements seem topoint in different directions. For example, the secular rise in IQ scores suggests a high malleability in intellectual development, whereas the adoption research indicates quite the opposite. What is required is a theory that can express the range of development for cognitive phenotypes in ordinary environments, but with the contradictory data available that is unlikely to be forthcoming. At the moment, the "state of the art" is such that no satisfactory theory of cognitive development and the origin of individual and group differences can be offered. The most sensible response for educational policy-makers in relation to IQ theory is to recognise its status as a "limit" theory and to treat as speculative theories of genetic differences between groups. In these circumstances there are two lessons to learn: (i) *IQ test scores should not be used to restrict opportunities to learn*, and (ii) that

genetic accounts of social and cultural differences in IQ should, in the present state of knowledge, be treated with the utmost circumspection. This discussion has dealt extensively with a central issue. It will be possible to engage a little more briefly with the other matter raised as problematic by Nechyba *et al.*

The search for the "true effect"

The aim of sociology is to provide explanations of social events and processes. A complete explanation will include an account of social structures (actually organisational properties), individual dispositions, and practices. Accounts of social processes are thus multi-layered, and in their attempt to reflect the complexity of the world provide narratives that *integrate* rather than *disintegrate.* In sociology the struggle to explain the complexity of the real world generates complex multivariate models: in economics the search for "true effects" seems to generate models of simplicity bordering on the simple-minded. A literature review may be expected to draw extensively on the material it reviews, and this is certainly the case with Nechyba *et al.* Thus, where Nechyba *et al.* (2000) write:

> The parental characteristics that employers value and pay for – skills, honesty, cognitive ability, reliability – are also the same characteristics that, whether through heredity or environmental channels, cause children to succeed. (pp. 53-4)

Mayer (1997), their original, has:

> the parental characteristics that employers value and are willing to pay for, such as skills, diligence, honesty, good health, and reliability, also improve children's life chances, independent of their effect on parents' income. (pp. 2-3)

In such circumstances – the differences introduced by Nechyba *et al.* seem arbitrary – working with the original text will lose nothing. Mayer is engaged in a search for the "true effect" of income which she defines as "the effect controlling all parental characteristics, both observed and unobserved, that influence the parents' income and the children's outcomes" (p. 8). Mayer points out that "the fact that poor children fare worse than rich children does not suffice to prove that low parental income per se hurts

children" (which is simply to recognise that correlations do not establish causality), and notes that children with certain attributes "do well even when their parents do not have much money" (p. 3). It is always possible, of course, to find opponents who build their arguments of straw, but no reputable sociologist of education would trouble to contest these statements. Nash (1993) concluded a summary of the specific ways in which income might contribute to educational attainment by noting that the "direct effects of income" are likely to be "over-estimated", and added that whatever disadvantage a student might suffer by "attending a largely working class school can be readily overcome by an appropriate family strategy" (p. 76). Nash and Harker (1998), furthermore, reported that students with high aspirations, positive academic self-concepts, and favourable perceptions of school, were more likely than others to demonstrate relative progress at school, independently of their social origin. The point of Mayer's analysis seems to be that as *poverty* is not the cause of low educational attainment, when the effect of all other factors, most of them associated with poverty, has been statistically removed, it follows that the attempt to raise educational attainment among low-income groups is unlikely to be achieved by increasing their income. If children from low-income homes do not usually fail unless, like those involved in the Milwaukee Project New Hope, they are also affected, as Nechyba *et al.* put it, by "alcohol abuse, dysfunctional family relationships, conflicts with employers, problems with baby-sitters and cars, and simply depression" (p. 55), then it is *those* specific circumstances of their environment that should be the target of policy interventions. Most sociologists believe that this pattern of dispositions constitutes a *habitus* generated by poverty and oppression, but these economists argue that is more likely, apparently on the grounds that not all low income families possess such a *habitus*, to have a genetic cause.

Critical sociologists will recognise at once that this economic reductionism effectively negates the value of collective sociological concepts, including class and ethnicity, except as nominal categories useful only for monitoring the efficiency of state "providers" to deliver a fully comprehensive service. What is characteristic to a *sociological* account, its structure-disposition-practice form, is thus "deconstructed" in such a way that the complex relations of causality between these levels, for example,

between income, associated class "cultures", and social practices cannot even be investigated. It seems absurd to argue that a set of dispositions and practices cannot be *caused* by class-location on the grounds that a "culture" is not adopted by *all* members of a class and not *only* by them. This is a failure of the "sociological imagination" on a massive scale. The existence of such multiple cultural responses within a broadly defined economic social class has long been recognised by sociology and, indeed, is a commonplace notion, as the old concept of the "deserving" and "undeserving" poor, illustrates. Willis (1977), always cited in the sociology of education for his study of working-class youth, distinguished between the resistant "lads" and the conformist "ear'oles". It is necessary to insist that the same structural conditions may give rise to different sets of dispositions and practices. The cultural pattern that made it taken-for-granted and ordinary behaviour, to refer to a well-publicised child-abuse case, for Terina Matiaha to return from the pub at 3am, sleep in on Sunday until 1pm, and then spend the rest of the day asleep or in front of the PlayStation while her almost two-years-old daughter, whom she had not seen for four days, was dying in the care of her extended family, cannot be discussed without reference to structural conditions (Johns, 2000). It seems that social theorists may need to give these issues a more detailed analysis. What, for example, do we mean by the term "culture" when used to describe the practices of social classes and ethnic groups?

The identification of class and ethnic cultures is not unproblematic. There are, in fact, several distinct criteria that may be used to distinguish a practice as characteristic of a particular social group: statistical frequency, traditional origin, and collective interest. It seems that economists have an exclusive preference for statistical frequency. In this concept, the culture of a group is known by its common practices, that is by its actual way of life, and statistical methods, including, for example, correspondence analysis used by Bourdieu, may have a useful contribution to make, even to the extent of defining the group itself. This is actually one of the central definitions adopted in the analysis of class cultures. The culture of a group may also be regarded as comprising those practices, even if adopted only by a small minority of its defined members that can be recognised as traditional to the group. Contemporary criteria of ethnic culture more often than not have

this form. Finally, there is the identification and analysis of culture by a principle of interest or generation in which, for example, the practices of a group are held to be derived from the nature of its objective or structural position. The working-class, for example, might be held to have a collective interest in resisting the demands of capital, and so generate a culture of resistance at different levels, both formal and informal, actual and symbolic, and so on. This mode of thought is well-established in cultural studies. These modes of the determination of dispositions and practices are not necessarily in opposition, but neither are they necessarily coupled together, and they often lead to quite different social movements within a cultural framework. It is relatively easy to specify a practice as that characteristic of a group by observing whether it is common or not; whether a practice is traditional to a group must be established by historical enquiry and rests ultimately on legitimate authority; and to demonstrate the relationships between structural conditions and the emergence of practices in response to them requires rigorous sociological and anthropological analysis. Thinking within this framework is useful when dealing with the multitude of problems that arise when the *common* practices of a defined group, are not *traditional* to that group (hence, "inauthentic"), and are generated by an actual *principle* (perhaps, "assimilation"), antagonistic to a theoretical principle derived from other criteria of its definition (such as "autonomy"). When, as is customary in our fields, the term "culture" can refer to practices, dispositions, and organised groups, the amount of time necessarily devoted as a consequence to internal conceptual clarification becomes increasingly burdensome. And meanwhile the discipline is being sidelined...

Conclusion

The "gaps" associated with social class and with ethnic origin in access to education are very substantial. They cannot be made to disappear by forms of analysis that construct their causal origins in narrow modes of practice ripped out of their social context and given a genetic determination. The flirtation with genetic theory is, to say the least, disingenuous. Nechyba *et al.* rely heavily on Rowe (1994) who has no inhibitions in remarking that "social class may capture not variation in rearing and environmental social background, but instead variation in genes" (p. 135). This argument, in the

context of New Zealand, can only lead to trouble. There is no way that the Maori working-class, which comprises the overwhelming majority of that population, and has married extensively into the Pakeha working-class, can be excluded from its application. The only sane recommendation that can be made to government is that theses about the genetic determination of social and cultural differences should be confronted with a realist approach to social science and rejected on the evidence of the available data. IQ theory remains a stubborn problem. The standard theory of intelligence has, in fact, been all but abandoned by educationists, but IQ-type tests are used routinely with little regard for theory by researchers investigating the effects of genetic determination on cognitive development. The sustained critique of IQ theory has been effective in education in that IQ tests and the assumptions they sustained are no longer common in schools. There may be a certain irony, however, in noting that in as much as intelligence theory is not now a central component of teacher education, there is a greater ignorance of the nature of IQ tests than was once the case. Many students, aware of the dubious history of IQ theory and its unwarranted assumptions, are convinced that "intelligence" is a "social construct" with no real existence and so may be dismissed without further consideration. This sort of critique, particularly when learned by rote, is actually a form of ignorance, and cuts no ice whatever when confronted with the findings of mainstream adoption research. Ignorance is never the best foundation for critique. It is particularly useless to repeat the mantra, for example, that within-family effects do not necessarily have the same causes as between-family effects, when one of the most troublesome aspects of the entire debate is the difficulty of imagining how they can actually be different in this area. As no coherent narrative of cognitive development has yet been established, the implications for social policy must be regarded as uncertain. There is undoubtedly a need for further research into cognitive development by research methods able to investigate, in both natural and experimental settings, the effective modes of communication between mother and child implicated in cognitive development.

The self-appointed task of critical social theorists is particularly arduous. It seems that government policy-makers are all but bound to turn to economists when our sciences are perceived to privilege advocacy over

analysis. Economists, at least, can be relied upon not to advocate spending money. If that were the only "bias" of economic reductionism it would, in fact, be relatively innocuous. The fact is, however, that economics is not a master narrative conferring authority on its practitioners to provide "objective" and "neutral" analysis in the most complex areas of sociology, psychology, and education. These pretensions of economics deserve to be exposed. Yet, the reasons why sociology, in particular, seems to have lost favour, even to be distrusted, by policy-makers, should be a matter for serious self-reflection within our disciple. It is one thing to mount a critique of the limitations of economic theory to comprehend the nature of social practice, but it is quite another to address the need to develop systematic, and where appropriate quantitative, models that will be perceived as valuable to others. The lessons for critical social theory, surely, point directly at the need for a closer attention to the study of lived cultures and actual social practices in our fragmented community. The "gaps" *are* caused by relations of social class and ethnic domination, but the precise nature of the connections between these structures, the dispositions associated with them, and the multitude of practices generated, cannot be taken for granted. On the contrary, the real implications of the postmodern insight that *discourses*, as narratives of practice, are not *determined* should be thrust home. We live in a society in which the adoption of social practices by individuals is increasingly likely to be de-coupled from their socio-economic location: but that must not be allowed to encourage the view that such practices, in themselves, do not have their origin in structural conditions.

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Disability and Gender: Querying the "Double Handicap" Assumption

Peter Beatson and Paul Perry

Abstract

This paper reports on findings concerning disability and gender that emerged from an International Social Survey Programme survey of attitudes towards social equity in New Zealand. In general, the data on disability confirmed the findings of other research in this field, namely that people with disabilities are disadvantaged in many respects by comparison with non-disabled New Zealanders. However, when the data were disaggregated by gender, and the situation of disabled women vis-à-vis non-disabled women was compared with that of disabled men vis-à-vis non-disabled men, an unexpected pattern emerged. Contrary to received wisdom on the subject, the survey suggests that disabled women are not as disadvantaged in terms of employment, socio-economic status and domestic circumstances as their disabled male counterparts. A particularly surprising discovery was that disabled women in some respects have better basic educational qualifications not only than disabled men but than non-disabled women as well. These findings suggest the need for more research into the "double handicap" experienced by disabled women.

Background

The data set on which this article is based comes from the *Social Equity in New Zealand* survey carried out in 1999 by Professor Philip Gendall and the Department of Marketing at Massey University (Gendall, 2000). This was one of the annual series of surveys that constitute the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) undertaken in many countries around the world. The data sets are available to researchers, and interested parties are regularly invited to suggest additional items for possible inclusion in forthcoming questionnaires.[1]

1. The authors owe a debt of gratitude to Professor Philip Gendall and the Department of Marketing at Massey University for allowing us to add a question about disability to the survey, and for making a fully operable data set of the survey freely available to us.

The *Social Equity in New Zealand* survey was conducted in three postal waves from late May to late August 1999. It was directed towards people aged 18 years and older drawn from the New Zealand Electoral Roll, based on a systematic sample stratified by electorate. The sample size was 1,108, a response rate of 60.5%, after adjustment for invalid addresses in the original sample. There were 67 numbered questions in the survey, equivalent to about 150 variables, covering basic demographic information and attitudes towards issues of social equity. The sample is generally representative of individuals at least 18 years of age, but does have a slightly higher proportion of women than men compared to the population, and slightly over-represents those over 30 years of age (Gendall, 2000).

The present authors asked to have a question on disability included in the demographic variables. Since the main focus of the survey was on social attitudes amongst the New Zealand population generally, on which we merely "piggy-backed" our question, we did not feel it appropriate to impose any refinements on the one broad category – disability. People were simply asked: "Do you have a disability or medical condition that is long-term (lasting 6 months or more)?" Our findings, therefore, refer only to a very broad, loose and entirely self-defined category. "Disability" is a blanket term that conceals many important differences. We do not know what kinds of impairments are involved, nor do we know the severity of the impairments, and whether subjects were born with these impairments, or became adventitiously impaired in later life. We do not even know something as elementary as what the term "disability" means to different respondents. For instance, people with severe impairments (such as total congenital deafness) may not have registered themselves in the survey as "disabled," since it is a term with which they do not identify.

We are operating, therefore, with an admittedly blunt instrument. Despite this limitation, some interesting patterns did emerge, previously unknown attitudinal characteristics of people with disabilities were discovered and, above all, some apparently anomalous facts relating to the comparative disadvantages experienced by disabled women and disabled men came to light. It is to the latter dimension of our findings that this paper is devoted.

Gendall's original survey covered people of all ages over 18. The authors

of the present report, however, were particularly interested in employment issues, and in those for whom disability was a major feature of their identities throughout their adult lives, not a product of the aging process. We therefore made the decision to limit the present study to those of working age (18-64), leaving people who had passed the retirement age for a possible future paper. Hence, when general terms such as "people with disabilities" are employed in the following, the rider "of working age" is always implicit.

Table 1 presents some basic demographic facts about the working age population, disaggregated by disability, gender, age (18-44, 45-64) and ethnicity (Maori). There were 847 in the sample population, of whom 10.1% identified as possessing a disability. In terms of gender, disabled and able-bodied people were represented in roughly the same proportions. Disabled people were over-represented in the 45-64 age group. This tendency was particularly marked with disabled females, of whom 64.4% were 45 and over, as against 56.1% of disabled men. Maori with disabilities were marginally over-represented (12.8% as against 10.6% of non-disabled Maori). However, the absolute number of disabled Maori in the sample (11) made statistical generalisations risky, hence there is no separate analysis for Maori.

The tables at the end of this article allow two forms of comparisons to be made. On the one hand, they contrast demographics and attitudes between the disabled and the able-bodied, first aggregated, then disaggregated by gender. On the other hand, they allow an assessment of the relative position of disabled men and disabled women in comparison to their able-bodied peers for a variety of demographic variables and socio-political attitudes. Summary indicators of the latter comparisons are contained in the two right-hand columns of the tables, headed FCDD and MCDD (the initials will be explained shortly). It is on these latter contrasts that this article is focused, but the full range of possible comparisons have been included in the tables as they are of considerable significance in themselves, and may be useful for readers with a general interest in the condition of people with disabilities.

Our findings about the situation of disabled people in an able-bodied world are not in themselves remarkable, as they merely confirm what most people with disabilities, their families and service workers know from first-

hand experience, and they reinforce patterns revealed in the 1996 census and the subsequent household disability survey (Ministry of Health, 1998; Statistics New Zealand, 1998). No matter what indicator is employed, the category of the disabled is severely disadvantaged by comparison with the non-disabled. In the discussion document *Making a world of difference: Whakanui Oranga* (Dyson, 2000, p. vii), it is observed that "Participation in communities will be at its optimum when people experiencing disability have the same opportunities and outcomes as other New Zealanders in all facets of life, including in education, employment, business, politics, income and housing." With the possible exception of education, the figures in our tables suggest that people with disabilities are currently far from such optimum participation.

Given this general background ambience of social disadvantage, our present research question focuses on gender differences, as set out in the columns headed FCDD and MCDD in the tables. Granted that all people with disabilities are worse off in many respects than their able-bodied counterparts, how do disabled women fare by comparison with disabled men? It is in our answer to this question that our findings part company with already known facts and familiar patterns.

The double handicap: re-interpreting the figures

We have borrowed the term "double handicap" from the title of the book *Women and disability: The double handicap* (Deegan & Brooks, 1985). The phenomenon is also explored in the work of Fine and Asch (1988). For the term "handicap" can be substituted "inequality," "disadvantage" or even "oppression." The central assumption was summed up in the words of a female American delegate to the 2000 Congress of Rehabilitation International: "Disabled women are still the lowest – I would say the poorest of the poor. We have the lowest employment rate probably of any minority population, because we have both the issue of being women and the issue of being people with disabilities" (Gourley, 2000). Not explicitly stated but clearly implicit in this observation is the assumption that disabled women are more disadvantaged than their disabled male counterparts.

The idea that disabled women experience a double handicap not only appeals to what might be termed our "intuitive" or "common sense"

understanding of social inequality, but also has what appears to be an unshakable empirical basis. At the common sense level, it seems reasonable to assume that if people with disabilities are at a disadvantage in an able-bodied world, and if women are often at a disadvantage in a patriarchal one, then logically we would expect that when the two categories "disabled" and "women" are combined, disabled women would suffer a compound disadvantage.

An empirical way of checking out this intuition is to run statistical comparisons between disabled women and disabled men on the one hand, and disabled women and able-bodied women on the other. If we discover disabled women are worse off, in terms of key indicators of inequality, than both their disabled male counterparts and able-bodied women, then surely double handicap is at play? The writers in *Making a world of difference* make this reasonable assumption when they write: "Women experiencing disability are more likely to have low incomes than all men are, and they are similarly disadvantaged compared with women who do not experience disability" (Dyson, 2000, p. 2).

For many of the results in our present study there is evidence which supports this idea. For example, consider yearly (personal) income (Table 3): 55% of disabled women are in the lowest income category (up to $20,000). This compares with 42.2% of able-bodied women and 35% of disabled men. Thus we see the evidence of double disadvantage. Disabled women are worse off than disabled men, and worse off as well in comparison with able-bodied women.

What we wish to demonstrate now, in the face of common sense assumptions and apparently hard empirical evidence, is that the double disadvantage model frequently does not hold up under close scrutiny, if the evidence is interpreted in an alternative fashion. We are not disputing that women with disabilities are at an absolute disadvantage by comparison with disabled men and able-bodied women. Our central contention, however, is that these may not be the most relevant comparisons to make. Simply juxtaposing the two contrasts just mentioned creates a false impression, as it ignores another order of comparisons that should be made. The latter feed into the equation a factor that so far has been left out of the account, namely the situation of able-bodied males.

By introducing this factor, a new order of comparisons is possible, and a new indicator of comparative gender disadvantage can be created. It is arrived at by first establishing the level of disadvantage experienced by disabled women when compared with non-disabled women. Second, a similar comparison is made between disabled men and able-bodied men. Finally, and most importantly, these two comparisons themselves are compared. That is, the comparative inequality between disabled women and able-bodied women is measured against the comparative inequality of disabled and able-bodied men. This measurement allows us to answer the most relevant question we should be asking about disability and gender: "Are disabled women more disadvantaged in relation to able-bodied females than disabled men are to able-bodied males?"

The answer might well be "no." Two hypothetical examples may help clarify the point. Let us suppose that we discover that disabled women's hourly average pay is only 85% of that of disabled men. At first sight, this seems to be evidence that disabled women are at a disadvantage compared with their male counterparts. The apparent disadvantage disappears, however, if it is discovered that all women earn only an average of 85% of the male hourly wage. Disabled women are in exactly the same boat as working women generally. In a gendered world, they are not necessarily at an income disadvantage in comparison with their able-bodied sisters.

Now let's take the argument one stage further. Let us suppose hypothetically that disabled men earn on average only 75% of the able-bodied male wage. Suppose, too, that disabled women earn 90% of the average able-bodied female wage. By contrast with their able-bodied female counterparts, disabled women are 15 percentage points less disadvantaged than are disabled male workers when compared with their able-bodied male reference group. In a gendered social universe, disabled females are not as badly off amongst women generally as disabled males are amongst men generally.

In the rest of this article, a considerable number of such comparisons will be presented. We had some initial problems in finding a way to summarise our findings in a clear and succinct form. In the end we devised a simple mathematical indicator of the two key differences we wished to compare – the gap between disabled women and able-bodied women, and

that between disabled men and able-bodied men. We have labeled these indicators FCDD (female comparative disability disadvantage) and MCDD (male comparative disability disadvantage). In each, the word "comparative" refers to the comparison between disabled females and males and their able-bodied gender counterparts.

The FCDD and MCDD were arrived at by calculating with each variable what percentage the disabled were of the able-bodied. For instance, if 60% of disabled females were in the lowest income bracket as against only 40% of able-bodied women, the FCDD would be 150%. If 10% of disabled women but 20% of able-bodied women were in the upper income bracket, the FCDD would be 50%. Where there is no difference between disabled and able-bodied females, the FCDD is 100%. When reading the figures, the most important point for readers to bear in mind is that the more the indicators depart from 100%, the more the disabled are disadvantaged in relation to the able-bodied.

The really crucial comparisons for our purposes are between the FCDD and MCDD figures in the right-hand columns. The reader can instantly see where the greatest comparative disadvantage lies. Consider yearly (personal) income in Table 3. For the low income category the figure for females is 130%, thus indicating that disabled women are significantly disadvantaged relative to able-bodied women. However, the male figure is about 201%. Thus disabled men are greatly more disadvantaged in a male world than disabled women are in a female one.

When reading the figures below, readers should bear in mind that in some cases a figure higher than 100% signals a disadvantage experienced by disabled people, but in other cases it is a FCDD or MCDD lower than 100% that indicates disadvantage. For example, again taking yearly personal income, a figure above 100% in the lowest income bracket indicates a disadvantage: more disabled than able-bodied people are poor. However, for the highest income category ($40,000 or more), being below 100% indicates disadvantage: fewer disabled people are rich. Thus, readers must use their judgement when deciding if in a particular case inequality is expressed in a percentage higher or lower than 100%. The main point to watch for in all cases is the amount the figures depart from the 100% norm.

Equipped with these indicators we shall now investigate comparative

gender disadvantages in the areas of employment, socio-economic status and domestic circumstances (Tables 2-5). In the following discussion, we have highlighted instances where the disadvantages experienced by disabled women are less than those of disabled men. With the data overall, in those variable categories where a disadvantaged position can be logically defined, the number of situations where the male disabled population is comparatively worse off than the female disabled population runs about 2 to 1.

Comparative gender disadvantages in employment, socio-economic status and domestic situation

Employment (see Table 2)

Disabled women are less disadvantaged by comparison with the able-bodied female norm than disabled men are by comparison with the able-bodied male norm:

	FCDD	MCDD
• *in part time employment*		
15-35 hours	73.0%	429.4%
under 15 hours	201.5%	329.7%
• *on average hours worked weekly*	100.6%	83.4%
(Note that disabled women actually work more hours a week than able-bodied women)		
• *in having been unemployed in the last ten years*	121.5%	149.6%
• *in the average number of months unemployed in the last ten years*	105.7%	127.7%
• *in earning over $40,000 a year for full-time workers* (see Table 3).	146.5%	61.6%
(Note that disabled women are actually advantaged by comparison with able-bodied women)		
• *in current public sector employment*	65.9%	23.5%
• *in self-employment*	102.3%	143.5%

What the above figures do not reveal is that disabled women are slightly more disadvantaged than disabled men in terms of currently not working for remuneration, FCDD 211.8% as against MCDD 197%. However those disabled women who are engaged in the paid work force are in almost

every respect less disadvantaged, when compared with the relevant gender reference group, than their disabled male counterparts. They have experienced a lower unemployment rate over the last ten years, and have been unemployed for shorter periods of time. If we assume that within reasonable limits it is advantageous for people to work more paid hours a week, disabled women do better not only than disabled men but (very marginally) able-bodied women as well. The same applies to the pay of women with disabilities working full-time: fewer are in the lowest income category and more in the highest than either disabled men or non-disabled women.

Disabled women are less under-represented in employment in the public sector than disabled men. They are also less likely to be self-employed. Self-employment is not necessarily an indicator of disadvantage – it may, indeed, reflect entrepreneurial initiative. However, in some cases people with disabilities set up their own small (and perhaps precarious) businesses after repeated failures to obtain waged employment. In all events, if we take waged employment in the mainstream workforce as the norm and self-employment as the exception, disabled women are closer to the female norm than disabled men are to the male one.

Socio-economic status (see Tables 3 & 4)

Disabled women are less disadvantaged by comparison with the able-bodied female norm than disabled men are by comparison with the able-bodied male norm:

	FCDD	MCDD
• *in yearly personal income in the lowest category, up to $20,000*	130.3%	201.2%
• *in yearly personal income in the highest category, $40,000 or more*	80.2%	47.4%
• *in yearly household income for the lowest income category*	219.4%	242.6%
• *in self placement in top half of the social hierarchy 10 years ago*	118.0%	108.9%

(both disabled women and disabled men are actually advantaged compared to their able-bodied peers)

	FCDD	MCDD
• *in self-placement in the top half of the social hierarchy today*	87.9%	60.2%
• *in self-placement in the bottom half of the social hierarchy 10 years ago*	79.1%	86.3%
(both disabled women and disabled men are advantaged compared to their able-bodied peers)		
• *in self placement in the bottom half of the hierarchy today*	123.3%	209.3%
• *in having no more formal education than Form 2*	110.5%	160.0%
• *for those aged 18-44 years, having no or only school qualifications*	62.6%	104.4%
(note that disabled women are considerably advantaged relative to able-bodied women).		
• *in having at least some tertiary education*	94.7%	54.9%
• *in having gained a tertiary diploma or certificate*	175.0%	103.6%
(Note that both disabled women and – marginally – disabled men are advantaged by comparison with the able-bodied)		
• *for those aged 18-44 years, in having a university degree*	58.1%	55.7%.

Disabled women are less disadvantaged in the socio-economic hierarchy than disabled males, when compared with the relevant gender reference groups. Objectively, there are lower proportions in the bottom income bracket (both personal and household) and a higher proportion in the $40,000 plus personal income bracket. Subjectively, disabled women rank themselves in greater numbers than disabled men in the top five positions of a ten-point social scale, and fewer rank themselves in the bottom five.

This point is worth dwelling on for a moment, as it involves perhaps the most depressing finding to emerge from the survey. Respondents were asked not only to place themselves on a ten-point scale indicating where they felt they stood in the social hierarchy today, but were also asked to rank their position a decade earlier. There was a major difference between the able-bodied and the disabled in this respect. In the main, the self-

perceptions of the able-bodied reflect considerable upward social mobility during the ten-year period, moving from the bottom to the top half of the hierarchy. On the other hand, the self-perceptions of people with disabilities reflect downward social mobility in almost the same proportions. The net effect of these two measures is a picture of other New Zealanders "going up in the world," while disabled people had gone down.

Returning to the gender issue, the self-perception of disabled males in terms of their current and past locations in the social hierarchy suggests considerably more downward social mobility than is the case for disabled females. About 66% of disabled men rated themselves in the top half of the social hierarchy ten years ago, compared to 44% of disabled males today, a drop of about 22 percentage points. Nearly 64% of disabled females placed themselves in the top half ten years ago, compared to about 59% today, a drop of only about 5 percentage points.

The biggest gender differences of all are in the domain of educational qualifications. Disabled men do marginally better than their disabled female counterparts when it comes to acquiring university degrees, but in all other respects disabled women out-perform disabled men. Not only that, but in some respects they also appear to be less educationally disadvantaged than able-bodied women.

Marital status (see Table 5)

Disabled women are less disadvantaged by comparison with the able-bodied female norm than disabled men are by comparison with the able-bodied male norm:

	FCDD	MCDD
• *in being divorced or separated*	201.8%	234.9%
• *in being single or never-married*	86.9%	113.5%

(Note that disabled women are arguably actually advantaged relative to able-bodied women).

In assessing comparative disadvantage in this area, we are making the assumption that most adults wish to live in a stable, long-term partnership with one other person – a partnership which is perhaps particularly important for people with disabilities, given their need not only for emotional fulfillment but also for practical assistance. Our findings are

slightly ambiguous, as comparatively more disabled men than disabled women reported being married at the time of the survey, yet considerably fewer disabled women reported being single/never married. Where a clear gender difference does appear is in the "divorced/separated" category: disabled people of both genders have experienced a breakdown in close affective relationships, but disabled men seem to be more at risk than disabled women in this respect.

Social philosophy and political preferences

It has been suggested in the foregoing that in some important respects disabled women are less disadvantaged than disabled men when compared with the appropriate gender reference groups. We shall now take our inquiry into gender differences in the disability world one step further. The main purpose of the *Social equity in New Zealand* (Gendall, 2000) survey was to uncover New Zealanders' opinions as to whether social justice prevailed in this country. To elicit their attitudes on matters of social equity, respondents were asked to agree or disagree with a series of propositions (see Table 6).

Depending on their responses, subjects can be classified as espousing one of two distinct social philosophies – by which term we mean views on how society should be organised, and on whether contemporary New Zealand is basically just and equitable. Although the terms are a little vague and imprecise, we shall typify these philosophies in terms of the classical "right/left" political dichotomy.

Those on the right endorse the neo-liberal ideology that prevailed in this country from the advent of Rogernomics in 1984 to the election of the Labour-Alliance coalition in 1999. They believe society to be basically fair and open, a meritocracy in which individuals compete on equal terms and are rewarded fairly in proportion to their ability, initiative and diligence. The corollary is that they do not believe government should intervene in civil society to reduce inequalities and promote social justice. In the 1996 elections, respondents with this social philosophy were likely to vote for the right or centre-right parties ACT and National.

Those on the left espouse the social democratic critique of neo-liberalism. For them, society is not an equitable meritocracy, and competitive individual

striving does not generate overall social justice. Rather, we occupy a world in which income is distributed unfairly, in which the rich and powerful benefit from such inequity, where unfairness or bad luck, rather than individual merit, determines one's destiny, and in which the vulnerable and the dependent are stigmatised by their more fortunate fellow citizens. Given the prevailing unfairness prevalent in civil society, benevolent government intervention is required to remove inequities and promote social justice.

People with these views would tend to vote for parties of the left and centre-left – i.e. Alliance and Labour. New Zealand First (which was riding high in the 1996 elections) is a slightly more ambiguous case: populist nationalists like Winston Peters are hard to place on the left/right political continuum. However, before the 1996 elections New Zealand First appeared to champion the interests of the dispossessed against the neo-liberal establishment, so even though Peters subsequently joined National in government, it is probably not unreasonable to interpret a vote for New Zealand First in 1996 as indicative of opposition to right-wing policies.

Given the fact that people with disabilities are disadvantaged on almost all indicators of employment and socio-economic status, we would intuitively guess they would tend to cluster on the left side of the neo-liberal/social democratic continuum. This hunch is confirmed by the survey findings. When we analyse the attitudes and voting preferences set out in Tables 6 and 7 a clear pattern emerges. On aggregate, disabled people feel less affinity than the able-bodied for neo-liberalism. That is, they tend to disagree with the propositions that rewards are fairly handed out in society, and that poverty is the product of lack of will-power or laziness. Conversely, they see the income gap in society as excessively wide, believe that society is run by and for the interests of the rich and the powerful, and feel social destiny is governed not by justice or individual merit, but by unfairness or the roll of the dice. Finally, they are sensitive to the way in which beneficiaries are regarded, considering them the object of discriminatory attitudes which turn them into second class citizens.

Given this take on the social world, people with disabilities opt for the social democratic side of the political fence. That is, disproportionately more than the non-disabled they agree or strongly agree with the propositions

that it is the responsibility of government to reduce differences in income, and to spend more on benefits for the poor, even if this leads to higher taxes. As we would logically expect from these attitudes, disabled people opt in greater numbers for parties of the left than do the able-bodied.

Our particular focus in the present paper, however, is not so much on differences between the disabled and able-bodied worlds as on the gender dimension of differences within the disability world itself. Given the fact that disabled women are less comparatively disadvantaged than disabled men, and subjectively rank themselves higher on a ten-rung social ladder, does their comparative advantage translate into social philosophy and voting patterns? If how we interpret the world is to some extent determined by our place in it, it would be logical to expect that disabled women would be less inclined to the left of the political spectrum than disabled males. Do the figures bear out this hypothesis?

The answer in almost every case is an emphatic "yes." While disabled women are distinctly more left-inclined than able-bodied women, they are markedly less so than disabled males vis-à-vis their able-bodied male counterparts. Summarising their attitudes towards social equity and government intervention set out in Table 6, we find the following:

Disabled women are less likely to disagree or strongly disagree with the proposition that:

	FCDD	MCDD
• *People are poor due to laziness or lack of willpower*	121.5%	141.2%

Disabled women are less likely to agree or strongly agree with the propositions that:

	FCDD	MCDD
• *People get rewarded for their effort*	95.9%	42.9%
• *Inequality continues because it benefits the rich and powerful*	115.6%	145.9%
• *People are in need because society treats them unfairly*	136%	153.1%
• *People are in need because they have been unlucky*	98.9%	138.7%

	FCDD	MCDD
• *People on social security are made to feel like second-class citizens*	127.4%	145.4%
• *It is government's responsibility to reduce differences in income*	117.3%	152.1%
• *Government should spend more on welfare benefits*	176.6%	216.2%

Though sceptics as regards the level of social equity in New Zealand society, disabled women are clearly less sceptical than are disabled men. Reflecting their disadvantaged position in society, all disabled people are further left than the able-bodied, but disabled women are closer to the centre than their disabled male counterparts. In virtually every respect, there is a gap of at least 20 percentage points between the FCDD and MCDD figures.

This attitudinal difference translated into political allegiances at the 1996 elections (see Table 7). The disabled as a category preferred the three opposition parties Labour, Alliance and New Zealand First over National and ACT, but the preference is more strongly evident among disabled males than disabled females. The difference can be seen most clearly in their respective support for the Alliance, where the FCDD was 122.1% and the MCDD was 188.4%, and for New Zealand First (FCDD 175.8%, MCDD 288%). On the other hand, while both disabled females and disabled males were under-represented in their support for National, the latter were markedly more averse to that party than were their female counterparts (FCDD 93.8%, MCDD 57.8%).

Conclusion

In the main, the results of the survey on which this paper is based merely confirmed what is already widely known. In almost every indicator of employment, socio-economic status and domestic situation, people with disabilities are heavily disadvantaged by comparison with the non-disabled.

There are three areas, however, in which our findings would appear to break some new ground. In the first place, an anomaly revealed by the ISSP survey data is that people with disabilities are not at such an educational disadvantage as one might intuitively guess. They are less

successful than the able-bodied in gaining the highest tertiary qualifications, but at the other end of the educational spectrum they leave school better, not less, qualified than the able-bodied. They also score well in medium-range tertiary qualifications, such as trade or professional certificates, and diplomas below the level of a Bachelor's degree.

Another modest original contribution this report makes to the field of Disability Studies is its exploration of the social philosophy and political orientation of people with disabilities. The disabled are more sceptical than the able-bodied of right-of-centre explanations of how society operates, seeing it not so much as an equitable meritocracy as an arena in which power, wealth and blind chance prevail, and where "winners" relegate the less fortunate to the rank of second-class citizens. These attitudes translate into political voting preferences. Not content with the present structure of society and their place in it, people with disabilities opt in greater proportion than do the non-disabled for parties of the left which proffer state-led solutions to societal problems.

It is in its analysis of gender differences within the disability world itself, however, that we believe this article may have set the stage for an interesting debate. In face of the generally accepted notion of a double handicap, it could be argued that disabled women are often less disadvantaged by comparison with the female norm than their disabled masculine counterparts in the male world. This does not hold true in every area, but key indicators suggest that if double disadvantage is at play, it is disabled men who are at the greater risk. We stress that this is a tentative, preliminary finding that needs to be checked against the results of other surveys.[2] We also emphasise that we are not querying the fact that disabled women are often worse off in absolute terms than both disabled men and able-bodied women. The comparative advantage of disabled women only emerges when we place them in a gendered social world, comparing them and disabled men with the appropriate reference groups – able-bodied women and able-bodied men respectively.

We shall conclude this report with a plea for the regular inclusion of

2. There is also a need for more analysis with controls for factors like age and the nature of the disability.

disability as a key demographic variable, along with standard items like gender, age, ethnicity and socioeconomic status, in future statistical surveys. To acquire a fuller and more detailed picture of the place of people with disabilities in our society, we need much more empirical data. This could be built up incrementally if all large-scale research projects would only routinely include "disability" in their questionnaires.

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Table 1. ***Basic Background Characteristics, Comparing the Disabled and the Able-Bodied (A.B.), for People of Working Age (18-64 years)****

	Working Age Population		Working Age Females		Working Age Males		Comparative Disability Disadvantage**	
	Disabled	*A.B.*	*Disabled*	*A.B.*	*Disabled*	*A.B.*	*Females FCDD*	*Males MCDD*
Age	(n=86)	(n=761)*	(n=45)	(n=410)	(n=41)	(n=350)		
18-44 years	39.50%	59.80%	35.60%	63.20%	43.90%	56.00%	56.3	78.4
45-64 years	60.50%	40.20%	64.40%	36.80%	56.10%	44.00%	175	127.5
Gender	(86)	(760)						
Female	52.30%	53.90%	–	–	–	–	–	–
Male	47.70%	46.10%	–	–	–	–	–	–
% Identifying As Maori	(86) 12.80%	(761) 10.60%	(44) 8.90%	(409) 10.50%	(41) 17.10%	(350) 10.90%	84.8	156.9
Attendance At Religious Services	(86)	(753)	(45)	(406)	(41)	(346)		
Twice a year or less	68.50%	69.80%	64.50%	63.80%	73.10%	76.60%	101.1	95.4
2 Times a month or more	14.00%	17.70%	15.50%	22.40%	12.20%	12.20%	69.2	100

\# Not all categories of a variable are presented in table, and hence totals may not add to 100%

* Figures in parentheses are the total number of cases for the disabled, or the able-bodied e.g. there were 761 able-bodied people in the sample when the disability question was run against age; 59.8% of those 761 people were in the age group of 18-44 years. The total number of cases varies between variables due to differences in the number of missing cases.

** The percentage the disabled are of the able-bodied.

Table 2. ***Employment Related Variables, Comparing the Disabled and the Able-Bodied (A.B.), for People of Working Age (18-64 year)***

	Working Age Population		**Working Age Females**		**Working Age Males**		**Comparative Disability Disadvantage #**	
	Disabled	*A.B.*	*Disabled*	*A.B.*	*Disabled*	*A.B.*	*Females FCCD*	*Males MCDD*
Employed Full-Time (35+hrs)	(n=86) 36.1%	(n=761) 61.1%	(n=45) 22.2%	(n=410) 43.2%	(n=41) 51.2%	(n=350) 82.0%	51.4	62.4
Employed Part-Time (15-35hrs)	(86) 16.3%	(761) 14.7%	(45) 17.8%	(410) 24.4%	(41) 14.6%	(350) 3.4%	73.0	429.4
Employed Part-Time (<15 hrs)	(86) 12.8%	(761) 5.3%	(45) 13.3%	(410) 6.6%	(41) 12.2%	(350) 3.7%	201.5	329.7
Unemployed or Beneficiary	(86) 25.6%	(761) 5.0%	(45) 31.1%	(410) 4.9%	(41) 19.5%	(350) 5.1%	634.7	382.4
Home duties	(86) 18.6%	(761) 17.1%	(45) 28.9%	(410) 28.8%	(41) 7.3%	(350) 3.4%	100.1	214.7

Average Hours									
Worked Weekly	(55)	(653)	(19)	(327)	(36)	(325)			
	36.98	41.00	35.20	35.00	39.10	46.90	100.6	83.4	
Current Employ. Status		(85)	(742)	(44)	(398)	(41)	(344)		
Public Sector	7.1%	14.0%	11.4%	17.3%	2.4%	10.2%	65.9	23.5	
Publicly Owned									
Private Sector	8.2%	11.7%	4.5%	11.3%	12.2%	12.2%	39.8	100.0	
Private Sector	23.5%	37.1%	18.2%	32.2%	29.3%	42.7%	56.5	68.6	
Non-profit/Charity/									
Welfare Org.	7.1%	4.3%	9.1%	5.5%	4.9%	2.9%	165.5	169.0	
Self-Employed		22.4%	17.4%	13.6%	13.3%	31.7%	22.1%	102.3	143.5
Not working	31.8%	15.5%	43.2%	20.4%	19.5%	9.9%	211.8	197.0	
Have Been Unemployed									
In Last Ten Years	(77)	(731)	(37)	(389)	(40)	(342)			
	40.3%	29.8%	37.8%	31.1%	42.5%	28.4%	121.5	149.6	
Average Months									
Unemployed InLast									
Ten Years	(25)	(203)	(10)	(105)	(15)	(93)			
	23.0	19.3	20.3	19.2	24.9	19.5	105.7	127.7	

The percentage the disabled are of the able-bodied.

Table 3. ***Socio-economic Status Variables (Social Class, Education and Income), Comparing the Disabled and the Able-Bodied (A.B.), for People of Working Age (18-64 years)****

	Working Age Population		Working Age Females		Working Age Males		Comparative Disability Disadvantage #	
							Females	Males
	Disabled	*A.B.*	*Disabled*	*A.B.*	*Disabled*	*A.B.*	*FCDD*	*MCDD*
Self-Identified Social Class	(n=84)	(n=756)	(n=44)	(n=409)	(n=40)	(n=346)		
Lower & Working	35.7%	20.4%	36.4%	20.8%	35.0%	19.9%	175.0	175.9
Up Working & Middle	47.4%	59.2%	54.6%	58.7%	37.5%	60.1%	93.4	62.4
Up. Middle & Upper	13.1%	15.7%	9.1%	15.9%	17.5%	15.7%	57.2	111.5
Amount of FormalEducation		(86)	(758)	(45)	(408)	(41)	(349)	
Up to Form 2	8.2%	3.7%	2.2%	1.9%	2.4%	1.5%	110.5	160.0
Secondary School	64.0%	59.7%	62.2%	60.5%	65.9%	58.8%	102.8	112.1
Univ./Polytech	27.9%	36.6%	35.6%	37.5%	19.5%	35.5%	94.7	54.9
Highest Formal Qualification	(85)	(756)	(45)	(407)	(40)	(348)		
None/School Only	47.0%	49.4%	42.2%	52.3%	52.5%	46.0%	80.7	114.1
Certific./Diploma	44.7%	32.5%	51.1%	29.2%	37.5%	36.2%	175.0	103.6
Degree/PostGrad	8.2%	18.1%	6.6%	18.3%	10.0%	17.8%	36.1	56.2

Highest Qualific.(18-44 years)	(34)	(450)	(16)	(256)	(18)	(194)		
None/School Only	41.1%	49.1%	31.3%	50.0%	50.0%	47.9%	62.6	104.4
Degree/PostGrad.	11.7%	20.9%	12.5%	21.5%	11.2%	20.1%	58.1	55.7
Highest Qualific.(45-64 years)	(51)	(306)	(29)	(151)	(22)	(154)		
None/School Only	51.0%	49.7%	48.2%	56.3%	54.5%	43.5%	85.6	125.3
Degree/PostGrad	5.9%	14.1%	3.4%	13.3%	9.1%	14.9%	25.6	61.1
Yearly Income	(80)	(734)	(40)	(394)	(40)	(339)		
Up to $20,000	45.1%	30.7%	55.0%	42.2%	35.0%	17.4%	130.3	201.2
$40,000 or more	18.8%	32.1%	15.0%	18.7%	22.5%	47.5%	80.2	47.4
Yearly Income(Full-Time Only)	(29)	(454)	(9)	(175)	(20)	(278)		
Up to $20,000	6.8%	6.9%	0.0	10.3%	10.0%	4.7%	-	212.8
$40,000 or more	37.9%	46.5%	44.4%	30.3%	35.0%	56.8%	146.5	61.6
Yearly HouseholdIncome	(81)	(729)	(42)	(389)	(39)	(339)		
Up to $20,000	40.7%	17.8%	45.2%	20.6%	35.9%	14.8%	219.4	242.6
$40,000 or more	23.5%	44.6%	16.7%	43.2%	30.9%	46.4%	38.7	66.6

* Not all categories of a variable are presented in table, and hence totals may not add to 100%

\# The percentage the disabled are of the able-bodied.

Sustaining Sociology: An Interview With Gregor McLennan

Gregor McLennan was interviewed by
Chamsy el-Ojeili and Lincoln Dahlberg

Question

At the 2000 BSA conference in Glasgow, Scotland, you talked of sociology "making something of a comeback within the critical human sciences, in the form of a new positivity that made itself felt in a number of ways during the 1990s". Against the deconstructive impulse within the sociology of the 1980s, which was marked by fear of the various "sins" of modernist theorising, you argued that "a creeping positivism" has been at work – one that has put aside "negative" critique in "favour of something more substantive and affirmative". Can you trace for us this movement, focusing upon what a more substantive post-post-modern sociology might look like, and citing some exemplars of this new positivity?

McLennan

I need to qualify the suggestion of "creeping positivism". I don't really mean a revival of positivism as such, though of course there are serious advocates of this around. The post-positivist turn is too firmly, and rightly, entrenched for this to happen. But at the same time there are lots of misapprehensions about positivism. The logical positivists, for example, were quite happy with the notion that "facts" were theoretically constructed and that "realism" was actually an unscientific residue that had no place in science as such, though it could be defended as common sense and indeed even as a kind of political reminder. So the widespread equation between positivism and naive forms of realism/objectivism is just mistaken. Similarly, leading positivists were comfortable with the notion that sociology and other social sciences deal in "explanation sketches" and not physics-like universal laws. On this sort of point, there is actually quite an overlap between positivism and post-positivism.

The creeping positivism I referred to is more like a return to what is interesting in the notion of *observation*, and the belief that exercises in

theorising cannot be self-sufficient: we must be trying, in however roundabout a manner, to be *saying something* about the state of things, including discursive things. Now, given this, and given that the whole status of "theory" has become problematized *within* theoretical discourse itself, people are finding it interesting just to see what happens when theory (or a certain type of theory) is "bracketed off", at least for a while. So, you find discourse analysis people getting stuck into the serious micro-detail of "strips" of conversation interaction; the sociology of science changed over to "new literary forms" mode, under a heavy discursive turn, but then again transforming itself into "science and technology studies", in which Latour et al., instead of wasting time pronouncing about construction versus realism, or the science and nature relation *in general*, go around observing how scientists actually argue in their workaday setting, how scientific "objects" are identified, how "factishes" begin to get embodied in entities, and so on; Deleuze talks about how he "hates" the absurd "interiority" of much so-called theorising, and how instead we have to respect the "life of objects" and their resistance to the theorising consciousness; one of my own current projects is to try to revisit the notion of societal ideas, not looking at these as an exemplification of (modernist) theories of ideology, or as (postmodernist) expressions of fragmented and nomadic subjectivities and all that, but just ascertaining how social ideas circulate, who carries them, what counts as ideational success, etc; feminist philosophers, having come to an impasse over the abstract and unresolvable question of words/things, objectivity/constructionism, and so on, are rediscovering the value of a kind of feminist empiricism, which brings some freshness into enquiry. All these examples are deliberately framed as ways in which erstwhile "reflexive" theorists on the edges of sociology have come to adopt a more "positive" mode, so one could expect more "mainstream" sociological projects to be even more affirmative of the need for some new observational orientations. But it's not just sociology – cultural studies, for example, is now also more alert to the need for strenuous investigations into patterns of consumption, and the circuits/trajectories of cultural objects. The post-post-modern moment, then, if we must put it that way, involves a scaling down of the pretensions of theory and greater appreciation of the sheer work needed to craft concepts that can be put to good use in substantive

fields, and a greater appreciation of the interest of even piecemeal and incomplete "findings". A final respect in which something of positivism is being rekindled (but, to repeat, this is *not* merely a historic reversion as such) is that there is greater will around nowadays to strive for *consensus*, both intellectually and in the politics of intellectual work. After all, if we really think that paradigms are incommensurable, that subjectivities are fragmented beyond all synthesising, that any old theory is compatible with any old data, then there comes a point when it is simply not worth arguing about anything, or trying to demonstrate that what can be found out by way of disciplined and specialist scholarly labour is any different to what we might shout about in a bar-room slanging match. Despite the importance of the moment of the "politics of difference", if difference goes all the way down, and if we are all entirely saturated by our self-forming cultural situatedness etc., then we have entered the Hobbesian war of all against all and each against each. Positivism came along to suggest that certain types of critical-rational consensus can be sustained well enough to be socially progressive. When postmodern feminist philosophers such as Susan Hekman end up – rather ironic though this is – turning to Weber for guidance on how to retain a certain kind of value neutrality within a project that has been chosen by way of value orientations; and when everyone seems to hang so much on the generalised notion of "dialogic democracy", and so on, I read this as a way of strengthening progressive consensus in and across difference, and in a way that's a positivistic impulse.

Question

What are the specific sociological values linked to this observational orientation? In particular, we are interested in your argument for the necessity in social theorising of evolutionism, objectivism, totalisation, essentialism, and universalism; and we are interested in the importance that you place on asking hard questions of postmodernism's celebration of contingency, difference, and reflexivity?

McLennan

Well, I don't think I'd want to tie down the question of sociological values simply to this "observational orientation" as such, because the issue of what, if anything, specifically characterises sociological discourse – its "form of

enlightenmentality" in my colleague Tom Osborne's helpful phrase – remains important in quite a general sense. And this is not just a matter of academic defensiveness: even if Sociology departments in universities go out of business, sociology (small "s") will still in all likelihood coagulate within larger clusters of (trans)disciplinarity. The point I've been making about this is that whilst certain "traditionalist" aspects of objectivism, realism, enlightenment, rationality, explanation and all that, have been usefully *problematised* during the postmodern "moment" (and long before that, actually), they've hardly been done away with, as many minor commentators seem to assume. For one thing, you typically find that strongly worded postmodernist manifestos in this area end up quietly backing off into a "weaker" position that looks for all the world like complex modernism itself. Secondly, the problems involved here are taxing, but few theorists of the anti-modernist sort take enough conceptual trouble over them. For example, you might not want a bar of objectivism, but I don't know anyone who's happy with subjectivism, or with the notion that our scholarly work, which of course has political and ideological touchstones, simply *follows* those commitments. You might not like the idea of some kind of necessary cross-situational social logic, and prefer the idea of radical contingency and situated experience, but a moment's reflection shows that pure contingency cannot actually be theorised, nor can situatedness be articulated without reference to higher-level generalities. Or you might not like the idea of reductionism, but show me an interesting explanatory thought that isn't reductionist in some way, except when it's a secondary complexification of some bold reductive gambit. So I maintain that "post-positivism" represents a qualification and expansion of traditional notions of realism, objectivism, explanation, and so on, not their rejection/replacement. Where "reflexivity", which is becoming tedious otherwise, comes in, is to register that in putting together a typically sociological account of something, the prevailing style of reasoning is a matter of analytical values rather than a logically necessary mode of appraisal: a matter of believing that *explanation* is quite a good thing, as opposed to mere description; that theorising and substantiating something can for some purposes be better than just invoking it; that seeing the social world and all its bits as having a certain developmental and functional logic may not be

the final answer to everything, or the only way of seeing, but it's still mightily intriguing and beats a meta-theory of infinite dis-location if we want to understand certain kinds of things about people's lives.

Question

Can you say something about the challenges that post-colonial theory offers sociology. We are particularly interested here in the charge that sociology is hopelessly Eurocentric, in the "battle for the soul" of post-colonial theory, and in the impasse that you have identified in post-colonial thinking.

McLennan

To me, the accusation of "Eurocentrism!" made against sociology is important, but it's more complex and difficult than many post-colonial critics make out. On the one hand, quite obviously, sociology is a creation of modern Europe, and many of its basic categories and ambitions do reflect this. In one sense, there is nothing problematic about this: all ideas come from some area and some era. The stronger position is that in speaking of big things like society, progress, history, knowledge etc, and in striving to speak in some kind of "objective" or "universal" way, sociology actually imposes its own cultural values, and the Western ways of life they secure, on everyone else.

Now there is something about this that must be right, and as such it represents a fundamental challenge to sociological understanding. Indeed, it has to be a basic proposition of *sociology itself* that ideas are embedded in ways of life and group interests, so how can this not also apply to sociological ideas? But you can already see here the difficulty emerging: it is only through sociological insight that sociology can be challenged; and it is only if the critical reflection on sociology's pseudo-objectivity is itself in some sense "objective" that the whole argument gets off the ground. So there simply can't be a one-line resolution to the issue, or a one-line condemnation of sociology as Eurocentric in that sense. That being so, it would be altogether abject for the sociologist just to writhe around beneath the pin of anti-Eurocentric polemic saying, right, you've got me there, I'm so awful, all those other post-colonial knowledges are so much better and worthy and emancipatory than I, so just let's have done with it and sign me up for a

subjectivity alteration workshop. Better to ask, when the charge of Eurocentrism is in play: what, *exactly*, is the nature of the claim in question, and what rhetorical shape do the post-colonial critiques themselves take (for example, they are sometimes mechanistically reductionist and debilitatingly moralistic).

Take contemporary historical sociology as a little module for these matters. If you look at people like Gellner and John Hall, they're on the more explicitly Eurocentric side, arguing for the civilisational virtues of certain aspects of western modernity within a renewed "rise of the west" problematic. But the difference between them and imperialist apologists of old, is that they're perfectly open about this value-stance, and actually make some pretty robust points in that mould – for example, that the current emphases on reflexivity and self-criticism are unthinkable outside the intellectual pluralism of the western liberal tradition itself. Now, if you actually recognise your particular value-stance and situational base, is that a confirmation of Eurocentrism (in the bad sense) or an escape from it?

Post-colonial discourse, in my view, doesn't really answer this question satisfactorily, because it oscillates between two senses of "Eurocentrism", the first being a conspiratorial ruling ideology of western supremicism, the second invoking a much vaguer cultural atmosphere which no one can avoid – that's culture for you – but which takes many different forms and reaches variable levels of self-saturation. The problem with post-colonialist polemics against sociology is that it is only the first meaning which carries any serious damage, and no sociologist these days can be found exemplifying it. Indeed, people like Mann and Runciman in historical sociology – no postcolonials, they – provide strenuous accounts of historical development in general and the specificity of the west in particular that are strictly and explicitly incompatible with classical "westernist" teleology. Yet you still hear rather crass complaints about historical sociology being unilinear, evolutionist, progressivist, etc. Here I would simply say that until we sort out a credible theory of ideology and culture, which we're a long way from currently, it's not even clear what's really at stake in the Eurocentrism issue. Above all, we've got to avoid a version of what the philosophers call the genetic fallacy: that knowing something about the social origins and formation of ideas tells us all we want to know about

their validity and fruitfulness.

Question

Cultural studies has, of course, attempted to provide answers to questions of ideology and culture. As a graduate of the CCCS, how do you view the present shape of cultural studies and its contribution to our understanding of the operation of discursive formations. Can you also say something about the particular ways in which – border wars aside – cultural studies and sociology can inform each other.

McLennan

Well, first of all I'd want to say that there is quite a lot of substance on this question in a recent special issue of *New Zealand Sociology*! My own approach to the cultural studies/sociology interface has three dimensions. One dimension is really hard for us to get past, in circumstances where, like it or not, jobs and professional self-esteem matter. This is the "rivalry" scenario between sociology and cultural studies whereby, in a marketplace battle for students, each discourse tries to outdo the other. Sociology is thus presented as boring, old, modernist, rationalist, unreconstructed, etc. from the cultural studies side; whilst sociologists point out the shallowness, the ephemerality, the lack of depth (because sociologists said all these things before cultural studies came bouncing into the world) etc. etc. of cultural studies. I have to say that probably because I'm supposed to have been "professing" sociology for the past twelve years or so, I'm much more appreciative of the sociology side of this diatribe than I was as a graduate student at Birmingham's CCCS (though CCCS was in many ways more "sociological" than subsequent variants of cultural studies). I do think that cultural studies, under the guise of being heavily "theoretical", has in fact been rather descriptive and hortatory. What passes for "theory" is sometimes pretty thin, taking the form of assertions and moralism rather than argument and strenuous concept-formation. There has also been a fairly alarming set of contradictions at the heart of the growth of cultural studies as an academic industry: the head-over-heels disciplinisation of a supposedly inter- or even anti-disciplinary subject; a tight and elitist circuit of people and conferences all in the name of radical open plurality, and so on. And, as is clear in my other answers to questions, I genuinely think that

the virtues and values of sociology are both substantial, and anyway cannot be dispensed with, even were we to raze all sociology departments in universities to the ground. But of course, there's also a simple element of jealousy coming in here: sociologists just resent their own ageing and cultural studies' popularity.

Beyond all that, the second dimension is to try to say that progress can be made if we go back to emphasising, not the rhetoric of disciplines as such, but substantive and ideological stances in critical social science. As soon as you do this, it turns out that quite a lot of the folks who stick up for disciplinary sociology, or who are formally members of sociology departments, are not actually "trained" in sociology at all (I'm a case in point, and more than half of my current department did not do undergraduate sociology); meanwhile many of the personnel in cultural studies, and the ongoing projects they conduct, are manifestly sociological in a general sense. In spite of logistical and cultural pressure to retain a strong sense of disciplines (there's a good book by Andrew Abbott on all this: *The chaos of disciplines*), the proper umbrella for all of us, I think, is something like "the critical human sciences", deliberately harking back to neo-Kantian times, when there was a richness of discussion around science, interpretation and politics that still pretty much grasps where we are now. Within that, it should not be the labels "sociologist" or "cultural studies buff" that primarily defines us, but Marxist, post-feminist, social evolutionist, new realist criminologist, or whatever, and many of these tags will themselves overlap when the focus is on particular objects of enquiry. The third way in which I have thought about this, following Runciman's map of intellectual tasks in social science, has been to try to use the sociology/cultural studies polemic to try to explore further the very fabric of social understanding. So we could start by thinking, perhaps, that sociology's niche is in the production of social *explanation*, which is necessarily rather more painstaking, "structural", time-dependent, etc. than the more *engaged* and *descriptive* mode of cultural studies discourse. The point in cultural studies is to witness and express the self-understandings of our lives and times, to take issue, to raise provocations, etc. Then you could say that both styles of intellectual operation, and the modes of articulation within each, are bound to be somewhat different, but they are

essentially complementary and equally necessary. And, because we would be dealing with lower case typologies rather than reified ones, it then becomes a contingent question as to how much of what type of enquiry happens to be carried out in particular sociology or cultural studies academic departments. I like this approach, but unfortunately there are some problems here too. This is because it is genuinely difficult to construct and hold to a definitive explanation/description distinction. The work of explanation is not iron-clad, being necessarily provisional, governed by currently available materials and theories, and though not the *same* as simple expressions of ideological or discursive allegiance, undoubtedly connected to these. On the other side, description, narrative, depiction, evocation – call it what you will – requires implicit or explicit explanatory content to make any kind of coherent sense. Still, there's not a great deal of considered work in cultural studies around the logic, purpose and scope of enquiry in the human sciences, so even to try out a distinction that doesn't quite stick is good to think with, as Stuart Hall used to say.

Question

You have asserted that "Marx is back, and with good reason". But what precisely is still resonant in Marx and the Marxian tradition? There are, that is, various sophisticated attempts at salvaging a useable Marx/Marxism: Callinicos's obdurate Marxism; Laclau and Mouffe's attempt to save the Marxian spirit while putting the body to death; Jameson's defence of Marxian totalisation; Zizek's psychoanalytic post-Marxism; analytical Marxism; an ethical socialism following Heller, etc. Can you also comment on the troubled relationship between Marxism and sociology?

McLennan

Just on Marx himself, in a sense I think we've only just started the familiar business of taking this classic figure, and figuring out what, in terms of his intellectual achievement, is good and bad, beautiful and ugly in it. You can imagine this going on for centuries, a bit like Plato. This is because his thought has been so closely associated with practical historical movements and particular state regimes. Now that that link is broken, lots of interesting questions open up about Marx's very distinctive style of research, narrative and argument, his arresting metaphors, his personal vituperance and so

on. I certainly found some fresh aspects of Marx's explanatory style on looking back recently at the *Communist manifesto* and the *18th Brumaire.*

Also, Marx is of continuing interest in terms of our (perhaps suspect) need for a model of the exemplary intellectual. Marshall Berman, for example, rescued Marx's modernism from most of the customary "bad" images of modernism in the eyes of people who thought postmodernism was really new and exciting – often just by quoting Marx, the kinds of things he *said* – that in my view pretty much put an end to the rather second rate disputes of the time around modernism and postmodernism in social theory. And that's what a true classic, a true intellectual does for you: you just read her attentively, and you feel simultaneously inspired and rather humbled, conscious of your own academic posings and wooden box categories. Marx is of that stature, whether ultimately right or wrong about what has gone on in the last 200 years.

But thirdly, sociologists and others have been far too quick to say that Marx *was* "wrong" or outdated in what he had to say about society and politics. Certainly, the idea that he and so many Marxist activists held over the decades – both "orthodox" Marxists *and* all the various "real" or "left" alternatives – that the insights of Marxist theories of class and capitalism can be directly and unilaterally put into political practice via the agency of a centralised political party, was criminally mistaken. And one aspect of modernism that is irreversibly problematical now is the idea that whole societal groups – the working class, the people, progressive forces, women, blacks, etc. – can be "represented" in some essentialist or all-encompassing way at the political "level", whether the latter be in terms of bourgeois parliaments or assemblies of the masses. So the specifically political side of the inherited Marxist traditions of the "unity of theory and practice" is now impossible to sustain, and in many ways all the classic modernist conceptions of the political, of representation, of citizen homogeneity, of the nature of subjective life such that it can be channelled productively into legislative and regulative measures for radical change, have indeed been placed "under erasure". Here, people like Laclau, Zizek and Heller are saying interesting and important things, if often in an overblown way.

But this doesn't mean that the "basic" Marxist account of historical development and capitalist society is wrong, or even that a Marxist notion

of class and class politics/consciousness is unsustainable. Here is where the writers we've referred to, along with many other feminist and post-colonial theorists, seem to me either dissembling or – contrary to their "radical" claims – *conservatively* pluralistic. In many of the post-marxist writings, you tend to find between the lines, or at the end of the polemic, sentiments to the effect that, "of course", capitalism is still with us, that class is hugely important, and that we really cannot do without some kind of totalising understanding of our social situation. And then *no* acknowledgement follows that this fundamentally changes the *tenor* of the engagement with Marx, not to mention the substance. Or what happens is that some coherent "alternative" position is assumed to be on offer, and is assumed to be somehow progressive or "transgressive", yet often all this amounts to are jejune exhortations to "explore" the "intersections" or whatever amongst an endless list of contender identity-formers – ethnicity, gender, class, sexuality, ability, embodiment, subjectivity, Lacanian lacks, performativity, and so on. In a similar way, there is this uncritical and unfounded assumption around, for example, that "multiculturalism", in addition to usefully naming a condition or set of issues, represents some kind of new coherent platform, that it can have a truly "radical" or "critical" variant, that it is the place of the future even if only in the sense that it "unsettles" dominant mores and the supposed "desire" for "sameness", etc. Or in the realm of more specifically sociological theory, you find someone such as Castells mounting a big campaign for a certain kind of pluralistic analysis of the contemporary world, which is then gradually pulled together under the broad "new" totalising concept of the mode of information, and then, when we get beyond the mistiness of this couched in terms of "the space of flows", "real virtuality", or "timeless time", we find that the mode of information doesn't replace the mode of production (capitalism) but is actually the latest stage of capitalist organisation. In these kinds of cases, it seems to me, we have to be *against* pluralism, because pluralism often signals a lazy moral and intellectual condition, wide open to colonisation by tricksters and reactionaries. Marx remains the shining example of how to at least attempt to embrace plurality within a position that struggles to achieve integrity, in all senses of that important word.

Not only that. You can see in the review articles around Castells's work

(which I do admire in many ways, incidentally) that quite a few post-marxists are rediscovering their older inclinations to essentialism, given the relative lack of serious political economy in Castells's conspectus. So there is a definite recognition under way of Marx's incredibly powerful and in general terms quite accurate anatomy of capitalist growth, spread and dynamics. (If George Soros says this too, it must be right.) So you find many ostensibly non-Marxist sociologists talking about globalisation, agreeing that, "of course" the global formation is capitalist, we didn't need Marx to tell us that, etc. But actually, we did need Marx to tell us that, and sociologists of that ilk 30 or 40 years ago would simply not have been saying that "of course" the global formation is capitalist, that this brings on the risk of tremendous inequalities and exploitation, etc.

I even think that Marx's account of class formation and identity is still worth developing, though I accept that it leads to a slightly far-fetched view of political identification in the present day. To me, Marx included all workers by hand and brain in the collective labourer or broadly conceived "proletariat", and held that the resources for a new type of associative and non-exploitative society would be generated within that broad and diverse mass. Now if you take that view, as against narrow sociological views of class to do with manual labour or occupational categories, etc., then at the right sort of level of abstraction, you could say that the "working class" is growing, not shrinking, that those with a truly meaningful stake in capitalist organisation are few, and that the total sum of hardship, exploitation, frustration, alienation, stress, unhappiness, etc. is growing, at least relative to rising expectations, to the point where the economic and political systems of the capitalist mode of production might be unable to cope without significant transformation. Now I accept that built into this perspective are some sociologically implausible things: that surgeons, professors, consultants, and managers of enterprises should be seen as workers, and that there is at least some prospect for a vast range of people coming to regard their "interests" as lying in a common search for a more co-operative, democratic and life-enhancing way of producing and consuming what we need to go on. On the other hand, this kind of prospect is not completely out of the question, given the very real struggles of many middle class people to retain their relative affluence and respectability, the quite

widespread discontent with the nasty side of individualized and demoralised consumption, the disaffection with official politics, and so on. And if you take class experience and commonality at this level, the idea that it stands somehow in contradiction to other sociological aspects of identity and experience (gender, ethnicity, etc.) doesn't hold up. What I would say, though, is that there is an important tension between the politics of interests and commonality on the one hand, and a politics of identity and difference on the other, and that the former needs now to prevail over the latter.

Overall, I think we have to say that Marxism *is* a sociology, and does contribute in a central way to the sociological project of understanding the logic of social relations in any particular epoch and across epochs. So I guess part of my recent inclination to defend aspects of sociology as a pursuit is that this is one way of defending the continuation of a broad Marxism. But clearly there are (productive and interesting) tensions. When Marxism gets too epochal, or too reductionist, or too normatively visionary, sociologists can offer descriptive (meso and micro) accounts of the different lived experiences and conditions of particular groups of people at particular points in time that will qualify or even puncture the grand narrative, and bring us crashing down the levels of abstraction. Equally, whilst Marxism and (macro) sociology do converge in requiring this totalising horizon of the logic of social systems, other sociological theories will present rival accounts of the nature and dynamics of social totalities. I don't really have a problem with any of this: intellectual pluralism is healthy and necessary – only on condition that we don't have pluralism as an *aim* as such. So it could well be that, like any important theoretical paradigm, Marxism's conditions of validity and realms of application will come to look strictly bounded from some future and more encompassing perspective. But that still doesn't mean that it is "dead".

Question

One of the features of contemporary manifestos aimed at renewing sociology has been an accent on the importance of political commitment for sociologists. For instance, Craig Calhoun has put forward a number of critical axioms for politically committed social theory. In a somewhat similar vein, Giddens's Third Way work

has become somewhat attached to the sociological enterprise. How do you feel about such strictures and such projects, and what roles and responsibilities do you view as central to intellectuals in the social sciences?

McLennan

I doubt whether the call to be politically involved as a sociologist is any louder than in the past; and I'm not sure that "political commitment" as such, at least in any traditional sense, is really at the heart of "critical social theory" and similar labels. Often, the "critical" in critical social theory is rather consciousness-centred, individualised or subculturally specific, and sometimes pretty bland on the whole: be reflexive, question dominant assumptions, remember that power is probably operating, even in the highest realms of grand theory, and so on. But what are you supposed to do with this exactly? And how can we ever tell whether we have truly reflexively adjusted ourselves rather than carried on regardless, but with a new presentation of self? Anyway, the idea that reflexivity is critical does weave in with Bauman's notion that we've moved from being arrogant legislators to humble interpreters. But as with other of Bauman's arresting contrasts, these self-images are maybe better thought of as co-existing rather than sequential. You could say that it's precisely the role and the ordeal of the intellectual to be always crashing simplicity against complexity, big pictures and strong solutions against modest sketches and thoughtful deconstructions, at the level of the culture as a whole. When crass simplicity is in command, intellectuals want to show their subtlety and sense of imaginative alternatives; when insurmountable complexity and pluralism are the order of the day, the intellectual's duty is to seek a resonant big statement that cuts through the tangles. Of course, you don't have to be a sociologist to be an intellectual, nor be some kind of public intellectual just because you're a sociologist, but given that intellectuals usually seek to have something distinctive to say about "the logic of the social" or "our present condition", there's quite an intimate connection.

Over the last 20 years, the social and intellectual ravages of neo-liberalism have re-awakened the impulse in critical social theorists to take up the soapbox again. And in very different ways of course. Most of them have moved (back) slightly to the Left, but along a wide scale of radicalism:

Giddens's social democratic Third Way, Habermas's deliberative democracy, Rorty's Deweyian progressivism, Touraine's misleadingly tame-sounding "two and a half way", Bourdieu's eloquent tirades against the new misery/weight of the world, and on to the "new Internationale" of Derrida, Negri's protean Multitude, and so on. It's all quite invigorating – the role of humble interpreter only lasts so long, I guess – at least for the men, who feel compelled to be loud.

But two things at least seem slightly different about this resumption of a loud and active stance. First of all, whatever one thinks about Tony Giddens's Third Way – personally, I think it shows that the category of "ideology" has not yet outlived its usefulness – he has acutely pointed out that we live in an increasingly "sociologised society". Maybe one of the ironic successes of sociology is that no one knows what is special about it any more, and that it is done more outside, than inside, the academy. So sociologised discourses are everywhere – in journalism, in the counselling industry, on citizens' radio, in schools, in the tidal waves of popular *chat* that are washing over contemporary experience (Talk Society, we might say, is as important a phenomenon as Risk Society). This means that how one operates as a sociological intellectual, who one is speaking to and for, are quite difficult issues resulting in highly varied sites and strategies. Secondly, although grand themes and slightly grandiose self-images have made a comeback, the way in which ideas *work* and *travel* in contemporary society remains intriguing, politically as well as sociologically. What kind of idea, for example, is the Third Way itself, how does it work, and what is it for? What kind of "alternative" ideas are around, and how would they have to operate to be successful? Rather basic, but unresolved, questions. Again to cite Tom Osborne, who I've been working with on this kind of issue, we seem to be in a world not of "oracular" or "ocular" ideas, but of "vehicular" ideas: messages and images that take us short distances from A to B for particular purposes. It's not that these are necessarily good or bad, but that we have to be quite careful about them and their supposed "critical" purchase. For example, you might not be too enamoured with the Third Way, but plenty of "critical" theorists seem to like some variety of "multiculturalism" or "cosmopolitanism", which themselves are vehicular in character, i.e. apparently useful and mobilising, especially for

certain kinds of professional groups, but seeming to fall apart when you try to identify just what, analytically or normatively, merits the "ism" in such cases.

Shortly before his death, Bourdieu raged against some of these new pseudo-progressive, quite moralistic orthodoxies, dubbing them the "new planetary vulgate", and I go along with much of this. I also admire the Bourdieu version of the sociological intellectual. Obviously, there are serious dangers of the "legislator" kind here, but the politics of truth, after all, is to do with the (search for the) truth and not just the negotiation of personal opinion. Also, in spite of much talk of things "beyond humanism", the sociological intellectual cannot be other than in the Progress game, at least as a horizon.

Papers by Gregor McLennan drawn upon in this discussion:

(1996). Post-Marxism and the "four sins" of modernist theorizing. *New Left Review 218*, July / August.

(1997). Sociology and cultural studies: Rhetorics of disciplinary identity. *History of the Human Sciences 11*(3).

(1998). *Fin de Sociologie?* The dilemmas of multidimensional social theory. *New Left Review, 230.*

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Reviews

Making social science matter:
Why social inquiry fails and how it can succeed again
Flyvbjerg, B. (2001). Sampson, S. (trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

The emergence of social theory
Robb, J.H. (2001). Wellington: J.H. Robb.

Reviewed by Catherine Brennan

Flyvbjerg's *Making social science matter* is written against the background of the contemporary "Science Wars" being fought out between the natural sciences and the social sciences over what constitutes "scientific" knowledge. This war over "who" or "what" can occupy the territory of "science" has been ongoing for over a century now. For instance, the *Methodenstreit*, a battle fought over the status of the human sciences, bitterly divided German scholars at the end of the nineteenth century. In this respect, Flyvbjerg's book represents a thought-provoking, insightful and timely contribution to the ongoing debate over the nature of science. The methodological issues tackled by Flyvbjerg are presented to the reader in an accessible and graceful prose. Flyvbjerg's book could be aptly described as a manifesto for what he calls a phronetic social science. He develops a conception of social science grounded in a contemporary interpretation of the Aristotelian concept of *phronesis*, usually translated as prudence or practical wisdom.

The kernel of the argument in Part I of the book (consisting of four chapters) prepares the ground for Flyvbjerg's conceptualisation of a phronetic social science in Part II (consisting of seven chapters). It is Flyvbjerg's contention that the social sciences have been unable and probably will never be in a position to develop the type of explanatory theory that distinguishes the natural sciences. He deconstructs the ideal scientific theory (*episteme*) which must be: *explicit*, that is, it must be comprehensible to any reasoning human being; *universal*, in that it must apply in all times and places; *abstract*, in the sense that reference to concrete

instances is not required; *discrete*, that is, developed with the assistance of context-independent elements which do not relate to human interests, traditions and so on; *systematic*, in that it must comprise a whole in which the various elements are linked to each other by rules or laws; *complete* and *predictive*. Bearing in mind that human activity is, ontologically speaking, quite distinct from natural processes, it cannot (contrary to those social scientists promoting the unified science ideal), according to Flyvbjerg, be reduced to a set of scientific rules/laws. What is more, any type of blueprint social engineering (*techne*) undertaken by social scientists to predict and control human activity is unacceptable.

Given the inexorable disenchantment of modern society, Flyvbjerg calls for a balancing of instrumental rationality with value rationality. It is precisely here, he contends, that social science rendered as *phronesis* can make its most fundamental contribution. The principal objective of a phronetic social science "is to carry out analyses and interpretations of the status of values and interests in society aimed at social commentary and social action, i.e. praxis" (p.60). The phronetic approach operating via a practical rationality based on judgment and experience, can contribute to modern society's capacity for value-rational deliberation (even if currently this is a society of means without ends) in concrete circumstances. This phronetic approach is the precondition for enlightened economic, cultural and political development. The point of departure for phronetic social research is summarised by Flyvbjerg in the following three value-rational questions: Where are we going?, Is this desirable?, and What should be done?

Flyvbjerg goes on to argue that in addition to these fundamental value-rational questions, the explicit consideration of the question of power must be integrated into the classic Aristotelian notion of *phronesis*. He stipulates that Foucault's analysis of power in modern society is the most appropriate since it focuses on "how" power is exercised in strategies and tactics in concrete situations. Hence, the pertinent fourth question anchoring phronetic social research is: Who gains, and who loses, by which mechanisms of power?

Finally, Flyvbjerg outlines the methodological guidelines for a phronetic social science based on his reading of Aristotle and Foucault: it focuses on

values; it places power strategies and tactics at the centre of analysis; it seeks to make social research relevant by grounding it in the context studied (using archives, annals, individual documents and so on) and, thereby, typically creates interest by outside parties in the research; it considers the "thick description" of micropractices more fundamental than the study of discourses in everyday situations; it frequently uses the case study and narrative analysis; it attempts in separate projects to incorporate both the analysis of structures and actors; and, finally, it fosters ongoing meaningful dialogue in context with no one voice, including that of the researcher, claiming final interpretative authority. When Flyvbjerg gives an overview of his research on the Aalborg Project in Denmark in Chapter 8, he demonstrates the effectiveness of this methodology.

In the course of developing his conceptualisation of a phronetic social science, universalism serves as Flyvbjerg's *bête noire*. It is his fundamental argument that the horns of the relativism-foundationalism dilemma can be avoided by contextualism *à la* Foucault. There is no sense in searching for formal structures with universal properties *à la* Habermas. Norms cannot be given a universal grounding independent of the very people espousing them in a socially and historically conditioned context. It necessarily follows that each society has its own "régime of truth" (Foucault 1980, p. 143). In other words, Flyvbjerg endorses Foucault's promotion of situational ethics since the only alternative is deemed to be ethical uniformity with utopian-totalitarian implications.

Contrary to Flyvbjerg, a phronetic social science grounded solely in contextualism is, in my view, not a sufficiently safe bulwark against relativism. What is being propounded here is moral conventionalism in the sense that the limits of one's social world amount to the limits of the moral domain as such. I would suggest that Benhabib's (1992) espousal of a post-Enlightenment universalism, what she understands as an "interactive universalism" (as opposed to a more formal universalism situated beyond historical and cultural contingency), offers a phronetic social science a much more secure defence against relativism.

Given the limits of space, all that can be said here is that Benhabib argues for a communicative ethics involving the generation of reasonable agreement about moral principles via the process of open-ended moral

discourse. Moral principles are the contingent achievement of an interactive form of rationality involving embodied and embedded agents who have the capacity for exercising an "enlarged mentality," meaning the ability to reason from concrete others' points of view. What is equally important is that moral discourse can only take place in light of the normative principles of universal moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity. These metanorms which we recognise as valid, if we engage in moral discourse, have been made possible by the culture of modernity in which the justification of norms and values and their reflective appraisal, has become a way of life (i.e., a historically self-conscious universalism).

Stated otherwise, communicative ethics involves the utopian projection of the good life that nurtures the norms of universal respect and egalitarian reciprocity. The modernist version of utopia promoting rationalist, totalitarian visions of social engineering is not at issue here. Rather, what Benhabib has in mind is the longing for that which is "not yet," the longing for the "wholly other." "Without such a regulative principle of hope, not only morality but also radical transformation is unthinkable" (Benhabib, 1992, p.229).

Like Flyvbjerg, then, Benhabib does not ignore the diverse historical and cultural contexts in which values are deliberated upon. On this view, every society has, indeed, its own "régime of truth". The crucial difference is that a historically self-conscious universality (apprehended in terms of universal moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity) is the regulative ideal against which all "régimes of truth" are evaluated. What is more, Benhabib's communicative ethics, located within the horizon of modernity, is not morally neutral because it does privilege a secular, universalist, reflexive culture which is potentially coextensive with all of humanity.

Robb's *The emergence of social theory* offers a general account of the history of sociological theory up to 1940. Most of the books published on the history of sociology focus on what are deemed to be key contributors to the development of sociological thought. Marx, Durkheim and Weber are usually regarded as the jewels in the crown of the sociological imagination. Robb takes a different approach in that he refers to many thinkers not often mentioned in histories of sociology. The book consists of fifteen chapters extending from an overview of the ideas of the Ancients and the

philosophers of the Middle Ages up to a summary of Parsons' ideas in the final chapter. The meticulous notes at the end of each chapter provide a point of entry into more advanced work on the various thinkers. The three kinds of sources used include: primary texts, the reviews and comments of the social thinkers' contemporaries, and the writings of those who have undertaken historical research on primary texts.

Robb's book will serve well as a good reference guide for undergraduates providing valuable background material on the history of sociological theory. Given the extensive range of thinkers and ideas covered, a final chapter summarising what the author understands as the primary issues would have been helpful, especially for undergraduates. Moreover, the use of subheadings in the various chapters would facilitate comprehension on the part of undergraduates.

The question of how to study the history of social science is continually a bone of contention amongst scholars. Robb, on my reading, champions the method of the "new historicists". In contrast to "presentism" which reconstructs the history of social science (and sociology) as a progressive movement towards the present (what is known as the Whig interpretation of history), historicist historiography in both its "old" and "new" forms advocates the study of the past on its own terms (see, e.g., Jones, 1977). The past must be understood as it understood itself. The "new historicists" also insist that it is necessary to recover a past author's intentions in order to fully understand the meaning of a historical text or set of ideas. Robb (p.4) concurs with this point of view.

The new historicism promotes a model of the interpretation of texts which is not wholly tenable (see Seidman, 1983). The intentionalist theory of textual meaning is predicated on the idea that the author has privileged access to his/her own intentions. Hence, the meaning of a historical text can be unravelled, once an author's intentions have been teased out. In this regard, Robb (p.4) asserts that it is not always easy to dredge out what authors of the past intended to disclose. The point, though, is that it cannot be assumed without further ado that past authors fully understood their intentions. What about unintended meanings conveyed by a past writer?

The historicist view that the past must be treated on its own terms is not wholly plausible either. To be sure, the text (and its author) must be

placed in the proper sociohistorical context. It is in this sense that historicists argue for a discontinuity between past and present. However, as Seidman (1983, p.84) rightly points out, historicists are guilty of objectivism because they assume that the values and interests of the interpreter of historical texts do not encroach upon their reconstruction of the past. Moreover, the past is treated as an object over against a knowing subject who collects facts about it from texts. In the course of reading Robb's history of sociological theory I did, indeed, think that I was being introduced to historical texts and ideas, "things in themselves," as it were, that did not touch the horizon of the writer (and my own horizon) in late modernity.

Gadamer's (1979) historical hermeneutics shatters the objectivist pretensions of historicism and, thereby, offers interpreters like Robb a more appropriate paradigm for the reading of historical texts. Gadamer's (pp. 267-274) "principle of effective-history" attests to the fact that interpretation is less a matter of understanding the past on its own terms than a dialogue between past and present. In the process of understanding a historical text what takes place is a continual mediation of past and present, a "real fusing of horizons" (p.273).

The interpreter is always historically located, he/she is always embedded in the "prejudices" ("prejudgments") of tradition. Or put another way: "True historical thinking must take account of its own historicality" (p. 267). Seen in this light, there is no "object in itself". A historical text or any ideational complex developed in the past, can only become an object of knowledge in relation to the present context and perspective of the interpreter. It is only possible to comprehend a historical text retroactively when the "prejudices" of the interpreter's horizon interact with the horizon of the text. It follows that each interpretation can in principle disclose something true about the historical text under consideration. On the other hand, Gadamer (1979) points out that the interpreter must be open to the claims of the text itself. For, after all, "a person trying to understand a text is prepared for it to tell him (*sic*) something" (p.238).

In view of the fact, then, that the historical text poses questions and responds to the interpreter's questions, Gadamer contends that the truth of a text does not, contrary to historicists like Robb, reside in an author's intentions, but rather in what is disclosed about the world through the

"real fusing of horizons". It is in this context that social thinkers like Marx, Weber and Durkheim have acquired "classical" status because their texts still bequeath valuable insights to us about our embeddedness in the past and our contemporary world.

In sum, Flyvbjerg's book is a valuable contribution to ongoing methodological debates within the social sciences. And the depth of knowledge of an extensive range of literature demonstrated in Robb's book, bears out the continuing relevance and vibrancy of the sociological tradition.

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Sociology Australia

Bessant, J., and Watts, R. (2002). (Sec. Ed.). Crow's Nest, NSW: Allen and Unwin

The life of Brian: Masculinities, sexualities and health in New Zealand

Worth, H., Paris, A., and Allen, L. (Eds.) (2002). Dunedin: University of Otago Press.

Reviewed by Allanah Ryan

The authors of *Sociology Australia* ask the question "why another sociology textbook?" A good question, given that the shelves of university libraries are already groaning under the weight of countless copies and editions of introductory sociology texts. Those of us who teach sociology in the Antipodes have for a long time had to rely on American and British texts (and in so doing find ourselves apologising to students for texts that draw on examples that are unfamiliar to them). It seems reasonable then to answer the question posed above in terms of providing "locally relevant" reflections on sociology for students who find themselves in this part of the world.

Bessant and Watts set out to "provide a guide to thinking about what it means to be living in Australia in a time of major change" (p.viii). They highlight the need for students to confront some hard thinking about where "we" (i.e. Australians) are now, and the kinds of choices that face "us" (i.e. "them"). As I write the previous sentence I am immediately aware that this is a book that is primarily addressed to Australian students and teachers of sociology. While the first part of the text traverses general sociological concerns (e.g. the history of the discipline, the process of modernisation, the different varieties of sociological thought, how to "do" sociology, issues of ethics and research), the rest of the book is couched in terms of being an Australian. Part Two of the text examines issues around "Identity" – sub-titled: "being yourself, being Australian." Here the authors discuss theories of the self, selves in families, issues of age, sex and gender, ethnic identity, nationalism and multiculturalism, and finally a chapter on health. In Part Three the authors explore Australian culture, politics and society in relation to processes of globalisation and social change. Here there are chapters on work, class, poverty, power, and the media.

So what is there here for the sociologist teaching New Zealand students?

In many respects the text does a good job for Australian students of situating sociology within a contemporary social setting. The connections between the local and the global are teased out in a more or less accessible fashion. But it is inescapably an Australian text. While there are parts of the book that might provide supplementary material for our students, unsurprisingly much of the discussion is couched in terms of Australian history, culture and politics. Therefore the examination of such things as ethnic relations and politics makes little sense in this country. This is not to say that the book is of no interest to the New Zealand teacher of sociology. For example I give the chapter on sex and gender to my stage one students to read because it provides a neat overview of some complex arguments around the social construction of gender and sexuality. It is one of the least "Australian-ified" chapters and interestingly there is nothing here to tell the reader how Australia's history and contemporary social relations shapes dominant expressions of gender and sexuality. The book could meet other needs too. For example it might be interesting to use the text in a comparative way to examine how Australia and New Zealand, while sharing so many aspects of colonial history and a similar place in the global economy, have developed quite different forms of culture, politics and social relations. Ultimately however the book does not serve the New Zealand market well and I look forward to the publication of more texts that place sociology in the local context.

The impetus for the book *The life of Brian: masculinities, sexuality and health in New Zealand* came from a conference held in Auckland in July 2000. The three editors have drawn together ten chapters that explore the various ways that masculinity is expressed and experienced in this country. While all of the contributions address masculinity there are only two chapters that also address both sexuality and health. Clive Aspin discusses issues of sexual health for gay Maori men and Steven McKernon addresses such concerns for heterosexual men. Issues around men's health more generally are examined by Anthony O'Connor in his chapter "Young pakeha men's conceptions of health, illness and health care". The intersection of masculinity and sexuality is explored in chapters by Terry O'Neill on gay-disabled masculinity, Annie Potts on the discursive construction of the "penis-self", Heather Worth on Maori and Pacific Queens and Louisa Allen

on young men's corporeal experiences of (hetero)sexual pleasure. Other aspects of masculinity are traversed in chapters by Bob Connell (globalisation and masculinity), Julie Park, Tamasailau Suaalii-Sauni, Melani Anae, Ieti Lima, Nite Fuamatu and Kirk Mariner (a late 20th century Auckland perspective on Samoan masculinity) and Richard Pringle's Foucauldian examination of his "youthful rugby experiences". The list of chapter titles indicates the wide variety of expressions of masculinities that are explored in the book. Indeed that is one of the stated aims of the editors – to examine how class, ethnicity, sexuality and culture intersect with masculinity and give shape to its diverse forms. The notion of some kind of homogeneous "Kiwi bloke" is seen as a construction based on nostalgia, and therefore limiting as a way of understanding contemporary expressions of masculinity.

The editors' introduction situates the study of New Zealand masculinities within a generally poststructuralist framework drawing on the work of such authors as Elizabeth Grosz, Judith Butler and Michel Foucault (while giving a passing nod to Bob Connell, whose paper "Masculinities and globalisation" was the key note address given at the original masculinities conference). A plea is made for rethinking the connections that have traditionally been made between bodies, gender and sexuality. The editors draw on a radical form of social constructionism which argues that there is no necessary connection to be made between any aspect of biology with any feature of gender or sexuality (this theme is developed further in Heather Worth's discussion of Maori and Pacific queens where "tits is just an accessory"). This constructionist orientation could be said to be hegemonic within contemporary social analysis of gender and sexuality. While there is much to be said in favour of social constructionist accounts when they draw our attention to problematic features of biological essentialism, there are various aspects of such an approach that make me wary, especially when dealing with issues of health and illness.

I am not convinced that radical forms of social constructionism around health are particularly helpful. There do seem to be some material and biological limits to gendered/sexed bodies. For example, HIV "load" does differ between different bodily fluids and even individuals. This is not an effect of discourse or performativity. Bodies that are diseased have needs

which require recognition of their biological processes (as well as social and cultural needs) so that pain, discomfort and even sometimes cure, might be effected. At the most general level much of the poststructural analysis offered in the book commits an "epistemic fallacy" by conflating the epistemological (statements about what is known) with the ontological (objects in the world). Simon Williams develops this critical realist point in relation to disease, but the points are just as relevant for issues of gender and sexuality more generally:

> Disease labels, [...] variable as they are, are merely *descriptive*, not *constitutive* of disease itself. [...] The body in short, diseased or otherwise, is a real entity, no matter what we call it or how we observe it. It also, like all other social and natural domains, has its own mind-independent generative structures and causal mechanisms. (Williams, 1999, p. 806)

This sort of approach is notable by its absence, not just in this book but in a great deal of current writing in New Zealand about gender, sexuality and health.

Nevertheless, Bob Connell's contribution to the book, and to the field of gender studies more generally could be seen as attempting something along the lines suggested by Williams. While Connell is not averse to a dash of constructionism himself, his analysis, particularly as it is developed in his paper about masculinities and globalisation, calls for forms of analysis that are more "structural" in nature. He asks those researching masculinity to place their analyses within a global context. Here more traditionally political and economic features of social structure are called on to help us understand how contemporary masculinities are taking shape. He also points out that this will necessitate using research methods other than those based on life-histories and ethnography if we are to understand the institutions and social relations shaping masculinities in a globalised world. Such a research agenda also places a variety of forms of hegemonic masculinity under scrutiny. Unfortunately there is little in *The life of Brian* that tells us about corporate or neo-liberal masculinities, or even men who are no longer young but are still powerful.

While there are inevitably gaps in an edited text, most of the chapters will genuinely be of interest to scholars in the field. It provides an excellent

snapshot of some of the work that is being done in this area and is a useful resource for student and academic alike. My beef with the book is a more general one directed against the sometimes uncritical poststructuralism that runs through contemporary gender and sexuality studies. Much could be gained by turning back to that slated concept of "the real."

Reference

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Gender: A sociological reader

Jackson, S., and Scott, S. (Eds.) (2000). London: Routledge.

Reviewed by Chris Brickell

I awaited the publication of *Gender: A sociological reader* with anticipation. Clearly this was to be a reader of scholarship on gender, but a reader which would encapsulate a specifically *sociological* approach. Whereas many other gender readers are either interdisciplinary or located within hybrid fields such as cultural studies, Jackson and Scott's volume addresses itself to the concerns of sociology. More accurately, perhaps, it provides a forum for elaborating the authors' particular vision for a specifically sociological scholarship on gender at this point in time. To this end the editors provide an introduction which chronologically surveys the theoretical developments within the sociology of gender. They depart from the common practice of surveying the significance of each chapter: this is an introduction to the field more than a presaging of the significance of the individual contributions.

According to this introduction, specifically sociological writings on gender adopt the following approaches. Gender involves a "real" division between "women" and "men", but this division is neither natural nor neutral. Instead, the division at all levels is an outcome of social processes, and these processes produce hierarchy, specifically the privileging of men, *qua* men, over women. This is not to say that women and men are monolithic unities, rather, they are better understood as variables which intersect with other forms of inequality around race, class, sexuality and so on. The authors argue convincingly for "middle range theories" which recognise the complexities of these interrelationships without overlooking the significance of the division between "women" and "men".

Jackson and Scott understand the processes through which hierarchies are held in place as neither static nor reified. Gender is embedded in social interactions and everyday practices, and the patterning of these is a crucial part of the reproduction of gender relations as they play out in particular cultures, histories and contexts. A sociological approach to gender involves

paying attention to the interrelationships between macro-social and micro-social processes. In order to underscore their discussion, the authors replace the holy trinity of socialist/liberal/radical feminism with three other typologies for studying gender: ethnomethodology, materialist feminism and poststructuralism. These express the concerns at hand: gender as a processual quality that is "done" in particular interactional settings; gender as an outcome of institutionalised hierarchy; and gender primarily as a cultural or discursive construct. The last is a focus of some contention: while gender is indeed instituted through discourse, the editors argue (quite rightly) that this approach must not prevail to the degree that it supplants considerations of materiality and social interaction.

Many of the book's chapters tie nicely back into the concerns of the ethnomethodological/materialist/poststructuralist typology, although the sections of the book are themselves organised by a number of other themes (knowledge, class, paid/unpaid work, intimate relationships, embodiment). There are many extraordinarily useful pieces in the collection. Candace West and Don Zimmerman's classic "Doing gender" weaves together micro-sociological understandings of gender as a process which we "do", and macro-sociological insights about "doing gender" being a matter of "doing power". This approach has proved useful and popular for teaching introductory sociology. Christine Delphy's "Rethinking sex and gender" is a compelling reassessment of the sex/gender distinction that is all the more convincing for the deft way it combines the importance of meaning-making, hierarchy and material circumstances. Chrys Ingraham's piece on "the heterosexual imaginary" is a closely worked-through account of the relationships between sexuality, heteronormativity and sex/gender.

David Morgan's "You, too, can have a body like mine" insists on the specificities of men's bodies in a way which embeds the discussion in a deconstruction of traditional binaries through which men are identified with rationality and public life and women with the body and private life. As well as a discussion of the ways that material and ideological factors construct bodies coterminously, Morgan's essay pays close attention to processes of individualisation within overarching social contexts. Other contributions include classics by Heidi Hartmann, Arlie Russell Hochschild, and Patricia Hill-Collins which are strangely underrepresented in gender

readers.

The one inclusion that had me particularly intrigued is an excerpt from Judith Butler's omnipresent *Gender Trouble*. What does this inclusion signify, given that in their other essays the editors critique Butler's work as insufficiently sociological (Jackson, 2000, pp. 101-2; Jackson and Scott, 2001, pp. 16-18)? Is Butler included as a example of how *not* to do a sociology of gender? Or, is she here because her influence on sociologists is undeniable, even though her work does not really address itself to the "sociological" concerns (viz. social interaction, or the adoption of "middle range theories") outlined in the editors' introduction? Things become a little more mysterious when the introduction suggests (p.18) that Butler derives insights from Monique Wittig's writing while emptying it of the materialist analysis that would render Butler's work more sociological. However, Wittig's work – the apparent link between Butler and sociology – is not included in the reader.

At the heart of all of this, of course, lies the question "what characterises a sociology of gender?", itself an expanded variant upon "what is sociology?" On the whole I agree with Jackson and Scott's answer to this question. A simultaneous attention to difference-as-division, social action and interaction, and the centrality of process within structures and everyday life – as well as the role of discourse – are central to the ways I envisage the specific contribution of sociology to the study of gender. But what if any given writer grants more weight to discourse or the intricacies of interactions, and less to inequalities or social structures – does that make them not a sociologist? Jackson (2000) has suggested that a "feminist sociology" offers a corrective to the cultural turn. But what of those who follow the cultural turn as sociologists? Does their writing belong in "a cultural studies reader" rather than "a sociological reader"? Can we say with any certainty what "a sociologist" is now? Could we ever? Could Judith Butler, even, "pass" as a sociologist?

It strikes me that Jackson and Scott are involved in a wider enterprise than may at first appear. At a time when sociology is still suffering from something of a crisis with respect to its identity and legitimacy, this collection takes the opportunity amid the confusion to assert one particular sociology as sociology itself. What is offered under the rubric of "sociology" is not an

uncontested consensus about what a sociology of gender "is", for there is no such thing. Rather, the particular sociology represented as sociology in general is an amalgam of interactionism and materialist feminism. Much as I agree with it, it is surely only one recipe for a sociology of gender. In the end, I suppose, whether such a universalising move constitutes sneakiness or cunning depends on one's point of view! At the same time (and perhaps somewhat contradictorily?), this is all very admirable. Here are two editors who have not only put together a most useful collection of writing, but who unashamedly assert sociology's crucial importance and make some bold claims on its behalf. Elsewhere, Jackson has asserted her "militant advocacy of sociology" (2000, p. 93). This collection certainly fits that bill.

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